*1 S040575. July [No. 2003.] PEOPLE,
THE Plaintiff Respondent, MARKS,
DELANEY GERAL Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel Power, Court, Richard under for Defendant and appointment by Supreme Appellant. General, Lockyer, Anderson,
Bill Robert R. Chief Attorney Assistant Attorney General, Gillette, General, Ronald A. Bass Dane R. Assistant Attorneys Wooden, General, and Sharon R. Deputy Attorney for Plaintiff and Respon- dent.
Opinion BROWN, convicted A jury Geral Delaney Marks of two J. Code, counts first (Pen. 187; murder degree further all refer- statutory § ences are to indicated) this code unless otherwise and two counts of premeditated (§§ 187). counts, murder attempted With to all respect found true jury the allegation that defendant a firearm used personally (§ 12022.5). murders, With respect found defendant attempted jury inflicted personally (§ 12022.7). It great bodily injury upon victims found true the special circumstance that defendant committed allegations multiple 190.2, (§ commission, murders (a)(3)), subd. committed in the murder at- 190.2, commission tempted flight (§ (a)(17)(A)), from a subd. robbery (§ committed murder against 190.25). worker At subse- transportation it found quent proceeding, beyond a reasonable doubt defendant had suffered four convictions and prior felony served two set terms. prior prison for the crimes at death. The court penalty trial denied defendant’s capital 190.4, motion modify (§ the sentence subd. This (e)). is automatic appeal Const., 11; (Cal. VI, Code, 1239). art. Pen. § § below, For the reasons stated we affirm the judgment entirety. its
I. FACTS Phase Guilt A. People’s The Case The Bell Shooting Taco
a) 17, 1990, at defendant entered On 7:30 approximately p.m., October to and 14th in Oakland. He normal Taco Bell on Jackson Streets appeared him on occasions a Taco Bell who had seen several Boyd, employee Sherman The men Bell in the two acknowl- community. inside the Taco and elsewhere began two encharitos Boyd prepar- each other. Defendant ordered edged the order. ing it at the head of Taco Bell employee
Defendant out a gun, pointed pulled face, she fell. Defendant did Mui and fired. As blood flowed her Luong, remorse, excited; he whatso- feelings “no no not appear upset displayed acted as if the Grace that defendant Haynes ever.” It seemed customer left done Defendant day.” quickly were shooting “something every Street, exit Jackson where he walked toward the restaurant’s onto through Lake Merritt. Griffin, Bell manager Diane and Taco assistant
Boyd, customer Haynes, four had also in court as the shooter. All Marla Harris all identified without hesitation. lineup selected defendant from brain because the damage but suffered shooting, Mui survived Luong to her brain. She also suffered the flow of and blood oxygen blocked shooting shock, . . . down.” In the cord shuts “basically which spinal spinal trial, and the never shooting Luong between the years three and one-half speaks Her visits her at rehabilitation center returned home. brother her, does him recognize and it if she but she never responds, appears all. Shootings Market Gourmet
b) Peter Baeza John evening, that same At 7:40 p.m. approximately the Gourmet shopping, and Denise Frelow was working, were Myers Street, feet from Market, on Jackson convenience store located did not him any a male enter store but pay observed Myers Taco Bell. one of the bottles in the as if to point male raised arm attention. The Baeza, the store fell backwards. Myers He fired a gun section. liquor cooler, owner, a cordless holding telephone, behind the deli crouched *8 shot, which to call Defendant fired another Myers prompt- him expected the Baeza to the fall to floor and blood. Defendant ing phone, cough drop store, calm, “breezed out” of the “real cool and like had nothing . . . .” happened died at the was where he
Baeza scene. rushed to Myers hospital, life, arrived “in shock and a coma.” massive Myers To save his required a a transfusions. Doctors also removed of his liver. kidney majority was released on but to suffer Myers from November continued hospital sporadic pain.
An on revealed a autopsy Baeza the cause of death was bullet wound side of the chest. Forensic evidence further revealed shooter fired gun from a distance of 18 inches. approximately and Frelow testified the
Myers shooter was a Black male with braids in his hair; recalled he wore a court Myers brown Both in and in his October jacket. 22, 1990, statement to described the police, Myers shooter being approxi- tall, feet five inches a mately eight with medium build. Frelow testified tall, shooter was between five feet six inches and five feet nine inches 155 or weighing In an approximately earlier statement pounds. police, she described the shooter as about five being feet six or seven inches tall. Defendant’s self-described measurements were five feet five tall and inches 22, 1990, On October Frelow a pounds. observed of suspects, lineup from which she selected defendant as the thought she shot Baeza and person Myers, she although was sure.
c) The Taxicab Shooting Williams, Austin Nigerian a worked same émigré, for the taxicab company 17, 1990, as Daniel McDermott. On October both drivers were at a lined up taxi on stand 13th near Street A a Broadway Oakland. man and woman taxi; walked toward Mr. hurriedly Williams’ s the man went front door and woman passenger went the rear door. The man was passenger a brown wearing and the jacket, woman was wearing multicolored dress that had diamond in its She also her face. shapes pattern. scar on Williams informed the that his was next couple not the taxi available. The taxi, then entered McDermott’s which them from couple drove away stand. Yi
Susan was at her home living Avenue in Alameda. At parents’ Eagle 8:30 an approximately night automobile drove that she p.m. up thought her might be father’s car but was a She taxicab. saw a Black male yellow door, in, outside the standing front as if the driver. passenger leaning paying woman, the taxi. away The man was at a whom Yi saw walk yelling Black, dress. She and wore multicolored heavyset, couple ap- Yi heard to be A of minutes later” boyfriend “couple peared girlfriend. louder, firecrackers, from the area where coming what sounded like except the “skid of tires real backing up taxicab was She then heard parked. *9 fast,” and she the taxi in reverse fast. moving very saw was As Menefee had been for about a of girlfriend year.
Robin defendant’s under a train. Defendant they October were living together park had for a That possessed couple days. a .38-caliber gun then beer neither had and and evening, money, they “panhandled,” bought so Merritt, a to wine. As Menefee sat on near Lake defendant told her platform him. returned to 60 minutes later and told her there wait for He stay self.” that he had shot two He acted “like his normal people. to taxi at 13th and Broadway
Menefee defendant a stand accompanied her too if she left him. because she was scared that defendant would shoot taxi, driver, to one but who had Defendant Menefee enter attempted accent, then entered moving. They an African told them he was not taxi, in back and defendant front. sitting sitting McDermott’s with Menefee that was game being Defendant and McDermott discussed the World Series them a lot on the radio at the time. McDermott drove to parking broadcast Avenue, lived. defendant near where defendant’s Neither Eagle grandmother ride. nor Menefee had to any money pay (cid:127) leave the taxi. She went When the taxi told Menefee to stopped, a the taxi was into to She heard from where alley gunshot coming an urinate. told that he had shot the Defendant ran toward Menefee and her parked. The horn began honking. to act taxi’s normally. driver. Defendant continued home, of defendant’s but grandmother’s The knocked the door couple an house for about 25 no one answered. then hid under They apartment minutes, bought after walked to a store and defendant some which couple bus, defendant. later sat for a arrested waiting As groceries. they police a on her cheek. Menefee has scar no kind indicating any revealed he had injuries
The on McDermott autopsy a to the face. of death was bullet wound cause struggle. $1 to work so he bring habit to five bills long-standing It was McDermott’s his bills and 43 cents on person $1 Defendant had seven could make change. arrest; found on currency cents no was at the time of but paper the taxi. No was found in money McDermott’s body. to where defendant Landes Austin Williams brought Mark
Sergeant told could him. Williams identify whether Williams being detained to see Landes that defendant looked similar to the man who Sergeant very attempted taxi, He enter his but he could not be certain. noted the defendant’s skin color and were the same that of his would-be complexion passenger, similar, was also but had not had hairstyle very good enough Williams look at the man to make a identification. positive Landes
Sergeant jacket retrieved near home of alley grandmother. defendant’s Defendant on the in court put refused jacket determine it fit. whether The court instructed it could consider that refusal as reflecting guilt. consciousness of
d) Evidence Pertaining to All Counts Mark Sergeant O’Connell the Alameda Police examined Department revolver defendant’s and found there were four one live expended casings *10 Lee, round remaining. criminalist for the Oakland Lansing Police Depart- ment, examined the revolver found on defendant and the four bullets removed Baeza, from the McDermott, bodies Mui Peter Luong, Daniel from the of John vicinity Myers. Lee concluded with “virtually absolute that certainty” fired at bullets Baeza and Myers came defendant’s gun. Lee’s analysis “indicated” the bullet recovered from McDermott came from the gun, analysis bullet that “suggested” injured Luong also came “ from that It source. was highly any that of the were fired unlikely” bullets from a other than gun defendant’s.
