The People of the State of Colorado v. Kenny Lee Martinez
No. 24CA1501
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
February 12, 2026
2026COA7
Honorable Nikea T. Bland, Judge
Division VII. Opinion by JUDGE TOW. Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur.
February 12, 2026
2026COA7
No. 24CA1501, People v. Martinez — Criminal Procedure — Postconviction Remedies —
A division of the court of appeals concludes that the phrase “based on the pleadings” in
The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
City and County of Denver District Court No. 14CR564
Honorable Nikea T. Bland, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Kenny Lee Martinez,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur
Announced February 12, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Erin Wigglesworth, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶ 2 In this opinion, we clarify what a postconviction court may consider before determining that it is appropriate to deny a
¶ 3 Because the postconviction court properly considered the files and record of the case that were attached to or referenced by the parties’ briefing on the motion, and because we discern no other basis to disturb the court‘s order, we affirm.
I. Background
¶ 4 Based on allegations that Martinez assaulted his wife with a candlestick in front of her nine-year-old son and thirteen-year-old niece, a jury convicted him of second degree assault, two counts of
¶ 5 On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction. See People v. Martinez, (Colo. App. No. 15CA0473, Mar. 30, 2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶ 6 Martinez then moved for postconviction relief under
Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V)
¶ 7 Martinez contends that the postconviction court failed to apply the correct legal standard when denying his motion and supplement without a hearing. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 8 We review de novo a postconviction court‘s denial of a
¶ 9 We use principles of statutory construction when interpreting rules of procedure. People v. Smith, 2017 COA 12, ¶ 16. First, we read the language of the rule consistently with its plain and ordinary meaning, and if it is clear and unambiguous, we apply the rule as written unless doing so leads to an absurd result. People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70, ¶ 21.
B. Rule 35 Procedures
¶ 10 Rule 35 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure affords every person convicted of a crime the opportunity for postconviction
¶ 11 Martinez contends that the phrase “based on the pleadings” in
¶ 12 As noted, in a postconviction court‘s initial review of a Rule 35 motion, subsection (c)(3)(IV) plainly allows the court to consider “the motion and the files and record of the case.”
¶ 13 The central point of contention on this issue is whether the phrase “based on the pleadings” in
¶ 14 We first note that the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure define “pleadings” as “the indictment or information or complaint, or summons and complaint, and the pleas of guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, and nolo contendere.”
¶ 15 Martinez directs us to the Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. He argues that a court‘s denial of a motion under
¶ 16 Nevertheless, to the extent such an analogy is helpful, it works against Martinez‘s position. A court‘s consideration of the pleadings under
¶ 17 We are also unpersuaded by Martinez‘s reliance on Smith. In that case, the division said that pleadings “do not encompass attachments to the parties’ filings.” Smith, ¶ 17. However, the attachment at issue in Smith was an affidavit from the prosecutor‘s investigator — in other words, evidentiary material that was not already part of the existing record.
¶ 18 But the division in Smith proceeded to clarify:
We do not suggest that a party is precluded from attaching an exhibit to a pleading for the court‘s convenience or to corroborate factual assertions. But it is error for the court to render judgment on the pleadings based on
factual allegations that are outside the existing record in the case.
Id. at ¶ 19 n.2 (emphasis added). Thus, Smith plainly stands for the proposition that documents already in the existing record can be considered on a
¶ 19 Moreover, Martinez‘s strict reading of subsection (c)(3)(V)‘s “based on the pleadings” language would lead to an absurd result for three reasons.
¶ 20 First, Martinez‘s reading of the rule would allow litigants, intentionally or not, to assert facts in their briefs that are not supported by the record, given the court‘s inability to review the record itself to verify the factual assertion. By way of example, Martinez‘s appointed counsel asserted in the supplemental motion that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to a purportedly prejudicial statement on the serious bodily injury (SBI) form admitted as an exhibit at trial. In its response, the prosecution attached a copy of the original SBI form and the version of the SBI form that was admitted at trial, which showed that the statement had been redacted and was never provided to the jury. Under Martinez‘s reading of subsection (c)(3)(V), the court would not
¶ 21 Second, our de novo review of the summary denial of a
¶ 22 And finally, we cannot conceive of a logical reason why the parameters of review would shrink after all parties have had a full opportunity to present their positions to the court in writing. If, after thoughtful briefing from counsel on both sides of the issue, it is clear from the pleadings (and any reference to the record) that the defendant will be unable to prevail at a hearing, it would be absurd to require expending the parties’ and the court‘s resources to conduct a futile exercise of holding a hearing.
