Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a traffic stop by an Oswego police officer, defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(6) (West 2006)) and driving under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(5) (West 2006)) (DUI) in case number 06 — DT—57. As a result of the same arrest, defendant was also charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2006)) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/ 401(a)(2)(A) (West 2006)) in case number 06 — CF—69. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, and the trial court granted the motion on August 11, 2006. On September 7, 2006, the State moved to reconsider the trial court’s ruling. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider on September 28, 2006, and on October 23, 2006, the State filed a certificate of impairment (see People v. Young,
On July 11, 2007, defendant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The State responded to the motion on July 19, 2007. At that time, the State’s reply brief was not yet due and no panel of this court had been assigned to decide the appeal. A panel of this court hearing motions denied the motion to dismiss on August 1, 2007, and shortly thereafter the appeal was assigned to a different panel of this court for disposition. Defendant later filed a “Motion to Submit Jurisdictional Motion With Issues Addressed in the Briefs and Arguments.” Defendant asks us to again consider our jurisdiction, despite the earlier denial of his motion to dismiss. The motion is allowed. The motion panel’s ruling does not foreclose us from revisiting the question of jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Waddick,
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argues, inter alia, that the State had only 30 days to file its notice of appeal after the trial court granted the motion to quash and suppress on August 11, 2006, and that its motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling did not extend the period for filing the notice of appeal. Defendant forthrightly acknowledges that his argument is contrary to a number of decisions from other districts of the appellate court, but he urges us to take a fresh look at the issue. Defendant directs our attention to six decisions: People v. Van Matre,
Two of the cases defendant cited — McBride and Clark — have little or no bearing on the issue before us. The question in Clark was whether the defendant’s notice of appeal was timely where it was filed within 30 days following entry of an order: (1) denying the defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to dismiss and (2) reinstating a previously vacated guilty plea and sentence. McBride stands for the proposition that the State may move for reconsideration of a suppression order prior to filing a notice of appeal. McBride,
Moreover, we are aware of two cases not cited by defendant— People v. Smith,
“Public policy clearly favors correction of errors at the trial level. We have previously held that a motion to reconsider is an appropriate method to be utilized in directing the attention of the trial judge to [a] claim of error. (Childress v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1968),97 Ill. App. 2d 112 ,239 N.E.2d 492 .) The time for appeal commenced with the denial of that motion.” Robins,33 Ill. App. 3d at 636 .
Defendant correctly points out that Robins based its holding on a decision in a civil appeal — Childress. Civil and criminal appeals are governed by different rules, although there is substantial overlap (see 210 Ill. 2d R. 612). When Childress was decided, Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (36 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)), which applies to civil appeals, provided that, if a party filed a timely posttrial motion, the notice of appeal was due within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of the motion. However, the rule governing the perfection of appeals in criminal proceedings tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal only “if the appellant applies for probation or files a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment.” 36 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). Thus, Childress provides no analytical support for Robins.
We need not decide, however, whether Robins was correctly decided. Even if Rule 303(a)’s tolling principle applied in criminal cases, Robins, like Childress, nevertheless involved a final judgment or order. Stokes, however, involved an interlocutory order — one suppressing evidence. See People v. Leach,
All the same, the dissent endorses the result in Stokes, asserting that “[i]t is the reasoning of the case, the basis in public policy, that gives the tolling rule force, not solely its provenance.” (Emphasis added.)
If public policy is seen as the driving force in fashioning principles of appellate jurisdiction, things seem to fall into place — at least initially. Childress’s tolling rule in civil cases conforms to the applicable supreme court rule and to the public policy favoring correction of errors in the trial court. The same public policy supports Robins’s application of the tolling rule to final judgments in criminal cases even though, at that time, no supreme court rule provided for such a result. The dissent’s reasoning runs less smoothly, however, with respect to interlocutory orders. In the dissent’s view, public policy supports extending the tolling rule to interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, even if no supreme court rule so provides and even though the rule applicable in civil cases does not permit tolling. The dissent notes that, in civil cases, interlocutory orders from which an appeal may be taken ordinarily involve some burden or hardship, and the public policy favoring prompt appellate review of such orders “trumps the public policy preference of allowing trial courts to correct their errors in order to prevent needless appeals.”
That said, our fundamental disagreement with the dissent’s approach to the jurisdictional issue — at least as that approach takes shape in the first section of the dissent — is that it treats public policy as the polestar of the jurisdictional analysis. Public policy is relevant to the inquiry insofar as it finds expression in our supreme court’s rules governing interlocutory appeals. But the law could not be more clear that the rules themselves are paramount. Our state constitution provides:
“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6.
Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)) permits interlocutory appeals from orders suppressing evidence, and Supreme Court Rule 606 (210 Ill. 2d R. 606) specifies the manner in which such appeals are perfected. We thus may not follow Stokes solely on the strength of a public policy rationale, ignoring Stokes’s failure to justify its result with reference to the supreme court rules governing appeals from suppression orders. We may not simply substitute our own view of sound public policy for the express command of these rules. The question before us is not whether it is desirable to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal while a motion to reconsider is pending. The question, rather, is whether the applicable supreme court rules call for doing so.
Before tackling that question, we briefly consider the four remaining decisions applying a tolling rule: Van Matre, Burks, Rimmer, and Smith. Van Matre relied on Stokes and Robins (Van Matre,
In Rimmer, the trial court granted a motion to quash and suppress. The State later filed a motion to admit certain statements based on “attenuating circumstances.” Rimmer,
Smith cited People v. Williams,
The dissent notes that the principle was extended to interlocutory orders in People v. Mink,
We do not demand symmetry in civil and criminal appeals. Rather, we ask only for adherence to the applicable supreme court rules governing appellate jurisdiction in each setting, whether or not they yield similar results in procedurally analogous cases. Our point in once again citing Craine is simply that a tolling rule is not a necessary corollary of the trial court’s inherent power to correct its own errors, as the dissent evidently believes.
We now turn our attention to the supreme court rules that, as previously noted, govern the jurisdictional question in this case. Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) states in pertinent part that “[i]n criminal cases the State may appeal *** from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in *** suppressing evidence,” but does not specify when the State’s notice of appeal must be filed. The time for filing the notice of appeal in a criminal case is the subject of Supreme Court Rule 606(b), which provides:
“Except as provided in Rule 604(d), the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion. When a timely posttrial or postsentencing motion directed against the judgment has been filed *** any notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of all pending postjudgment motions shall have no effect and shall be stricken by the trial court. Upon striking the notice of appeal, the trial court shall forward to the appellate court within 5 days a copy of the order striking the notice of appeal, showing by whom it was filed and the date on which it was filed. This rule applies whether the timely postjudgment motion was filed before or after the date on which the notice of appeal was filed. A new notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days following the entry of the order disposing of all timely postjudgment motions. Within 5 days of its being so filed a copy of the notice of appeal or an amendment of the notice of appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the circuit court to the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken. Except as provided in paragraph (c) below, and in Rule 604(d), no appeal may be taken from a trial court to a reviewing court after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken. The clerk of the appellate court shall notify any party whose appeal has been dismissed under this rule.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b).
We interpret a supreme court rule in the same manner as a statute. People v. King,
As defendant correctly notes, the first sentence of Rule 606(b) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment unless a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed. Thus, the tolling rule embodied in this sentence and the four that follow applies to final judgments. The penultimate sentence of the rule, which is not limited to final judgments, contains no explicit tolling provision. As applied to final judgments, the first five sentences of the rule and the penultimate sentence could produce different results. The conflict may be resolved, however, by applying the principle of construction that, “[wjhere a general statutory provision and a more specific statutory provision relate to the same subject, we will presume that the legislature intended the more specific provision to govern.” Moore v. Green,
The dissent suggests that the possible conflict between the first five sentences of the rule and the penultimate sentence justifies an ex-tratextual approach to construction. According to the dissent, the principle of “acquiescence” should be applied so as to construe the rule in accordance with Burks, Smith, Van Matre, Rimmer, and Stokes.
“The general rule is, that where terms used in the statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments or re-enactments of the statute, they are to be understood and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court unless a contrary intention of the legislature is made clear. The judicial construction becomes a part of the law, and it is presumed that the legislature in passing the law knew such construction of the words in the prior enactment.” People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank,361 Ill. 75 , 78-79 (1935).
Similarly, “where the legislature chooses not to amend terms of a statute after judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court’s statement of legislative intent.” R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n,
It is also debatable whether the threshold requirement for application of the principle — that the terms used in Rule 606(b) “have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction” — has been met here. None of the decisions on which the dissent relies actually explored the language of Rule 606(b). As we noted, the decisions were based on public policy rather than construction of Rule 606(b), which was mentioned only parenthetically. For all practical purposes, the cases simply ignored the rule. We question whether this may be properly called “judicial construction.”
