*1
People Manning
v
PEOPLE MANNING
15, 2000,
Docket No. 224898. Submitted June
at Detroit. Decided Decem-
15, 2000,
ber
at 9:15 A.M.
Tiya Manning
charged
Wayne
in the
Circuit Court with murder
sup-
assault with intent to murder. The defendant moved to
press
inculpatory
given
police
an
statement
that she had
to the
awaiting arraignment.
while she was confined and
The defendant
police
early morning
had been arrested
the
in the
horns of June
15, 1999,
placed
police
and had been
in a cell in the Inkster
head-
quarters.
arrest,
Between four and five hours after her
the defen-
rights by
police and, thereafter,
dant was
gave
informed of her
the
police.
morning
18, 1999,
a statement to the
On the
of June
before
arraigned
court,
defendant,
she had been
in the district
the
after
indicating
police
police
to the
that she wished to talk to the
with-
attorney present, gave
police
out an
a second statement to the
implicated
which she
herself in the homicide. It was the second
statement, given
eighty-one
arrest,
some
hours after her
that shе
sought
suppressed
court,
to have
as evidence. The circuit
Sean E
Cox, J., although finding
nothing
that there was
in the record to
suggest
police intentionally delayed arraigning
that the
the defen-
hope
eliciting
dant in
incriminating statement,
sup-
the
an
or to
port
finding
involuntary
that the second statement was
under the
People Cipriano,
(1988),
factors set forth in
The Court of held: suppressing The circuit court erred the second statement solely eighty-one-hour delay on the basis of between the defen- dant’s arrest and release. holding supplant holding The in Riverside Co does not Cipriano, and, indeed, holdings in those two cases dovetail. majority delay forty- in Riverside Co held that a of more than eight arraign- hours between arrest without a warrant and the Opinion Court government charges to show burden to the shifts the merit on extraordinary emergency cir- fide or other of a bona the existence showing such a and that absent caused cumstances that per forty-eight se. River- hours is unreasonable of more than admissibility question into evi- with the Co did not deal side *2 given prosecution that had been of a statement in a criminal dence delay police an unreasonable between there had been to the after circumstances, arraignment. and Under such an arrest accused’s depends admissibility the state- on whether of the statement requires voluntarily, given that consider- a determination ment was delay arraign- Cipriano, in set forth in ation of all the factors only being one of the factors to be considered. ment appears presented Although the second on the record it delay voluntarily given despite defendant’s was statement suppressing arraignment, the statement court’s order the circuit to the circuit the matter must be remanded must be reversed and findings under the fac- that it make of fact court with instructions Cipriano. tors set forth in remanded. Reversed and result, J., concurring in stated that the circuit court Kelly, suppress solely granting on the basis of the the motion to erred delay to the circuit court to that the matter must be remanded and totality under the of the statement consider the voluntariness any Appeals have made The Court of should not
the circumstances. the statement on the basis of the of the voluntariness of evaluation appeal. record on Prearraign- — — — — Voluntariness Law Evidence Confessions Criminal Delay. ment only Unnecessary delay be taken before one factor to confession; evaluating a con- the voluntariness of a into account solely excluded from evidence because fession should not be totality surrounding prearrаignment circum- where the of the voluntarily given. stances indicates the confession Attorney General, Thomas Granholm, M. Jennifer O’Hair, D. Pros- General, John Casey, L. Solicitor Chief Timothy Baughman, and A. ecuting Attorney, Appeals, people. and for the Research, Training, Feinberg, L. for the defendant. James Kelly JJ. P.J., and Before: Whitbeck, and O’Connell, People Manning v prosecution appeals J. The in this case Whitbeck, granted granting leave from a trial court order Tiya Manning’s suppress defendant motion to inculpatory gave police statement that she officers awaiting arraignment. while she was confined and stay The trial proceedings court entered a pending interlocutory appeal. the outcome of this In appeal, explore we must the “fit” between the Michigan Supreme suppres Court’s standards for the following sion of a confession an arrest without a People Cipriano,1 warrant in and the United States probable Court’sstandards for the of a сause determination after an arrest without a warrant in Riverside Co v McLaughlin.2 We conclude that supplant Cipriano Riverside Co does not and that, opinions indeed, the two dovetail. We further con post-Riverside clude that this Court’s Co decisions in People McCray3 v Whitehead,4 while *3 emphasizing mentioning Cipri Riverside Co and not departing Cipriano. ano, are not to be read as from We therefore reverse and remand.
1. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY pertinent The trial court set forth the facts of this opinion granting case in its and order defendant’s suppress: motion to early In the morning 15, 1999, of June Inkster Police
responded
by
shooting
drive
on Florence Street. At
(1991).