2. Evidence Defense Bell, Defendant denied anyone at the Taco shooting Gourmet Market or in a on taxicab October 1990. Defendant testified he cashed check for $170 on October 15. He had instructed Robin Menefee never ask whether he had money; always defendant told he was broke. When Robin people Menefee left defendant’s he the rest of the presence, evening October spent search, 17 unsuccessfully certain looking for individuals. After his he sat on his grandmother’s porch, disgusted she would not answer. Defendant’s Marks, Norah grandmother, testified that defendant came after 10:00 by p.m., after which time she does not her open door. cousin, Mitchell,
Menefee returned and told defendant that her Felix wanted to talk to him. Defendant then obtained the in the gun presented case. It was the time People’s first in his life had ever he a firearm. possessed He was to it to a location on for transport mystery drug $150. Street High Defendant later bought groceries some on Street Webster for Menefee and They himself. were aat bus so defendant could waiting bring stop gun Street, when High police arrested defendant. for residue gunshot examined defendant’s hands Mark Landes
Sergeant Fabiny, a criminalist They Joseph after the were clean. shooting. four hours residue gunshot testified County for the Alameda Sheriff’s Department, had fired four shots be found on someone if he she would more likely 27, 1991, recovered by examined the May Fabiny jacket instead of one. On none. gunshot for residue found 3. Rebuttal on midnight defendant just past O’Connell interviewed
Sergeant Mark gun had found the told O’Connell he Sergeant October 1990. Defendant also defendant in Lieutenant Daniel Voznik days questioned earlier. couple he Defendant explained hours after the shootings. the early morning days Pablo Avenue two prior found the in some bushes San gun to him to transport that someone had it given He did not mention shooting. $150. exchange on the afternoon of March was as court bailiff working Wemken
Johnny inmate charged He defendant with another conversing observed murder, in custody, he was why Harris. Harris asked defendant Latonya “ she asked in for three murders.” When answered that defendant died, answered, “I shot them.” how they 4. Surrebuttal *11 defend- She asked testimony. confirmed some of Bailiff Wemken’s
Harris a murder charge. and he he was fighting ant his charges, responded about died, answered, did not shot.” He “They got he When she asked how they “I shot them.” say,
B. Phase Penalty Evidence
1. The People’s miscon- of defendant’s instances The evidence presented specific People also The People and enforcement officers. both civilians law duct against Daniel on families of the murders of the effect of evidence presented and Baeza. McDermott Peter
a) Criminal Conduct Other Violent on December was home with defendant. She Bailey grew Brenda up call, he finished his When he to use her phone. defendant visited when defendant After she told about brothers. Bailey’s comments derogatory made comments, a she did not want to hear his he hit her the head with floor, her her chair Defendant onto concrete telephone. pulled very two of her teeth. Defendant then her thick breaking pushed through window. and Comet her. For fingernail bathroom Defendant threw polish incident, her on the this she needed 26 stitches on the inside of chin and 27 attack, she told about outside. Defendant threatened if anyone mouth, a son’s cut off her nine-year-old would bomb in her put six-year-old head, and mother. son’s kill her lived Hitchens had with defendant for about He beat her and
Shirley year. knife, clothes, furniture, stabbed her with a so she keys, ran her away, leaving 31, 1982, In the everything. morning hours Hitchens was early January on a street defendant walking when drove and told her to in his car. up get Jones, She refused because she was scared. She ran and told who Bobby Hitchens, car. Defendant tried approached defendant’s but Jones grab knife, intervened. Witness Jeff Heilbronner saw defendant holding chasing another man around a car. Someone shouted that the were police coming, defendant into car and it in Officer jumped Terry reverse. Lewis put Jones, and grabbed Bobby fell to the Police they officers twice ground. car, ordered defendant to exit not start his defendant but began driving backwards. The warned officers defendant that there were behind him. people Defendant drove over both Jones and Officer If Lewis. defendant had driven backwards, he would straight have driven over Officer Lewis’s lower leg. Instead, defendant turned wheels the car over so drove the officer’s lower back. Officer Lewis suffered bruises when the car his arms pinned against street.
On December Jim Payne his son Trent went to a 7-Eleven store to rent When the movie. father out pulled money pay, $400 $500. about grabbed Defendant knocked Payne ground bloodied his nose. also described several instances of defendant’s violent criminal *12 4, 1989,
conduct inside correctional facilities. On Alameda February County Sheriff Breslin heard a loud Deputy Greg coming noise from banging defendant’s cell in the North Jail. When County investigated, Breslin Deputy him, cell, told defendant “I didn’t kick the and fuck Defendant you.” adopted a “karate stance” and challenged Breslin fight. to Breslin left Deputy Deputy the cell and returned with another when defendant at deputy, lunged Deputy Breslin. Defendant bit him and him in the Defendant taunted punched groin. Breslin, feel, “I bit and balls. it Deputy you you How does punched bit punk?” Deputy Breslin recalled defendant “I him real And bragged, good. I like a remember cried out bitch.” 19, 1986, was as watch commander serving
On James Hewitt January Defendant, West at San Luis as Facility Obispo. part California Men’s Colony inmates, Herzog Black another inmate named approached of a group to are a concern in the nose. Such interracial assaults special struck him security personnel. prison 28, 1989, kicked backward karate-style Deputy On March defendant
' Jones, him in an elevator at North Jail. When County who was transporting destination, their him arrived at Deputy defendant and escorting deputies Defendant his foot on the wall and Jones removed defendant’s handcuffs. put backward into Jones. Deputy drove himself 1, Jail, 1990, when confined at Santa Rita defendant asked
On October a razor shaving. for toilet for paper Deputy Sheriff Sebastian Deputy Tine to gave tucked the razor blade inside the them defendant. paper Tine face, distracted, drawing defendant him in the When Tine was struck Deputy and knocking glasses. blood off his courtroom, in a with his arms
On November defendant was sitting room, entered his attorney Najpaver shackled. When Joseph in the and waist began kicking groin “bolted” from his chair and Najpaver fast, at five was defendant’s attorney area least times. very Najpaver 6 attack. until after November shortly October b) on Survivors Impact He was daughter. Daniel McDermott’s older always Le Gree was
Jacqulin He was never way strangers. and went out of his loving, help kind death Le been to handle father’s or Gree would have able angry. violent .her accident, an than rather through if it had occurred natural causes better her Le most when act. Gree feels the loss painfully defendant’s purposeful children their tell her do not remember they grandfather. her She last saw daughter. was Daniel McDermott’s younger
Ingrid Page of military her service. go father as was to Germany part she preparing father, had want to kill her who could not understand would why anyone She of her father’s the hardest anybody. Initially, aspect never done anything never was that her father unnatural cause. Now the hardest part death its or her daughter. the chance to meet her husband Baeza, met no of Peter Baeza’s. Until he Carter was an employee Thomas disorder. Baeza treated Carter a because of seizure job one would give not, him obtain did and helped as a human when other being, people Carter Carter like a son. Carter’s the disorder. He treated disability payments *13 had almost due to assistance. Since Baeza’s seizures Baeza’s disappeared death, however, has lost his and has been unable to find another. job Carter deteriorated, then fiancée Baeza Carter’s condition and his left him. physical kind often extended credit to the of the and was to elderly neighborhood everybody. Waller,
Carmen Baeza Peter Baeza’s described her father as a daughter, act, a He and that gentleman.” “class her about her Chilean taught heritage males can be looked father she gentle. She for someone like her when was to ready get married. The most difficult of her father’s was part passing look in her when learned mother’s she her husband of was eyes years funeral, dead. After a family brought collage photographs to Baeza’s life his widow’s home. Carmen moved four-year-old Waller’s son all next toys his and “I wanted collage explained, to with just play like we used to.” Poppo,
Peter Baeza’s memorial service was whom the standing-room only. People did not family know them and described Baeza’s acts kind- approached Many ness. who elderly could attend wrote letters cards. It people would have been easier for Waller had her father’s death if it been accept the result of She poor health. what it like wonders will be for her children to grow without their up grandfather. Baeza
Fanny met her future husband when she was nine and he years old was seven. immigrated to the United They States from Chile on Easter children, Sunday, their two whom a to raise in better they hoped environment. Baeza worked as an aircraft mechanic until he bought Gourmet Market in Fanny Baeza worked as a health nurse until public her retirement in when she was nurses. supervising nearly other honest, father, Peter Baeza was He responsible, was trustworthy. good husband, good and a good provider. Fanny Baeza was from breast recovering cancer when her husband was murdered. husband,
When Ms. Baeza her lost she lost With children her everything. out, moved grown and all she had her was husband for She suffered company. insurance, as there little financially, remained after nothing probate. murder, She sell her home Since the begin working she again. a.m., wakes every morning 3.T5 the time when she of her up learned husband’s death from a call. Peter Baeza used to call wife four telephone death, or five times to tell her much he her. day how loved After his however, me, she has become as there is to call very lonely, “nobody nobody with, my share day nobody to hear how his was. Just me.” day
Peter Baeza his son a work taught Charles ethic and politeness. Although death, came family initially together after his have since they grown *14 death devastating. further The financial Peter Baeza’s was apart. impact There not in the estate even for funeral. When was enough monéy pay murder, thanked Charles and Baeza visited the store after the Fanny people them Baeza of their lives. One woman told Charles letting Peter be part how moved her husband. She had a neighborhood, fleeing she former Peter Baeza extended her credit until she money. got job. son no young successful, made it She became and stated she never would have eventually her. summa- but for Peter Baeza’s and faith in As Charles Baeza generosity rized, is There him. There never will regular nobody “This not a like guy. be ... . I’ll live life to be like him.” my trying Evidence Defense testified, and who
Defendant several witnesses described his presented circum- general Defendant’s own covered both background. testimony of his fife and the incidents raised by penalty stances specific People’s evidence. phase
a) Background Testimony Defendant’s in Defendant the oldest child in a six. His father worked family was construction, and then at and his mother worked for phone company left He in when he was two Navy different schools. joined the govern- later. He received to continue his education from years money ment, He do because he did not want to. began but did not work any For the as a when his was girlfriend pregnant. in 1978 working receptionist decade, odd next defendant alternated various among jobs prison. accident, suffering After an October bus defendant began epileptic his mother’s His condition when he learned of aggravated seizures. was No in his family and unable to attend the funeral. one death. He in prison him it would affect thought told defendant for four months because they medication for receiving his Defendant was programs. participation prison the shootings. seizures at the time of talk about father never him a “father-son” regretted gave
Defendant his that defendant school. His father was staying jealous importance one until whereas he did obtain age earned his school high diploma he was 40.
