THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACOB MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
NOS. 4-23-1512, 4-23-1513, 4-23-1514 cons.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
March 12, 2024
2024 IL App (4th) 231512-U
PRESIDING JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment. Justice Turner specially concurred.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County Nos. 22CF480, 23CF316, 23CF317 Honorable Frank R. Fuhr, Judge Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: (1) In an appeal from a pretrial detention order, arguments made in the notice of appeal but not in the memorandum (should the defendant choose to file one) are regarded as abandoned.
(2) Arguments made in the memorandum but not made with specificity in the notice of appeal are forfeited.
¶ 2 In these three cases, Rock Island County case Nos. 22-CF-480, 23-CF-316, and 23-CF-317 (our case Nos. 4-23-1514, 4-23-1512, and 4-23-1513, respectively), the circuit court granted amended petitions by the State to deny defendant, Jacob Martin, pretrial release. The denials were pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On September 18, 2023, the circuit court held a pretrial detention hearing, in which the prosecutor made a proffer regarding one of the three cases on appeal: case No. 22-CF-480 (our case No. 4-23-1514). Essentially, the proffer was that defendant was in a stolen vehicle, exited the vehicle and ran, threw clothing and a gun as he was running, and made an incriminating statement after the police caught him and arrested him.
¶ 5 After this proffer, defense counsel argued the prosecutor had come forward with no evidence that defendant was a real and present threat to anyone or to the community. The circuit court inquired if it could “take judicial notice of the facts [it] had learn[ed]” at the preliminary hearing in case Nos. 23-CF-316 (our case No. 4-23-1512) and 23-CF-317 (our case No. 4-23-1513). Defense counsel responded with a question of his own:
“So if you take judicial notice of those, you would take judicial notice of those in consideration as to whether or not he is to be detained on 480, which is detainable?
THE COURT: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object.
THE COURT: Well, that‘s what I‘m going to do.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
THE COURT: So, based on the facts that came in front of me at the preliminary hearings on those two *** as well as his history in the judicial
delinquency system which he was repeatedly sentenced to Department of Corrections, and he‘s continued to show absolutely not only no respect for law, but endangering the lives of the community particularly the lives of law enforcement. He needs to be detained. * * *
I‘ll detain him on 480 ***.”
¶ 6 The prosecutor then asked the circuit court, “Can I have it on the two more recent ones as well?“—that is, case Nos. 23-CF-316 and 23-CF-317. Defense counsel remarked, “I don‘t see any other detainable offenses.” The prosecutor rejoined, “They can be detainable if we can prove willful flight or dangerousness.” The court agreed that “[t]hey could be detainable on willful flight.” Defense counsel asked, “But was it alleged? Which ones?” The court said, “I will allow the State to amend [its] petition based on the facts as I determine them to be, which would show that he is not only a danger to the public but a threat to flight.” Defense counsel objected, and the court acknowledged that the amendment would be over defense counsel‘s objection. After the court admonished defendant on his right to appeal within 14 days, the hearing was adjourned. (We note that the 14-day period for appealing does not begin until the court enters its written detention order (see
¶ 7 After this first pretrial detention hearing, which turned out to be limited to case No. 22-CF-480, the State filed amended petitions for the denial of pretrial release in all three cases. The amended petitions were a change from the original petitions in that the amended petitions included an allegation that defendant was prone to willful flight.
A. Case No. 4-23-1512
¶ 10 In case No. 4-23-1512 (Rock Island County case No. 23-CF-316), the information was made up of four counts. Count I charged defendant with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (
¶ 11 On May 9, 2023, in a preliminary hearing (of which, as we have noted, the circuit court took judicial notice), Brett Buchen of the Rock Island Police Department testified substantially as follows. On March 16, 2023, in Rock Island, Illinois, at approximately 6:31 p.m., Rock Island police officer Alex Bowman reported that he saw a Honda traveling east on 11th Avenue at its intersection with 8th Street. The Honda was going fast, and Bowman knew that (1) the Honda had been reported stolen and (2) the Honda “had also been involved in numerous inciden[ts] of driving recklessly, swerving at officers both on foot and in squads and attempting to get officers to pursue that vehicle.” Bowman, who was in uniform and in a marked squad car, turned east onto 7th Avenue and saw the Honda now traveling west on that avenue, toward him.
¶ 12 Buchen continued:
“Officer Bowman said he was able to look over and see the driver of the vehicle, identified him as [defendant], who he knows from many previous encounters. He had a mask on that was only covering only from his lips down, and he was holding a cell phone up appearing to be possibly recording as he pulled up next to the side.
Officer Bowman said that the vehicle then started swerving at his car, trying to hit his car ***.”
