History
  • No items yet
midpage
People v. Marquez
692 P.2d 1089
Colo.
1984
Check Treatment

*1 Commission, Utilities

P.2d 577 Colorado, The PEOPLE of the State of Plaintiff-Appellee,

B. disagree

We also with Caldwell’sas supplementary hearing sertion that MARQUEZ, Wilfred Delano by conducted the commission to determine Defendant-Appellant. the cost of the disallowed advertisements violated this court’s order in No. Caldwell to 82SA307. propriety

reconsider advertising Supreme Colorado, Court of expenses “in already view the record En Banc. established.” Our remand Caldwell directed the Dec. existing commission to review the record findings respect and make factual propriety including advertising ex-

penditures rate-making expenses under

the commission’s standards. established remand,

On the commissionreexamined the determined, contrary

record and to its ini- decision,

tial number of advertise- categorized

ments could not be as rate-

making expenses. No new evidence with

respect to the nature of the advertisements categorization

or their was heard

commission, regarding and the decision

propriety of each advertisements properly solely based on the record as prior appeal.

it existed to the initial

Having determined which advertisements properly rate-making

were included as ex-

penses Caldwell, in accordance with

commission then acted within its broad au-

thority taking steps additional to deter-

mine the cost of the disallowed advertise- required

ments that were to be excluded

from the Public Service rate increase. procedure

Such a is consistent with the duty legislative agent

commission’s as a

investigate and determine matters that are state,

in the interest of the and was not an

improper expansion of our remand order in

Caldwell. Ohio and See Colorado Smelt- Refining

ing Company v. Public Commission, 68 Colo. 187 P.

Utilities remaining

We have considered the chal-

lenges asserted Caldwell and find them

to be without merit. judgment of the district court is

affirmed. *3 Woodard, Gen., Atty. B.

Duane Charles Howe, Atty. Gen., Can- Deputy Joel W. trick, Petrusak, Gen., M. Sol. Robert Asst. Gen., Denver, Atty. plaintiff-appellee. for Encinas, P.C., Alfred Duane Montano & Montano, Denver, defendant-appellant. ROYIRA, Justice: defendant, Marquez, Delano Wilfred appeals his conviction two counts of robbery,1 second-degree as- aggravated sault,2 and crime violence.3 *4 also found the defendant was an habitual criminal.4 We affirm.

I. robbery out charges The arose House Motel in Colorado the Palmer prosecution’s estab- Springs. The evidence approximately 2:30 a.m. on lished that at 6, 1980, July armed men entered the two auto- lobby of motel. One carried an pistol, 12-inch knife. matic attempted men their identi- Both conceal caps. stocking ties with bandanas de- gunman, as the The later identified fendant, Lewis, the motel’s forced James guard, sergeant security who was also a Office, County the El Paso Sheriff’s subsequently go to the front desk and into forced to lie a rear office. Lewis was then his to Lewis’ pistol With floor. head, wallet. gunman removed Lewis’ gunman began unsuccessful The then an weapons. search Lewis for Butler, Myrtle The other robber forced clerk, go front desk motel behind the drawer, ap- to the which contained cash traveler’s proximately and some $35 checks, Butler the safe. When and then to safe, she was taken to open could not Lewis, top thrown on the rear office and gunman fur- preventing from thereby Lewis searching ther Lewis. This enabled .38 gun, a caliber revolver. to conceal his (1978 16-11-309, Supp.). 18-4-302, 8 C.R.S. & 1983 §3. 1. 8 C.R.S. § (1983 16-13-101(1), Supp.). 18-3-203, (1978 Supp.). §4. 2. C.R.S. & 1983 § knife-wielding proceeding then raised his criminal plea robber because his guilty interpreted prepara- knife Lewis in tendered accordance with Fed.R. point, tion for attack. At that Lewis objection an Crim.P. Defendant’s overruled, drew revolver and fired. The knife- jury his subsequently found wielding collapsed robber on the floor. him to be an habitual criminal. office, the