Moreover, although supreme court rules are construed in the same manner as statutes, application of the acquiescence principle to a supreme court rule is analytically problematic. The dissent’s argument is that the supreme court has had opportunities to amend Rule 606(b) to correct the results in Stokes and similar cases; by not availing itself of these opportunities, the court has acquiesced in those results. In fact, the supreme court had even more direct opportunities to repudiate the tolling rule. Leave to appeal was sought in Burks, Smith, and Van Matre. The supreme court denied leave to appeal in all three cases. See People v. Burks,
The dissent also offers an alternative textual analysis of Rule 606(b)’s first sentence, which states, in pertinent part, “the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” (Emphasis added.) 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). The dissent suggests that the word “final” modifies only the first instance of the word “judgment,” not the second. Under this reading, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final judgment, or within 30 days after the ruling on a timely motion to reconsider directed against any appealable judgment, final or interlocutory.”
We note that the dissent’s reading of Rule 606(b) would appear to foreclose any appeal from an interlocutory order if no motion to reconsider has been filed. The dissent claims this is not so, because the penultimate sentence of the rule permits an appeal from an interlocutory order within 30 days of its entry. This view not only ignores the definite article in the first sentence, but also fails to give any effect to the word “final.” If the dissent is correct that appeals from final judgments and interlocutory orders may, in either case, be taken within 30 days of the judgment or order itself, or within 30 days of the entry of an order disposing of the motion, the word “final” serves no discernible purpose. It would appear that, without the word “final,” the results would be exactly the same.
The dissent’s remaining argument for recognition of a tolling rule invokes considerations of stare decisis. But stare decisis considerations do not apply to decisions from other judicial districts of the appellate court. People v. DeVoss,
The dissent further argues that, if we decline to follow the course set by Stokes and its progeny, we should apply our decision only prospectively in accordance with the principles described in Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park,
Our supreme court stated:
“Generally, when a court issues an opinion, the decision is presumed to apply both retroactively and prospectively. [Citations.] That presumption can be overcome in two types of circumstances. First, the issuing court itself may expressly state that its decision will be applied prospectively only. [Citation.] Second, a later court may, under certain circumstances, override the presumption by declining to give the previous opinion retroactive effect, at least with respect to the parties appearing before the later court. The present case falls under the latter category. Accordingly, we will confine our discussion to cases which involve situations in which a later court is deciding whether to give a previous decision prospective effect only.” Aleckson,176 Ill. 2d at 86-87 .
The defendants argued that only the supreme court had the power to give a decision only prospective effect. The Aleckson court flatly rejected the argument. Aleckson,
Although Aleckson clearly stands for the proposition that the appellate court has the power to give a decision only prospective effect, it would seem that the exercise of that power necessarily presupposes that the appellate court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Our jurisdiction is, after all, the basis of our power to act. It is one thing to hold that a reviewing court that has jurisdiction to hear an appeal may apply a prior decision only prospectively. It is quite another to hold that a reviewing court that has found its jurisdiction lacking may nonetheless act outside its jurisdiction on the theory that it is empowered to apply its jurisdictional decision only prospectively. To so hold would empower the reviewing court to exercise jurisdiction where none exists. We are hesitant to extend Aleckson in this manner without clear direction from our supreme court.
We need not definitively resolve the question in this case, however. As Aleckson demonstrates, the question of prospectivity may be taken up in subsequent cases as is necessary or appropriate. Moreover, it has long been the law that, “[o]n those occasions when prospective application is warranted, the holding of the court still controls the case at bar; to not apply the rule would render it dictum and deprive the challenger the fruits of his efforts in questioning the old, erroneous rule.” John Carey Oil Co. v. W.C.P Investments,
In sum, the order quashing defendant’s arrest and suppressing evidence was not a final judgment, so the State’s motion to reconsider did not toll the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal. That period expired on September 11, 2006. The State’s notice of appeal, filed on October 23, 2006, was untimely and did not confer jurisdiction on this court.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, because we are creating a split of authority, and because a substantial number of cases involving this issue are currently pending, we have, “on our own motion, granted a certificate of importance [Ill. S. Ct. R. 316 (eff. Dec. 6, 2006)] and directed the same to issue.” People v. Butchek,
Appeal dismissed.
GILLERAN JOHNSON, J, concurs.
Notes
See
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
This case poses the question of whether the State’s timely filed motion to reconsider will toll the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The issue between the majority and the dissent, however, is whether this court should follow the doctrine of stare decisis, even though, arguably, the rationale underpinning the tolling rule is wrong, but well established. Central to the doctrine of stare decisis is the idea that, usually, it is more important that the law be settled than it be settled correctly. People v. Jones,
As my disagreement with the majority is its abandonment of settled precedent, I first trace the history of that precedent. Then I discuss stare decisis and how the precedent has been implicitly followed. Last, I offer an alternate interpretation of the rule that avoids the necessity of abandoning the long-standing tolling rule.