[3]
People McCray,
[4]
People Whitehead,
People Cipriano,
[1]
Riverside Co v
v
McLaughlin,
210 Mich
238 Mich
Mich 315;
approximately defendant 1:08 A.M., possible role in the homicide that regard to a Police in spent night shooting. The from the defendant resulted police headquarters at about 5:30 Inkster and in cell fifteenth, morning defendant was read her am. on the morning rights Sgt. gave a statement. On the Hill and gave 18, 1999, 10:20 defendant Detective at about June a.m., him with- stating that she wished to talk to Williams a note attorney present. gave state- Defendant then another out an implicating Defen- allegedly herself the homicide. ment 1999, 18, (June have the second statement dant wishes to suppressed. 10:30 a.m.) aspect police investigation procedural is some- compara- Department is a
what The Inkster Police involved. tively department approximately police consisting small police are Of those 35-40 officers of whom six detectives. only Hines) spe- detectives, (Detective one detective six cially 1999, designated cases. In twelve homi- for homicide City of Inkster. The first officer cides occurred within Abdallah, charge call officer was Detective who was the on 14-15, night 1999. Detective Abdallah went on the of June morning and that Detective on vacation on the sixteenth assigned Hines was Williams was to the case. Detective assigned Williams as it was his first to assist Detective spent investigation. the mоrn- homicide Detective Williams reviewing ing the case and that afternoon of the sixteenth application typed proceeded arraign to have a warrant application completed was on the morn- the defendant. The ing and Williams and of the seventeenth both Detective prosecutor’s to the office Detective Hines went downtown prepared. Wil- warrant As this was Detective to have the unit, trip Hines went liams’ first to the homicide Detective along. processed application the two
The warrant afternoon, Williams went officers left. Later that Detective Upon pick up completed warrant. back downtown to Inkster, went to the 22d his return to Detective Williams *4 17, 1999, to District Court at or about 3:30-4:30 on June p.m. Unfortunately, arraigned. the warrant was have defendant key incomplete missing. Detective with documentation People Manning op Opinion the Court paperwork missing Hines verified that was and that the morning, warrant would be have to rеdone. The next June 18, 1999, cases, filling assigning Detective Hines was in for vacationing another officer. Detective Williams advised him speak that defendant to wanted with him and Detective request get Hines advised Detective Williams to writ- ing. Detective Williams took statement. defendant’s second Subsequently, proceeded Detective Williams downtown and arraigned received the new warrant and was defendant that afternoon.
Approximately passed 81 hours between the time defen- dant was arrested and time of the statement. second prosecution with charged Manning first-degree murder5 and two counts assault with the intent to successfully commit murder.6 moved to quash one of the assault counts. Manning thereafter a motion suppress filed her statement conduct a Walker that hearing.7 Manning argued because of in arraignment, her statement was involun tary under the standard in Cipriano, announced supra. Following opinion the release of this Court’s Whitehead, supra, Manning both argued White hеad and the United State Court’s decision Co, Riverside mandated that her statement be automatically suppressed because she held for eighty over hours without arraignment. its analysis,
In the trial court made the following finding: nothing in this record which indicates that
[T]here
Department
detectives of the
Police
Inkster
were motivated
gain
justify
a desire to
additional
information
Ms.
6 MCL
MCL
See
750.83;
750.316(l)(a);
v Walker
MSA 28.278.
MSA
(On Rehearing),
28.548(l)(a).
374 Mich
H. STANDARD OF
erred in
We
determine whether
trial court
must
involuntary
Manning’s
finding that
confession was
solely
length of
betweеn the
on the basis of the
arraignment. A trial court
her arrest and her
time of
totality
in decid
of the circumstances
must view the
knowing,
ing
a defendant’s statement
whether
voluntary.8
intelligent,
will not reverse
This Court
and
findings regarding those circum
the trial court’s
clearly
they
finding
A
were
erroneous.9
stances unless
clearly
if it leaves with a definite and
erroneous
us
trial court made a mistake.10
firm conviction that the
question
appeal
also entails a
Resolution of
questions de
law. We review such
novo.11
People Snider,
v
A. OVERVIEW proper understanding A of the rather intricate issue of the intersection between the Fifth and Fourth requirements requires a Amendment threshold knowl- edge Michiganpretrial proce- practice criminal briefly process. Below, dure. we outline that
B. ARRESTS making peace generally arrest, Before a officer upon magistrate obtains an arrest warrant from a a probable showing predicates of cause. There are two (1) to the issuance of such an arrest warrant: the presentation proper complaint alleging of a the com (2) finding mission anof offense and a of “reasonable cause” to believe that the in individual accused the complaint magistrate committed that offense.12 may finding base the of reasonable cause on the fac complainant allegations complaint, tual in the the complainant’s complainant’s testimony, the sworn the supplemental testimony affidavit, or the or sworn affi presented by complaint davits of other individuals the required by magistrate.13 6.102(A) or the MCR uses phrase “probable 6.102(B) the cause” and MCR states finding probable “may that a hearsay cause be based on rely allegations
evidence and on factual complaint, complainant the affidavits from or the testimony adequately others, a the sworn witness preserved permit any review, combination of 13Id. MCL 764.1a; MSA 28.860(1). may Importantly, peace а officer
these sources.” person is a warrant if a misdemeanor arrest a without presence is or if there rea the officer’s committed felony a was committed sonable cause to believe person arrested committed it.14 that COURT
C. DISTRICT
ARRAIGNMENTS
person
warrant,
a
arrested
a
After
is
without
person
arresting
bring
mag
before a
officer must
unnecessary delay.”15
for
“without
istrate
arraignment,
magistrate
determines
At
person
probable cause
whether there is
to believe
person
When a
is arrested with
committed
crime.
judicial
yet
warrant, therefore, no
officer has
out a
reasonable
for the arrest.
found that there was
cause
persons
“presumptively
Thus, while all accused
are
proven
person
guilty,”
being
until
is
innocent
when
probable
hearing,
without a warrant or
cause
held
yet
judicial
there
officer has not
determined that
person
to believe
even reasonable cause
commit
Therefore, when
Scalia
ted a crime.