From the corridor outside the office, gunman began using firing into the H. Two struck wall as shield. shots first contends arm, Butler—one the left the other jury procedure selection used in El Paso fire, leg. the left Lewis and one returned County requirements failed to meet the gunman’s struck his shots arm. 7(b)(2) Rule Jury Colorado Rules of gunman stepped doorway then into the and Selection and Service that such failure However, aimed a “death shot” Lewis. should and of itself be sufficient to re- first, gunman in hitting Lewis fired quire 7(b)(2) Rule reversal. states: gunman immediately chest. The fled the September No later than scene. year thereafter, each each chief judge later, ap- A time shall supplemental short determine which lists peared Hospital in Colora- at Saint Francis applicable available each Springs gunshot do wounds to his counties his district. The chief judge chest and arm. No bullet remained shall direct the commissioner *5 arm, lodged county bullet chest in acquire but the to the had each in his district to Although near except his shoulder blade. defend- these lists no later than October ( n ) shock, signs provided ant he had was conscious as otherwise in subsection emergency physician, (b), the room where a Dr. this so all section that master lists Blum, simple may integrated prior removed the bullet with a 1March thereafter, procedure. Shortly po- following year.5 (emphasis the two the supplied). lice officers who removal witnessed the (b)(4)provides: Subsection physician. obtained the bullet from participating For those counties in the by experts Tests firearm established that sys- jury centralized automated selection removed the defendant’s bullet from supervision tem under of the state chest was fired from the revolver used administrator, court and deadlines during robbery. Lewis procedures acquiring and transmit- prosecution’s ting pre- At the supplemental conclusion of lists shall be case, attempted present the defendant scribed the state court administrator. However, an alibi court defense. trial proceeding which followed the de- refused to submit the defendant’s tendered challenging jury fendant’s motion ar- jury on alibi instruction to the the basis ray, County jury he called an El Paso com- that the such defendant had not established missioner as a witness. testified She was then found defense. county began participating since above, referred of the crimes jury system central automated selection proceeded whereupon the trial court supervision under the state court phase habitual criminal of trial. administrator, understanding it was her alleged judge Count five of the information that the chief made no had determi- previously supplemental availability, been nor the defendant had nation of list jury acquired of bail such convicted of federal offense had commissioners jumping. con- that the The defendant claimed this lists. She also testified central city directory system viction could not be used the habitual automated used the 7(a). solely Supplemental registration 5. lists Master lists consist of voter C.R.J.S.S. additional available, except city county lists in each in those counties include directories where city which used source drivers’ and chauffeurs’ licenses. 7(b)(1). directories the main C.R.J.S.S. jury prior January of the master lists “if juror disqualified that no shall be and driver licenses registration voter satisfied, examination of from the testimony, the this On the basis lists. evidence, juror from other quash the informa- motion to impartial an verdict 24(c) juror] will render denied. was pursuant to Crim.P. [the according tion and the evidence sub- to the law court did not err find the trial We mitted to the at trial.” court’s the record denying motion because potential juror, Mrs. Wil- of the voir dire failed to demonstrates cox, enmity or bias toward the disclosed no requirements of Rule 7 that the establish e.g., People Meyer, defendant. See showing met. He made no not been had (Colo.1981)(prospective juror pat- P.2d 103 in the County’s participation that El Paso prejudgment ently demonstrated “a fixed “the deadlines comply system did case and an unwill- the merits of the- about transmit acquiring and procedures for principles ingness accept apply those prescribed ... ting supplemental lists [as] trial”); that form the bedrock of a fair There administrator.” by the state court (Colo. People, P.2d 1331 Morgan v. County that El Paso also no evidence 1981) ability willing- (juror doubted to, the state or that denied access following explana- apply ness to the law have access to did not court administrator principles general of law re- tions supplemental lists.6 garding presumption of innocence and silent). Here, the right to remain most III. manifested a that can be said is that Wilcox next contends that be- The defendant prose- misunderstanding of the role of the refusing trial court erred cause the during cution and the defense a criminal challenge potential to a grant his for cause dire, trial. After its extensive voir to exercise juror, needlessly he was forced juror trial court was satisfied the could challenges. peremptory Section one of his Moreover, impartial verdict. render an (1978),requires the 16-10-103(l)(j), 8 C.R.S. expressed willingness apply Wilcox challenge for cause trial court to sustain principles find no “man- proper of law. We “a of mind where there exists state *6 by judge the trial ifest abuse of discretion” evincing enmity or toward the juror bias denying challenge for cause which defense counsel’s defendant.” Under disturbing his decision on would warrant dire, that she juror stated skilled voir Abbott, See, e.g., People v. 690 review. set thought the case must be both sides of (Colo.1984);People Taggart, v. P.2d 1263 make a determina- forth before she could (Colo.1981); People 1375 v. 621 P.2d Thus, suggested it that such tion. is 538, 1320 McCrary, 190 Colo. 549 P.2d the defend- disposition would have biased (1976). presumption of inno- by nullifying the ant cence. IV. discounts the voir

The defendant argues Defendant next that the by trial court which dire conducted any light into evidence of the bullet re clarify or shed admission claims “did not testimony body from his and the juror’s that both sides moved upon the insistence attending personnel medical violated his forth.” We disa of the case must be set privilege.7 statutory physician-patient Be- 10—103(l)(j)also states gree. Section 16— inviolate; therefore, preserve it master wheel dence maintenance of the system person shall not be examined as a witness through is to be a centralized automated following by cases: supervised court administrator. the state C.RJ.S.S. 10. (d) surgeon, registered physician, or A (1973 13-90-107(l)(d), nurse, & 1983 practice profes- 7. Section duly authorized to pertinent part: Supp.) any pursuant reads in laws of this state or sion to the (1) state shall not be examined without particular in which relations There patient encourage as to information consent of his policy confi- it is the of the law to

1095 created, privilege statutorily cause it privileged.8 bullet was Even if the Community strictly must be construed. bullet could be considered “information” Court, Hospital v. Association District acquired by physician, we believe that 98, 100, 243, P.2d 194 Colo. 570 244 it physical once was removed it was a ob- “any privilege ject covers information ac- implicate any that did not testimonial quired attending patient, confidentiality patient which was between the and the necessary physician] him physician. enable [the § prescribe patient.” or act for the 13-90- It is also police uncontradicted that two 107(l)(d), (1973 Supp.). 6 & C.R.S. 1983 officers witnessed the removal of the bullet encompasses Information more than com- emergency in the room while pa- by munications statements made case, conscious. such no confiden- resulting tient but includes observations State, existed. See Green v. tiality 257 from examination. Colorado Fuel & Iron (1971) (admission Ind. 274 N.E.2d 267 Cummings, Colo.App. Co. v. 8 46 P. privilege of bullet not violative of when (1896) (privileged 875 information includes officer witnessed removal and testified examination). Yet, that acquired same); State, Doss Ind. 256 267 acquired necessary must be information for (removed (1971) N.E.2d 385 bullet not sub- physician prescribe to act for the ject privilege where sheriff re- observed patient it Hanlon privileged. to be same). Therefore, moval and testified to Woodhouse, 113 P.2d Colo. testimony the officers’ which laid the foun- (1945) (blood alcohol test results not neces- dation for the admission of the into bullet sary privileged); for treatment were not prohibited evidence privi- People, Cook v. P. 214 Colo. lege. (1915) (patient’s refusal to physician allow argues Defendant also tes bullet or tell him remove how wound timony of attending personnel medical was received was information not neces- physician-patient privilege. violated his treatment). sary for Both Dr. Blum and the nurse who treated the emergency area of St. statutory We have held Hospital Francis testified extent privilege applicable criminal cases. wounds, gunshot the defendant’s his treat People Reynolds, ment, and identification matters. Still, establishing burden jurisdictions privilege upon Those which have applicability rests propriety testimony examined the such Clark privilege. the claimant Court, (Colo.1983); primarily have focused whether in District Grissom, 502, 505, formation disclosed trial was confiden Nelson v. *7 bearing the 991, Among tial. factors The defendant has confi P.2d 993 dentiality parties are of the whether third applicability the failed to establish present testimony and whether the con privilege in this instance.