¶ 13 The two vehicles turned west onto 12th Avenue, and Bowman turned off into an alley, allowing the Honda to continue west on 12th Avenue. When Bowman emerged from the alley and turned west onto 13th Avenue, a one-way street, he saw the Honda “sitting at 11th Street and 13th Avenue parked in the wrong lanes of travel[,] facing south[ ].” The Honda “then turned and came the wrong way down 13th Avenue and struck Bowman‘s car on the driver‘s side through to the bumper and then proceeded east[ ].” The resulting damage to the squad car was $4169.43.
¶ 14 Another police officer, who had been listening to the radio traffic, pursued the Honda. “[T]hat pursuit went through several parts of the city,” Buchen testified, “ultimately coming out on the Milan Beltway, speeds reaching over 100 miles an hour, when it was discontinued because they lost sight of the vehicle.” In fleeing the police in this high-speed chase, defendant ran 7 red lights and 13 stop signs.
¶ 15 On November 29, 2023, the State filed an amended petition for the denial of pretrial release. In its amended petition, the State alleged that the circuit court should deny pretrial release
¶ 16 In the pretrial detention hearing on November 30, 2023 (the second pretrial detention hearing), the proffer by the prosecutor was substantially the same as Buchen‘s testimony in the preliminary hearing—again, a hearing of which the circuit court had announced it would take judicial notice. The proffer made only two additions to the testimony that Buchen had given in the preliminary hearing. First, “defendant was on pretrial release in cases 22-CF-656, 22-CF-675, and 22-DV-190 and is charged with a new felony offense.” Second, “Officer Bowman spoke to Rodney Scott, who stated he observed the [sport utility vehicle] intentionally turn around and strike Officer Bowman‘s squad [car,] corroborating Bowman‘s version of the events.”
¶ 17 At the conclusion of this second detention hearing, the circuit court found as follows:
“23-CF-316, I find by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident and the presumption great that he committed the offense—the qualifying offenses, aggravated assault, a forcible felony. I also find by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of the public as well as the specific persons in our community who take the obligation to access [sic] police officers, and he has specifically endangered police officers with his actions not just
in this specific case, but in—repeatedly in other cases and his actions of fleeing and eluding. So he‘s a risk of flight and he‘s a danger. And once again, based on his history, the facts before me, the number of fending—pending felonies, his age, and his total disdain for any court orders or rule of law, I find that there are no conditions or series of conditions that could be imposed that would prevent him from endangering the public, police officers, or ensure his attendance at court.”
¶ 18 On November 30, 2023, the circuit court entered a written order for detention, which, in its caption, bore all three case numbers (22-CF-480, 23-CF-316, and 23-CF-317). For the following reasons, the order found that “less restrictive conditions would not assure safety of any person or persons or the community“:
“nature and circumstances of the offense
History and characteristic of offense
age of defendant.”
The order further found that “defendant pose[d] a real and present threat of willful flight” because of the “repeated flight of defendant from police.”
B. Case No. 4-23-1513
¶ 20 In case No. 4-23-1513 (Rock Island County case No. 23-CF-317), the information was made up of three counts. Count I charged defendant with the possession of a stolen motor vehicle (
¶ 21 In its amended petition for the denial of pretrial release, the State claimed that pretrial release should be denied because defendant was “charged with *** a felony offense other than a Class 4 offense” and “ha[d] a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.” See
¶ 22 In the preliminary hearing on May 9, 2023, Officer Buchen testified substantially as follows regarding this case. On March 17, 2023, at 8:09 p.m., Rock Island police officers Andrew Eagle and Zachary Costas were on patrol in a fully marked squad car. When stopped at an intersection, they saw a white Nissan Sentra pull up to the intersection. Costas was aware that the Nissan had been reported stolen. The police officers shone their spotlight on the driver of the Nissan and, from “multiple contacts with him,” recognized him as defendant. He was wearing a black jacket and black beanie, and he appeared to reach under the driver‘s seat. The police officers turned on the emergency lights and siren of their squad car. Defendant sped away, going west onto 21st Avenue, and Eagle and Costas pursued him. “[T]he speeds reached up to 135 miles an hour in the 70 mile an hour zone on I-280, [and defendant] and his vehicle were still pulling away from [the] officers.” Defendant “disregarded [three] stop signs *** during the pursuit on top of the speeds that were reached.” Eventually, the stolen Nissan was found in an alley behind defendant‘s mother‘s house, in the 500 block of 17th Avenue in East Moline. The police arrested defendant at that address. A day later, defendant‘s mother turned over the keys of the Nissan to the police.
¶ 24 At the conclusion of the pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court found as follows:
“23-CF-317, I find by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident and presumption great that [defendant] committed the qualifying offense. Based on flight, he‘s got a couple of felonies. He fled at 135 miles an hour down the Milan Beltway, a busy thoroughfare, endangering everyone that was on the road at the time. He had numerous pending felonies at the time. His repeated flight from the officers indicates, in my opinion, that that is an intentional conduct with a purpose to thwart the judicial process by preventing his apprehension.
