184 P. 1008 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1919
The action was brought under the "Red-light Abatement Act" [Stats. 1913, p. 20], for the purpose of abating a nuisance existing in the Johnson House, a hotel in Chico, and of causing the same to be closed as provided by the provisions of said act. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiff, from which the owner of the premises has appealed. Three points are made by appellant, as follows:
1. He insists that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment, for the reason that it consists solely of evidence of the general reputation of said house in the community.
2. It is claimed that the testimony of the two investigators or detectives, who testified in the case, cannot be considered by reason of the application of the doctrine of the "law of entrapments."
3. The further claim is made that the evidence is insufficient to show that at the time of the filing of the complaint on the 14th of September, 1918, or at the time of the trial, one month later, the house was being used for said unlawful purposes, assuming that the evidence was sufficient to show such use on August 12, 1918, the date on which the last act of illicit intercourse and the reputation of the house were shown.
From reading and an examination of the record we are satisfied that there is no merit whatever in any of these contentions. As to the first point there was a strong showing of the bad reputation of the house in said community. The witnesses who so testified were persons of long residence there, or persons engaged in business in Chico, or persons whose calling would tend to make them familiar with the general reputation of any hotel in the community. They comprised business men, ministers, peace officers, and also women who were interested in the social conditions and welfare of the community. Their testimony was direct, clear, and unequivocal that the house had a bad reputation in the respects indicated. As an example of the general character of the testimony of these various witnesses we may quote from the record of the testimony of Galen L. Rose as follows: "Q. Do you know the general reputation of the Johnson House for lewdness, prostitution, or assignation? A. I do. Q. What is it — good or bad? A. Bad. (Cross-examination.) Q. With *481
whom did you discuss the reputation of the Johnson House, Mr. Rose? A. I have discussed it — it came up in a general way in a conversation with a considerable number of people — I do not know as I recollect the individuals; but is a topic that comes up frequently in a conversation in a general way. And in all of my conversations I never heard a good word for the Johnson House, and I heard a good many speak and they were that it was bad." [1] It is to be observed that section 5 of said act provides: "In such action, evidence of the general reputation of the place shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the existence of said nuisance." This would seem to imply that such evidence may be of itself sufficient to prove the character of the house, and upon this point it may be said that seldom is such a strong showing made as appears in the present instance.[2] But beyond that, there was strong evidence that the character of several inmates or frequenters of the hotel was morally bad, and this is a circumstance of great importance in the determination of the character of the house. (De Martini v.Anderson,
As to the second point, it is sufficient to say that the record contains no evidence that said detectives, or either of them, offered any inducement to or enticed or allured or urged or persuaded in any manner the said Hazel Howard to commit any crime or to go to the Johnson House for any immoral purpose whatever. Moreover, this is not a criminal proceeding, but is a civil action for the purpose of abating a nuisance, and if such inducement had been offered, the evidence would be admissible for the purpose of showing that said Johnson House was at the time in question used for the purposes alleged in said complaint and that the persons in charge of it were allowing such use. In this connection it may be proper to quote from Corpus Juris, volume 16, page 88, on the doctrine of entrapments, as follows: "While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct." It will be observed that in nearly all of those cases where such evidence has been held inadmissible it has been upon the ground that no crime has been actually committed, as in the case where the owner induces a person to steal his property. In such case there could be no commission of the crime, if the property is taken with the owner's consent, since it is an essential factor of the crime of larceny that it be against the will of the owner. It may be further said that the cases distinguish clearly between measures used to entrap a person into crime and artifice used *483
to detect persons suspected of being engaged in criminal practices, particularly as such criminal practices vitally affect the public welfare rather than individuals. (People v. Liphardt,
[4] As to the third point, it is sufficient to say that it was proved that the Johnson House was used for said immoral purposes as late as August 12, 1918, and that there was a course of such conduct up to that time. From this proof the presumption would follow that said condition continued to exist as long as is usual for things or conditions of such nature. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1963, subd. 32.) Of course, if there were satisfactory evidence that the condition had changed, it might be said that the presumption was overcome. There was indeed the testimony of the owner of the premises that no immoral acts of the character charged had been committed in the house since said date of August 12, 1918. He even went further and declared that no such acts had ever been committed therein. The lower court, undoubtedly, was *484
not greatly impressed with the truthfulness of his statements. We cannot say that he was entitled to any more credit than was accorded him by the trial judge. As bearing upon this consideration, we may cite People v. Dillman,
We think it must be held that the case was fairly tried and justly decided and that no error whatever appears in the record. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
Ellison, P. J., pro tem., and Hart, J., concurred.