cerns verbal communications or informa respect through to the With admission of tion obtained or observation exam bullet, argues defendant-patient the that the ination. Where the oral acquired by bullet was ly physician itself “information” communicates to the informa attending nature, physician the which privilege enabled the tion a confidential the physician prescribe likely require to or act physician and therefore to exclusion of acquired necessary attending patient supports, the was the that bullet was obtained the prescribe physician, private party, to enable him to or act not the act of a who was patient for the .... acting agent police as an of the but out necessity. Benson, People See v. 176 medical Although suggests the defendant that bul- 421, (1971); People Colo. derson, 490 P.2d 1287 v. Hen- may product illegal let search, have been the of an 308, Colo.App. P.2d 38 559 1108 authority proposi- cites he no for such a found, tion. The trial court record

1096 personnel was concerning both medical limited to testimony such communica Decina, 2 133, People acquired through v. N.Y.2d information observation tions. (1956) 799, N.Y.S.2d 558 Blum nor N.E.2d 157 and examination. Neither 138 negligence op for criminal statement (prosecution any testified verbal nurse automobile), the court held that erating may have communication defendant phy required exclusion of the privilege circumstances, them. Under these made to concerning the defend testimony sician’s that we conclude the admission into evi- epilepsy which the history medical ant’s challenged the bullet and the testi- dence of physi to the had communicated defendant physi- not violate the defendant’s mony did also custody. See police cian while privilege. cian-patient (La.1980) Carter, v. 383 So.2d State de (doctor’s testimony inadmissible where V. doc gunshot wound told suffering fendant contends that The defendant officers, police tor, hearing of out of admitting weapon trial court erred from the wom had received his wounds he by Lewis and the bullet removed from fired However, robbed). physi where a he an grounds the defendant on Peo testimony limited information cian’s ple prove custody chain of failed through and examina observation obtained from the time the items were taken into likely tion, less to exclude privilege is they were custody until the time introduced concerning the defendant’s con testimony weapon Lewis evidence. identified readily to or dis is disclosed dition which night at the one on the trial as he fired and is present therefore cernible others robbery. He testified it further Thomas, v. State not confidential. See night was in the same as on the condition aff'd, (1954), 52, 356 U.S. Ariz. robbery. The bullet was admitted 885, (1958) 2 L.Ed.2d 78 S.Ct. through testimony of into evidence De testimony concerning the ex (physician’s Wedge, tective who identified bullet as severely cut hand tent of defendant’s removed from the defendant. one privi bandage was not identification Wedge that he saw the bullet re stated during present sheriff was leged where Blum, body by moved from defendant's acquired information treatment gave him the bullet. who later Under all); State “readily discernible” was cross-examination, Wedge admitted that he (1978) George, 223 Kan. had initialed the bullet but stated that opinion un (physician’s that defendant was identify he from its distinc could bullet alcohol, upon influence of based exami der here tive indentations. The record demon jail, infor privileged was because nation weapon that both re strates not “transmitted to mation so obtained was adequately were identified moved bullet through” present); officers who were sufficiently connected with the crime Broussard, Wash.App. State Fite, E.g., justify admission. (1974) testimony (physician’s con P.2d 1128 (Colo.1981) (bloodstained 761, 767 627 P.2d from cerning removal of bullet identified); Reynolds v. properly mattress by privilege where defendant not barred People, 172 Colo. hospi took him the told the officers who Washington (work sheets); (1970) shot and wanted bullet tal (1965) People, P.2d 735 un and where bullet visible removed *8 (weapon). skin). der the case, in this the Turning to the facts VI. the defendant was record establishes that We next turn to defendant’s con presence police in the of officers treated tention that there was insufficient evidence emergency gunshot He suffered the area. aggravated the two of to submit counts the chest were wounds to arm and robbery jury. prose the He claims the every- to readily apparent to and discernible Furthermore, testimony no evidence that the wal- cution introduced present. the one any money money.” let taken from Lewis contained the light When viewed the any or that it had value. He also asserts prosecution, most favorable to this evi- nothing of that value was taken from But- dence was more adequate than to enable a ler and she not of person the owner reasonable money conclude that anything taken from the motel office. Our presence. was taken from People Butler’s of examination the record Bartowsheski, 235, (Colo. discloses sub- v. 661 P.2d 1983); stantial and sufficient support evidence to Brassfield, 588, 652 P.2d jury’s People Bennett, (Colo.1982). verdict. 183 592 (1973). Colo. Defendant’s assertion that the evi 18-4-301, (1978), dence