¶ 24 But what does the phrase “based on the pleadings” in subsection (c)(3)(V) mean? Is it merely a codification of the party presentation principle? See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.“). Is it nothing more than an acknowledgment that the court can decide the matter without a hearing if it finds that doing so is appropriate? Is the true gravamen of the sentence in subsection (c)(3)(V) that includes the phrase “based on the pleadings” that the hearing must be prompt? We leave these questions for another day.
¶ 25 On the circumstances before us, we need not decide the outer bounds of what the phrase “based on the pleadings” means. We decide only that when a party‘s briefing references or attaches a portion of the existing record, the postconviction court can consider it when determining whether a hearing is warranted.
¶ 27 The postconviction court‘s order relied only on the portions of the record cited in the parties’ pleadings — namely, the facts the parties incorporated by reference into their pleadings — or attached to their pleadings. For instance, the court referenced only the portions of the trial transcript that were cited in the prosecution‘s response when it found that Martinez‘s ineffective assistance claim regarding the warrantless search of his house lacked merit. The court also relied on the prosecution‘s citation to the SBI exhibit provided to the jury (which, as mentioned, was also attached to the prosecution‘s response) to reject Martinez‘s claim that a prejudicial, unredacted SBI form was admitted at trial. And the court rejected Martinez‘s claim that his counsel admitted ineffectiveness on the ground that his pleadings were “conclusory and [did] not have supporting details.” This finding did not rely on the record, although in resolving this claim, the court did speculate about what part of the record Martinez‘s allegation might be referencing. But in
¶ 28 Accordingly, because the portions of the transcript that the postconviction court considered were referenced by the parties in their pleadings and were part of the files and record of the case, the court did not err by relying on them in denying Martinez‘s motion without a hearing under
III. Request for Release of Juror Information
¶ 29 Next, we address and reject Martinez‘s claim that the postconviction court erred by denying his request for the release of juror information.
A. Additional Background
¶ 30 In May 2022, the postconviction court granted, in part, postconviction counsel‘s motion requesting juror information — namely, to allow access to a juror who had expressed hesitation about returning to deliberations. The motion alleged that, during deliberations, one of the jurors informed the court that she did not
¶ 31 The next month, Martinez‘s counsel alerted the postconviction court that counsel had received the juror‘s information and was “working to locate the correct person and to interview that person.” Counsel requested, and the court granted, an additional forty-five
¶ 32 In September, four months after the postconviction court‘s order granting access to the juror, postconviction counsel filed the supplemental postconviction motion. In it, counsel renewed her request for disclosure of additional juror contact information, noting that “[t]he defense investigator has located an out-of-state address for the juror and is still working to make contact.” The court noted that the motion did “not provide any further evidence regarding the alleged juror misconduct” and instead “merely restate[d] the argument from the prior Motion for Access to Juror Information.” Finding “no overt, objective coercion or misconduct by the jurors,” the court “err[ed] on the side of protecting juror[s‘] privacy” and denied counsel‘s request.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 33 We review for an abuse of discretion a court‘s denial of a request for juror contact information. People v. Bohl, 2018 COA 152, ¶ 16. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly
¶ 34 Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about “any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury‘s deliberations” or about “the effect of anything upon that juror‘s or any other juror‘s mind or emotions.” Likewise, a court may not receive a “juror‘s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror” concerning as much.
¶ 35 Nevertheless, Colorado courts recognize an exception to
C. Analysis
¶ 37 Martinez agrees that the record did not include evidence that the jurors engaged in overt coercive acts. Instead, he asserts that because the record did not rule out potential overt coercive acts that may have made the juror not want to return to deliberations the next day, the postconviction court‘s refusal to release additional
¶ 38 We are not persuaded that the postconviction court‘s ruling was an abuse of discretion. The court granted postconviction counsel‘s request to provide contact information for the juror central to this claim and agreed to consider the release of additional information “after investigation into [this juror].” The court also granted both of Martinez‘s counsel‘s subsequent requests for additional time to contact and interview the juror. Despite this, the supplemental motion did not provide the court with additional information beyond what had already been provided in the original motion. Moreover, without additional evidence of juror misconduct, the allegations set forth in Martinez‘s motion were too speculative to support disclosure of juror information. See Bohl, ¶ 22. Indeed, the juror returned the next day and continued to deliberate, and no jurors subsequently reported any misconduct to the court or the parties. See id. at ¶ 26. Also, Martinez agrees that there were never any reports of continuous violent, abusive, and profane language or threats of physical violence against this juror or any other juror. See Mollaun, 194 P.3d at 418. And a juror‘s distress, by itself, does
¶ 39 Therefore, given the lack of record evidence showing prejudice from jury misconduct, combined with
IV. Disposition
¶ 40 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.