Justice
referred
dissent
Co to an “innocent arres
his
in Riverside
literally
quite
he was
correct.16
tee,”
*7
The Fourth
of the
States Con
Amendment
United
applied
through the
stitution, as
to the states
Four
prohibits
teenth
searches
Amendment,17
unreasonable
Const, Am which states:
IV,
and seizures. See US
persons,
right
people
to be
the
secure
their
houses, papers,
effects, against
searches
unreasonable
and
[14]
15 MCL
[17]
[16]
Riverside
Sodal Cook
MCL
764.26;
764.15(1);
Co, supra
MSA
Co,
MSA
According to the United Court, States forty-eight of more than hours after arrest is presumptively extraordinary unreasonable, absent circ Michigan, right In umstances.18 to be taken magistrate before a for without unneces sary delay implicates two sections the Declaration Rights provides § 11, of our constitution: which pеrson, papers possessions “[t]he house, that and every person shall be secure from unreasonable provides § searches and seizures,” 17, and which person deprived liberty “[n]o shall . . be . of life, property, process without due of law.”19
D. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS AND BINDOVERS step process preliminary The next examination, which must be conducted within four days arraignment.20 permits teen If the court preliminary the defendant to waive examination, it must bind the defendant over for trial.21 If preliminary defendant does not waive examina party may subpoena tion, each witnesses, offer proofs, and examine and cross-examine witnesses.22 felony considering In a matter, if, after evidence, probable the court determines that there is cause accused to a Riverside MCR MCR See Const See also MCL 6.110(C); 6.110(A). “prompt” supra Co, 1963, see also 766.1; art examination. 1, at 56-57. MSA §§ 11 MCL 28.919, 766.12; which entitles the state and the MSA 28.930. *8 615 243
624 Opinion the Court and that committed has been the offense believe court must bind it, the committed the defendant generally a circuit court, trial over to the defendant trial.23 court, for ARRAIGNMENT
E. TRIAL COURT arraignment an must be based on in trial court An Generally, pros or an indictment.24 information jury although grand information, uses ecutor method. Unless an alternative remain indictments prosecutor’s justice, fugitive from is a defendant may has until the defendant not be filed information preliminary but the examination,25 had or waives date set or before the must be filed on information may arraignment.26A defendant the trial court for by filing arraignment state a written waive trial court “acknowledging received defendant has that the ment copy read or had it read information, has of the a explained, charge, the substance
understands
pleads
open
not
court,
waives
charge
guilty
Otherwise, at
mute.”27
or stands
may plead
arraignment, a defendant
the trial court
mentally
guilty
guilty,
guilty,
but
contendere,
nolo
not
insanity.
guilty
reason of
ill, or not
F. WALKER HEARINGS
Michigan
People
Court
Walker,28 In
statements
contends that
when a defendant
held that
[25]
Id.
[28]
Walker, suprа MCR
MCR
MCR
MCR
6.110(E);
6.112(B).
6.112(C).
6.113(C).
see also
MCL
766.13;
MSA 28.931.
Opinion op the Court
that had been made were
trial
involuntary,
court
*9
presence
must conduct a
outside the
hearing
the
jury
voluntariness,
determine the issue of
at which
may
the defendant
take the stand
waiving
without
testify
not to
at trial.
right
right
judi
This
to a pretrial
cial determination
the voluntariness of a criminal
defendant’s statement derives from
prohibition
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu
against compelling
person
tion
a
in a criminal case to
against himself;
be witness
our Michigan counter
is in
part
1963,
1,
Const
art
requirement
§
that
voluntary
a defendant’s statement be
is based on the
recognition
means,
that there are
ranging from out
physical brutality
right
to more refined and subtle
methods, for
“overcoming
defendant’s will.”29As the
United States
Court has said:
recognized
court has
that coercion can be mental
“[T]his
physical,
as well as
and that the blood of the accused is not
only
inquisition.
hallmark of an unconstitutional
A num
demonstrated,
ber of
if
cases have
demonstration were
needed,
efficiency
that
rack
and thumbscrew can
matched,
proper subject, by
given
sophisti
be
more
”[30]
‘persuasion.’
cated modes of
suppress
A motion to
evidence must be made in
trial,31
requirement
advance of
and
applies
this
to a
suppress
involuntary
motion to
confession.32
Therefore, a motion for a Walker
will
hearing
nor
mally follow the trial court arraignment
precede
but
Mich
(1964).
Ct
[30]
[29]
[31]
People Gray,
274;
Id. Jackson v
at
1;
4 L Ed
389-390,
NW2d 515
Leonard,
2d 242
Denno,
quoting
[45]
(1960).
Mich
(1974).
[378]
Blackburn
US
App 643, 644;
App 86,
368, 389;
v
Alabama,
[84]
[207]
Opinion Court point this that the Fifth trial. It is at the actual protection against self-incrimination Amendment protection Amendment with the Fourth intersects against seizures, because searches and unreasonable may argue an unreasonable that a defendant warrant and the district an arrest without a between involuntary in an confes resulted court exactly argu made this Indeed, sion. the defendants Cipriano, McCray, Whitehead, and it is ment in argument Manning makes as well. THE
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUE simply Manning’s The issue here is nоt whether delay. rights were violated Fourth Amendment clearly forty-eight than *10 The here was more government on the hours and the burden would be prove extraordinary that circumstances necessitated delay.33 Manning’s The issue instead is whether suppressed should be because of the statements delay. Cipriano Michigan Supreme held Court in connection with an that a statement obtained only unreasonable is inadmissible when the involuntary, statement was as determined several Cipriano occurred before factors.34The decision in Supreme decision in River the United States Court’s Manning Cipriano argues side Co. that the factors are applicable not here because the confession must be automatically suppressed under the Fourth Amend exclusionary question Therefore, ment rule. becomes whether a Riverside Co Fourth Amendment among is one factor to be considered violation Cipriano, supra [34] Riverside Co, supra at 57. Cipriano other factors or whether such a violation automatically suppression results confession.
