97 N.Y.S. 322 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1905
The information charged that the defendant, on behalf of the H. Marcus Skirt Company, á corporation and an employer of labor, did “ coerce ■ and ■ compel one Hyman Scheinbaum to enter into a written, agreement *. ■* * not to join or become a member of any labor organization as a condition of” securing employment from said company and continuing in its employ. A copy of the agreement .was set forth in the information. The company therein agreed to employ Scheinbaum as a piece worker as long as he proved satisfactory and to pay for all finished work weekly and he agreed not to belong to any labor union or. to take part in any strike, against his employer, and in the event of his failure to .comply with his agreement to forfeit any money due and also the amount deposited as security, which was one dollar per week from his earnings, not " exceeding ten dollars. The defendant pleaded guilty to the information, but at once moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the information does not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime, because the statute contravenes the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution' and also the State Constitution, “ in that it restrains the right to free contract for a purpose not calculated, intended, convenient or appropriate to protect the public health or to serve the • public comfort or safety.” • The motion was denied and sentence passed, and thereupon the defendant appealed: Section 171a of the Penal Code provides as follows: “ Any person or persons, employer or employers of labor, and any person or persons of any corporation or corporations on behalf of . such corporation or corporations, who shall hereafter coerce or compel any person or persons, employe or employes, laborer or mechanic; to enter, into, an agreement, either written or verbal'from such person, persons, employe,'laborer, or mechanic, not to join or become a member of aüy labor organization, as a condition of such person or persons securing employment, or continuing in the employment of any such person , or persons, employer or employers, corporation- or. corporations, shall be deemed guilty Of a misdemeanor. .The penalty for such misdemeanor shall be imprisonment in a penal institution for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
The information to which the defendant pleaded guilty shows a
■ The learned counsel for the People .argues that the words of the statute and of the information, “ coerce ” and “ compel,” imply the use of some unlawful means and relate to and embrace something more than a mere suggestion or request. We are of opinion that this contention cannot be sustained. 'The statute was aimed .at the coercion or compulsion resulting from the desire to obtain work and the inability to obtain it without entering into such agreement. The question, therefore, is, as we -view it,' whether it is competent for the Legislature to inflict criminal punishment on an employer for asking an. applicant for employment whether he belongs to a labor union, and whether he is willing to withdraw or agree not to join as a condition of obtaining employment and making that a condition of the employment. It is manifest that if this legislation be constitutional, at some future time when the Legislature is differently organized it may make it a crime for a person whose employment is solicited to impose as a condition of. accepting the " service that the employer shall' not employ non-union men or those who do not belong to the particular union of the individual making the agreement. It is obvious that if it was competent for the Legislature to enact this statute, it will be competent for it to enact in various forms class legislation that will not be for the public good. At one session it will enact legislation in the interest of the employers, and at another in the interest of employees; and these questions would become important political factors. Such legislation, is a radical departure from what has been regarded in the past as the province of the Legislature. It has always been supposed,' and the decision's so holding are numerous, that-an employer, so long as.the contract does not affect the public health, morals or welfare, is at liberty to employ or discharge whomsoever he pleases and to refuse to employ any person, no matter what his motive therefor may be, without becoming answerable therefor except for a breach of contract for an unjustifiable discharge of an employee; and likewise that an individual may accept, or refuse any employment that he chooses or quit work at will, and thát his reason therefor cannot be questioned, and he
Of course, contracts to evade the laws or otherwise against public policy are not within the protection óf either the Federal or State Constitution. (Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447.) Many other cases might be cited tending to show that this legislation is uncon
It .may be that the Legislature under its reserve, power to alter, amend', and repeal the charters of corporations and general laws Under which they are formed (Const, art. 8, § 1), might declare it, unlawful for corporations to'make such contracts; but.it is evident-, that the provisions of section 171a of; the Penal Code,.- now under consideration, were enac.tecl on the assumption that the. Legislature could thus regulate the contracts of Individuals as well a's of .corporations. ' 'Many of the corporations affected are in business -competition with individuals, and it would be- unreasonable to impute to the Legislature an intention to discriminate against domestic, corporations in favor of the individuals in business competition with them. The learned counsel for the People neither suggested in the. oral argument nor in his points that the statute is severable, and may be constitutional as to corporations even though unconstitutional as to. individuals. We, therefore, do not deem it necessary to discuss the. point, which suggested itself to us,'further.
■ It follows that the. judgment of conviction should^ be reversed, and the defendant discharged,
O’Brien, P. J., Patterson and Ingraham, JJ., concurred; McLaughlin, J., concurred in result.
Judgment reversed and defendant discharged.