A. Stare Decisis
1. History of the Tolling Rule
The majority correctly identifies the cases comprising all of the reported cases that have considered expressly the question of whether the State’s motion to reconsider a grant of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence will toll the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal to vest the appellate court with jurisdiction. I note that each of the cases holds that the motion to reconsider tolls the time to appeal and that a notice of appeal filed within 30 days after the resolution of the motion to reconsider will be deemed timely, or else cites to a case so holding.
Robins incorporated the notion:
“Public policy clearly favors correction of errors at the trial level. We have previously held that a motion to reconsider is an appropriate method to be utilized in directing the attention of the trial judge to [a] claim of error. (Childress v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1968),97 Ill. App. 2d 112 ,239 N.E.2d 492 .) The time for appeal commenced with the denial of that motion [to reconsider].” Robins,33 Ill. App. 3d at 636 .
This concept apparently arose fully formed and developed from the civil law. Robins offers no analysis or consideration of the propriety, if any, of engrafting principles derived from the civil law onto the criminal law. On the other hand, the issue pertains to the regulation of the courts, and a court’s ability to correct its errors, which would not seem to vary significantly between the civil and criminal arenas. The force of the holding in Robins, then, should be commensurate with the soundness of its reasoning. Robins purports to base its holding on the “[p]ublic policy favor[ing] correction of errors at the trial level.” This notion of providing the opportunity for a quick and expeditious method to correct errors short of appeal has been repeatedly confirmed and endorsed by our supreme court (People v. Mink,
I recognize that the majority does not directly assail Robins. Instead, it attacks Stokes, which derived its tolling rule from Robins. It finds Robins to be factually distinguishable because Robins involved a final order while Stokes involved the same sort of interlocutory order — a grant of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence — that is at issue here. According to the majority, therefore, Stokes’ reliance on Robins is unpersuasive and suspect both for the importation of civil law and the factual difference. I disagree. Just as Robins’ expression of the public policy behind the tolling rule retains vitality, so too does Stokes’ explanation. It is the reasoning of the case, the basis in public policy, that gives the tolling rule force, not solely its provenance. If there were no legitimate policy rationale behind the rule, then it would have been superceded or otherwise displaced. The fact that it has the legs to be cited as justification 30 years later suggests that it was an apt expression of public policy then and now. Thus, regardless of whether Robins appropriately cited Childress for the tolling proposition, it clearly expressed the public policy behind the tolling rule, and that public policy provides the valid analytical support for Stokes.
The majority also assails Stokes on the ground that, if it is applying civil principles to criminal appeals, then the motion to reconsider, being a motion directed against an interlocutory order, is ineffective to toll the running of the 30-day time period for filing a notice of appeal. The majority cites to Craine v. Bill Kay’s Downers Grove Nissan,
The majority worries that following the well-settled tolling rule is inimical to a defendant’s right to have the charges against him expeditiously resolved.
I would accept the statements of the tolling rule in Robins, Stokes, Clark, McBride, Rimmer, Van Matre, and Burks at face value. In my view, they are underpinned by a proper and valid expression of public policy to which the majority gives too little weight in its analysis.
In Smith, the court relied on Williams,
Williams, in turn, relied on Heil for the proposition that “[t]he relevant statutes, and the rules promulgated by [the supreme court], demonstrate the intent that in criminal as well as civil matters the circuit court be given the opportunity to reconsider final appealable judgments and orders within 30 days of their entry.” Heil,
Next, in Mink, the supreme court found that the public policy was better served by expanding its rationale to include interlocutory judgments. In Mink, our supreme court stated that “[a] court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its own rulings, even in the absence of a statute or rule granting it such authority. [Citations.] A court’s power to reconsider and correct its decisions extends to interlocutory, as well as final, judgments.” Mink,
Mink, Williams, and Heil contain clear and unambiguous expressions of public policy favoring allowing the trial court to reconsider its rulings, and this public policy includes reconsidering interlocutory judgments. The cases cited by the majority implement this policy in reference to Rule 606(b). Based on the valid public policy motivating the tolling rule in all of the cases considered by the majority, I would adhere to their consistent holdings that a timely motion to reconsider a grant of a defendant’s motion to suppress tolls the time for taking an appeal.
The majority takes issue with my elucidation of the public policy underpinning the tolling rule, contending that it has no basis in the supreme court rules. See
The majority further questions the public policy underpinnings of the tolling rule, asserting that, despite Mink’s statement that “[a] court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its own rulings, even in the absence of a statute or rule granting it such authority,” and this power “extends to interlocutory, as well as final, judgments” (Mink,
Additionally, the majority demands symmetry between the civil and criminal justice systems.