Section failed to C.R.S. show Butler owned the mon provides ey person robbery that a commits taken from the motel is immaterial. defining The they knowingly “anything robbery provides where take statute of anything of person presence value from value taken from person of an presence” “or threats, force, of other” the use of another will suffice. § 18-4-301(1), (1978). 8 C.R.S. “anything intimidation. The term It is of val necessary to ue,” section, allege person that the as used from this “includes real property whom the is tangible taken was property, intangible the owner personal if it sufficiently appears allega from the property, action, rights, contract choses tions accused services, was not the any owner. rights enjoy of use or Hampton v. People, § 146 Colo. ment connected therewith.” 18-1- P.2d 864 Irrespective of where le 901(3)(r), The kind lies, gal title ownership may be properly of property robbery value taken in a prose person laid from physical pos whose People, cution immaterial. Maes v. property session the was taken. Id. We (1972) (defendant’s prosecution are also satisfied that the es robbery instruction that carries it a taking tablished of property “from petty lesser included of grand offenses presence” of Butler. improper theft because kind and value of property immaterial). gravamen VII. taking. offense the manner of the argues The defendant that the trial Sterling People, 151 Colo. (1962), refusing committed error denied, reversible cert. 373 U.S. instruct alibi. The (1963)(value defense S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d 699 following tendered immaterial); instruction wristwatch taken was Rowan judge: trial People, (1933) 26 P.2d 1066 (value gas taken from presented $49.81 station evidence this case has immaterial). raised the issue the affirmative de- fense prosecution, of alibi. The there- evidence, appropriately when fore, proving your has the burden of viewed, required the submission both beyond satisfaction a reasonable doubt of aggravated robbery counts jury. guilt of the Defendant as to that testified, Lewis and defendant does not dis- issue as well to all elements of pute, that his wallet was from him. taken If, the crimes charged. after considera- The fact that there was no evidence of tion of concerning all the evidence currency coin or in the wallet is of no defense, along affirmative with all of the consequence. personal The wallet itself is evidence, you are not convinced property supports infer- reasonable beyond guilt a reasonable doubt “thing ence that a of value” was taken Defendant, you then find must from Lewis. The evidence further shows guilty. Defendant not money kept and traveler’s checks were in the cash points drawer at motel. Butler The defendant the following going fight entitling testified that she was not evidence as him to the in- alibi *9 money mother, stepfa- had and told the robbers “here’s struction. The defendant’s they picked emergency room where the defendant ther, and brother testified ultimately arrested.” truck, had defendant up a to access, vicinity of the Las Animas in general rule is that an July on Royer intersection embodying theory the defendant’s struction hours p.m., approximately 40 6:30 given about must be if there is of the case support None of these witness- in the record it. Peo robbery. after the evidence Dillon, (Colo.1983); ple 655 P.2d v. at the whereabouts es knew defendant’s Tenorio, People Colo. trial also robbery. The of the time (1979); Truesdale, establish, testimony did not that their found (1976); People, Payne had exclusive use that the defendant A de truck. no is entitled to his instruction fendant addition,- introduced two defendant improbable or unreasonable matter how by prepared the Colo- “non-serious cards” be, may but must be borne contention “[i]t (the Department De- Springs rado Police mind that the contention referred cards records partment). Non-serious evidence, grounded upon must be one ex- by Department which indicate kept mere fanciful invention of counsel neither a received, investi- complaints are act times involving impossibility.” Payne nor one an Colo, require 240,132 no fur- gated, and determined at P.2d at 442. People, evidence and relied first card indicated that a None of the introduced action. The ther he 6, upon by the defendant indicates “that July a.m. complained at 2:32 on caller [by place specified than was at a bar, assaulted in a that a man was § 16-7-102, prosecution].” 8 C.R.S. where, officer was unknown Thus, theory was not Hospital emergency go to the Francis St. grounded upon evidence in record. We card showed that some- The second room. find in the trial court’s refusal to no error of Las Animas and one near the corner jury. submit the instruction to the thought they yelling then Royer heard nearby party 2:49 a.m. gunshots from a VIII. Department’s records custodian testi- also the lan Defendant attacks disposition code the second fied that ten guage complicity instruction investigating the officer card indicated that prosecution. Instruction No. by dered party gave warning. He fur- a verbal 14 read: if the officer had found ther testified that if it person guilty is offense is A an fired, gun then more action had been person committed another whom than a notation on a non-serious card would legally person he A is is accountable. taken, re- if not an actual case have been legally accountable for the behavior filed. was introduced port No evidence constituting a criminal offense another report- tying the to the incidents defendant if, promote intent to or facilitate with the ed on either card. offense, aids, he the commission abets, person in argues theo- or advises such other now that his planning committing the offense. ry of the that the he case was “wounds proximity received sustained close were concedes that the instruction Defendant indicated upon to his truck and the and 18- sections 18-1-601 based [first card] 1-603, (1978),9 report pattern Francis officer was St. 18-1-603, person legally Complicity. is C.R.S. 18-1-603. A 9. Sections 18-1-601 (1978), provide: principal behavior of accountable as for the constituting upon a criminal offense if with Liability another based behavior. 18-1-601. person promote or A of an offense if it is commit- the intent to facilitate the commis- offense, aids, abets, person for ted of another the behavior or advises sion of the provided legally which he accountable as person planning committing the other sections 18-1-602 to 18-1-607. the offense.