(2) Other Witnesses defendant’s including at the phase, Several other witnesses testified penalty Marks, Bell, his aunt Bobbie Jane Elaine Marks Relisha his sister daughter Redic, Marks, Winn, Lorraine Damon and three cousin his brother women birth, who had Betty known defendant since his childhood or Reverend *15 Williams, Jones, Childs, Effie and Willoris defendant’s grandmother daughter. consistent that described defend- They mostly testimony presented ant as in a environment with where having grown up good family religion, violence, abuse, there was or and no alcohol no domestic with a father drug who education and work. encouraged hard Defendant to his helpful as a had no family child. He more than the child and was average problems never in serious trouble.
Defendant’s began discharge after his where he problems Navy, “lost himself’ through drugs. as if there had been deterio- “[I]t seem[ed] [a] ration in thought as defendant was off the processes,” “talking [defendant’s] use, wall.” father Defendant’s defendant’s but defendant disapproved drug trouble, refused listen to his father’s advice. Because of defendant’s his home, did father not want him at the family at the home of defendant’s or at the grandmother, funeral of defendant’s mother. Defendant had a close mother, with his and relationship his to attend her funeral inability may have contributed to his problems.
Defendant never hit his (age testified), 15 when she daughter anyone else in her She never saw him intoxicated and never had presence. any with him. When he in problems was not she saw him once or prison, twice week.
b) Other Violent Criminal Conduct Defendant testified regarding of misconduct specific de- examples scribed in the case. Defendant admitted he had four People’s convic- prior tions, but he asserted had been falsely convicted. He claimed Shirley car, Hitchens wanted to enter his one Bobby Jones was the with a knife did, chasing Lewis, defendant. He did not think ran over he Officer but if he it was an accident fled as he for his life. Defendant happened punched Brenda face Bailey in the after had tried only she to throw (unsuccessfully) hot chicken in his face. grease Defendant himself against Jim protected hands,” Payne’s law into his “tak[ing] own admitted although he was He never wrong taking Payne’s hit his hands. money. Payne
Defendant that he did attack Breslin. Defendant had explained Deputy been his Bible when the called “son reading him a of a bitch.” deputy said, Defendant “You are the same motherfucker called punk my [who] mother a bitch. Fuck then you.” running Breslin came at defendant. Deputy Defendant Breslin in Defendant him punched Deputy groin. slapped around, but Breslin and another hit defendant Deputy deputy groin, then all they laughing. started Jones, had been defendant. shoving
Defendant did not kick who Deputy him, him, all to do is you got told “I’m just person, Defendant punched me, because the and I’ll move.” Defendant struck Tine Deputy deputy ask threw his book about harassed him with racial remarks and away attacked Julius and Ethel Defendant Rosenberg. and execution of prosecution ran but initially away, after him. Defendant Herzog jumped inmate Herzog back, he did. realized had to so fight Defendant Joseph
Defendant admitted kicking attorney, Najpaver. told him to plead guilty wanted different counsel because Najpaver life and did not evidence to show gather sentence of imprisonment, accept *16 the attack to secure new counsel. defendant was innocent. Defendant planned if a me but... grant justice, “I knew it was verbal conflict that wouldn’t [if] I make verbal to be removed .... I knew had to it’s he has physical contact to rid of him.” get
3. Rebuttal from defendant Lauricella obtained statement Sheriff Rachael Deputy often insults. After exchanged after his attack on Tine. The two men Deputy stated, if you “I’ll head your motherfucking hit you upside remarked, me,” “I’ll that son a bitch then make Tine disrespect Deputy about Tine’s Deputy he ever When defendant asked lived.” regret day a cell in administrative hiding segrega- accusation that defendant was soldier1 accusation, tion, hit him. Defendant so defendant Tine Deputy repeated had racial any did not tell Lauricella that Tine used Deputy epithets. Deputy 4. Surrebuttal Lauricella, but that made the to
Defendant he statement agreed Deputy for several weeks. Tine in racial slander engaged asserted that Deputy Tine, who tore it up form grievance against Deputy Defendant completed defendant’s face.
II. DISCUSSION Issues Competency A. the Evidence
1. Sufficiency of trial, him stand erred in finding competent Defendant contends him Amendment under both Fourteenth due thereby depriving process big talked someone who explained the term was an insult described Deputy Lauricella open. the door was up but did not back talk when behind his cell door I, to the article 15 of the California United States Constitution and section A if result of mental Constitution. defendant is “as a incompetent the defendant to understand disorder or is unable developmental disability, or to the conduct of a nature of the criminal assist counsel in proceedings (§ (a).) defense in subd. defendant has the a rational manner.” of the burden of evidence. incompetency preponderance proving by (§ (f); subd. v. Marshall 15 Cal.4th (Marshall).) P.2d the record in the An court reviews appellate 262] (Ibid.) most determination. We conclude that light jury’s favorable substantial We further evidence find supports jury’s competency finding. the trial court declined to order a hearing. properly subsequent competency
a) Facts The defense several witnesses establish defendant’s presented incompe- tence to stand trial. defendant’s Joseph attorney, initial testified that Najpaver, defendant started out as a client. But defendant often cooperative interrupted hearing Defendant wished have a preliminary proceedings. different him attorney because he believed that represent thought Najpaver counsel, guilty. Defendant four new brought Marsden2 motions to obtain which during defendant asserted had called a “nigger,” him which Najpaver *17 had not. Defendant that Najpaver and Cocounsel complained Najpaver Joseph McGrew “have to con tried ... or me to take life manipulate sentences for I do.” something did not tried to had a which Najpaver negotiate through plea defendant could receive a sentence of life without imprisonment of possibility Defendant became parole. the when very angry during hearing preliminary his former girlfriend provided damaging testimony.
Judge Nelson George over defendant’s Dur- presided hearing. preliminary defendant, ing hearing, prosecutor tried to but defendant photograph closed, tried to his keep eyes which distorted of his face. gave picture Judge Nelson considered this a rational act because it would prevent prosecution an accurate defendant’s overall developing photograph. Considering however, behavior Nelson' during hearing, Judge concluded defendant case,” “was in a out acting manner to his his prejudicial by distracting and attorney influencing his former girlfriend during testimony. her Defend- ant did not that act out when way officers testified. police
Dr. James Anderson’s was that all defendants found stipulated testimony trial to stand to Atascadero State Dr. John incompetent go Hospital. Riley, there, testified that the has a trial psychologist hospital competency program that to restore defendants to so can stand trial. Of attempts competency they
2
Cal.Rptr.