My point, ultimately, is not that I am 100% correct in my reasoning and the majority is 100% wrong (although the majority seems to think along those lines), but rather it is that, where we have a well-established rule of law that has, rightly or wrongly, been engrafted onto the supreme court rules, and where the supreme court itself has expressly passed upon the public policy reasoning underlying the supreme court rule at issue, we should not be so quick to delete the rule and unsettle the law in a heretofore well-settled and uncontroversial niche, and one as important as appellate jurisdiction. After all, “appellate jurisdiction is akin to strolling through a minefield” (Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Jennings,
2. Implementation of the Tolling Rule
The principle of stare decisis further strongly supports following the holdings of Burks, Smith, Van Matre, Rimmer, McBride, Clark, Stokes, and Robins, as well as the clear expressions of public policy in Mink, Williams, and Heil. Our supreme court recently explained the principles behind stare decisis:
“The doctrine of stare decisis ‘ “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” ’ People v. Caballes,221 Ill. 2d 282 , 313 (2006), quoting Neff v. George,364 Ill. 306 , 308-09 (1936), overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman,387 Ill. 321 (1944). In other words, ‘ “a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument” ’ (Wakulich v. Mraz,203 Ill. 2d 223 , 230 (2003), quoting Prall v. Burckhartt,299 Ill. 19 , 41 (1921)), so that the law will not change erratically, but will develop in a principled, intelligible fashion.” People v. Colon,225 Ill. 2d 125 , 145-46 (2007).
Our supreme court admonished, however, that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be followed blindly and mechanically.
“If it is clear a court has made a mistake, it will not decline to correct it, even if the mistake has been reasserted and acquiesced in for many years. [Citation.] That said, this court will not depart from precedent merely because it might have decided otherwise if the question were a new one. [Citation.] As we recently reiterated, any departure from stare decisis must be ‘ “specially justified.” ’ People v. Suarez,224 Ill. 2d 37 , 50 (2007), quoting People v. Sharpe,216 Ill. 2d 481 , 520 (2005). Thus, prior decisions should not be overruled absent ‘good cause’ or ‘compelling reasons.’ Suarez,224 Ill. 2d at 50 , quoting Sharpe,216 Ill. 2d at 520 . In general, a settled rule of law that does not contravene a statute or constitutional principle should be followed unless doing so is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. [Citations.] Good cause to depart from stare decisis also exists when governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.” Colon,225 Ill. 2d at 146 .
In addition, this court has noted that “[t]he rule of stare decisis is founded upon sound principles in the administration of justice.” Appelhans v. McFall,
Of course, one man’s meat is another man’s poison, and the majority can easily assert that Robins is flawed because it inexplicably imports into the criminal law a principle (and one that is later repudiated in Craine) from civil law; Stokes is poorly reasoned; and Smith relies on a case that does not stand for the principle relied upon. I have questioned this reasoning above and, obviously, I do not view it as “good cause” or providing “compelling reasons” to depart from the tolling rule consistently set forth for the previous 30-plus years in Robins through Burks. After all, under the doctrine of stare decisis, in most circumstances it is more important that the rule be settled than it be settled correctly. Jones,
Instead, the majority’s departure from the principles of Robins through Burks, while arguably settling the rule correctly, nevertheless unsettles a system that has been functioning for the past 30-plus years and confers no benefit upon the courts or the public other than, perhaps, an abstract and academic sense that the “plain” language of Rule 606(b) is at long last being given its plain and unambiguous meaning. (Of course, even the majority does not contend that Rule 606(b) is without ambiguity, and I offer my interpretation of the rule in part B below.) Whether or not the majority’s rejection of the settled rule of law in Robins through Burks will “result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests” (Colon,
The majority shrugs off the argument in favor of observing stare decisis with a citation to People v. DeVoss,
This distinction between the hierarchical principle and stare decisis is important, because the doctrine of stare decisis lends a “should” to the inquiry of “can” used by the majority in this case. The majority demonstrates that we can change the settled interpretation of Rule 606; stare decisis causes me to ask whether we should change the settled rule. The short shrift to which the majority gives the doctrine of stare decisis is unfortunate. While I might agree with the majority that its reading of Rule 606 is more faithful to the words employed in the text of the rule than is the current tolling rule engrafted onto Rule 606 by 30 years of case law, I would adopt that reading only in the absence of those 30 years of case law. That the tolling rule has been employed continuously for 30 years is a testament to its workability and adequate functioning. Thus, my point here is that, because the tolling rule is not broken, and because it has been part of Illinois case law (despite the obvious analytical shortcomings identified by the majority) for more than 30 years, it should be followed. See Jones,
The majority responds that it is not stare decisis, but comity, that governs our adherence to other districts’ decisions. This view suggests that we owe no more deference to the decisions of the First District of the Appellate Court of Illinois than we do to the decisions of the First District of the Court of Appeal of California. See Black’s Law Dictionary 267 (6th ed. 1990) (judicial comity is principle by which “courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another”). Given our identity as one appellate court and the extent to which we routinely rely on other districts’ decisions, I disagree with this view. In any event, it makes little practical difference here. If comity is what governs, then this surely is a case in which we should exercise it.