1099 or, alternative, complicity theory, in at the in instruction for use time the that ver- the however, urges, of trial.10 Defendant that designate dict form which manner of com- People terminology employed the exact in provided mission of the crime for basis Martin, v. 776 561 P.2d jury’s verdict. Both requests were de- (1977), though should have even been used nied. at no alternative instruction was tendered Ledman, In People v. (Colo. 622 P.2d 534 trial. The Martin court did outline the 1981), we held the culpability require that offense, complicity elements of did but attempted ments for aggravated robbery specific prescribe language not for a com- alternative, mutually exclusive, but not plicity previously We instruction.11 have contrary argument, and jury Ledman’s “basically complicity held that a instruction on instructions culpability alternative language may in statute” be specific elements of knowledge intent and R.V., People v. sufficient. 635 P.2d did not mutually characterize them as ex (Colo.1981).12 Here, in- complicity clusive. paralleled struction the statute was In People Taggart, an also sufficient. The submission such (Colo.1981), a before Led- decided week instruction did not constitute er- reversible man, acceptance we held that of a ror. general verdict guilty for child abuse did IX. deprive his right to a The defendant next contends that unanimous verdict where in- accept- submitting trial court erred in jury structed the the crime could be general ing guilty verdict of to the crime Her- in ways. Citing committed alternative aggravated robbery deprived and thus People, 23, 30, nandez right him of his ver- jury to a unanimous (1964), we reaffirmed the § 16-10-108, (1978); dict. 8 C.R.S. Crim.P. general principle that evidence of 23(a)(8) 31(a)(3). ways the alternative that a crime can be will support general committed verdict. jury The trial court instructed on addition, that, “[sjtate we general noted courts requirement of a ver- unanimous n consistently unanimity have held that aggravated robbery dict and that can required only respect ways, committed in two to the ultimate alternative one re- quiring specific intent, guilt of the other know- issue or innocence § See ing 18-4-302(l)(a) charged of the crime respect conduct. and not with -302(l)(b), The defendant to alternative means which the crime committed.” Taggart, objected to the latter instruction re- 621 P.2d at quested the prosecution choose one n. 5.13 pattern jury complicity complicity may

10. in instruction for with the en- instruction have People There, effect at the time of can be in jury trial found abled the to find the defendant on V., (Colo.1981). v. R. culpable “knowingly," the less mental state of jury on was instructed the elements of com underlying the mens rea substantive of- plicity in same words used Instruction fense of motor vehicle theft. 635 P.2d at 896. currently complicity 14. No. instruction The need such concern is absent in this case. use found at CJI-Crim. 6:04. Here, jury specific was instructed on intent. holding Martin was that trial court specially concurring opinion adopts the 13.The ruling principal erred that unless the analysis Gipson, set forth in United States charging named the count the defendant with Cir.1977). However, (5th rejected F.2d 453 we aggravated robbery principal, committed Taggart approach we when noted such defendant could not be considered as a subsequent principal Gipson complicity federal cases have found in- under statute. Colo, applicable 561 P.2d at 777. where on the "is instructed committing alternative methods of crime justices 12. Three be- dissented in R. V requirement of a unanimous verdict.” give they cause found the trial court’s refusal to defining the defendant’s tendered instructions "specific "intentionally intent” intent" *11 trate, the that district under seal of federal on

Here, instructed the was court, was the certified that the custodian ag the crime of ways alternative the two the the records. And committed, custodian of legal and robbery could gravated be court, seal, under certi- of that same clerk The must unanimous. verdict be that their duly was commis- magistrate the fied that aggravated requirements for culpability sioned, by and authorized law to qualified, mutually alternative, not but robbery are execute his certification. any establishing exclusive, and evidence general ver support a will one alternative contends that because Defendant addition, ample evidence there was dict. Facil of the Canon Correctional the warden on either or both support a verdict custodian, certify prison the ity not did committing Accord offense. ways of duly not authenticated. Exhibit was submis ingly, that the trial court’s we hold validity was of the federal records The general acceptance verdict of sion and trial questioned grounds. on similar right of his deprive the defendant did not judicial of fact that judge took notice to a unanimous verdict. Facility is located Correctional Canon County and he found that Fremont X. Institution was located Federal Correction of alleges a number next defendant magistrate presid district where portion during the criminal errors habitual magis of the ed. Both certifications Ex- argues People’s first that He of trial. Judge Lundquist the custodi and trate 21, copies his Colorado and of hibits 19 and legal are indeed the custodians ans were records, “duly not au- prison were federal validity. City of presumption to a entitled required by section 16—13— thenticated” Court, 184 Springs v. District Colorado of (1983 Both exhibits Supp.).14 Defendant 519 P.2d 325 Colo. proving defendant’s links in are essential pre this presented no to rebut evidence prior convictions. therefore, his sumption; claim “duly authenticated” records were not prison Colorado Exhibit defendant’s exercising their lawful that courts the basis a true cor- record, certified to be and was custodians, and not authority certified the of records at the copy rect the custodian officials, is without merit. corrections Lund- Facility. Judge Canon Correctional County Court certi- quist the Fremont argument additional Defendant’s offi- prison was the fied that the custodian the Colora copy judgment Finally, the cial of the records. custodian him of court which convicted do district Court, County under clerk the Fremont burglary properly certified also was court, certified that the seal of that claims because a merit. He without and judge duly commissioned authoriz- judgment was attached his copy of the to execute his certification. ed law record, County judge prison Fremont certify judgment which was prison able federal Exhibit court, thus circumvent of not rendered record, by the custodian was certified People, requirements of Brown v. ing Institu- Correction records at Federal (1951). The 238 P.2d 847 jurisdiction of the within the tion located prosecutor made no reveals that for the West- record District Court United States by entering magis- attempt to Brown circumvent Texas. A federal ern District of finger- 16-13-102, (1983 photographs pro- party. Supp.) Identification C.R.S. Section part of such prints that record vides: any judgments of convictions and former part provisions any under of this On trial part of the record of record or are court copy duly of the record authenticated party’s after sen- place incarceration of such any judgments of convictions and former tencing any convictions for of such former against of said crimes of record court prima evidence judgments be facie shall against shall party informed indicted or may party identity be used such such prima be convictions facie evidence against him. in evidence against may such used in evidence

