People v. MathewsPeople v. Mathews
This court ordered the correction of a clerical error but otherwise affirmed the judgment on October 25, 2017. (People v. Mathews (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 601.) In December 2017, Mathews filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, contending that the matter should be remanded to the trial court in light of S.B. 620 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682). This legislation took effect on January 1, 2018, and vests sentencing courts with discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements, including the
Accordingly, we vacate our decision of October 25, 2017, and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion under amended
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shortly before 6:00 p.m. on the evening of September 21, 2013, the victim, a man in his early sixties, was walking in San Leandro with his grandson and their family dog. As the victim was throwing away some garbage, he noticed two men standing nearby. One of them, whose face was mostly covered, approached the victim and “tried to grab [the victim‘s] things.” The victim surrendered the contents of his pockets, which included $38, a phone card, and an identification card, and the man then struck the victim on the head with a gun and fled with his companion.
At around 5:50 p.m., a silver sedan was recorded dropping Mathews off at Highland Hospital in Oakland. The timing of some of the subsequent events at the hospital is unclear, and we discuss these timing issues in more detail when addressing Mathews‘s Fourth Amendment claim. Generally, however, Officer Keith Ballard-Geiger and Officer Pantoja of the San Leandro Police Department arrived at the hospital within minutes and made contact with Mathews in a trauma room. Officer Ballard-Geiger observed a perforation in Mathews‘s scrotum and a wound to his shin. The officer also searched a bag of Mathews‘s clothing, which included a pair of jeans with blood in the crotch area and a small, bloodstained hole in the shin area.
Officer Ballard-Geiger also seized some possessions of Mathews‘s, including a cell phone, that hospital staff had stored in a safe. A subsequent forensic examination of the phone demonstrated that it was used in the vicinity of the robbery to make a call at 5:40 p.m. and “traveled east from the location . . ., got on the freeway on [Highway] 580, traveled northbound, and terminated somewhere near Highland Hospital.”
Mathews was charged with one count of second degree robbery, with an accompanying allegation of a principal‘s personal use of a firearm, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of carrying a loaded firearm on one‘s person in a city.2 Before trial, he filed a motion under
The trial court sentenced Mathews to 13 years in prison, comprised of a term of three years for robbery and a consecutive term of ten years for the accompanying enhancement, a concurrent term of eight months for firearm possession by a felon, and a term of eight months, stayed, for carrying a loaded firearm on one‘s person in a city.3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Mathews Is Not Entitled to Relief on His Fourth Amendment Claim.
Mathews claims that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying the motion to suppress. We disagree. The motion was properly denied as to the cell phone and resulting evidence, and any error related to Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of Mathews‘s clothes and wounds was harmless.
1. Additional facts.
Officer Ballard-Geiger, who was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing, stated that at 5:44 p.m. on the day in question, he and Officer Pantoja were dispatched to the scene of the robbery after receiving a report of “a possible shooting.”4 Shortly after they arrived, dispatch reported that there were two possible male suspects and that “a shooting victim in a silver vehicle had possibly left the scene.” Dispatch also “advised [the officers] that there was a shooting victim . . . at Highland [Hospital],” and they were told to go there.
Meanwhile, Officer Ballard-Geiger called the patrol sergeant, who told him “that it looked like an armed robbery had actually occurred and that one of the suspects had possibly shot himself while fleeing the scene.” The officer went into a trauma room, where he was “directed . . . to the subject [who] had been brought in with the gunshot wounds,” whom he identified in court as Mathews. Mathews told the officer that “he got shot,” and he said his name was “Damari Johnson.”
Officer Ballard-Geiger observed Mathews‘s injuries, which included “a perforation to the right side of his scrotum” and what appeared to be “a graze wound to his lower right leg, his shin area.” The officer was able to see the injuries because either Mathews or a nurse moved a sheet that covered them. Hospital staff directed Officer Ballard-Geiger to a bag of clothing that Mathews was wearing when he arrived at the hospital. Officer Ballard-Geiger inspected the bag‘s contents, including a pair of jeans with blood on the crotch area and lower right pant leg, which also had a small hole in it. Officer Ballard-Geiger believed that Mathews “was possibly the person involved in the robbery, [and] that he might have shot himself.”