v. Marsden
Dr. 1992. Dr. Fred Rosenthal examined defendant on February trial, Rosenthal concluded defendant was not to stand this basing competent “by conclusion of his behavior number mostly descriptions people over the Dr. that defendant did not understand the Rosenthal years.” opined him, charges nature of the because defendant indicated against charges only concerned of a Defendant was weapon. cooperative possession Rosenthal, Dr. went off on defendant’s comments although occasionally Dr. defendant because he believed tangents. Rosenthal considered paranoid deal attorney made a with the district to convict him attorney any there thus no chance of defendant’s kind of trial.” On “getting cross-examination, a defendant Dr. Rosenthal stated if he himself were innocence, who maintained his and his counsel to have him sought plead receive life a sentence of without guilty imprisonment possibility did not attorney. he would take find a different Dr. Rosenthal parole, steps know that defendant had to do so on four occasions. attempted separate Harris, a and Santa Rita mental health counselor at North County
Josalyn Jails, week two from October to June He saw every to her between the district and the attorney about collusion complained (his for the attorney defender. Defendant trusted Susan public Sawyer compe- and thus with her. Defendant was aware of tency hearing) cooperated be sentenced to death. might possibility Quinn Rita Jail and conducted Sheriff Richard worked Santa Deputy *18 Quinn that defend- reviews of defendant. often recommended weekly Deputy be in isolation. Defendant wished to ant housed administrative segregation the the he indicated he had received jail; remain from rest of segregated made to remain He segregated. threats from other inmates. Defendant excuses moved, which that if he have “disciplinary problems,” once stated would staff, inmates, and to mean he assault other Quinn might Deputy interpreted On one refuse to the jail.” generally “go[] along program wrote, occasion, Quinn just hiding “I believe that Deputy [defendant] have remain He does seem to some mental jail. problems, rest of Quinn was believed defendant compe- Deputy Administration] Isolation].” trial. tent stand the Santa Rita Jail. She had
Dr. Gudiksen worked a at Karen as psychiatrist over and found years examined approximately people competency of them She defendant in in February most examined incompetent. March and in She concluded he was not to stand July competent trial, defendant’s and bizarre basing disorganized speech descriptions interview, ailments. Defendant as if he were physical during paused Dr. voices. In defendant’s Gudiksen also hearing determining incompetency, relied on his which was defendant and history, by personally provided Dr. stated defendant on and on Attorney “goes Gudiksen’s Najpaver. report . . . about between his and that described some appearance by discrepancies Dr. hearing witnesses.” Gudiksen had read the preliminary and did thus not know whether defendant’s was valid. transcript, point Francis was the lead attorney. McGrew cocounsel with who was Najpaver, himself, During defendant talked to preliminary hearing, laughed inappro- and objections. made Robin Menefee’s “set him off.” He priately, testimony remarked, not true. a She “That’s She’s in her head. doesn’t know got plate what she’s about. She’s not talking a witness.” good Stein,
Dr. a David clinical administered psychologist, neuropsychological tests to defendant. Defendant had motor skills. Defendant also had impaired difficulty material. It him sequencing took 170 seconds to complete project dots, connecting which average in 15 30 seconds. He person completes also was unable to copy Defendant could shapes figures accurately. count head, backwards from 20 could three four times in his correctly multiply needed but to use his fingers to He eight times six. recited multiply correctly alphabet, although added the letter “u” He correctly after “q.” identified the of the President United States and his and the predecessor, Governor of California. Based on observations the records he personal reviewed, Dr. Stein concluded emotional organic prob- lems. Lasalle, three an People presented Holly witnesses. accounting super- Jail, at
visor Santa Rita testified that reflected defendant records never prison more than he had spent money prison commissary remaining his However, account. she admitted that the records would not reflect any activity if defendant to make a with insufficient funds. attempted purchase Sergeant Harvey Lewis testified that defendant completed paperwork requesting legal Durbin, materials. Sheriff Deputy Timothy classification officer at Santa Jail, Rita for the of inmates. In June responsible assignment defendant asked Durbin work for a Defendant believed Deputy assignment. that if he had it would look better to the job trial. upcoming *19 Defendant told Durbin that he was an invitation to Deputy rejecting appear the on television Most Wanted America’s because his program attorney interests, advised him that it was not in his best as he himself might “trip up.” Defendant stated would he have a competency hearing soon. Durbin Deputy 218 his whether that was a to decide whether defendant could fire hearing
asked “No, it is a to see hearing defendant attorney, responded, competency added, lose in June and whether or not I am sane.” Defendant “I should that early I’ll trial later in the my start main ’93.” year rebuttal, Burstein, clinical In the defense called Dr. Jules a and forensic for Dr. Burstein had examined 100 individuals approximately psychologist. 60 over the 11 and found to 70 years, percent competency past approximately He had of them examined defendant for 1989 competency incompetent. time, At Dr. was case. that Burstein concluded defendant regarding prior trial, as he of the too “only stand understood nature competent charges well,” and have believed defendant although attorney former might him, did was of co with Dr. Burstein believed defendant operating incapable wish to Dr. had recorded defendant as a malingerer, Burstein cooperate. July who him. In crazy against someone acts stop judicial proceedings 1992, however, and determined he was not Dr. Burstein examined defendant with charged. defendant did know which offenses was although competent, attorney, Defendant told Dr. Burstein that “he fine” with his new got along examination, informed Dr. Sawyer Susan Before 1992 Sawyer. Attorney Gudiksen, Dr. and Dr. Burstein of the conclusions of both Rosenthal Dr. Dr. had become Burstein whom Burstein acquainted defendant, examine because by Sawyer’s invitation Attorney perplexed In two doctors is sufficient. usually determination of incompetency by 1992, Dr. in his assessment defendant 1989 to change explaining the clinician in found defendant Burstein noted that 1989 nonpsychotic, Harris, Burstein whereas in whose clinician Dr. Joslyn reputation found defendant respected, psychotic. trial. The defense
The determined defendant was to stand competent denied verdict. court notwithstanding moved judgment motion, Durbin’s alone substantial testimony provided observing Deputy evidence of defendant’s competency.
b) Discussion He the jury’s finding.3 Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports P.2d (1981) Cal.3d 629 People Cal.Rptr. relies on v. Samuel 29 489 [174 evi- (Samuel), an array where the defense “presented impressive 485] (Id. 497.) found that We further p. dence” demonstrating incompetence. our during guilt penalty phases, Although developed cites evidence (See hearing. competency the court at time of is limited to the evidence before review court’s P.2d v. Welch Cal.4th 754] [trial by challenged appeal competency cannot be not to declare doubt as to defendant’s decision evidence].) produced to subsequently reference *20 neither of the witnesses contradicted of the People’s any defense testimony. (Id. 498.) Samuel We find p. from distinguishable this case.
First,
the defense evidence was not
Although
defense
compelling.
presented
expert testimony,
cross-examination called into
People’s
ques-
tion the
of the
reliability
As we
experts’ analyses.
have explained, expert
(Marshall,
is
testimony
as reliable as its
supra,
only
bases
Furthermore, the defense who considered experts defendant incompetent were unfamiliar with much of the evidence that tended to render defendant’s behavior comprehensible. Dr. Rosenthal concluded defendant was paranoid and unrealistic about the because proceedings defendant was convinced his attorney and the district had attorney made a deal to convict him he so would aget trial. But Attorney in fact Najpaver to conclude a attempted plea agreement with the district attorney, which would have a convic- generated tion without a trial. Dr. Rosenthal testified that if his own had tried attorney to have him for a plead guilty sentence of life without imprisonment possibility of innocence, even parole though maintained his he himself would seek new counsel. Dr. Rosenthal did not know that defendant had tried to do so on four occasions. separate Dr. Similarly, Gudiksen’s stated report defendant “goes on and on . . . about between discrepancies his appearance and that described by some of the witnesses.” Dr. Gudiksen assumed that this indicated repetition issues,” that defendant was not on the “focusing but she had not read the preliminary hearing and thus did not know transcript, whether defendant’s concern was a legitimate criticism of the case People’s him. against
Second, and more whereas the Samuel failed to importantly, prosecution contradict of the (Samuel, any defense supra, 29 testimony 498), Cal.3d at p. below abundant produced evidence that contradicted the defense testimony, most of it coming defendant’s own mouth. For example, although Dr. Rosenthal opined defendant believed the concerned charge only remarked, of a possession weapon, himself “I didn’t do no Taco Bell and no shootings Gourmet shootings, no cab shootings.” Defendant’s statements support inference that he fully recognized of the magnitude he faced charges and the as well as potential consequences, counsel’s death, to seek an unwillingness “And this acquittal. life or either I fife or I get get death. It’s cut and just Either life dry. you get or you *21 death, two life. I somebody and here are with need get playing your people to see . . .” Defendant who is serious that want me victorious . objected . . me to take fact that and McGrew “tried to . Attorneys manipulate Najpaver At I did not do.” one Marsden defend- something hearing, life sentences with, court, a I told the “I want defender . . . who can work ant public I but if understand me .... I know can’t own I’m my lawyer, saying pick a life at .... I can’t with the my get my rights there is conflict and is stake innocent, I’m He believe I’m and counsel who don’t believe innocent. don’t addressed me as such.” Defendant also indicated he understood he’s to see hearing nature of the a hearing: competency competency “[I]t whether or I am sane.” and further he could counsel
Defendant’s statements conduct showed assist conduct defense. he did with the Although attorney in the of the not cooperate murder, he defendant’s conviction for trying arrange noncapital who to he advice with because trusted her. He took her Attorney Sawyer cooperated work a on not to on television to make sought good impression appear able but Defendant thus showed he was to with counsel jury. cooperate so, an to achieve a In largely sometimes to do substitution counsel. refused remarked, earlier described the instant defendant during hearing, proceeding I a in the I want Mr. “I know acted like fool courtroom. don’t zip-down Denton as and I will not with him.” Defendant my attorney cooperate, if he acting to refrain from like fool” “zip-down promised cooperate a new granted attorney. were
Furthermore, did not although defendant’s outbursts comport did to counsel. courtroom reflect his to advice protocol, they attempt provide that counsel failed to ask a witness who For defendant example, complained there was smiling claimed to have been five feet from the whether perpetrator teeth, missing about the as defendant had unusual anything perpetrator’s which the could teeth. We conclude there was substantial evidence from to trial. infer defendant’s stand rationally competence a further contends his conduct trial warranted during Defendant further and the trial court erred in to failing suspend examination his competency, However, has found to be once defendant been the proceedings. enough are not to require even bizarre statements actions competent, 33.) courts (Marshall, give 15 Cal.4th supra, Reviewing further inquiry. p. to hold deference a trial decision whether a competency court’s great “ ‘ in no a defendant’s appraise “An court is hearing. position appellate feign a calculated insanity, in the trial court as indicating attempt conduct ’ ” (Ibid., quoting or sheer proceedings, temper.” insanity delay 1, 838 P.2d 727 (1992) Cal.Rptr.2d v. Danielson Cal.4th [13 Price Court 729], another v. Superior disapproved ground (Price).) P.3d fn. 13 Cal.4th 618] Moreover, defendant’s most outburst trial conspicuous during amply proves his ability to understand the and assist counsel. When the proceedings concluded his redirect examination of John prosecutor Myers, Honor, me, “Your I This interrupted, object. stated it was not it was person No. 6 who committed the .... did shooting He not even ask.” Discussion among and the court revealed that attorneys had selected a Myers suspect other than defendant at a photographic lineup. prosecutor recognized, however, there awas sound tactical reason for defense counsel’s not asking *22 Myers about his failure to select defendant: had indicated “it was a Myers toss individual; between defendant and up” the “number six” Myers finally chose the latter. there was a Although legitimate reason for not asking Myers about his selection at the defendant’s comment reflected lineup, he compre- hended not the just nature of the but the state of the proceedings People’s case and its potential deficiencies. Defendant also demonstrated his to ability counsel, offer assistance to even if such assistance was neither solicited nor welcomed.4
