delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Todd Mannon, appeals the order of the circuit court of Marshall County denying his petition to rescind statutory summary suspension. We reverse.
The defendant was stopped in Henry by a police officer and charged with driving with no red taillights and no registration for his boat trailer. Immediately after the officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle, he was advised by radio dispatch that defendant’s driving privileges were revoked. Defendant was then taken into custody, searched, cuffed and transported to the Marshall County jail. When defendant was placed in custody, the officer did not make any mention or inquire of the defendant concerning possible alcohol intoxication. At the scene, the officer did not ask the defendant if he had consumed alcohol or request him to perform any field sobriety tests. Upon arriving at the jail, the officer completed his paperwork for the initial charges, i.e., driving while license revoked, no red taillights, and no boat trailer registration.
After completing this paperwork, the officer then asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests at the jail. The defendant complied. At the conclusion of the field sobriety tests, the officer admonished defendant concerning the statutory warnings for administration of breath or blood-alcohol tests. The officer requested defendant take a breathalyzer test. Defendant refused and was then arrested for “driving under the influence of alcohol” (DUI). In conjunction with defendant’s arrest for DUI, a summary suspension of his driving privileges was issued 46 days later.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. We agree.
According to section 2 — 118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (the Code), there are four areas of inquiry with respect to seeking rescission of a statutory summary suspension. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2 — 118.1(b).) As stated in section 2 — 118.1(b)(1) of the Code, the first area of inquiry is “Whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 — 501 [of the Vehicle Code], or a similar provision of a local ordinance, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2 — 118.1(b)(1).) The test for determining whether an arrest has occurred is whether a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have concluded that he was not free to leave considering the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Jones (1990),
The applicable statute in this case provides in pertinent part:
“Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle *** shall be deemed to have given consent *** to a *** test of *** breath *** if arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket for any offense as defined in Section 11 — 501 ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11-501.1(a).)
Therefore, according to the statute, the prerequisite for a valid arrest for DUI is the issuance and service of a written citation sufficiently apprising the defendant he is, or has been, charged with DUI. According to section 11 — 501.1(a) of the Code, if a suspect has not been properly arrested for DUI by the service of a uniform citation, the statutory summary suspension shall not issue. In People v. Wozniak (1990),
For the reasons heretofore indicated, the order of the circuit court of Marshall County is reversed.
Reversed.
SLATER and GORMAN, JJ., concur.
