People v. Martin

Sep 1, 2026
C103252

The People charged defendant Deshayla Jattyanna Martin with arson of property and alleged a prior serious felony conviction. After the trial court denied her request for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, she pleaded no contest to unlawfully causing a fire to a structure and admitted the prior serious felony.1

On appeal, Martin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that she was unsuitable for pretrial diversion. She also asserts that remand is required for the trial court to consider the fines and fees that are reflected in the abstract of judgment but that were not orally imposed at sentencing. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in denying her request for diversion. We likewise see no basis on which to remand for further proceedings concerning fines and fees. We order correction of the abstract of judgment and sentencing minutes and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

According to the police reports submitted to the trial court, Martin‘s friend drove her to an abandoned residence to pick up her mail. At the residence, Martin and her boyfriend got into an altercation, and he was physically abusive. Martin returned to her friend‘s car, grabbed a torch, walked back to the house, and lit the grass in the front yard on fire. She returned to the car and left the scene. The flames burned an area of about 20 feet by 15 feet before it was extinguished by the Sacramento Fire Department.

The People charged Martin with arson of property (§ 451, subd. (d)) and alleged a prior serious felony conviction for first degree burglary (§§ 459, 667, subds. (d)-(i), 1170.12).

Martin moved for pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. Her motion attached an assessment by a mental health counselor, who diagnosed Martin with major depressive disorder, recurrent, with psychotic features; post-traumatic stress disorder; amphetamine-type substance use disorder; and cannabis use disorder. The counselor also noted that Martin had suffered trauma, abuse, and neglect as a child. The counselor concluded there was “concern of risk due to her past fire-setting behavior” and recommended “[m]oderate to high intensity services.”

The People opposed Martin‘s motion, arguing, among other things, that she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. The opposition attached exhibits, including a record of Martin‘s criminal history, law enforcement reports for the current arson charge, and police reports for her prior burglary offense. With regard to that offense, the victim told a responding officer that Martin kicked in the door of her house, went into the victim‘s bedroom, punched the victim in the face, told the victim that she “was going to kick [her] ass,” and left. A responding officer reported that the victim had blood dripping from her nose, which was “noticeably crooked” and appeared to be broken.

The trial court determined that Martin was eligible but not suitable for diversion. The court began its suitability analysis by stating: “The question … is, does she pose an unreasonable risk to public safety as defined in Penal Code section 1170.18 if treated in the community. Often referred to as super strikes by those who practice within the legal criminal law field.” In making that determination, the court explained that it could “consider both the opinions of both the prosecution and defense, the mental health expert‘s opinions, if provided, and her history of violence and criminal acts by the defendant, and the facts of the current case such as whether or not weapons were used, warning or lack of warning, or injury or lack of injury, the nature of the threats, if any.” The court observed that arsons can vary in severity, and for guidance, it looked to People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207 (Pacheco), which the court read as standing for the proposition that “some arsons can be so dangerous that … they put the community at risk … .” The court found that Martin‘s case presented such a risk. Martin used an incendiary device to ignite dry grass in the front yard of a reportedly abandoned residence and then “simply drove off while [the] fire was burning.” This was “not a situation” in which someone lit a small fire in a contained area. “This was starting a fire in front of a house on dry grass and then leaving the scene with making no effort or consideration as to what could occur from that fire.” Based on these facts, Martin‘s criminal record, and her history of violence, the court found that she posed “an unreasonable risk to public safety as defined in Section 1170.18 if treated in the [c]ommunity.” On that basis, the court denied her motion for diversion.

Martin later pleaded no contest to unlawfully causing a fire to a structure (§ 452, subd. (c)) and admitted the prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced her to 32 months in state prison (16 months doubled for the prior strike). In pronouncing sentence, the court did not impose any fines or fees. The abstract of judgment and minute order list a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $300 stayed parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).

Martin filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court granted her request for a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

I.

Martin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for mental health diversion and asks this court to remand for reconsideration of her suitability for diversion.

A.

To obtain pretrial mental health diversion, a defendant must show that he or she is both “eligible” and “suitable” for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b), (c) & (e); People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 859-860.) A defendant is “eligible” for diversion if he or she has been diagnosed with a mental disorder that “was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2).) Under the current statute, a defendant is “suitable” for diversion if the defendant‘s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment, the defendant consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial, the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, and the “defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).) Under section 1170.18, subdivision (c), an ” ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” Those violent felonies, commonly referred to as “super strikes,” include homicide, attempted homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, and any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the age of 14. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1150-1151.) In determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the trial court “may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant‘s treatment plan, the defendant‘s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

We review the trial court‘s decision to deny mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.) ” ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence [citation].’ ” (Ibid.) The fact that reasonable minds may differ as to the appropriate resolution of an issue does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 655.)

B.

Martin principally contends that the trial court committed legal error by failing to apply the proper standard to her diversion request. We perceive no such error in the court‘s ruling.