V. SEIZURE AND CONFESSION: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS A. PURPOSES OF THE AND FOURTH FIFTH AMENDMENTS above, As noted the Fourth and Fifth Amendments applicable of the United States Constitution are to the through states the Fourteenth Amendment.35 Further, Rights Michigan the Declaration of in the Constitution counterparts also contains state to these amendm prohibits The Fourth Amendment unreason ents.36 persons able searches and seizures of and property.37 prohibits Thus, it is this amendment that unreason delays prob finding able between an arrest and a prohibits able cause. The Fifth Amendment involun tary self-incrimination.38 It is therefore this amend prevents prosecutor introducing ment that from confession that was not made When a voluntarily.39 during confession is made an unreasonable seizure, protections these two intersect.
B. UNREASONABLE SEIZURES: RIVERSIDE CO
Pugh,40
In Gerstein v
Court held an arrest becomes unreasonable under the Fourth
[405]
Sodal, supra.
(1975);
(1994);
[40]
*11
36 See Const
[35]
Albright Oliver,
38 See US
[39]
37 See US
(2000).
Dickerson v United
Gerstein
Riverside
see also Const,
Const,
1963,
Pugh,
Am IV.
Am V.
art
420 US
510 US
1,
States,
Co, supra
§§
11 and 17.
266, 272-273;
103, 114, 125;
530 US
at 53.
428;
114 S Ct
95 S Ct
120 S Ct
854;
2326;
628 person for an unreasonаble if a is held Amendment judicial that there officer determines time before a probable Co, In Riverside arrest. cause for the was any Court held States United presumed forty-eight be hours must of more than govern then falls on The burden unreasonable.41 extraordinary circum demonstrate that ment delay may A shorter stances necessitated delay.42 sig It is if it was also be unreasonable unnecessary.43 dealing a case Riverside Co was civil nificant that prohibition against solely with the Fourth Amendment not address the effect It did unreasonable seizures.44 ability prosecutor’s on the of the unreasonable during the a confession obtained to introduce delay.45 class action Co involved a federal Riverside injunctive McLaughlin seeking and declara Donald “ tory himself and ‘all others simi relief on behalf of quite larly McLaughlin’s “situation” situated.’ ”46 County simple. was incarcerated in the Riverside He probable a cause determinat Jail and had not received complaint named three A second amended ion.47 plaintiffs, individually repre and as class additional plaintiffs sentatives, and asserted that each of these warrant, without a had received had been arrested prompt probable hearing cause nor bail neither hearing, The federal district and was still custody.48 Co, supra at 56-57. Riverside
42Id. at 57.
Id. at
Id.
Nevada,
79,
1280;
48Id. at 49. *12 People Manning
Opinion of the Court injunction.49 court issued an The Ninth Circuit Court Appeals County’s policy determined that Riverside providing probable cause determinations within forty-eight hours of arrest was not in accord with required probable Gerstein, which a determination “ ”50 ‘promptly after arrest.’ procedure County, Riverside in a similar to Michi gan’s, probable combined cause determinations with arraignment procedures required arraignments unnecessary delay any be “conducted without and, in days event, within two of arrest.”51However, the two- day requirement did not count weekends and holid ays.52 according Supreme Thus, to the Court, “an individual arrested without a wаrrant late in the week may days long in some cases be held for as as five receiving probable before a cause determination” and Thanksgiving holiday, 7-day delay “[o]ver the possible.”53 Supreme
Therefore, the United States Court in Riv point erside Co had to decide at what arraignment following an arrest without a warrant delay” became an “unreasonable under the Fourth Importantly, Amendment.54 however, the United States Court did not face the Fifth Amend question ment of the voluntariness of confessions during delay, ques obtained an unreasonable nor the tion of the exclusion of such confessions under the Fourth Amendment.
[49] Id. [52] Id. Riverside at Id. Gerstein, supra 50, quoting Co, supra at 125.
