People v. MartesPeople v. Martes
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Goldberg
OPINION OF THE COURT
Joel M. Goldberg, J.The issue is whether an information is facially sufficient where the factual part only alleges that the defendant was observed “in possession of a quantity of crack/cocaine” without also stating how the defendant possessed it.
For the reasons stated herein, this court finds that there is an absence of factual allegations of an evidentiary character sufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant *1035committed the crime charged. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is granted.
FACTS
The defendant was originally charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (
In contrast, the complaint also contained ample factual statements supporting the officer’s conclusion that the substance possessed by the defendant was crack/cocaine. The officer’s conclusion, as phrased in the usual boilerplate language used in complaints, was based on: (1) his “professional training as a police officer in the identification of crack/cocaine and cocaine”; (2) his having “previously made arrests for the criminal possession of crack/cocaine and cocaine”; and (3) his “professional training and experience as a police officer” which made him “familiar with the common methods of packaging crack/cocaine[,] and the vials and tinfoils used to package the substance in this case is a commonly used method of packaging such substance.”
Following the defendant’s arraignment, the felony charge of possession with intent to sell was reduced to the misdemeanor of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (
Subsequently, the People filed a laboratory analysis report showing 15 vials containing a total of 16 grains of cocaine. This converted the complaint to an information. (See, People v Harvin, 126 Misc 2d 775 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1984].)
The defendant thereafter filed this motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency pursuant to
THE STATUTES
To be facially sufficient an information or misdemeanor *1036complaint (as well as a felony complaint) must “provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged”. (
As defined in
If no “facts or circumstances” are alleged in an accusatory instrument, it is impossible to make a “reasonable cause” determination in accordance with the statute.
An additional requirement for facial sufficiency is that the information or misdemeanor complaint (as well as a felony complaint) substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in
Turning to
These factual allegations must be verified. (
It is the People’s contention that their statutory burden is satisfied because the police officer signed a verified complaint asserting he personally observed the defendant “possess” crack/cocaine.
However, “possession” as defined by the Penal Law has two distinct meanings encompassing a variety of factual scenarios:
“Possess” means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property. (
A defendant may “possess” contraband if it is in his actual physical possession or if it is within his dominion and control and available for unlawful use if desired. (See, e.g., People v Robertson, 48 NY2d 993 [1980].) Where a defendant is alleged *1037to be holding the contraband, a finding of “possession” can readily be made. But where a defendant is not observed to be in actual physical possession, a finding of “constructive possession” must depend on an analysis of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Similarly, where defendants are jointly charged with possession the facts are critical, since it is unlikely that all defendants were simultaneously holding the contraband.
Further, with respect to cocaine, an inference of possession may, as a matter of law, arise from its presence together with the defendant or defendants in an automobile or in a room. (See,
Upon analysis it appears that a bare allegation that a defendant “possessed” cocaine is not an allegation “of an evidentiary character”, as required by
A finding of “reasonable cause to believe” that the defendant “possessed” cocaine cannot be made upon a bare allegation that the defendant “possessed” cocaine, just as a finding of “assault” cannot be made only upon an allegation that the defendant “assaulted” the complainant. Such findings properly may be made only after an examination of the “facts or circumstances” of the case. (
In contrast, a bare allegation of “possession” is appropriate for use in an indictment, because indictments are prohibited from containing allegations of an evidentiary nature. (See,
Since evidentiary allegations are prohibited in indictments and required in informations and complaints, the same lan*1038guage cannot satisfy both
Finally,
An information, under ordinary circumstances, need not allege facts to show that a defendant’s possession of cocaine is “unlawful”. (See,
Due to its nature as contraband, facts showing “possession” of narcotics will usually suffice to establish that such possession was “knowing”. (See, e.g., People v Reisman, 29 NY2d 278 [1971], cert denied 405 US 1041 [1972].) The required factual allegations to support this element may be minimal. (See, People v Miles, 64 NY2d 731 [1984].) Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where a defendant has narcotics under his apparent custody and control but is not in “knowing” possession, either because the amount is extremely small or the narcotics are actually out of the defendant’s sight. (People v Pippin, 16 AD2d 635 [1st Dept 1962]; People v Camacho, 47 AD2d 527 [2d Dept 1975].) Thus, where the court is presented with a factual vacuum, with regard to the element of “possession”, the element of “knowing” cannot be established.
DISCUSSION
A complaint or information must contain evidentiary facts showing the basis for conclusory statements. (People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986].) In fact, the Dumas holding is the basis for the use of the boilerplate language in the complaint in support of the arresting officer’s conclusion that the substance in this case was cocaine. The Dumas rationale likewise requires factual allegations to support the conclusory assertion that the defendant “knowingly possessed” cocaine.
As noted above, unlike an indictment, the evidentiary basis *1039for the charges must be stated on the face of an information or a complaint. (Compare,
Both types of accusatory instruments must sufficiently provide the defendant with fair warning of the offense charged to enable preparation for trial as well as state the offense charged with sufficient particularity to prevent multiple prosecutions for the same offense. (See, People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 594-595 [1978]; People v Harvin, 126 Misc 2d 775, 777, supra.) However, an information or complaint must also contain evidentiary facts, because, unlike an indictment, an information or complaint has no underlying Grand Jury minutes that can be inspected by the court to insure that the charges are adequately supported by evidentiary facts. (See,
An information or complaint serves as the basis for the court to determine if the defendant should be held to answer the charges. To hold a defendant, the court at arraignment must rely on the facts stated in the information or complaint to make a “probable cause” determination within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Williams v Ward, 845 F2d 374, 387 [2d Cir 1988].) Thus, holding a defendant to answer charges on an accusatory instrument that does not on its face establish probable cause, involves a violation of constitutional magnitude, as well as statutory rights. (Gerstein v Pugh, supra, at 114,123-125.)
Further, an information or complaint if facially sufficient may be used to obtain an arrest warrant. (
*1040The law places on the drafter of the charge the burden of persuading the court that there is a legally sufficient basis to hold the defendant. Where the charge is possession of cocaine, this burden cannot be met by simply alleging that the defendant was “in possession of cocaine”.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.