Defendant was found properly to stand trial. competent Requested Instruction Defendant’s Defendant the requested following instruction: “If the special defendant found trial, mentally to stand criminal competent will proceedings immedi- ately be resumed and the trial on the offense shall charged be held in the business, normal course of the court’s If the defendant is found mentally [f] trial, to stand incompetent criminal shall remain proceedings until suspended such time as he meantime, becomes mentally In competent. the the court will order the defendant to be confined at a state for the hospital care and treatment of the disordered mentally where he will in a participate program to designed the promote defendant’s restoration speedy to mental compe- tence.” The trial court refused to read the instruction. The court stated that Dr. Riley’s testimony Atascadero regarding State Hospital already provided information, jury this although court an expressed inclination to instruct if the were jury confused about the issue. Defendant contends the court erred instruction, in failing to read the thereby his under violating rights Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, I, 7, 15, and article sections and 17 of the California Constitu- tion. We find no error. 4 again The defense moved a competency hearing guilt after defendant testified in the phase. The large motion was based in part on frequent nonresponsiveness defendant’s to the found, however, questions posed. As the trial court strategically ignored defendant the limited scope questions of and aggressively presented jury that material would either tend to
raise a doubt guilt engender about his sympathy for him. The court considered this “an intentional and by volitional and willful go decision him to scope questions outside the place material jury before the that he perceived to be in his interests.” (1985) v. Moore
The defendant based request (Moore). held a defendant in Moore Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d [211 856] finding is entitled to an instruction that a sanity proceeding upon request not immediate by reason of does entitle the defendant to guilty insanity as an We the instruction ordinary release would acquittal. explained sane to would find defendant designed preclude possibility jurors to him to returning because no other from they way simply perceived prevent (See 1 Cal.4th community. People Kelly 385].) 822 P.2d Defendant likewise have found argues might competent immunity punish simply prevent permanent ment. instruction, however, characterized defendant’s return requested inevi and the eventual of criminal proceedings
competence resumption “to the defendant’s Notwithstanding table. hospital’s attempt promote mental no restoration to there was competence,” guarantee speedy Furthermore, we and the instruction was therefore flawed. recovery, speedy declined extend Moore its context. v. Thomas original have beyond (People *23 489, 199, 101].) (1992) Finally, 2 Cal.4th P.2d 539 828 [7 based, erroneous constitutionally because the instruction is not its proposed a result have been omission does not warrant reversal unless different would (See (1987) case. which not the reasonably probable, People Young 891, to read instruction Moore Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 916 [234 819] [failure under 46 Cal.2d People reviewed standard v. Watson prejudice (Watson)].) P.2d [299 243] B. Guilt Phase Security
1. Courtroom next to the trial erred in sheriff deputy Defendant contends court placing He this him of his rights him contends error during testimony. deprived Fourth, Fifth, to the United under the and Fourteenth Amendments Eighth, I, California and article sections of the States Constitution error. Constitution. We find no trial, defendant be defense counsel
Prior to start requested ex- attorney restraints in the courtroom. One defense to subject physical trial; attorney him the other fear injure during that defendant might pressed him but injuring concerned not with defendant’s indicated trial before the The his defense misconduct harming by jury. defendant’s restraints, declined record it failed before concluding court to impose (1976) 16 v. Duran by establish the “manifest need” required (Duran) for the restraints. 545 P.2d Cal.3d 282 Cal.Rptr. 1322] of the witness stand to the proximity jury box court to prompted revisit the issue once defendant was about to The court two testify. proposed alternatives: defendant could testify from his counsel’s table or he position him, could from the testify witness stand with a marshal next sitting facing him. The court recalled defendant’s which included an history, assaulting break, attorney court and a sheriff this case. After a defense deputy during counsel indicated that defendant wished to from the witness chair. The testify court it would explained marshal in chair next to defendant on position the raised that was to Juror No. 7.5 The court recalled platform parallel behavior, orders, defendant’s assaultive prior his violation of court and his being removed from the courtroom for earlier in the being verbally disruptive trial. The court noted that the jury box was four feet from where only sit, defendant would and it would be “total dereliction of [the court’s] to have the responsibility” nearest marshal “some 30 or 40 feet away, who tables, would have to around go chairs and other people get [to] [defend- ant].” admonition,
The court read the following at the defense’s “With request: Scott, respect position observe that Deputy you’ll Scott is Deputy all, seated next to the box. up First of let me indicate to you you [f] are not to as to the speculate reasons Scott is in why this nor Deputy position, are to let it you become of your deliberations or part your conclusions this case in any way. This is a perfectly normal should not procedure, you draw any adverse from this of kind.” any [inferences]
Defendant cites Duran for the
that there
proposition
must be a “manifest
need” for the
of the
placement
marshal so
to him
close
as he testified. Duran
the manifest need
imposed
standard for the
(Duran,
use of
restraints.
physical
*24
supra,
We maintain this between therefore distinction to the manifest need and decline security personnel, impose deployment (Duran, for the of marshals inside courtroom. supra, standard deployment 8.) 16 Cal.3d at fn. p. have had him bound testify by
Defendant now claims the trial court should was a less never asserted there restraints not visible Defendant jury. courtroom, now bars securing object means of his failure intrusive could have court shackling instant claim invisible through (See to defendant. benefit less achieved same security prejudice Duran, to restraint waives Cal.3d at supra, object p. [failure above, Furthermore, be restraints well claim].) may as indicated physical a security defendant than testifying more distracting disorienting behind) the (and next to slightly four or five feet guard’s away, presence jurors. *25 courtroom, and his disrup- own counsel in
Defendant had attacked his his at one court had led to removal tive and violations of orders behavior box, to the jury of the witness stand The court observed the proximity point. to leave the jury unpro- would be reasonably irresponsible concluded it in the record violent behavior a defendant with a of tected from capital review, exercised its the trial court properly Under standard of any courtroom. in courtroom. securing discretion
2. Visual Exhibits Defendant contends the trial court erred in over his admitting objection both a Mui videotape Luong’s activities of depicting daily photographs the crime scenes and victims. He a violation alleges under rights Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Eighth, Amendments to the United States Consti- 7, 15, tution and sections and 17 of article I of the California Constitution. We find no reversible error.
a) The Videotape The offered into evidence People videotape depicting typical day Mui The Luong. shows her tape receiving physical therapy, accompany- ing from the explanations medical attending The defense personnel. objected tape being unduly under prejudicial Evidence Code section 352. The defense argued the “does not show tape great It shows the bodily injury. results of great Insofar bodily injury.” as the offered the People tape prove the great bodily injury allegation, insisted the should be People compelled the defense’s accept suffered the stipulation Luong requisite injury.
The court overruled the objection. The court considered the contrast between great bodily and the injury results of great as “a bodily injury distinction without a difference.” The court found the was “cer videotape not” tainly “inherently inflammatory.” court noted is tape approxi “[t]he mately 36 to 37 minutes it long, depicts for—very nearly all what’s on [sic] victim, is a tape of the picture Mui either Luong, in bed or lying being to a transported wheelchair or to a table and then back special again or having her therapist limbs. There is manipulate about this which in nothing view, any way, my visible, is inherently There is inflammatory. no blood although certainly there dispositive, is no indication of overt signs pain suffering on the of the victim.” part The trial court some of our quoted analyses its decision to explaining allow the to use the People videotape rather than prove allegation accept defense’s offer of a The court stipulation. recalled we upheld the admission of allegedly prejudicial evidence in videotape photographic v. Turner 50 Cal.3d 789 P.2d Cal.Rptr. 887]. “The prosecution was not obliged to these details prove solely from the witnesses, testimony live and the entitled jury was to see how the physical details of the scene and body of murder . . .” supported prosecution theory . Likewise, (Id. 706.) p. court recalled the “strong policy against the state’s case of depriving its persuasiveness forcefulness by forcing *26 226 of in its that soften the the evidence
prosecutor accept impact stipulations 31, 793, (1969) v. 802 (People Cal.Rptr. McClellan 71 Cal.2d entirety.” [80 871].) P.2d 457 “bloodied, have admission of a of lifeless
We the upheld photograph (1997) 16 to “establish that a murder occurred.” v. Scheid body” (People 1, 348, (Scheid).) Cal.4th 15 939 P.2d We observed Cal.Rptr.2d 748] [65 did not establishing Scheid that the of other evidence that fact existence rule that a (Ibid.) the evidence’s exclusion. We reiterated the compel “ ' not “to in lieu of prosecutor obligated antiseptic stipulations accept ’ ” 16, (1994) v. (Id. evidence.” Crittenden p. People quoting [visual] 474, 83, 887]; (1992) 9 Cal.4th 133 885 P.2d v. Pride People Cal.Rptr.2d [36 195, 636, 643].) 3 243 below Cal.4th 833 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d People [10 evidence of condition to similarly were entitled to visual provide Luong’s therefore the trial court bodily she had suffered We find prove great injury. decline allowed the the offer. correctly stipulation People itself, the the we find error. admission of no reversible Regarding videotape observe, would no bar to as Luong As the there have been People presenting witness, even a live that would have been more harmful yet likely defense, difficult We well as for and her caretakers. Luong as experience with the distinction an rejection injury also trial court’s of between agree any the If the the defendant’s left mayhem result show injury. People hand, the hand victim with two on one does only fingers the photograph or its results? injury only depict of Mui
There was thus some evidence introducing videotape a basis hand, 37 was condition. On the other Luong’s videotape approximately minutes of whether much of it was cumulative. long, arguably Regardless error was any admission of the entire videotape proper, possible the overall only strength harmless. We base this conclusion case, a defense but on defendant’s offered alibi defense. Unlike also People’s accident, incline to convict would not videotape of mistake (Cf. (1988) unless it he was v. Scott defendant found perpetrator. 1090, will flight not consider [jury 200 1095 Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. [246 406] convinced of defendant’s as identity perpetrator].) unless inculpatory Furthermore, at the have been admissible “would clearly videotape at the guilt harm even if not show the penalty phase [to inflicted] [citation], at that any phase.” obviating prejudice thus phase possible 68 P.3d Cal.4th v. Smith (People [134 302].) the “harmless of review is defendant asserts standard
Although Chapman standard a reasonable doubt” beyond prescribed California held 824], S.Ct. we have U.S. L.Ed.2d (1967) 386
227 the of of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 rules ordinary application Constitution, and we review of does not the federal thus implicate allegations Watson, error under the standard of 46 Cal.2d supra, “reasonable probability” 1060, (1994) at Cal.4th 1125 Rodrigues v. 8 page (People [36 235, (1994) 7 Cal.4th (Rodrigues); Fudge 885 P.2d v. Cal.Rptr.2d People 1] 321, Watson, we 36].) Although 1103 875 P.2d apply [31 we that the result be the same under Chapman. note would
b) The Photographs
Defendant also
to the admission of
introduced
objects
several photographs
of
objection.