[53] Id. [54] Id. 243 Mich answer to the issue was reason-
The Court’s ably straightforward: jurisdiction provides judicial believe that a [W]e probable
determinations of cause within 48 hours of arrest comply will, general matter, promptness as a with the requirements reason, jurisdic- of Gerstein. For this such systemic challenges. will tions be immune from *13 say probable This is not to that the cause detеrmination particular passes simply in a case constitutional muster provided may hearing it because is within 48 hours. Such a nonetheless violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove probable that his or her cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples delay of unreasonable are delays purpose gathering for the of additional evidence to justify arrest, delay against the a ill will motivated the delay delay’s individual, evaluating arrested or for sake. In delay particular unreasonable, a whether a case is how- ever, flexibility. degree courts must allow substantial of delays ignore Courts cannot the often unavoidable in trans- persons facility porting another, arrested from one to han- dling late-night bookings magistrate readily where no is available, obtaining presence arresting the of an officer who may busy processing suspects securing be other or the premises arrest, practical of an and other realities. probable
Where an arrested individual does not receive a hours, changes. cause determination within 48 the calculus case, In such a the arrested individual does not bear the delay. proving Rather, of burden an unreasonable the bur government den to the shifts to demonstrate the existence extraordinary emergency of a bona fide or other circum may particular longer stances. The fact that in a case it take pretrial proceedings than 48 hours to consolidate does not qualify extraordinary Nor, anas circumstance. for that mat ter, jurisdiction intervening do weekends. A that chooses to proceedings offer combined must do so as soon as is rea sonably feasible, but no event later than 48 hours after arrest.[55] [55] Id. at 56-57. pointing dissented,
Justice Scalia with some disdain jurisprudence, to “this Court’s constitutional which alternately rights creates that the Constitution does rights not contain and denies that it In does.”56 Justice promptness requirement view, Scalia’s in Gerstein delay no for “left room intentional unrelated to completion steps ‘the of administrative incident to ”57 acknowledging arrest.’ While he not cer ultimately tain how to limit,58 determine outer he concluded: extraordinary circumstances, it is an “unreason
[A]bsent meaning able seizure” within the Fourth Amendment police, having suspect warrant, for arrested a without probable a determination of cause for the arrest (1) prob arrangement either for reasons unrelated completion steps able-cause or determination inci arrest, (2) beyond dent to 24 hours after arrest.59 Despite Justice Scalia’s view, more restrictive majority holding in Riverside A Co clear. forty-eight more than hours between an arrest with *14 probable arraignment out a warrant and a cause government shifts the to burden to show the exis emergency tence a bona fide extraordi other nary showing, circumstances.60 Absent a such delay per is unreasonable se under Fourth Again, Amendment.61 however, Riverside Co did not consequences deal with the of an unreasonable [56] Id. at 60.
[58] [57] at 70. Id. [59] Riverside Id. at 63, quoting Gerstein, Co, supra at 67. supra at 114.
[60] Id. at 57.
[61] Id. 615 243
632 Opinion the Court delay, during makes defendant a criminal when, to the confession police.62 CIPRIANO CONFESSIONS:
C. VOLUNTARY Michigan decided, Co was Riverside When already a test established had Court during a made a confession whether determine supp arraignment must be arrest between analyze explicitly not The Court did ressed.63 Fifth Amendment. Fourth or either the issue under language of Fifth used However, the Court may prosecutor analysis, stating that the Amendment was made if it a confession introduce voluntarily.64 establishing for factors listed the Court then The was a statement whether voluntary.65 Cipriano defendants, all of whom three involved apparently and held a warrant66 arrested without were forty-six before hours or more in confinement for incriminating whom made and all of police Defendants while confined.67 to the statements hearings, which for Walker Harrison moved Dean and jury presence hearings held outside are incriminating statement determine whether that their state found The trial courts voluntary.68 respect voluntarily to defen- With were ments given.69 warrant. that defendant [62] 64 Cipriano, supra at 319. 69 Cipriano, supra Powell, Id. Id. at Id. at See Cipriano, supra. majority opinion 337, 341; 336-337, supra Harrison and defendant at 339-341, see 84. at Walker, supra. 337, 346. Cipriano does Cipriano not, however, were arrested without explicitly state *15 Cipriano, judge dant the court a Walker district held during preliminary hearing the and found examination all of his statements be admissible.70 Defendant Cipriano suppress then filed a motion to the state length the the ments, on basis of of his detention arraignment, before but the trial court denied that motion a All after the defendants were sub hearing.71 sequently appealed and, convicted and to this Court ultimately, Supreme Michigan Court, where their Cipriano Clearly, cases were involved, consolidated.72 admissibility today, as does the case we decide of delay perhaps cоnfessions obtained after a even an — unreasonable —be- arraign- tween an arrest without warrant and an squarely ment. The case therefore addresses inter- pro- section between the Fifth Amendment, which involuntary against tects and self-incrimination, protects against Fourth which Amendment, unreason- able seizures. prefaced Cipriano
The Court its decision in with a comprehensive analysis evidentiary conse quences illegal prearraignment It out detention.73 McNabb-Mallory congres- lined and the rule74
70Id. at 347.
71Id.