I suspect that the majority would rejoin that the tolling rule is not well settled in the Second District, because it has never been expressly considered. Or the majority might say that the lack of analysis at the inception of the tolling rule is a fatal flaw to its soundness, and that this is sufficient justification to depart from following those cases that have already decided the issue. I do not necessarily disagree. My disagreement, again, is that it is this appellate court that is making the decision. I believe that a decision to depart from a rule of law settled for more than 30 years is one that is properly within the province of our supreme court and not this court.
My interest piqued by the majority’s reading of Rule 606(b), I have extensively researched to see if the cases are aberrant or whether there is a consistent pattern of implementing the tolling rule over the years since Robins and Stokes. My research has uncovered no less than 14 reported cases in which the recitation of facts makes clear that the appellate court accepted implicitly the application of the tolling rule. Interestingly, the majority of the 14 cases originate from this, the Second District. In our defense, however, I note that in none of those cases was a jurisdictional issue regarding the timeliness of the notice of appeal raised or considered. See People v. Flores,
In the interest of fairness, I note that my research uncovered four cases in which the suppression, reconsideration, and notice of appeal were all accomplished within 30 days, thus presenting no issue under the majority’s rule: People v. Gott,
My point in the extensive citations is to illustrate that the Stokes rule, a timely motion to reconsider will toll the time in which to appeal, is both long standing and almost instinctively internalized within the law and its practitioners. To be fair, however, none of the cases cited above (
I make one last point under the topic of stare decisis: the majority, in responding to the acquiescence argument that I develop in section B below, noted that our supreme court dispensed with a 16-year-old rule despite the fact that the acquiescence principle would have justified its continued adherence.
B. Construction
My final area of disagreement with the majority is with its construction of Rule 606(b). The majority correctly notes that it is fundamental that the supreme court rules are interpreted in the same manner as statutes. 134 Ill. 2d R. 2; People v. King,
Accepting for purposes of argument that the rule is ambiguous, I propose a different principle of construction, namely, the principle of acquiescence. I realize that it is a weak reed on which to base a determination of the drafters’ intent, but, here, it is appropriate. Rule 606 has been amended nine times since 1970. As of July 1, 1971, Rule 606(b) was amended to state:
“The notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days from the entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken ***. *** [N]o appeal may be taken from a trial court to a reviewing court after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken.” 50 Ill. 2d R. 606(b).
Interestingly, the first sentence refers to an “order” or a “judgment.” The 30-day limitation likewise refers to the “order” or the “judgment.”
Rule 606 was next amended effective July 1, 1975, but no changes were made to Rule 606(b). 58 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). Robins was issued in 1975 and interpreted Rule 606(b) to allow a motion to reconsider an interlocutory judgment to toll the time to appeal. Effective February 17, 1977, Rule 606 was again amended, with Rule 606(b) taking more substantially the form in which it exists today:
“Except as provided in Rule 604(d), the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion. *** [N]o appeal may be taken from a trial court to a reviewing court after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken.” 65 Ill. 2d R. 606(b).
The evolution of Rule 606(b) demonstrates that the “order or judgment” language has been removed in the first sentence, replaced by the same language used today, “final judgment.” The final sentence continues to use the “order or judgment” language, as it does today. This suggests that it is perhaps an inadvertent holdover from the older versions of the rule that has not been harmonized with the terminology of the rule as it developed. In May 1977, Stokes was issued, relying on Robins, and holding that a motion to reconsider an interlocutory judgment will toll the 30-day time in which to bring an appeal. In 1978, in Heil,
Rule 606 was next amended effective October 15, 1979. 73 Ill. 2d R. 606. The amendment did not affect Rule 606(b) at all. Clark was issued in December 1979, holding that a motion to reconsider tolls the time to appeal. Clark,
In 1983, McBride was issued. Effective July 1, 1984, Rule 606 was again amended, but the amendment did not affect Rule 606(b). 107 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). For the next 15 years, the rule remained unchanged. During that time, Rimmer, Van Matre, Williams, Mink, and Smith were issued. All these cases expressed agreement with the idea that a timely motion to reconsider will toll the time to appeal.