I also find that in the court—recent appellate court rulings that we‘ve received so far, being out on bond under the prior law is considered a form of pretrial release. The new law—statute just eliminates the possibility of imposing as a condition of pretrial release the requirement that cash bond be posted. He was on pretrial release when these offenses were committed.
So for all those reasons, he is ordered to be detained. There are no conditions that could possibly provide for the safety of the public or ensure his attendance at court.”
C. Case No. 4-23-1514
¶ 26 In case No. 4-23-1514 (Rock Island County case No. 22-CF-480), the information was made up of two counts. Count I charged defendant with possession of a stolen motor vehicle
¶ 27 In its amended petition for the denial of pretrial release, the State claimed that not only was aggravated unlawful use of a weapon a detention-eligible offense (see
¶ 28 At the pretrial detention hearing of November 30, 2023, the prosecutor gave substantially the following proffer. On June 27, 2022, at 4:01 p.m., a police officer named Schroeder saw a Toyota Avalon that had been stolen from someone in Hampton, Illinois. The driver of the Toyota was “wearing dark clothing and a ski mask in broad daylight,” and “[t]here had been previous calls about the car driver driving recklessly.” Defendant got out of the Toyota and ran, “throwing clothing and a phone on to the ground while keeping something in his hand.” Chasing defendant on foot, Eagle caught up with him and tackled him. Defendant had on his person “the key fob of the stolen car.” A cell phone was on the ground.
¶ 29 The prosecutor continued:
“Sergeant Anderson found a gun laying on the ground at a different location. Defendant claims that he got the vehicle from a guy named Antonio Brown. He admitted to having the gun in the car and to throwing it. He state—he is wearing a
ski mask—he stated he was wearing a ski mask because people were trying to kill him. There was a bullet hole in the vehicle that was stolen. The defendant has no FOID card and no [CCL].”
¶ 30 The circuit court found as follows:
“So in 22-CF-480, I do find by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident and the presumption great that he committed the qualifying offense of unlawful use of a weapon, which is—carries a mandatory prison sentence for the dangerousness standard.
In light of the specific facts of the case as proffered, he was in the possession of a weapon and when he was stopped, he fled from the police, along with the very important fact that he later committed new offense while out on bond on that offense and repeatedly tried to avoid arrest and fled from the police in 23-CF-316 at over 100 miles an hour and 23-CF-317 over 135 miles an hour.
Also considering his history, his age, which he‘s 20, and the fact that he has shown a complete not just lack of respect for, but disdain for any law or court order, I find in that case he‘s not only a danger to the public but a risk of flight and that there are no reasonable conditions which could be imposed that would protect the public or ensure his attendance at court.”
¶ 31 At the conclusion of the hearing of November 30, 2023, after the circuit court announced its denial of pretrial release in all three cases, defense counsel said:
“MR. BREEDLOVE: [Defendant], I see you‘re raising your hand. I‘d advise you not to speak at this point. The judge has ruled. Anything that you say is
being recorded. The State could use it against you. We will be back tomorrow morning at 8:30 on your pretrial and I‘ll discuss whatever you need to discuss then. THE DEFENDANT: Breedlove, can I—can I please speak to you real quick, please?
MR. BREEDLOVE: Yes. But not in—not here with the prosecution and the judge. Okay? We‘ll speak tomorrow morning. Okay?”
Against the advice of defense counsel, defendant proceeded to argue, “[T]he Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment guarantees one‘s right to bear arms in public for self-defense.” Defense counsel interrupted defendant, telling him, “[T]his is something that you and I need to talk about. I know what you want to bring up. Now is not the—the time to bring it up. We will address it.” Defendant then accused defense counsel of rendering ineffective assistance, and he demanded that defense counsel be taken off his case—a demand the court refused.
¶ 32 The circuit court then admonished defendant on his right to appeal the pretrial detention order within 14 days. Defendant said:
“THE DEFENDANT: But, Breedlove—can I please make the appeal, Breedlove?
THE COURT: Wait. Wait. Wait. [Defendant.] Is there anything else you want to talk to him about right now?
THE DEFENDANT: Like, Breedlove, can you please talk to me now, please? Can you please come up here and talk to me right now?
MR. BREEDLOVE: I will—I will be filing your notice of appeal, but I can‘t—I am not going to come speak with you right now. We are set tomorrow morning at 8:30. I will speak with you in the morning.”
A. Abandonment of the Arguments in the Notices of Appeal
¶ 35 Defendant has filed a single memorandum, which he intends to be applicable to all three of these consolidated appeals. As we will explain below, he makes three arguments in his memorandum.