73Id. at 320-330. Id. at 319, 335, 339, statement obtained enforced Supreme determined Cipriano, 1 Ed 2d 1479 L 74 Briefly, L Ed confession Court by automatically excluding supra at 320. (1943), Mallory was not cases, “the McNabb-Mallory during right McNabb United the result In these cases the United States of a period suspect United v rule derives from two United States physical from evidence ‘unnecessary delay,’ States, States, prompt arraignment 318 US 354 US psychological any incriminating 449; 332; 77 S Ct even 63 S Ct coercion.’’ should be though Court 608; *16 App 615 243 Mich
634 Opiniоn the Court of The in 18 to that rule USC 3501.75 siona! reaction history of McNabb also the the Court discussed that, it noted77 Mallory Michigan.76 Specifically, in rule applicable criminal the rule was never to although the Michigan became courts,78 in state proceedings People the v Hamilton.79 adopt first state to rule the that on However, split the Court then noted People Ubbes,80and appeared, with v beginning issue the Maryland suggested that that in 1979 a court “ the ‘burning effect of McNabb-Mallory rule had the ”81 .’ get the . . . bam rid of mice prearraign Michigan The Court noted further that never included a directive ment statutes have voluntary confes comply that failure to will make Court, to the According sion inadmissible.82 75 provides: Subsection b of 18 USC 3501 judge determining trial issue of shall The the voluntariness surrounding the take into all of circumstances consideration the confession, elapsing giving including (1) of the time between the confession, making arraignment if it arrest and of the defendant arraignment, (2) such was made after arrest and whether before offense he was defendant knew the nature of the with which charged suspected making or of which he was at time of confession, (3) whether or such defendant was advised not any required any that knew he was not to make statement and him, (4) against such used or not such statement would be whether prior questioning right defendant to the had been advised of his counsel[,] (5) or not assistance of whether such defendant questioned giv- without assistance of when and when counsel ing such confession. 76Cipriano, supra at 325-329. 77 323, Id. at 78 Connecticut, 568, 1860; 600-601; 6 See 81 Ct L Culombe v 367 US S (1961). 2d 1037 Ed 79People Hamilton, 410; (1960). v 359 Mich 102 NW2d 80People 571; Ubbes, (1965). v 374 Mich 132 NW2d State, 161, Cipriano, supra 330, Shape quoting at 41 Md A2d 282 82Cipriano, supra at 333. only one factor that must be consid evaluating ered in the voluntariness a confession in major Michigan, as well as in the federal courts and a ity of the states.83The Court test “[t]he stated that considering voluntariness be whether, should totality surrounding all circumstances, the con product essentially fession is ‘the of аn free and by maker,’ unconstrained choice its or whether the capacity accused’s ‘will has been overborne and his ”84 critically impaired.’ for self-determination determining Court then set out for factors voluntary: whether a statement is *17 age accused; the of the his lack of education or intelli his level; gence previous experience the extent of his with the police; repeated prolonged question the and of nature the ing; length the of the detention of the accused before he gave question; any the statement the of to lack advice the rights; accused of his constitutional whether there was an unnecessary delay bringing magistrate him before the gave confession; before he the whether the accused was injured, drugged, intoxicated or ill or in health when he gave statement; deprived whether the accused was food, sleep, attention; or medical whether the accused physically abused; suspect whether and wаs threatened abuse.[85] with majority upheld On the basis of factors, these the convictions of all three defendants.86 Justice joined by Justices Levin and dis Cavanaugh, Archer, sented and would have reversed and remanded for a upheld new trial for defendant Dean, the conviction 83 Id. Culombe, supra 333-334, Id. at quoting at 602. 85 Cipriano, supra at 334.
86 Id. 243
Opinion Court of the the conviction reduced Harrison, and of defendant second-degree Cipriano with an murder defendant option retry prosecutor part of the on the first-degree Justice murder.87 Cavanaugh for defendant viewpoint up dissenting sentence, in one summed sup perceive between difference functional “We no during pressing detention unlawful made a confession suppressing following illegal confes arrest illegal during because made a detention sion obtained unnecessary delay arraignment.”88 CO AFTER RIVERSIDE D. SUPPRESSION OF CONFESSIONS quite Cipriano are Co and tests of Riverside Cipri Riverside Co on However, effect of clear. that have The state cоurts not so clear. ano is suppres effect on their own Riverside Co’s addressed split.89 United Nevada,90 In Powell sion tests are question whether faced the Court States voluntary Fifth Amend under the that are confessions they suppressed resulted because still be ment must Fourth under the seizure from an unreasonable it. Justice answer but declined to Amendment, that the defen however, have found would, Thomas suppressed “because not be statement should dant’s product McLaughlin was not a the statement Co] [Riverside violation.”91 *18 pros- prohibits exclusionary generally rule The during introducing obtained evidence ecutor from Huddleston, [87] [89] [88] Powell, supra [90] at 85. Id. See Cipriano, at New [924] Jersey supra SW2d 666 v at 360. Tucker, (Term, 137 NJ 1996). 259; [645] A2d 111 (1994); State v
[91] Id. at 89. 637 rights. violation of a Fourth defendant’s Amendment However, the United States Court has repeatedly held that a Fourth Amendment violation necessarily require does not the exclusion of evidence “ question as a of obtain result the violation.92 ‘The exclusionary remedy appropriate whether the rule’s is particular long regаrded in a context has been as an separate question issue from the whether Fourth rights party seeking Amendment to invoke the ”93 by police rule were violated In conduct.’ Penn sylvania Bd & Scott,94 Probation Parole v which exclusionary apply held that the rule not does parole hearings, Court, revocation with Justice majority opinion, writing Thomas this time noted “emphasized repeatedly that had it State’s use of evidence obtained violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.”95 say: The Court on to went “fully accomplished” Fourth Amendment violation is