HQl convicting judgment of the court this cannot be used in a subsequent criminal copy judgment, manner. A certified proceeding punishment to enhance under record, prison apart from the was offered the habitual criminal statute. Watkins v. during and admitted the habitual criminal People, (Colo.1982) (trial proceeding. has not at- explain failed to conspiracy elements of authenticity tacked the of this document. crime which was the alleged ob- *12 But see ject purpose or of conspiracy). XI. Leonard, People v. (Colo.1983) After information was (trial court’s dismissal of habitual criminal 2, 1980, September by adding amended on disapproved appeal counts was on where counts, prior felony alleging two convic pleas defendant’s voluntarily were and 1976, in filed tions 1971 and a made). understanding^ Federal convic- one criminal motion to dismiss habitual resulting tions pleas from defective of involving the offense of count15 federal guilty should likewise not be used in subse- jumping.16 argued that he had not bail He quent proceedings pun- criminal to enhance adequately and that no factu been advised ishment. plea guilty jumping al his to bail basis for providency hearing established at the was begin examining by We whether the fed- by required as Fed.R.Crim.P. II.17 De accepted eral district court which the de- fendant contends the trial court erred in plea properly fendant’s advised him the of plea finding was obtained charge nature of the of jumping. bail In in of the rule.18 violation assessing validity of the defendant’s guilty plea, guided by provisions we are previously This court has held that of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of prior resulting a state conviction from a Criminal constitutionally plea guilty plea defective of Procedure in effect at the time the 16-13-101(1), ¶5,000 (1983 Supp.) imprisoned 15. Section 8 C.R.S. not more than or not more provides: years, five than or both.... Every person any this convicted in state 17. If a attack a direct defendant demon- felony penalty pre- for which the maximum accepts strates that a federal district court a who, years scribed law exceeds five within guilty plea fully adhering without years ten of the date of the commission of 11, procedure provided for in Rule the de- offense, previously said has been twice con- plead McCarthy fendant is entitled to anew. brought upon charges separately victed tried, 459, States, United 394 U.S. 89 S.Ct. arising separate and distinct out (1969). purposes 22 L.Ed.2d 418 For episodes, criminal where, either in this state or else- however, opinion, of this the defendant’s suc- or, any felony aof under the laws of cessful collateral attack arising his earlier conviction state, States, any territory othér or United possibly plea guilty out aof defective States, subject jurisdiction the United only in an would bar use such conviction which, of a crime if committed within this proceeding. habitual criminal Watkins v. Peo- state, felony adjudged would be a be an shall (Colo.1983). ple, 655 P.2d 834 punished by habitual criminal shall facility in for a confinement a correctional impressed argu 18. We are not with defendant’s twenty-five years term of than nor not less felony jumping a in ment bail was not fifty years. than more plea Colorado at the time of defendant’s purposes It makes no difference for the of en jumping 16. The federal crime of bail is codified punishment previously hanced a committed pro- § U.S.C. 3150 Section 3150 felony felony crime is not a if it is a Colorado vides: where the had. Ren conviction was Whoever, having pursuant been released frow, willfully chapter, appear fails to before this any place time as well of a as commission shall, judicial required, or felony court officer as crime its under section determines status any security 16-13-101(1). a applicable ... incur forfeiture of Id. The section of the and, release, given pledged specifically provides was for his habitual offender statute shall, addition, (1) if he released con- that felonies “under the laws of ... the United charge felony, may punishment nection a or while States" form the basis for 16-13-101(1), awaiting pending appeal or certio- an (1983 § sentence or habitual offender. offense, Supp.). rari be fined after conviction Cir.), denied, 414 U.S. cert. provided In rule entered. (1973). In Eagle part: 38 L.Ed.2d

pertinent S.Ct. Thunder, the de 11 was met where Rule Before ac- (c) the Defendant. Advice to the crime of prosecuted for conten- fendant was nolo cepting plea deadly weapon, the trial dere, the defend- must address assault with the court inform open court and if he did willful personally ant asked of, he under- determine that ly, unlawfully him assault Mo knowingly, and stands, following: dangerous ses McBride with Anderson