over his
These
included
of the bodies
depictions
photographs
victims,
McDermott,
the
murder
Baeza and
two
Peter
Daniel
as well
scenes,
Market,
Bell,
crime
of the
the
the
Gourmet
Taco
photographs
taxicab,
McDermott’s
the
surgery
photographs depicting
performed
Luong.
Mui
Some of
scene
the crime
blood
portrayed
photographs
splatters
determined
tangible
other
of
court
the
signs
injury.
were
photographs
illustrative of the
therefore
found them admissible.
testimony,
the
We find
trial court
exercised
in
the
its discretion
properly
admitting
“ ‘ “ ‘The
was entitled
the
photographs.
to see how
of
jury
physical details
the
and the
scene
the
supported
prosecution theory
bod[ies]
(Scheid,
Pride,
16
supra,
Cal.4th at
quoting
3 Cal.4th
p.
People
supra,
243.)
As the United States
p.
Court has
the
Supreme
explained,
“persuasive
of
concrete and
is often
power
essential
particular
capacity jurors
satisfy
the law
obligations
(Old
on them.”
v. United
places
Chief
States
519 U.S.
L.Ed.2d
3. Impeachment Defendant contends the court due trial denied him of law process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in allowing People impeach him two and his at the prior convictions status time of his parole arrest. We the trial find court exercised its discretion. properly
a) The Prior Convictions
testified,
Before defendant
referred to four
convictions
prior
with which
wished
they
him: a
conviction for
theft
impeach
grand
(Pen. Code, 487),
(Health
a 1985 conviction
&
person
marijuana
for sale
§
Code,
11360),
Saf.
on a
conviction for
officer
battery
§
peace
Code, 243,
(c)),
with serious
(Pen.
battery
subd.
and 1980 conviction
§
Code, 243,
(Pen.
(d)).
subd.
The defense did
bodily
challenge
injury
§
use of the theft and
sale convictions for
marijuana
Although
impeachment.
moral
defendant argued they
two batteries involved
agreed
turpitude,
However,
court
were too
to be valid bases for
the trial
remote
impeachment.
involve moral
concluded the
conviction did not
battery-with-injury
turpitude.
*28
all
The court
the other convictions.
impeachment through
permitted
us to
Court
decisions
that
holding
Defendant invites
reconsider
of Appeal
on
the sale of
the
officer were offenses
marijuana
battery
peace
(See,
(1989)
v.
209
involving
e.g.,
Lindsay
moral
turpitude.
People
529];
(1986)
v. Standard
181
849
Cal.App.3d
Cal.Rptr.
People
[257
“
Moreover,
62].)
defendant’s
431
Cal.App.3d
Cal.Rptr.
[226
‘[b]ecause
the
in June
...
the
crimes occurred
to
of
8
1982
Proposition
prior
adoption
the
of a
conviction for
admissibility
law
governing
determining
prior
[for
313,
(1972)
v.
We to review claims because defendant forfeited decline these held an to them at trial.6 We have arguments “ failing raise by the trial to the way must be made in such a to alert court ‘objection sought, of and the which exclusion is nature evidence basis on anticipated ” to to its admissibility.’ afford the an establish People opportunity 619, 782, (1997) v. 15 937 Cal.Rptr.2d Holt Cal.4th 666-667 (People [63 883, 213], (1988) 44 Cal.3d P.2d v. Williams 906 People quoting [245 336, to the or 395].) 751 P.2d A admission general objection Cal.Rptr. evidence, from that advanced exclusion or one based on different ground of trial, in Hill example, People at does not the claim for For appeal. preserve 475, (1992) 3 P.2d (disapproved Cal.4th 959 839 Cal.Rptr.2d 984] [13 Price, ), fn. 13 the People 25 Cal.4th ground another supra, statement, and the defense the admission of a hearsay responded objected it in the form of a that the evidence was not because was hearsay question. on the of evidence We held the defense could not exclusion appeal it the defend hearsay was not because explained statement ground mind, court not to the ground as the defense had presented ant’s state of 988-989.) Visciotti (Hill, Similarly, People v. and the at trial. at pp. People Furthermore, (although June only battery peace preceded defendant’s on a officer 1983), apply would proposed defendant’s rule conviction occurred in and thus his marijuana theft and sale convictions. of 388], Cal.4th 1 825 P.2d the defense objected cross-examination, only two specific during and based those inquiries objec- tions on relevancy assuming facts not in evidence. We therefore ruled the defendant had failed to his claims that the preserve appellate prosecutor’s amounted to and that questions testimony cross-examination improper (Id. exceeded the 51-52.) direct examination. we scope Accordingly, pp. find defendant has failed to preserve challenges admissibility marijuana convictions based on the lack battery alleged of moral involved or the turpitude standards for determining admissibility prior Furthermore, convictions for impeachment purposes. considering strength defendant, of the case against as well as the magnitude of these offenses convictions, the relatively minor nature of the we prior no reason- perceive able of a probability different result if the had not impeached defendant. Parole Status
b) *29 Defendant's In his statement opening defendant of the explained possession gun by that asserting he was the in transporting for The weapon exchange payment. prosecutor thus wished to cast doubt that upon explanation by informing the defendant’s status as a meant that parolee his mere of possession the could weapon his return observed, to As the trial prompt prison. court the relevance of the status parole was not its to undermine tendency the credibility of the witness but the of the testimony. credibility
An analogous use of evidence might occur if a defendant were charged with theft and his defense at trial was that he had the purchased found liquor in his The possession. People might wish to introduce the defendant’s driver’s license that old, revealed he was 16 years not because there is anything intrinsically about culpable being 16 old but years because it would tend to undermine his claim that he the purchased the liquor. Similarly, evidence of defendant’s status parole was relevant as to the likelihood that defendant would someone transport else’s risk gun thereby to returning prison. Defendant’s own testimony confirmed the nature of his probative me, status. “When parole came police] to all I up [the was ex-felon thought Furthermore, with a gun, five years.” there was minimal attached to prejudice evidence, the of the light nature of the charged crimes and the prior felony convictions admitted. properly We therefore conclude the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to elicit defendant’s status. parole
Finally, case, of the light the overwhelming strength of any People’s error possible the regarding admission of either convictions or prior defendant’s status was parole surely harmless.
230 the First Evidence Conviction Sufficiency Supporting for of Daniel Degree Murder McDermott of evidence his conviction
Defendant contends insufficient supports murder We conclude sufficient evidence first of Daniel McDermott. degree conviction, or a on either basis. premeditation felony-murder supports (§ 189.)
In the evidence sufficiency proving determining premeditation deliberation, the entire in the most favorable to light we review record reasonable, it whether contains evidence that is determine credible, value, trier find and of solid from which a rational of fact could (2001) 25 a reasonable doubt. v. Silva guilty (People beyond 345, 93, (Silva).) Evidence 368 21 P.3d Cal.4th [106 769] motive, this killing manner are concerning planning, pertinent determination, are but factors not exclusive nor are they invariably these (Ibid.) determinative. all three factors. Defendant Daniel McDermott manifested shooting taxi, of the the inference
ordered Robin Menefee out which supports Moreover, he killed. if he brought did so to remove her from scene before ride, than which for the taxi it supports rather gun money pay that he a violent with McDermott. v. (People inference encounter planned 906]; People 763 P.2d Adcox Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. [253 P.2d (1987) 44 Cal.Rptr. Miranda Cal.3d 1127] *30 bills, $1 McDermott (Miranda).) Defendant was found with seven whereas car), to (nor with no was found in the which tends any money was found bills a close-range the manner of robbery Finally, killing, show a motive. (defendant baseball game without discussed the shooting any provocation him) evidence of likewise shooting struggle, with McDermott before or (1995) v. Hawkins 10 (People demonstrates deliberation. premeditation 636, 920, 574]; (1987) v. Bloyd P.2d People Cal.4th 956 897 Cal.Rptr.2d [42 368, 802].) P.2d evidence Substantial 43 Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. [233 of Daniel McDermott was the murder jury’s finding supports premeditated. that defend- finding was also circumstantial evidence supporting
There attempted robbery ant murdered McDermott in commission $1 The change. with bills and People Defendant was found seven robbery. $1 to several bills to bring evidence it was McDermott’s habit presented work, $1 with seven make Defendant was found change. with which he could bills; or in car. found McDermott’s person no was money paper Moreover, had no when entered they defendant and Menefee although money also taxi, later that evening. People were able to they buy groceries showed that to defendant on 13th prior picking Street and up Broadway, McDermott was and he did dispatched Berkeley, not inform the dispatcher that the had failed to show which he passenger would have done had the up, fare been a no-show.