[A] illegal seizure, search and no exclusion of evi- judicial proceeding dence from a “ or administrative can rights ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s which he has ” already exclusionary judi- suffered.’ rule instead a cially created deterring illegal means of searches “proscribe such, seizures. As the rule does not the introduc- illegally proceedings ,” tion seized evidence all . . . but only apрlies objectives in contexts “where its remedial are thought efficaciously Moreover, most . served.” . . because prudential constitutionally mandated, the rule is rather than 92 Evans, 1, 10; 1185; Arizona v (1995). US 115 S Ct L 131 Ed 2d 34 93Id., quoting Gates, 213, 223; 2317; Illinois 462 US S Ct L Ed (1983). 2d 527 94Pennsylvania 357; Scott, Bd Probation & Parole v 524 US S Ct L141 Ed 2d 344 Id. *19 615
Opinion of the Court only applicable its deterrence held it where we have be ”[96] outweigh social costs. its “substantial benefits remarkably eye, an invitation to this like To our looks balancing precisely the test that the Michi- sort use Cipriano. gan The harm Court used solely voluntary by excluding confession on caused a delay outweigh would the benefit of the basis delays. deterring unreasonable Other this exclusion Co, suit in Riverside are remedies, such as the civil beyond persons requirements of held available delay Co. will be a factor in Moreover, Riverside increasing possibility Cipriano analysis, involuntary. A suffi- the confession will be found ciently enough long will in itself be to make Cipriano. involuntary Thus, under River- confession supplant Cipriano. not, need and does not, side Co question this Court, then becomes whether directly departed indirectly, balancing has from the post-Riverside approach in its Co decisions. E. MICHIGAN’S POST-RIVERSIDE CO DECISIONS explicitly Michigan’s not courts have addressed the Cipriano. on Few decisions effect concerning Riverside Co suppression confessions have been published since Co. The two recent cases Riverside McCray Court, Whitehead, did decided apply they expressly Cipriano, state that not nor did Cipriano apply. not did police
McCray involved a defendant whom the had days without warrant and for three arrested held arraignment.97During confinement, before an his McCray, supra Id. at 362-363 (citations omitted). People Manning incriminating defendant made an statement to the Clearly, was an police.98 delay” per “unreasonable se under the Riverside Co forty-eight-hour However, rule. this Court did not set *20 Instead, the statement. aside this Court remanded to hearing the trial court for a to ascertain whether the police unreasonably delayed arraign the defendant’s noting suggest police ment, that “[t]he facts that the by gain were motivated a desire to additional infor justify may mation to the arrest and have intention ally delayed McCray’sarraignment hopes in of elicit ing incriminating Thus, while not cit statement.”99 Cipriano, ing hearing this Court remanded for a balancing process Cipriano which the set out in place. McCray any could take Nowhere in is there apply indication that this Court would Riverside Co suppress delay, during in order to a statement made delay presumed if even that unreasonable. Appeals case, second Court of Whitehead, also
involved an arrest without a warrant.100 As this Court days repeat being observed, “[a]lmost four later, after edly questioned by police various officers, defendant signed admitting a statement that he was one of the men who entered the store committed the Again, therefore, the assaults.”101 per was unreasonable se under the Riverside Co fоrty-eight-hour presented Again, rule. the case question Court with the whether the defendant’s con police during fession, obtained period questionable highly and under circumstances, 11-12. Id. at 99Id. at 12.
100Whitehead, supra at 3-4.
101Id. at 5. suppressed.102 have been This Court declined
should question, preferring under the doctrine to answer judicial expediency whether the decide trial suppress court’s failure to was harmless error.103We any beyond found that error was harmless a reason light overwhelming doubt, able of the other evi guilt, dence of the defendant’s and therefore affirmed the trial court’s decision.104 analysis, appro-
A harmless error course, not priate interlocutory appeal here because this is an impossible stage and it would be to determine at this any whether Therefore, error is harmless. we must delay’s decide the effect on the confession. This is precisely what this Court did not do in Whitehead. Admittedly, very strong however, this Court used lan- guage regarding delay. in Whitehead in its dicta We stated: *21 “presumptively
Persons arrestеd without a warrant are Id.[105] prompt judicial innocent.” at 58. A determination of probable important” cause for an arrest is “one of the most protections afforded citizens under the Fourth Amend prohibition ment’s of unreasonable seizures. Id. at 60-61 J., (Scalia, dissenting). protection, forty- To assure that eight-hour by carefully rule established Riverside must be by police ignore observed authorities. Those who that rule peril, running will do so at their own the risk that confes sions obtained will be deemed inadmissible and that convic tions based on those confessions will be reversed on appeal.[106]
102 Id. 103Id. 104 Id. at Co, supra. Riverside 106 Whitehead, supra at 13-14. very making strong In this statement, Court, as in McCray, Cipriano. did not refer to However, this clearly Court its dicta in Whitehead did not during describe a rule in which confessions obtained period unnecessary delay a of after an arrest without automatically suppressed. warrant would be Rather, we described a situation which those obtaining having such confessions ran thе risk of them deemed inadmissible.107 we Indeed, stated ear opinion “provides lier in the ing that the decision a warn person that statements made an accused dur ing longer may detainment well be found inadmissi purposes securing ble for of a conviction at trial.”108 possibility suppression; Thus, Whitehead raised the require suppression, despite strong it did not evi police dence there that the detained the defendant to analysis balancing secure his confession.109Under the Cipriano, obtaining officers confessions do run a greater having suppressed involuntary risk of them as unnecessarily delayed. when the How proposition ever, Whitehead does not stand for the automatically such confessions should be suppressed.
*22 F. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE We would be remiss if we did not also comment on purposes exclusionary rule. The United States Court has noted that the Fourth interpreted Amendment has never been to mandate suppression illegally pro- seized evidence in all [107] Id. at 14.
