*661 Opinion
Defendant Maciej Andrzej Madeyski purports to appeal from an order forfeiting certain items of computer-related equipment. 1 He contends Ms federal constitutional rigMs were abridged by the demal of his right to have appointed counsel, the denial of his right to a jury trial, and by failing to have the facts justifying forfeiture proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
The factual basis for defendant’s offenses is undisputed. Defendant was formerly employed as a network admmistrator at Intellisys. His duties included the purchase of computers and related equipment. Without informing Intellisys of his financial interest, defendant purchased equipment on his own and resold it to Intellisys at a markup. After defendant no longer worked for Intellisys, he still had several system administrator passwords, one of wMch allowed him to move tMough the entire Intellisys system. Defendant intruded into the Intellisys computer network on two occasions, which resulted in the network being shut down.
On August 6, 1999, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft, one count of extortion, and two counts of disrupting computing services. (Pen. Code, 2 §§ 484-487, subd. (a), 518-520, 502, subd. (c)(5).) Defendant was sentenced to state prison for tMee years and no appeal was taken from the judgment.
On December 13, 1999, defendant filed a motion for return of property. Thereafter, the People moved for forfeiture of the same property pursuant to section 502.01. On May 30, 2000, the court ordered that certain items of property be forfeited or destroyed, and that the remaining items be released to defendant’s wife. TMs appeal followed.
Discussion
Right to Counsel
At the forfeiture hearing, the court stated its belief that defendant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel, since the hearing was civil in *662 nature. It then asked defendant whether he was interested in hiring counsel. Defendant responded that he would represent himself. On appeal, defendant contends he had a federal constitutional right to counsel at the section 502.01 forfeiture proceeding. We disagree.
As this court has previously observed, “California has recognized a number of situations in which an indigent litigant will be entitled to have counsel appointed. The most obvious example is that of an indigent criminal defendant. ... In other cases the entitlement has been declared as a matter of procedural due process . . . , or established by statute, or both.”
(County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court
(1992)
Defendant takes the position that a section 502.01 proceeding is criminal in nature, and thus evokes the right to counsel. The position is untenable.
In
United States v. Ursery
(1996)
Thus, in assessing whether a statute imposes punishment, we inquire (1) whether the Legislature intended the sanction to be punitive and, if not,
*663
(2) whether the sanction is so punitive in effect as to prevent the court from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature.
(People
v.
Rivera
(1998)
In addition to section 502.01, there are multiple statutes that authorize the forfeiture or destruction of property upon conviction. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 245.3, 312, 480, 527, 597, subd. (f)(1), 597.1, subd. (k), 599aa, 12028; Fish & Game Code, §§ 12157, 12159.5, 12161, 12164; Health & Saf. Code, § 11470.) Cases that have considered the issue have found that forfeiture proceedings under these statues are civil in nature. (See, e.g.,
People v. Blue Chevrolet Astro
(2000)
In
People
v.
$30,000 United States Currency, supra,
Defendant contends that rather than consider forfeiture to be a civil proceeding as in
People v. $30,000 United States Currency, supra,
Section 186.2 is part of the California Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act (Act). (§ 186 et seq.) Section 186.1, part of the Act, provides: “The Legislature hereby finds and declares that an effective means of punishing and deterring criminal activities of organized crime is through the forfeiture of profits acquired and accumulated as a result of such criminal activities. It is the intent of the Legislature that the ‘California Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act’ be used by prosecutors to punish and deter only such activities.” Such language clearly indicates the Legislature’s intent to make forfeiture proceedings under the Act criminal in nature. No such intent is indicated in section 502.01.
*664
Defendant also contends that the forfeiture in section 502.01 is at least analogous to the restitution fine in section 1202.4, since both are part of a criminal proceeding. We again disagree. The Legislature has drafted section 1202.4 so as to make a restitution fine imposed pursuant to the statute a “penalty,” and thus a form of punishment. (See § 1202.4, subd. (a)(2);
People v. Hanson
(2000)
In conclusion, we find a section 502.01 forfeiture proceeding is a civil, not criminal, proceeding. Thus, defendant had no right to court-appointed counsel. Accordingly, there was no error in the court’s failing to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and in not advising defendant of the dangers of self-representation. For the same reason defendant was not denied his right to a trial by jury or to have the facts justifying forfeiture of his property proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Premo, Acting P. J., and Elia, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 13, 2001, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 20, 2002.
Notes
Defendant filed his notice of appeal in propria persona. The notice states he is appealing “the judgment and sentence imposed on May 30, 2000.” However, the judgment and sentence were imposed on September 28, 1999. An order of forfeiture was entered on May 30, 2000. In the interests of judicial economy, we treat the order as an appealable judgment. (See
Allabach
v.
Santa Clara County Fair Assn.
(1996)
A11 statutory references are to the Penal Code.