Defendant asserts the evidence that he took from McDermott property speculative, witness saw any money being taken from Mr. “[n]o However, McDermott.” circumstantial evidence a first may support degree robbery-murder or a finding, robbery-murder circumstance. (People special Lewis 26 Cal.4th .) 28 P.3d In Cal.Rptr.2d [110 34] Lewis, we affirmed a robbery-based “Defendant special-circumstance finding. admitted he had seen Simms in her money bra. evidence also keep Physical showed that of Simms’s blouse top her revealing ripped open, bill, $20 brassiere containing folded and that buttons that had come from Simms’s blouse near her lay There was evidence body. that Simms had cashed a recently and that paycheck she set aside for rent normally money from the paycheck facts, used the rest to crack. purchase Based on these a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant robbed Simms.” (Ibid.)
We also approved admission of habit evidence in v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148 146], 832 P.2d where the defendant was found in cash, of an possession $200 envelope containing over in evidence established it was the victim’s habit to store money envelopes earmark it for special (Id. at purchases. 1178-1180.) pp. As in the instant case, no witness observed the defendant take from the victim. But money we nonetheless held “the could infer jury that defendant had the opportunity (he steal leaned into the car), victim’s (he did steal was found in possession of an envelope and killed money), victim to his. his crime.” accomplish (Id. 1183.) The same p. analysis obtains here.
Finally, even if defendant had been found without any on his money person, could have rationally concluded he shot Mr. McDermott Silva, an to obtain attempt (See money. supra, 368-370.) 25 Cal.4th at pp. We therefore reject defendant’s evidentiary to his challenge conviction for the *31 first degree murder of Daniel McDermott.
5. Sufficiency Evidence on the Other Counts and the of Multiple-murder Special Circumstance Defendant the challenges of his validity other convictions. He contends there was insufficient evidence of and deliberation premeditation regarding the other three counts. Defendant also asserts the relied on a jury improperly felony-murder in theory him of the first convicting murder of Peter degree the of a first murder degree
Baeza. he contends absence Additionally, proper We finding. the multiple-murder special-circumstance conviction invalidates all these claims. reject
a) Premeditation and Deliberation Baeza, and involved a The Mui Peter John shootings Luong, Myers of business, a to a shot factual defendant of predicate: brought gun place similar calm, and a cool at close without maintained range any provocation, workers Miranda, 44 Cal.3d In supra, manner. Our decision in is thus dispositive. Miranda, a the a loaded into store bringing gun we observed that defendant’s to kill unarmed victim shortly reasonably suggested it thereafter an using in The evidence the of murder advance. the defendant considered possibility shootings Myers, is even of Baeza regard of planning greater the after the walked 800 feet to Gourmet Market as defendant approximately murder his mind before Bell the of was on shootings, suggesting subject Taco the next decision also unpro- he shot his victims. Our Miranda concluded few of unarmed behind counter a feet shooting standing voked victims inference a deliberate was of killing product away supported (Id. “calm,” 87.) than a of The rather rash violence. explosion p. plan “cool,” finding manner of also shooting supports “focused” (People and deliberation. v. Vorise 72 Cal.App.4th premeditation Furthermore, 12].) defendant shot Baeza after Baeza had 319 [85 to avoid to call Defendant thus had a motive reached for telephone him. shooting identification apprehension and deliberation was therefore conclude the evidence of premeditation We Baeza, Luong. John and Mui Myers, for the Peter involving sufficient counts )The Verdict Baeza b of a human killing court unlawful
The trial instructed “[t]he commission of . . . which occurs commission being during attempted when the degree is murder in the first perpetrator the crime robbery did not such crime.” this instruction Although intent to commit specific victim, circum- the robbery-murder special either the instruction on specify limited murder. Defendant now McDermott’s stance7 its applicability degree its of first finding have based erroneously contends jury might felony-murder theory. Baeza on an invalid killing murder murder, correct, and if robbery was it to the McDermott instruction applied engaged the commission or while the “The murder was committed robbery *32 the of Daniel McDermott.” attempted commission of that the instruction confuse it was defend perceived might jurors, ant’s obligation (1996) to seek clarification. (People v. Arias Cal.4th (Arias); 170-171 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d Rodrigues, supra, [51 980] 1192.) 8 Cal.4th at p.
Furthermore, even if we assume that the considered the jury felony-murder it, theory insufficient evidence defendant’s first murder supported degree conviction remains valid. Where the considers both a jury factually conviction, sufficient and a insufficient factually ground it cannot be relied, determined on which ground we affirm the conviction unless jury there is an affirmative indication that the relied jury invalid ground. (Silva, 370-371; 25 Cal.4th at supra, pp. Guiton 4 Cal.4th Thus, 1128-1129 45].) 847 P.2d in a recent case where we observed there was sufficient evidence that the defendant premedi murder, tated and deliberated the we held that if there was insufficient murder, evidence of we felony could assume the relied on the jury factually sufficient ground (Silva, of premeditation. 370-371.) Because there was pp. sufficient evidence deliberate, showing Baeza’s murder was premeditated there is no (Ibid.) basis for reversal.
c) The Multiple-murder Special Circumstance The jury thus convicted validly defendant of first murder degree regarding the murders of both Daniel McDermott and Peter Baeza. Accordingly, multiple-murder special-circumstance was valid. finding C. Penalty Phase
1. The Transportation-worker Special Circumstance Defendant contends verdict is invalid penalty phase because one of the circumstances found special by jury, murder of a transportation worker, death, does not a sentence of support life only without imprisonment (§ 190.25.) He parole. contends this error violated the heightened reliability requirement imposed capital prosecutions and Fourteenth by Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
To render a defendant eligible for the death must penalty, jury find true at least one of the circumstances listed in special section 190.2. so, Once it does must then decide in a whether the penalty phase defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility parole. jury weighs the factors listed in section 190.3 this making determination. *33 committed (1) defendant below found three circumstances: jury special 190.2, (a)(3)); the was committed (§ (2) murders subd. murder
multiple 190.2, (a)(17)(A)); the victim was a robbery (§ a subd. during (§ 190.25). Although worker the transportation transportation-worker special sentence, a circumstance that a death supports circumstance not special to a the two section 190.2 circum- leading special thereby penalty phase, the stances rendered defendant death-eligible, subject penalty properly the the factors. where would section 190.3 phase, jury apply (People 31, 351, 364, (1988) 45 Cal.3d fn. 7 753 P.2d Hamilton Cal.Rptr. 1109].) claims, however, the
Defendant “It does not make difference whether any other because we no of way telling circumstances were have proved special circumstance or or some sure whether it was special [No.] the combination . . . which caused the return death verdict.” But once jury circumstance, the has found a section the determination of 190.2 special death the whether to sentence the defendant to or life without imprisonment of factors. these Among on section 190.3 possibility parole depends of of (a): is factor “The circumstances the crime which factors was instant and the existence of any convicted proceeding special be true to Section there Accordingly, circumstances found to 190.1.” pursuant was about the that defendant nothing emphasizing improper prosecutor’s driver, as a taxicab as this doing murdered McDermott while was his job crime. a circumstance of charged 190.25, (c), “Nothing in this Section subdivision specifically provides, of section be construed to charging any special shall prohibit [other] does “While the statute does not authorize death it penalty, circumstance.” (3 if other circumstances are Witkin prohibit penalty proved.” special Punishment, 612.) If (3d 2000) & Cal. Criminal Law ed. Epstein, p. § turn the circumstance of we were to defendant’s it would accept argument, worthy taxi driver a fact the has deemed duty, Legislature on killing circumstances), (albeit into less than some other special sanction special 190.25, the If the had never enacted section Legislature shield from liability. that the of the still have been free to circumstances argue would prosecutor of a taxi driver doing job, supported which included killing, killing reversal, 190.3, (§' There be no basis for (a).) death factor would verdict. findings and robbery-murder both the multiple-murder special-circumstance defendant, contrast, Legislature because the were By according valid. life imprisonment a taxi driver a sentence of supported decided the killing now We decline to infer such an we must reverse. exculpatory without parole, for murdering decision to increase penalty effect from Legislature’s are no circum- where there other special workers cases transportation stances. Conviction a Peace Battery Prior Defendant’s Officer Fifth, Sixth,
Defendant asserts a of his under the rights violation Eighth, Amendments, Constitution, and Fourteenth and the California because the trial court instructed the that evidence had been introduced to show jury had (which four convictions deter prior jury previously 243, mined), including (§ (c).) officer. subd. battery police further instructed that it before could consider crime as an any alleged circumstance, aggravating it must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was in fact convicted of the crime. Defendant prior now claims this error, instruction was because there was insufficient evidence the police 243, officer suffered within the of section injury meaning (c). subdivision conviction, A defendant may attack a collaterally but must prior overcome a of strong constitutional v. presumption validity. (People 926, (2001) 291, 25 Cal.4th Cunningham 1013 25 P.3d Cal.Rptr.2d [108 519].) conviction, Defendant has never established the of invalidity his prior and therefore the instruction was proper.