[108] Id. [109] Id. at 4 (emphasis supplied). 615
642 243 Opinion the Court of persons.110 Pennsylvania ceedings against all In Bd emphasized “the State’s Probation, the Court of of the Fourth use of evidence obtained violation does not itself violate the Constitu Amendment 111 People Howard,112 referred to Court, tion.” This remedy exclusionary rule as a “harsh” and Michigan’s a statu declined to hold that violation of tory necessarily required rule,113 knock-and-announce suppression of the evidence. We likewise decline to requires rule that Riverside Co violation auto suppression inculpatory given matic of an statement police. adopt mandating To a rule exclusion of a during statement made defendant’s violation promptness requirement Fourth Amendment’s would primary purpose exclusionary not further the approach In view, rule. our the better is to consider evaluating as violation a factor the overall vol untariness of the statement.
G. THE
COURT’S LOGIC
TRIAL
relying
Here,
court,
the trial
Co
on Riverside
McCray
suppressed
referring and Whitehead,
Man-
ning’s
sоlely
gave
statement
because she
it more than
forty-eight hours after her arrest without a warrant. In
doing,
disregarded
balancing
so
the trial court
process Michigan Supreme
Cip-
Court set forth in
Manning argues
riano. While
that the trial court never
holding
held that the
Co
Riverside
overruled the
(1984), citing
[112]
People Howard,
[111]
Pennsylvania
MCL 780.656;
(1976).
United States v
Stone v
MSA
Bd
Leon,
Powell,
233 Mich
28.1259(6).
Probation, supra
468 US
428 US
App 52, 53, 57;
897, 906;
465, 486;
at
104 S Ct
96 S Ct
NW2d
3405;
This automatic exclusion is not the Fifth Amendment or the Fourth Amendment. The proper analysis Cipriano is voluntariness under the delay eighty pre- factors. The of more than hours sumptively violated the Fourth Amendment, but an unnecessary delay require sup- does not automatic pression of the confession. It is not automatic that during evidence obtained a Fourth Amendment viola- tion must be excluded. When a confession was during delay arraign- obtained an unreasonable before Michigan Cipriano ment, factors still must be applied. The unreasonable is but one factor in analysis. longer delay, greater that probability that the confession will be held involun- tary. point, delay long At some will become so that enough involuntary. it alone is to make a confession engaging balancing process Cipriano In in the that greater give outlines, a trial court is free to or lesser any weight Cipriano including delay to of the factors, arraignment. give A trial cannot, court however, preemptive weight to that factor, one as the trial adopt court did here. To do so is a rule of auto- suppression during matic of a confession obtained period delay, directly contrary a result Cipriano McCray’s, and that Co, neither Riverside requires. nor Whitehead 243
Opinion the Court VL CONCLUSION police without held Here, the eighty-one arrest without hours after her at least for determined that The trial court warrant. personnel, inexperience, shifts was the result pros- incomplete package from the warrant and an trial court’s deci- sole basis of the office. The ecutor’s inculpatory Manning’s suppress statement was sion to delay. pre-arraignment length *24 sup erred in that the trial court We conclude solely inculpatory Manning’s pressing on statement delay. The trial court should have the basis of the was volun whether the statement instead considered tary totality of the circums on the basis Manning, who The record indicates that tances.114 years arrest, old at the time of her was nineteen warnings giving her incul received Miranda115 before patory Manning testified that she both statement. rights. further testified read and understood her She police deprive food, water, that the did nоt her of sleep. that Man Detective Darian Williams testified any appear ning the influence of did not to be under appear drug and that she did not or other intoxicant Finally, we note that Man to need medical attention. police, ning, initiated the discussion rather than the inculpatory giving statement. that resulted in her appeal, Manning gave she the state- On notes that police questioning their ment so that the would cease only by doing that so would and because she believed police permit Manning argues that her to leave. testimony against finding that the militates 114Cipriano, supra at 333-334. 1602; Arizona, L Ed 2d 694 Miranda v 384 US 86 S Ct People Manning
Concurrence J. Kelly, voluntary. disagree. statement was We Our review of only urged the record indicates ning that the officers Man- truthfully. testify to while the Moreover, officers may have indicated to that she would be go giving able to home statement, after the record not that the does indicate officers conditioned her right doing to leave on so. solely length
Here, the trial court focused on the delay required and concluded that Co Riverside it apply exclusionary suppress Manning’s to rule to inculpatory In our as view, statement. we have out- above, lined so trial court was not constrained. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court appropriate findings make under the factors estab- Cipriano. lished again,
note,We that the rationale behind the exclu sionary rule is to deter official misconduct.116We are warning mindful of the this Court issued in possibility recognize Whitehead.117We therefore length that may some situations the alone ground suppress be a sufficient a defendant’s particularly inexpli statement, where the is so cably long police that it raises an inference of miscon *25 duct. do However, we not deal with such case here. proceedings
Reversed and remanded for consistent opinion. jurisdiction. with this We do not retain O’Connell, P.J., concurred. (concurring agree result).
Kelly, J. in with I the majority suppressing that trial in court erred Ed 2d 1046 [117] Whitehead, supra United Cipriano, supra (1976); States v Janis, at 13-14. US 433, 446, 458-459; 96 S Ct 49 L 243 by Kelly, J.
Concurrence
solely
inculpatory
on the basis
statement
defendant’s
instead,
have,
the court should
and that
of the
the statement on
voluntariness of
considered the
totality
under Peo-
of the circumstances
basis of the
ple Cipriano,
334;