(1) charge to which weapon, the defendant answered af the nature offered, mandatory min- plea firmatively. charge is more Where the law, if provided by any, penalty required. imum complicated, explanation is more pro- possible penalty and the maximum States, 508 F.2d Irizarry United by law.... vided (2d Cir.1974), charged the defendant was possess conspiracy and distribute purpose II.19 Fed.R.Crim.P. *13 charge the cocaine. That court held that “to assist rule is two-fold: [federal] identified,” making “fully was never the district the constitutional- judge in district explanation conspiracy that the defend- of required court’s limited ly determination truly voluntary” and “to guilty requirement not of plea ant’s did “meet the McCar time record at the produce complete a thy that the court determine defend relevant to plea is entered of factors ‘understanding of ant’s the essential ele ’ McCar- voluntariness determination.” of at ments the crime ... 394 U.S. 471 [89 459, 465, States, 394 89 U.S. thy 965, United 1173],” at 508 no S.Ct. F.2d at at 1166, 1170, (1969). 22 L.Ed.2d 418 S.Ct. acknowledge did that time the defendant charge he the nature of the nor understood in existing rule 1976 The federal understanding could such be inferred from procedure in which a particular no specified any of the defendant’s remarks. There understanding nature of the of fore, comply the district court did not with charge by the court. to be determined accepting guilty Rule 11 in the defendant’s by which the defendant’s “The method States, plea. Paradiso v. But see United charge understanding of the nature of (3d Cir.1973) (in prosecution F.2d 482 409 case, may vary case to from is determined possess conspiracy goods stolen from circum complexity of the depending on the commerce, precluded interstate court is not particular defendant.” stances and reading explaining na from indictment 11, Advisory Com Notes of Fed.R.Crim.P. charges of exercise ture should discre Rules. determina mittee on Criminal The determining expla upon tion when additional depends, part, complexity tion needed). In Majko nation v. United charged.20 Eagle Thunder v. of the crime Cir.1972), (8th States, States, 1326, (7th F.2d 1328 F.2d 790 477 457 United accepting readily requirement are not understandable without further that the court 19. charges aggra- plea properly explanation, advise the of the nature from those such charge always part a of the rule. robbery second-degree of the has been murder that vated original required rule the court to deter- easily average person understandable to a of plea that the was made with an “under- 37, mine Leonard, intelligence. People v. 39 standing charge and the the nature [of] 1377, Muniz, (Colo.1983); People v. P.2d 667 plea.” consequences Fed.R.Crim.P. (Colo.1983). Advisory on Criminal Notes of Committee Edwards, People 11(c)(1) version of contains Rules. current (1974), reading charge held that a we requirement that the defendant the additional explanation is sufficient of the substantive parole any special effect of understands "the guilty pleads a crime where the defendant term." charge aggravated robbery. Similarly, Gorniak, made a similar distinction in 20. This court has determining prior state convictions met (1979), whether reading charge a mere suffi- requirements have distin- Crim.P. 11. We the guished pleaded explanation where the defendant cient conspiracy charges such as those second-degree murder. the offense assault to rob where elements