1. The Memorandum
¶ 37 First, the memorandum argues that, in case No. 4-23-1514 (Rock Island County case No. 22-CF-480),
¶ 38 Second, the memorandum argues that, in case No. 4-23-1512 (Rock Island County case No. 23-CF-316), it was unproven that aggravated assault (
¶ 39 Third, the memorandum argues that, in all three appeals, defendant was denied his right to counsel under the sixth amendment (
2. The Notice of Appeal in Case No. 4-23-1512
¶ 42 First, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged.” See
“The proffered testimony indicates that the pursu[ ]it was disregarded of the offending vehicle. The sole alleged identification comes from a police officer (Bowman) who alleges to have made it while the perpetrator was wearing a black face covering from his lips down, was holding a cell phone in front of his face and was while the perpetrator was swerving and driving wildly, and positioning the vehicle to strike officer Bowmans. The pursuit was not followed after vehicle speeds reached 100 mph, and there is no indication of any kind that the defendant was the perp that meets the states burden.”
¶ 43 Second, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case.” See
¶ 44 Third, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of
“The defendant poses no specific threat. The defendant could be placed on a [Global Positioning System] monitor, which can determine if the defendant ever exceeds a specified speed limit to ensure there are no car chases involving the defendant.”
¶ 45 Fourth, “[t]he court erred in its determination that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure the appearance of defendant for later hearings or prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” See
¶ 46 Fifth, on the explanation lines for “Other,” defendant makes the following additional arguments:
“In considering willful flight, the court erred in conflating willful flight from arrest with willful flight from prosecution. Here, there is no evidence the defendant would be a willful flight from prosecution, even assuming the defendant did commit the offenses as described in the proffer, the defendant would only have been fleeing arrest and apprehension, not prosecution.
The court considered evidence outside the scope of this case by conducting a combined hearing and entering a combined order on multiple charges at the same time.
The court used a ‘check-the-box’ form and the ‘nature and circumstances’ and ‘history and characteris[tics] in the 6.1(h)(1) section ignores legislative intent and law of this case for need of a detailed factual basis. Defendant was not on pretrial release as alleged in state‘s petitions.”
3. The Notice of Appeal in Case No. 4-23-1513
¶ 48 Defendant makes the following arguments in his notice of appeal in case No. 4-23-1513.
¶ 49 First, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged.” See
¶ 50 The second, third, fourth, and fifth arguments and accompanying explanations in case No. 4-23-1513 are identical to the second, third, fourth, and fifth arguments and accompanying explanations in case No. 4-23-1512.
4. The Notice of Appeal in Case No. 4-23-1514
¶ 52 Defendant makes the following arguments in his notice of appeal in case No. 4-23-1514.
¶ 53 First, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged.” See
“There are bullet holes in the vehicle and the defendant claims he was being shot at. Given that there may be an affirmative defense of necessity under the circumstances, the proof is not clear that he committed the alleged offense in either count I or count II.
In addition, the charge in Count II is unconstitutional.”
¶ 54 Second, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case.” See
¶ 55 Third, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case, or defendant‘s willful flight.” See
¶ 56 The fourth and fifth arguments and accompanying explanations in case No. 4-23-1514 are identical to the fourth and fifth arguments and accompanying explanations in case No. 4-23-1512.
¶ 57 On the authority of People v. Forthenberry, 2024 IL App (5th) 231002, ¶ 42, the State “maintains that, to the extent [that defendant‘s] memorandum makes different arguments from those in defendant‘s notices [of appeal], the arguments in defendant‘s notices are forfeited.” In Forthenberry, the Fifth District held, “[I]f a memorandum is filed, it will be the controlling document for issues or claims on appeal and we will not reference the notice of appeal to seek out
¶ 58 In People v. Rollins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230372, ¶ 22, the Second District followed Forthenberry, holding that if a nonjurisdictional issue is raised in the notice of appeal but is left out of the memorandum (should the defendant choose to file one), the issue will be regarded as abandoned. The Second District said, “We deem the filing of a memorandum to reflect that an appellant has elected to abandon any arguments that were raised in his or her notice of appeal but not also pursued in the memorandum.” Id.
¶ 59 In accordance with Rollins, we conclude that defendant has abandoned all arguments except the three arguments he makes in his memorandum.
B. Forfeiture of the Arguments in the Memorandum
¶ 61 Defendant‘s first argument in his memorandum pertains to case No. 4-23-1514. He argues that the statute defining the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (
¶ 63 The third argument in defendant‘s memorandum pertains to all three cases. He argues he was denied his right to counsel under the sixth amendment (
C. Explanation of Good Cause
¶ 65
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court‘s judgments in case Nos. 4-23-512, 4-23-1513, and 4-23-1514.
¶ 68 Affirmed.
¶ 69 JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring:
¶ 70 I agree with the majority we should affirm the trial court‘s judgment but write separately to note I would have found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in detaining defendant.