3. The VictimImpact Carter Testimony Thomas of Defendant contends the trial court violated his and Fourteenth Eighth Amendment rights by allowing Thomas Carter to about the testify impact Peter Baeza’s death. We conclude the trial court admitted the properly testimony.
Carter testified that disorder, because he suffered from a seizure nobody Baeza, would him a give job—except who treated him like a son. Baeza Carter in financial helped getting assistance for his Baeza treated disability. Carter death, like a human whereas being, others did not. Prior to Baeza’s Carter’s death, seizures had and were almost improved gone. Since Baeza’s Carter lost his and was unable job to find other work. any His physical deteriorated, condition and his fiancée left him. Baeza extended credit to many elderly people.
Defendant contends the evidence should been have excluded because Carter was not a relative of Baeza’s. The United States Court has Supreme not restricted relatives, the admissibility of victim evidence to how impact ever. The court has are entitled recognized to show “the victim is an individual whose death loss to represents unique society 808, particular family.” (Payne (1991) v. Tennessee 501 U.S. 825 [115 720, L.Ed.2d 2597].) Furthermore, 111 S.Ct. separate Payne opinions recognized broad of victim evidence. The scope impact jury may 236 crime, its including “the full extent of the harm caused by
know impact Tennessee, community.” (Payne v. 501 supra, on the victim’s U.S. family O’Connor, J.), italics know (conc. added.) Murderers their 830 opn. associates, ‘survivors,’ close who will suffer harms victims “probably ha[ve] death .... that their from victim’s know victims [T]hey deprivations islands, children, or are or spouses not human but individuals parents Tennessee, (conc. supra, U.S. (Payne dependents.” friends Souter, J.), Payne added.) italics therefore that it We have drawn opn. refer “to the the victim and the effect of his loss on status of proper ones, v. Fierro friends, as a (People loved whole.” community 1302].) P.2d 1 Cal.4th *35 on a Defendant’s thus must rest distinction between the argument purported nonrelatives, the of evidence murder’s admissibility describing impact nonrelatives, by which we have and to which defendant testimony permitted, unsound, however, This is and would unwork- prove now distinction objects. the not related to formally able in cases where available witnesses were only admitted the the victim. We therefore hold the trial court properly testimony of Thomas Carter.
4. The Trial Court’s
CALJIC
8.88
Rereading
No.
of
deliberations,
the
the
a note to
court
jury
the
During
penalty phase
passed
“We,
in
cause
the
‘If a
following:
the
the above entitled
stating,
jury
request
the
comes to the conclusion that
circumstances
far
juror(s)
aggravating
circumstances
the
the
must
then
mitigating
automatically
outweigh
juror(s)
death
The court answered
an
reading
excerpt
choose the
’.’
penalty?’
by
Defendant asserts this
violated his
under
reading
rights
CALJIC No. 8.88.8
8
CALJIC No. 8.88 reads: “After
having
having
all of the
and after
heard
heard
evidence
counsel,
consider,
guided
arguments
you
and
account and be
considered the
of
shall
take into
factors,
you
by
mitigating
which
have been
applicable
aggravating
upon
circumstances
fact,
attending the
aggravating
any
condition or event
commission
instructed.
An
factor is
[][]
consequences
guilt
enormity
injurious
its
or adds to
which is
of
crime which increases
or
its
fact,
any
is
beyond
mitigating
an element
itself.
A
circumstance
[SD
above and
of
crime
condition,
justification
or excuse for the crime in
event which as such does not constitute
determining
extenuating
appropri
question,
may be considered as an
circumstance
but
mitigating
penalty.
weighing
aggravating
death
of
circumstances
ateness of the
®
imaginary
factors on
of an
scale or the
counting
does
mean a mere mechanical
of
each side
weight
assign]]
are
whatever moral or
arbitrary assignment
any
to
of them. You
free to
you
deem
each and
the various
factors
are
you
value
all of
sympathetic
appropriate
you
circumstances
determine under
relevant
permitted
weighing
consider. In
the various
aggravat
by considering
totality of the
justified
appropriate
is
penalty
evidence which
judgment
mitigating
To return
ing
totality
with the
of the
circumstances.
circumstances
so
aggravating
circumstances
are
substantial
you
persuaded
each of
must be
death
instead of life without
mitigating
it warrants death
circumstances
comparison
parole.”
Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Eighth,
Constitution,
7, 15,
and sections
and 17 of article I of the California
Constitution. Defendant contends the trial court “failed to
answer”
correctly
should have instead
a shorter answer: “No.” The instruc
given
law, however,
tion
ais
correct statement of
and if defendant favored further
clarification, he needed
it.
do
His failure to
so waives this claim.
request
(Arias,
supra,
Rodrigues, supra,
170-171;
5. Constitutional Challenges Defendant finally raises numerous challenges constitutionality California’s We have capital procedures. rejected these claims and do so again. we reiterate the Accordingly, following holdings: California’s death law penalty sufficiently narrows the class of death-eligible defendants. (People Lewis 610, (2001) 629, v. 25 Cal.4th 22 P.3d Cal.Rptr.2d [106 People Anderson 392]; (2001) 25 Cal.4th Cal.Rptr.2d 347].) P.3d The law does not broad death- impose overly 676; Anderson, (Lewis, eligibility murder. at felony 601.) at p. p. (Lewis, The discretion exercised California by at prosecutors proper. 676; Anderson, 601; v. Ochoa p. 26 Cal.4th p. 462 [110 78].) 28 P.3d A instruct trial court need not the jury *36 that they must find beyond (1) reasonable doubt the following: existence evidence; of aggravating circumstances (2) other-crimes that except aggrava tion outweighs (3) mitigation; death is the appropriate penalty (Anderson, at 601). The p. federal Constitution does not require (Pulley Harris 37, intercase proportionality (1984) review v. 465 U.S. 50-51 29, L.Ed.2d 871]), 104 S.Ct. and we intracase perform [79 proportionality review “to determine whether the is to defendant’s penalty disproportionate v. Steele (People 1230, personal culpability.” (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1269 [120 432, 190.3, 225].) 47 P.3d Cal.Rptr.2d (a) Section factor is not vague. (Tuilaepa 967, impermissibly v. (1994) 512 U.S. 975-980 California 2630]; Anderson, 750, L.Ed.2d 601.) 114 S.Ct. at [129 It also does not p. (Tuilaepa, 975-980; written require findings aggravating factors at pp. Anderson, 601), at bar the consideration p. criminal unadjudicated activity 976-977; Anderson, (Tuilaepa, v. 601; Cain at People (1995) at pp. 10 p. 1, 481, Cal.4th 1224]), 69 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d 892 instruction as require [40 (Anderson, at to which factors are and which are aggravating mitigating v. Box People 601; 1153, (2000) 69, p. 23 Cal.4th 1217 Cal.Rptr.2d [99 130]). 5 P.3d of time between passing conviction and execution (Ochoa, does not violate the 462-464), federal Constitution at and lethal pp. (Ochoa, injection is constitutional means of 464). execution at p.
238
III. CONCLUSION herein, affirmed. For reasons stated judgment Moreno, J., Kennard, Baxter, J., J., Chin, J., J., C. J. George, Werdegar, concurred. J., in the its
CHIN, including I concur Concurring fully majority opinion, conclusion that defendant’s with some arguments regarding impeachment ante, 227-229.) I (Maj. convictions are not cognizable. prior opn., pp. note lack write to that the also merit. separately only arguments in June 1982. A short time The California electorate 8 passed Proposition later, committed held for crimes on or we that it “applies only prosecutions 251, Cal.3d 258 (1983) after its effective date.” v. Smith 34 (People [193 692, 149].) the charged 667 P.2d when crime Accordingly, predated Cal.Rptr. 8, its trial courts had to the law existed before Proposition apply the law conviction. prior adoption, including relating impeachment 1016, 21 1056 (See, (1999) Cal.4th e.g., Carpenter Cal.Rptr.2d People v. [90 however, 607, Defendant, crimes in 531].) P.2d committed charged 988 Thus, crimes long this is for committed Proposition prosecution after matters, not date of the effective The date of the crime charged 8’s date. Gurule 28 Cal.4th (People conviction or its crime. v. underlying prior 557, 345, 224].) Accordingly, contrary 607 51 P.3d Cal.Rptr.2d [123 assertion, 8 to this trial. (E.g., People defendant’s Proposition applies 177-178, 841 P.2d (1992) 4 Cal.4th Sandoval [14 convic law to with a 1979 impeachment [applying post-Proposition-8 862] 1984]; also v. Jackson tion where the crimes occurred see charged 8’s P.2d (1985) Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. [Proposition 736] *37 for convictions when felony applies prior enhancement serious five-year 8].) but the crime postdates, Proposition conviction predates, charged involve been that defendant’ s convictions prior It has also settled long (1989) 854-858 Lindsay Cal.App.3d moral turpitude. (People officer]; (1987) 197 v. Clarida [battery People Cal.Rptr. peace [257 529] [same]; v. Standard Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d 363] [249 for marijuana Cal.Rptr. [possession 181 Cal.App.3d 62] sale, sale, unlike involves simple possession, noting possession others].) intent to corrupt
The court’s choice not to discuss the merits of these forfeited arguments read should be doubt on of this settled law. casting any for a was denied October rehearing Appellant’s petition