Effective December 1, 1999, Rule 606(b) was amended to take its current form. 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b); see also
Based on this recitation, it is clear that the tolling rule has been uniformly used (even endorsed by the supreme court in Mink, Williams, and Heil). From time to time, the supreme court has amended Rule 606(b), but never in such a way as to disapprove of the judicial interpretations holding that a timely motion to reconsider will toll the time for appeal. Further, after each amendment of Rule 606(b), additional cases reiterated the tolling rule. Based on this history, then, I would apply the doctrine of acquiescence to Rule 606(b) and follow the tolling rule consistently iterated in Robins through Burks. See, e.g., People v. Downs,
The majority is unimpressed with the principle of acquiescence. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing the dates by which the supreme court rule had been modified with the cases expressing the tolling rule, and the supreme court cases endorsing the policy and reasoning behind the tolling rule, I have demonstrated that the issue could be settled under the acquiescence principle. That, of course, does not mean the principle is not without problems in the context of applying it to the supreme court rules. Neither I nor the majority have found any case applying this principle to the supreme court rules. This suggests to me either that it should not be applied or that nobody else has attempted it. The majority clearly points out the weakness of reliance upon this principle alone. However, the principle of acquiescence along with the principle of stare decisis and the authority identified above provide significant reasons to continue to adhere to the tolling rule.
In addition to the principles of acquiescence and stare decisis, other principles of construction further militate in favor of continued observance of the tolling rule. This court has stated that, in construing an ambiguous supreme court rule, “the court may look beyond the language to consider the rule’s purpose.” People v. King,
Under the majority’s construction, any State appeal from the grant of a defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence must be perfected within 30 days, and all collateral activities, like a motion to reconsider, must be completed before that time as well. Under the heretofore unbrokenly applied tolling rule, a motion to reconsider will toll the time for appeal until it is ruled upon; then the 30-day clock commences for the State to file a notice of appeal. In a vacuum, neither construction stands out as significantly better. The tolling rule advances the policy of allowing the trial court to exercise its inherent error-correcting power and thus enhances judicial economy by potentially weeding out from appeal those cases in which the trial court realizes an error. The majority’s construction works to promptly resolve criminal matters and to ease the inherent uncertainty that the tolling rule would impose upon a defendant. We do not operate in a vacuum, however. The weight of the 30-odd years in which the tolling rule has been applied has created settled expectations among the practitioners before our courts. Changing the rule will inevitably upset those expectations.
It has been held that a court has the inherent authority to determine whether a decision is to be given only prospective application. Aleckson,
Considering the factors leads to the conclusion that this is a case for only prospective application. First, it declares a new rule. Whether the majority wishes to characterize its decision as resolving an issue of first impression, or as the changing of settled precedent, there is absolutely no question that the majority’s rule was never foreshadowed, either in Illinois case law as a whole or in Second District jurisprudence particularly. I think the balance on the second factor is in equipoise. As to the final factor, the rule will cause substantial inequity to those practitioners who have relied upon the 30-year-old landscape in preparing (and becoming locked into) their litigation strategies. This rule change was unheralded and impossible to predict. Thus, the third factor also weighs heavily in favor of only prospective application. I therefore urge my colleagues to declare that this case will have only prospective application. By prospective application, I mean to apply the rule such that only those parties who can still conform their conduct to the rule will be affected; those who have already acted in reliance on the tolling rule should, in fairness, remain unaffected by the rule. I also note that there are many ways to craft a prospective application of the majority’s rule. See Brown v. Jaimovich,
The majority argues that Aleckson should not be extended to a case involving jurisdiction. In Aleckson, though, the jurisdictional bar of compliance with the Administrative Review Law was held to be properly deferrable through only prospective application of the new rule. I fail to see any substantial difference between the situation in Aleckson and here. Moreover, under the old rule, we had jurisdiction to reach the issue and it is only the majority’s newly fashioned reading that divests jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burks,
I observe, additionally, an unlooked-for consequence to the majority’s construction. This case, in the scheme of things, is fairly insignificant. It thankfully involves no injuries or deaths or loss of tremendously valuable property. But what if it did? I note that the infamous Brown’s Chicken Massacre case involved a similar procedural posture to this one. There, the defendant prevailed on a motion to suppress evidence, namely, his videotaped statement. The State appealed, arguing that its prosecution of the defendant would be substantially impaired without the videotaped evidence. On consideration of the merits, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and reinstated the videotaped statement into evidence. People v. Degorski,
Looking to the broader picture, the majority has not, apparently, considered the effect of its holding. Under the majority’s rule, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. What about the dozens of cases identified above (and perhaps hundreds of unreported cases) that have been decided in accordance with the tolling rule? If the appellate court had no jurisdiction, then its order is void. This results in several classes for which the majority should make some sort of provision. In the first class, the appellate court will have affirmed the trial court’s order. This should result in no effect, because the challenged evidence properly remained suppressed, and the outcome of a trial, if any, was based on a case presented without the objectionable evidence. In the second class, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing evidence. However, the order was void, because the tolling rule did not extend the time for appeal. This leads to several subclasses: those defendants who may still timely file petitions for rehearing, those who may still file postconviction petitions, and those whose direct and collateral appeals are concluded. The question of a void judgment can be raised at any time; further, the void judgment will have resulted in a conviction. I imagine that, in each case, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial. However, from an institutional perspective, we have already gotten it right — the evidence was supposed to come before the finder of fact. The new trial, resulting from the void appellate judgment, will be fundamentally flawed, because the suppressed evidence was erroneously suppressed and should be presented to the finder of fact. This certainly does not seem to be a desirable result, even as it appears to be an inevitable one.