Officer Ballard-Geiger ran a record check on “Damari Johnson” at 6:33 p.m. The officer could not recall whether this occurred immediately after he got the name from Mathews, and he acknowledged that it could have been as long as 20 minutes later. At 6:36 p.m., Officer Ballard-Geiger was notified of a possible match, but he determined that the person was not Mathews based on the accompanying photograph.
At some point, Mathews was moved from the trauma room to a hospital hallway. There, Officer Ballard-Geiger questioned him further, and Mathews “told [the officer] his true name and date of birth.” Officer Ballard-Geiger ran a check on the name and learned
While Officer Ballard-Geiger was at the hospital, he recovered “a watch, some cash[,] and a cell phone” belonging to Mathews that hospital staff had placed in a safe. A hospital employee unlocked the safe and “gave [him] the items” after the officer did some paperwork. The officer was unable to recall, however, exactly when he seized this evidence. He testified that he retrieved these items sometime after Mathews was moved from the trauma room to the hallway. He also testified that he obtained the evidence after Mathews had told him that his name was “Damari Johnson.” But the officer‘s testimony was inconsistent as to whether he seized the items before or after he knew about Mathews‘s search condition, and he did not know whether the seizure was before or after he arrested Mathews.
Although Officer Ballard-Geiger recovered the cell phone at the hospital, he did not search the phone‘s contents at that time. Rather, during the ensuing investigation, Detective Brum turned on the phone, which revealed an image of Mathews on the screen saver and that the phone was serviced by Metro PCS. Detective Brum obtained search warrants for information about the phone, and Metro PCS provided information upon which a prosecution expert witness eventually relied in testifying that around the time of the robbery the phone traveled from the victim‘s neighborhood to the vicinity of Highland Hospital.
Mathews moved to suppress evidence obtained at the hospital and evidence that was attainable later only as a result of the seizure of the cell phone. The evidence obtained at the hospital was Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of Mathews‘s injuries and clothes and the phone. The evidence attainable as a result of the phone were screen
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Mathews argued that all of this evidence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because, among other reasons, Officer Ballard-Geiger was not aware of the search condition at the time he observed the clothing or wounds or seized the cell phone. The trial court found no such violation and denied the motion. Relying on Watkins, the court ruled that Mathews was estopped from seeking to suppress the evidence because “by giving a false name, . . . [Mathews] then precluded the officer, regardless of when the officer ran the check,” from discovering that Mathews was subject to a search condition. In addition, the court accepted Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s testimony that the officer “got the name Damari Johnson early on in his contact . . . and that he ran that [name].” The court observed that, had Mathews given Officer Ballard-Geiger his correct name in the first instance, “information would have come to light that would have changed everything in terms of how this thing unfolded.”
2. General legal standards.
We begin by discussing general Fourth Amendment principles. The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (
The applicable standards under which we review a trial court‘s order refusing to suppress evidence are well established. In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the disposition and defer to the court‘s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979 (Tully).) Any conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the court‘s order. (People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 529.) The court‘s ruling on
3. Mathews is estopped from challenging the admission of evidence derived from the cell phone‘s seizure.
In arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Mathews does not clearly distinguish among the various evidence he contends should have been suppressed: the cell phone and evidence derived from it, the clothing, and Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of his wounds. We first address his claim as it applies to the phone.
” ’ [O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search [or seizure] conducted pursuant to consent.’ ” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) Probationers who accept conditions of probation “may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches [or seizures] in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.” (Id. at pp. 674-675.) Usually, an officer must be aware of a search condition for it to justify proceeding without a warrant, and a search or seizure cannot be “undertaken for harassment or . . . for arbitrary or capricious reasons.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 610.)
In Watkins, the decision the trial court relied on to deny the motion to suppress, a police officer stopped the defendant‘s vehicle, and the defendant stated that he was on probation but falsely identified himself as his brother. (Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.) A record check of the brother‘s name did not reveal that the brother was subject to a search condition, but the officer nonetheless conducted a search and found contraband. (Ibid.) After his arrest, the defendant gave his true name, and a record check revealed that he “was on searchable probation.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that even though the officer was not aware of the search condition when he performed the search, the defendant was estopped from challenged the legality of the search as a probation search because he had concealed that he was subject to the condition by lying about his identity. (Id. at p. 1409.)
