Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Keegan, J.), rendered September 11, 1991, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of attempted murder in the first degree (two counts), attempted aggravated assault in the first degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (three counts).
Assuming that defendant is correct in his claim that the police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle, any taint resulting from the alleged illegal stop was fully attenuated by defendant’s independent and affirmative act of speeding away and firing three shots at the officers who followed (see, People v Boodle,
Defendant further argues that his statements should have been suppressed because his initial oral statement to the State Police was the product of custodial interrogation before he had been read the Miranda warnings. We consider this statement to have been spontaneously and voluntarily given, and thus properly admitted (see, People v Lynes,
As to defendant’s claim that he was improperly sentenced, we agree in part. The sentences imposed on counts five and six should have been made to run concurrently, not consecutively, with the sentences imposed on counts three and four. The acts of possessing the weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against the Town of Colonie Police Officers were material elements of the attempted aggravated assault upon the same police officers (see, Penal Law §§ 265.03, 110.00, 120.11), and the People failed to show possession of the gun with the requisite intent to use it unlawfully against the officers except when defendant was committing the attempted aggravated assault charged in the indictment. Thus, the sentences on counts five and six should run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts three and four (see, Penal Law § 70.25 [2]). However, count nine, which charges the criminal possession of a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against the City of Watervliet Police Officer, is not a material element of any
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from should be modified by ordering defendant’s sentences on counts five and six to run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts three and four, and otherwise the judgment should be affirmed.
Crew III, J. P., Cardona, White and Mahoney, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, to provide that the sentences imposed on counts five and six run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts three and four, and, as so modified, affirmed.
