People v. MartinezPeople v. Martinez
—Appeal from a judgment of Chautauqua County Court (Ward, J.), entered March 13, 2000, convicting defendant after a jury trial of, inter alia, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of selling cocaine on two separate occasions to different
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court properly determined after a hearing outside the presence of the jury that notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 (1) (b) was not required with respect to the viewing of defendant’s photograph by one of the two deputies. The deputy viewed the photograph immediately before the first sale for the purpose of identifying the target of the investigation and then viewed the photograph immediately after the first sale for the purpose of confirming the identity of the person who sold him the cocaine (see People v Chavys,
Defendant further contends that, because he interposed an alibi defense, he was entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity. That alibi defense, however, is weak and unconvincing. Although defendant’s stepdaughter and wife testified concerning defendant’s general routine, they could not say where defendant was on the dates in question. In contrast, the People’s case rests on the unequivocal in-court identifications of defendant by the deputies, who separately purchased cocaine from defendant on consecutive days either at the doorway of defendant’s home or just outside it. Because of the weakness of the alibi defense and the strength of the People’s case, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order disclosure of the informant’s identity (see People v Lloyd,
Defendant’s further contention with respect to the court’s charge on reasonable doubt is not preserved for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Saunders,
Also without merit is the contention of defendant that he
We also conclude that the court’s Sandoval compromise was not an abuse of discretion (see People v Wheeler,