As noted above, the trial court expressly found that Martin posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18. That is the standard set forth in the statute. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Martin acknowledges that the court recited the correct statutory standard, but maintains that the court erred in failing to identify on the record the specific super strike she posed a risk of committing. We are unpersuaded, because the statute does not require the trial court to make such an express finding. (Ibid.; cf. People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1003 [reviewing trial court‘s implied finding that the defendant was reasonably likely to commit a super-strike offense if granted diversion].) Moreover, given the context of its comments on the varying degrees of arson and Martin‘s prior history involving violent crimes, the record permits the conclusion that the trial court found there was an unreasonable risk that Martin would commit murder—a super strike—if she again intentionally set a fire that caused an unintended death. (See Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 213; §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv), 189, subd. (a).) Martin‘s further observation that neither arson nor her prior convictions are super strikes is also unpersuasive. The question under the statute is whether, based on the facts of the current offense and other factors, a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike in the future. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4); Pacheco, at p. 213.) Such a risk may be present even when a defendant has not previously committed a super strike. (People v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [interpreting § 1170.18].)

Martin argues in passing that the trial court failed to address the legislative goals behind the diversion statute. (See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631 [diversion statute‘s purpose is ” ‘to promote … [¶] … [i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety,’ ” quoting § 1001.35, subd. (a)].) But “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) Here, we see no affirmative evidence in the record that the trial court misunderstood the Legislature‘s objective of promoting mental health diversion when it concluded Martin was not suitable for diversion.

Last, Martin contends that the trial court erroneously relied on Pacheco. In that case, the defendant, who suffered from schizophrenia and methamphetamine addiction, set fire to brush near a homeless encampment and a ranch, burning about three acres of land and prompting a major fire department response, including two helicopters and a specialized airplane. (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 209-210.) The defendant was charged with arson of forest land. (Id. at pp. 210-211.) A mental health expert opined that the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger if treated in the community as long as he took his antipsychotic medications and refrained from methamphetamine use; if the defendant failed to do these things, the expert opined, he was likely to reoffend. (Ibid.) The appellate court upheld the denial of diversion, noting the significant risk that the defendant would fail to comply with his treatment and again start a fire with “devastating effect.” (Id. at p. 214.) Thus, the trial court properly found the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Ibid.)

It is true, as Martin notes, that the arson in this case did not result in the same level of damage as in Pacheco, but Martin‘s conduct was no less dangerous. Martin started a grass fire outside of a residence and left. The trial court could reasonably conclude that such conduct “is rife with the probability of widespread property destruction and loss of life.” (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.) Further, while Martin is correct that her mental health assessment recommended a treatment program, that is not the same as a qualified mental health professional opining that Martin‘s symptoms would respond to treatment. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).) Indeed, such opinion appears to be absent from the record. Further, beyond the facts of the offense, Martin‘s criminal history includes instances of violence. As noted, in committing burglary, Martin kicked in the front door of the victim‘s residence, punched the victim‘s nose so hard that it became “noticeably crooked,” threatened to “kick [the victim‘s] ass,” and left. Martin‘s criminal history also includes a conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. Based on the facts of the current offense and Martin‘s criminal history, it was within the trial court‘s discretion to find that Martin posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, even if reasonable minds could differ on the question.

II.

Martin additionally contends that the case should be remanded for the trial court to address fines and fees. She notes that the court did not orally pronounce any fines or fees at sentencing, but the minute order and abstract of judgment reflect the imposition of a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $300 stayed parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). She claims this was error that should be corrected on remand, and the People agree.

We decline to remand the matter because no party objected to the trial court‘s failure to impose fines and fees at sentencing. All ” ‘claims involving the trial court‘s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ raised for the first time on appeal are not subject to review.” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) “[A]ppellate courts may not correct a ‘discretionary sentencing choice’ if the People failed to object at sentencing.” (People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1153.) A restitution fine under section 1202.4 is “a discretionary sentencing choice.” (People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303.) And “[b]y waiving any objection to the restitution fine, the People also effectively waive[] any objection to the parole revocation fine, because the parole revocation fine [must] match the restitution fine as a matter of law. [Citation].” (Smith, at p. 853, citing § 1202.45.) As to the court operations assessment (§ 1465.8) and the criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), neither party asserts that the trial court‘s failure to impose these fees was unauthorized (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [sentence is unauthorized if “it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case“]) or reflects an ” ‘obvious legal error[] at sentencing that [is] correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings’ ” (Talibdeen, at p. 1153; see People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30 [equal protection principles permit trial courts to waive fees under § 1465.8 and Gov. Code, § 70373, upon request, where defendant lacks ability to pay]). Absent such an argument, we decline to disturb the judgment.

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral imposition of sentence on the one hand and the minutes and abstract of judgment on the other, the oral judgment controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385, 387-389.) Here, because no fines or fees were imposed at sentencing, they must be stricken from the minute order and abstract of judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to delete the $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), the $300 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), the $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and the $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected minute order and abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/

FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/

HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/

MAURO, J.

Notes

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.