Even if the application of the rule is announced to be only prospective, I am hard-pressed to see a way out of the morass that the new rule will cause — those defendants who have undergone a trial as a result of a now-void appellate judgment would seem to have a pretty good argument for a new trial, even if we tried to make the rule prospective only. Of course, if the rule operates retrospectively, then we must squarely face this consequence.
These consequences resulting from the varying constructions of Rule 606(b), in my view, favor keeping the tolling rule. As the consequences resulting from the competing constructions are a valid consideration in judging the merits of the competing constructions (King,
The majority’s interpretation of the language of Rule 606(b) is not foreclosed to challenge. It is arguable, as the State suggests, that “final judgment” refers to final judgments, while the use of the unmodified word “judgment” refers to both final and interlocutory judgments. In subsequent sentences, “judgment” is modified to make the understanding explicit that it is a final judgment (e.g., “When a timely posttrial or postsentencing motion directed against the judgment has been filed” (210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b) (sentence 2))). The first sentence, by contrast, states that “the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b) (sentence 1). The juxtaposition of “final judgment” and the unmodified “judgment” can be reasonably construed to state the general rule that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final judgment, or within 30 days after the ruling on a timely motion to reconsider directed against any appealable judgment, final or interlocutory. The “or if’ clause, then, expressly allows and validates the holdings in Robins through Burks. The “order or judgment” language in the penultimate sentence is reconciled by noting that “order” can refer to the denial of the motion to reconsider, and thus it harmonizes with the first sentence.
The majority reads the foregoing to require a motion to reconsider before a notice of appeal can be filed. Not so. The penultimate sentence states that “no appeal may be taken from a trial court to a reviewing court after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b) (sentence 7). This language allows for the possibility of filing a notice of appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment within the 30-day time limit. The alternative interpretation of the first sentence allows for the tolling rule to apply.
If this construction is adopted, then there is no need to resort to the tools and aids of construction — instead, the plain language of Rule 606(b) is no longer ambiguous and it is given its ordinary (and heretofore universally accepted) effect.
In summary, for over three decades, the courts in Illinois have uniformly held that a State’s motion to reconsider the trial court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to suppress will toll the time for appeal. This uniformity extends so far as to accepting without challenge the tolling rule in a significant number of cases, many of which are from the Second District. I have further undertaken an examination of the cases and found them to be based on the principle that the trial court should have the opportunity to correct its errors, thereby eliminating needless appeals. This principle is repeatedly expressed throughout all facets of the law and I believe it justifies our continued adherence. In addition, the principle of stare decisis suggests that the majority’s rule will actually cause the problems that a departure from precedent is supposed to remedy. Moreover, stare decisis suggests that it is better to keep a less-than-analytically-perfect rule if the rule is long standing and working; the long use of the tolling rule demonstrates both that it works and that it is quite long standing. The principle of stare decisis, then, strongly supports our continued adherence to the tolling rule. Also, Rule 606(b) may be interpreted in a manner that renders it unambiguous, contrary to the majority’s implicit holding. While the majority presents plenty of insightful analysis regarding the proper interpretation of Rule 606(b), as if it were a matter of first impression, I have presented sufficient reasoning to defer usurping the decision from its proper maker, our supreme court. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
The majority further notes that I have cited cases in which the State’s motion to reconsider was raised and resolved and its notice of appeal was filed, all within the 30 days provided by Rule 606(b).