Contrary to Mathews‘s position otherwise, Myers does not conflict with Watkins. As Watkins itself observed in distinguishing Myers, although Myers concluded that the evidence should have been suppressed despite the defendant‘s misrepresentation about his parole status, the conclusion was reached because it was the officer‘s failure to perform a record check, not the misrepresentation, that prevented the officer from learning about the search condition. (Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410.) In contrast, in Watkins the officer performed a record check, but the “defendant‘s lie about his identity ensured that the . . . check would not disclose his probation search condition in time.” (Ibid.) Thus, nothing in Myers undermines Watkins‘s holding that a defendant can be estopped from challenging evidence obtained after a record check fails to reveal a search condition when the check was based on false information provided by the defendant.
We also reject Mathews‘s implication that Watkins is inconsistent with the exclusionary rule‘s goal of deterring police misconduct. It is true, as Mathews points out, that “the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule [is] to deter police misconduct,” and it
Having concluded that it is appropriate to follow Watkins, we turn to address its application in this case. Mathews argues that “[e]ven under Watkins, [Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s] actions violated” the Fourth Amendment. He claims that the evidence shows that Officer Ballard-Geiger did not run a record check on “Damari Johnson” until after seizing the cell phone, so it was the officer‘s failure to do a record check, not the provision of a false name, that prevented the officer from learning of the search condition.
We do not agree with either the trial court or Mathews about the relevant point in time after which a defendant who provides a false name to a police officer is estopped under Watkins from challenging the validity of a search or seizure. The court ruled that estoppel was triggered when Mathews gave a false name, and Mathews argues that it was triggered when Officer Ballard-Geiger ran the record check on “Damari Johnson.” We conclude, however, that estoppel is triggered when an officer receives the results from a record check based on a false name.
Contrary to Mathews‘s position otherwise, substantial evidence in the record shows that the seizure occurred after 6:36 p.m. In arguing that Officer Ballard-Geiger seized the cell phone before running a check on “Damari Johnson,” Mathews fails to recognize that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s ruling and resolve any conflicts in favor of that ruling. (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 979; People v. Limon, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) We acknowledge that the officer‘s testimony was inconsistent on the timing of some events at the hospital. He initially testified that he seized the phone based on the search condition, and he later indicated that he was unsure whether the seizure occurred before or after he knew about the condition. But throughout his testimony, he remained clear that he ran the check on “Damari Johnson” before he “took physical custody of the phone.” Because it is not reasonable to infer that Officer Ballard-Geiger obtained the phone from the safe during the two or three minutes it took for the results of the check to come back, this testimony is sufficient to establish that the phone was not seized until after the officer would have known about the search condition but for Mathews‘s dishonesty.6 Therefore, under
4. Any error in the failure to suppress Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of Mathews‘s clothes and wounds was harmless.
Initially, we note that Mathews does not argue that Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of Mathews‘s clothing and wounds led to the discovery of any other evidence that should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. (See People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 268.) Nor does Mathews suggest that, had these searches not occurred, probable cause for his arrest would have been lacking. Instead, his only argument for why Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of the clothing and wounds mattered is the cursory claim that “there was little evidence . . . [of] guilt” without this evidence and the evidence related to the cell phone.
The admission of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not reversible per se. Instead, if such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, reversal is not required. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1128-1129.) We conclude that Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of Mathews‘s injuries and clothes did not appreciably contribute to the verdict. Evidence independent of those observations was introduced that demonstrated that Mathews was admitted to the hospital for a gun injury and had been shot in the area of his groin and leg. In particular, Mathews‘s hospital medical records, the introduction of which Mathews does not contest on appeal, described the injuries. In light of this evidence, any error in the admission of Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s observations of Mathews‘s clothing and wounds was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Mathews next contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying his Pitchess motion. We are not persuaded.