H03 violating charged changes state adequate defendant was were more than to estab- That held lish that on a federal enclave. law understood na- “[r]eading asking jumping. indictment and ture bail defendant had whether a discussed next consider whether a factu We attorney charge satisfy does not plea al basis for the was established. A Similarly, McCarthy.” 457 F.2d judgment federal court “should enter a making prosecution for a false and ficti upon plea such making without such in statement to a licensed firearms deal tious quiry satisfy as shall it that is a there firearm, buy order it was held er plea.” factual basis for the Fed.R.Crim.P. accepted improperly the trial court 11(f). rule, sentencing Under “the reading guilty plea simply after the indict judge develop, record, must on the [also] coun asking ment to the defendant and if as, the factual plea, basis for the for exam United charges. explained sel had ple, by having the accused describe the Cody, (8th Cir.1971), States 438 F.2d gave charge.” conduct to the rise denied, cert. U.S. S.Ct. York, Santobello v. New 404 U.S. L.Ed.2d 303 S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 427 Although jumping the crime bail Defendant contends that no factual basis one, relatively simple our is a concern is developed on the record for the ele accepting the district court whether willfulness, the mens rea for bail ment plea properly the defendant’s determined argues jumping. He because at “understanding of the essential elements geographical tended a funeral within the *14 States, v. McCarthy United of crime.” appeared only limits of the bond and one 22 394 U.S. 89 S.Ct. late, day conduct not to his did rise test L.Ed.2d 418 Our has been level willfulness found those cases explanation whether the court’s is under which have examined willfulness under the person a of average to intelli standable E.g., United States jumping bail statute. Leonard, gence. People v. P.2d 37 673 Phillips, v. (5th Cir.1980) 625 F.2d 543 Muniz, (Colo.1983); P.2d 667 (willfulness found where defendant altered (Colo.1983). 1377 appearance his and was arrested three and case, In transcript appear); this one-half months after failure to Dorman, plea United States providency hearing discloses that 496 F.2d 438 denied, Cir.), any plea (4th not cert. agreement was the result of U.S. involving (1974) (willfulness the dismissal of more serious 42 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. charges. represented apprehended The defendant was was found where defendant appeared simultaneously beyond geographical counsel and limits of the bond persons pleaded two one approximately who to month after the failure Hall, charges. appear); court limit United States different did not to 346 F.2d denied, (2d cert. explanation charge Cir.), its to a mere 382 U.S. indictment, 250, 15 (1965) (willfulness reading began but S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 161 explaining charge changed as follows: “First found where defendant twice his all, 5,000 Marquez, you charge Mr. here on from jurisdic a name and fled miles tion). jumping, appear Although of bail failure to in court is defendant’s conduct to, you’re supposed distinguishable having, when thereto from found in these that fore, cases, you a say been let free on bond that we conduct not cannot his did appear.” proceeding, adequate Later in the would establish an factual basis to satis specifically fy the court asked the defendant district it ac federal court before arraign appear cepted plea. whether he failed to for his his The defendant admitted ment, willfully supposed he he was to he chose travel to a funeral whether knew to there, felony appearing not in court for a and whether he knew he was instead going charge he appear. responded to when he knew that was released required affirmatively to ex- bond knew he was questions. all These decision, reaching interpreted find admissions devel this the court such appear. We unspecified recent cases from this in the court as factual basis record oped a sufficient holding jury a need not reach a unani- plea. support the particular mous verdict on a manner of plea not that defendant’s holdWe offense. Under this commission of Fed.R.Crim.P. accepted in violation only reflecting interpretation, a verdict jumping conviction was that the bail jurors agree all that the defendant commit- pro- criminal in the habitual properly used way one or the other ted offense Therefore, ceeding. the trial court did adopted by necessary. This has view been alleg- count refusing to dismiss the err in reading majority. disagree I this jumping. ing prior conviction bail of our cases. Accordingly, judgment of the trial Ledman, (Colo. In People v. respects. in all affirmed 1981), People Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375 (Colo.1981),we this issue. addressed LOHR, J., specially concurs. cases, however, we both noted that NEIGHBORS, JJ., join DUBOFSKY during object defendant had failed special concurrence. in the inviting a proceedings to an instruction Justice, LOHR, specially concurring: verdict, general and under those circum general stances held that a instruction on that the majority concludes defend- necessity unanimity sufficient. right denied his unani- ant was not principle Implicit in those decisions is when, despite timely ob- mous verdict right request that a defendant has a case the court submitted the jection, verdict form identifies the method of general instead utiliz- jury for a verdict crime, at commission of the least where the form that re- ing a verdict would have encompass conceptual methods alternative specify the manner in quired the ly distinct and different combinations of aggravated robbery was commit- culpable material acts and mental states. I Although disagree with this conclu- ted. us, In the now case before sion, ruling I that the trial court’s believe timely request, such a and the trial made error, and *15 harmless therefore constituted in refusing grant court erred to it. judgment in of the court. concur charged jury pursu- The defendant with commis- The trial instructed was 18-4-302, (1978), in aggravated robbery to sion of alternative ant section which, robbery ways although not aggravated necessarily can be committed mu- ways, tually this involving in alternative different acts exclusive under the facts of case, culpable different mental states.1 involve combinations of conduct and instruction, culpability objected to this and mental elements that are con- defendant attorney requested ceptually choose distinct and different from each district First, or, prosecution, in the alter- he could been found theory one of other. have native, require guilty jury form on a determination that verdict based weapon designate deadly to the manner in which the he was armed with a jury kill, intended, resisted, jury if committed should if to maim or crime was wound § 18-4-302(a), guilty. person. at verdict of Both of these another C.R.S. a arrive Second, (1978). by the In have requests were denied trial court. the defendant could (a) aggravated deadly weapon in armed a The relevant manners which He is with with intent, kill, maim, resisted, or robbery if to are set forth sub- wound can committed person any person; 18-4-302, (b) robbed or other or (a) and of section which sections (b) knowingly per- strikes He wounds or provide that: person deadly any or with son robbed weapon other a person robbery guilty of A who commits force, threats, use of or or aggravated robbery during if the act rob- of deadly weapon knowingly intimidation with a bery flight or the immediate therefrom: person puts person or robbed bodily injury.... reasonable fear of death aggravated disagreement if in found to have committed as to the been acts of the knowingly robbery wounded because upon defendant their which of conclusion weap- person deadly a struck another guilt predicated. As was the Fifth Circuit § 18-4-302(b), (1978). on. Final- C.R.S. Appeals Court of there stated: guilt ly, the defendant’s could have been standard, Like the “reasonable doubt” on a determination that he know- bottomed indispensable found to be an ingly put of person reasonable fear element all criminal in In re trials force, bodily injury by death or the use of Winship, 397 U.S. S.Ct. threats, weap- deadly or intimidation with jury 25 L.Ed.2d the unanimous § 18-4-302(b), on. C.R.S. requirement “impresses on the trier of of of second and third methods elevation fact necessity reaching subjec- of robbery the crime of to the more serious tive state certitude on the facts in aggravated robbery acts offense of involve issue”. 397 U.S. at 90 S.Ct. at possession additional to the mere of a dead- (footnote ly omitted). 25 L.Ed.2d weapon required under the first method. at 375 specific intent, a requires The first method unanimity requires jurors rule thus culpable than more mental state the know- agreement to be in just substantial as to ing required support conduct to conviction what a step prelimi- defendant did as a under the second third.2 nary determining whether the defend- It implicit Taggart Ledman guilty ant is charged. the crime Re- that the defendant was entitled to submis- quiring jurors vote of twelve con- special jury sion verdict forms vict a defendant little does to insure that upon request. timely Under the circum- right pro- to a unanimous verdict is case, that, I stances this believe order prerequisite jury tected unless this ag- have found the defendant consensus as to the defendant’s course gravated robbery, jury should have (footnote omitted). required action is also required agree unanimously upon been Note, 457-58; 553 F.2d generally see upon the essential acts and mental state Right Jury Unanimity on Material holding By which their verdict based. Fact Issues: United Gipson, States otherwise, majority greatly dilutes the HARY.L.REV. 499 guaranteed right unanimous verdict 16-10-108, section Notwithstanding disagreement my (1978), 23(a)(8) C.R.S. and Crim.P. majority general concerning verdict 31(a)(3). issue, I agree judgment form conclusion, this I reaching am aware conviction should be affirmed because that there are decisions from other states guilt evidence as to all permit patchwork that would *16 sort charged committing aggrava- methods of See, I impermissible. verdicts would find Therefore, robbery overwhelming. ted e.g., People Sullivan, 173 N.Y. ruling the trial court’s on this must issue however, believe, I N.E. 989 be error. considered harmless See United approach is to better reasoned be found Pavloski, (7th F.2d 933 Cir. States v. Judge opinion Wisdom’s United 1978). (5th Gipson, States F.2d Cir. 1977), reversing a because of a conviction say I am DU- authorized to Justice they trial court instruction join BOFSKY and Justice NEIGHBORS all agreed could convict if the defend- charged special guilty ant was offense even this concurrence. that, independent practical

2. Unlike the child abuse discussed in so discrete and as a offense Noble, (Colo.1981), matter, a verdict of one alternative charged of the crime reasonably methods commission interpreted could exclusive here, question part, "involve least in alterna- 635 P.2d at 211. other.” culpability tive which are forms of conduct

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Marquez
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Dec 17, 1984
Citation: 692 P.2d 1089
Docket Number: 82SA307
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.