Mathews‘s Pitchess motion sought “discovery as to prior acts of fabrication and/or misstatement of facts[,] . . . the fabrication of charges and/or evidence[,] and the authoring [of] or acquiescing to false or misleading police reports” by Officer Ballard-Geiger and Detective Brum. The motion also sought “discovery as to acts involving illegal search and seizure” by Officer Ballard-Geiger. The accompanying affidavit stated that the discovery was relevant for a motion to suppress and at trial because it bore on the credibility of both officers. In particular, the affidavit contended that the officers had intentionally created the false impression that the cell phone was recovered from Mathews‘s person incident to his arrest, not from the hospital safe, based on Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s statement in his report that he had “RECOVERED $464.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY, A BLACK LG CELL PHONE, AND A BLACK G-SHOCK WATCH THAT WAS FOUND IN [MATHEWS‘S] POSSESSION” and Detective Brum‘s statement in his report that “[T]HE CELL PHONE . . . WAS RECOVERED FROM MATHEWS DURING HIS ARREST.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
The trial court summarily denied the motion, concluding that Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s reference to the items being in Mathews‘s “possession” was not misleading. The court explained, “When at the hospital, the emergency personnel take his clothing and take his watch and his phone and his money, it‘s still his money. It‘s his stuff. It‘s in his possession. They‘re keeping it for safekeeping. . . . If he walks out of the hospital freely of his own accord, they‘re going to hand it back to him. It‘s in his possession. . . . [¶] I can‘t see that it‘s anything more than a semantic distinction. I don‘t find it to be material or deceptive. I don‘t find it to be an omission.”
To obtain discovery of an officer‘s personnel records, a defendant must file a motion that includes an affidavit establishing “good cause” for discovery of the records, “setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.” (
Mathews claims that the trial court “ignored” various points in reaching its ruling, but he does not clearly explain how this amounted to an abuse of discretion. He states
Mathews also claims that the trial court ignored his claim that the requested discovery was material to Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s credibility, but he does not explain his reasoning except to quote from his trial counsel‘s argument below that the officer‘s report contained a material misstatement. In any event, a defendant must “articulate how the discovery being sought . . . would impeach the officer‘s version of events” to make a showing of good cause (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021, italics added), not simply claim that the discovery might be useful to impeach the officer‘s general credibility. The court‘s ruling that further discovery was unwarranted was based on its determination that the wording of Officer Ballard-Geiger‘s report was not deceptive as to where the property was recovered—the only theory upon which Mathews argued that the officers had misrepresented what happened—and we cannot say that the court‘s interpretation of the reports constituted an abuse of discretion. In sum, Mathews fails to demonstrate any error in the court‘s summary denial of his Pitchess motion.
C. The Trial Court Correctly Calculated Presentence Credits.
Mathews also claims that the trial court incorrectly calculated his presentence custody and conduct credits. We disagree.
Mathews was arrested on September 21, 2013, and he was released on September 24, 2013, a total of four days in custody. He was then rearrested on
Mathews argues that he was actually entitled to 733 days of custody credits and 109 days of conduct credits, calculated at 15 percent of his custody credits. He bases this claim on the probation report‘s misstatement that he had spent 738 days in custody, a number apparently derived from the incorrect assumption that he was never released after his first arrest in September 2013. The probation report also shows, however, that he was in fact released later that September and rearrested that December. Thus, we agree with the Attorney General that the trial court correctly determined that Mathews was entitled to 648 days of custody credits (see
D. Remand Is Required for the Trial Court to Consider Whether to Strike or Dismiss the Firearm Enhancement.
Shortly before our prior decision in this case, the Legislature passed S.B. 620, which took effect on January 1 of this year. The legislation affected sentencing courts’ discretion to strike or dismiss various firearm enhancements, including the enhancement under
The Attorney General properly concedes that S.B. 620 applies retroactively to non-final judgments. (People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1090-1091; see also People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656.) He also does not oppose a remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement
III. DISPOSITION
Mathews‘s convictions are affirmed, but the case is remanded for the trial court to consider whether to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement imposed under
Humes, P.J.
We concur:
Margulies, J.
Banke, J.
Trial Judge: Hon. Kevin R. Murphy
Counsel for Defendant and Appellant: Hilda Scheib, First District Appellate Project
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey M. Lawrence, Senior Assistant Attorney General Sharon Wooden, Deputy Attorney General Dorian Jung, Deputy Attorney General