People v. Lynn

Conclusion IV. reasons,

1[ foregoing we reverse 16 For and remand this appeals' order

the court of appeals to hear to the court

case

People's appeal on the merits.

2012 CO 45 Colorado,

The State PEOPLE

Plaintiff-Appellant LYNN, Edward Defendant

Michael

-Appellee.

No. 12SA97. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc. 18, 2012.

June District,

Thirteenth Judicial E. Robert Watson, Attorney, Zachary District H. Bal- kin, Deputy Attorney, District Michael Whit- ney, Deputy Attorney, Sterling, District Col- orado, Attorneys Plaintiff-Appellant. Wilson, Defender, Douglas K. Public Da- Brune, Defender, Deputy mon Public Ster- Colorado, ling, Attorneys Defendant-Ap- pellee. Opinion

Justice HOBBS delivered the the Court. interlocutory

1 In appeal, this challenge suppressing incriminating an order statements made Michael Edward in custody. while The trial court held that Lynn's unambigu the statements came after ous for counsel. After such a re quest, police it is unconstitutional for officers questioning. they to continue If do continue interrogation, in violation of Miranda v. Ari zona, U.S. L.Ed.2d (1966), cases, subsequent the defen dant's statements made after the are agree inadmissible. with the trial court question, and hold the defendant's lawyer?" I talk "When can unambiguous request for counsel. Accord you looking know what I mean? It's like trial the order of the court ingly, we affirm something in war. You look at some- Lynn's statements. suppressing war, body shooting somebody you know J. war, They're what mean? there is a Why you you circumstance. did do what Lynn questioning, T2 At the time of did? pa- unrelated already being detained for Lynn incriminating then made Sterling Department statements. Police role violations. {3 Investigator Huston then met with Jeff suppressed The trial court the state- questioned regard- him booking cell and in a asked, after he ments made "When can assault, kidnapping, and ing allegations of lawyer?" people appealed I talk to The reading menacing. Huston was While § 4.1 and 16-12- us for review under C.A.R. asked, in an asser- rights, Miranda his (2011). 102(2), affirm. C.R.S. We now tone, lawyer?" can I talk to a "When tive responded, "You want to talk to Huston II. that, you say I'm done. Do lawyer? You agree 1 4 with the trial court and hold We I, lawyer if talk to a now? 'Cause want question, can I that the defendant's "When do, go. Alright bud? And that's you got I lawyer?" unambiguous talk to a was an re- asked, this, "If I can I Lyon then do fine." Accordingly, we affirm quest counsel. re- after?" Huston also talk to suppressing the order of the trial court on "Absolutely." As can be heard sponded, Lynn's statements. interrogation, Huston recording of the continued, speaking very quickly: A. Standard of Réview I Absolutely. yeah, this isn't over. Oh suppression of a T5 Our review I can your hear side of it now so

want to a mixed of law and fact. order raises figure out get going with the case and (Colo. Romero, 550, People v. P.2d 555 953 OK, 'cause going I'm to tell the DA. what 1998). factual find We defer court's story. I have all I have is one side of the ings they support if have in the record. saying your one half with all the witnesses legal review determinations de novo. Id. this, why you this.... I want to hear did Lynn's of the likelihood [Discussion Applicable B. Law (10 seconds).] testifying in court mother you. I And that's what want to hear from person T6 an accused re Once your complete side of it. I want to hear attorney, "serupulously quests police must no, important. Alright, And that is OK? interroga and cease all honor" bottom, I need you got sign but person has consulted with coun tion until the hand, another your right dude. You need Arizona, 436, 474, Miranda v. 384 U.S. sel. 1602, (1966); something? [Adjustment ... 504-05, clipboard or 16 L.Ed.2d 694 86 S.Ct. (13 seconds).] handcuffs Bradshaw, 452, 456-57 (Colo.2007) Illinois, said, (citing you to tell me Smith v. U.S. And like I don't have (1984)). 91, 95, 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 S.Ct. just anything you anything, you can tell me unambiguous where A for counsel must be Dude, to talk about. this is want you wish to you got part. to read this Do unequivocal Davis v. -to be sufficient. mind, States, 452, rights in 512 U.S. speak still to me with these United (1994). L.Ed.2d 362 In deter can S.Ct. said, you like I if that's the case? Now get mining whether a for counsel was anytime pound me the sand out tell sufficient, the trial court must consider I to talk about it. OK? of here don't want "can rea I can hear whether the accused's statements your what's side of it? So So it, sonably expression to be an of a present I can that with be construed that side of so am, case, really I'm man. 'Cause I attorney in for the assistance of an desire it, interrogation dealing I with custodial looking at these two sides of don't Wisconsin, have, 501 U.S. present police." a brutal McNeil want what (1991) 115 L.Ed.2d 158 S.Ct. cireumstances, any without assault itself omitted). regarding representation; The must be statement (emphasis such an enough police impermissible that "a reasonable officer following clear is an unam biguous request. 156P.3d at 458. in the cireumstances would understand attorney." for an Following unambiguous statement be request, ques all 2350. The 512 U.S. tioning must cease. 953 P.2d at unambiguous it accused's puts on notice that the the officers defendant sought Where statements his to counsel and intends to exercise suppressed video-recorded, are audio- or right against his self-incrimination. Brad disputed and there are no facts outside the shaw, suspects 156 P.3d at 457. Because recording controlling suppres the issue of legally sophisticated paragons not be or sion, position we are in a similar as the trial clarity language, in of their use of court to determine whether the statements reviewing a defendant's statement for al Madrid, suppressed. People should be v. broad, leged ambiguity, give courts must (Colo.2008). 1010, 179 P.3d 1014 We under narrow, interpretation rather than a to a independent take an recording review of the for defendant's counsel. to determine whether the statements were 953P.2d at 554-55. properly suppressed light of the control- 17 Trial courts are to determine Tinglaw. Id. ambiguous

whether a for counsel is by totality the of the circumstances. Id. at Application C. to this Case assessing totality In 555. the of the cireum- words, %10 In addition to the stances, the court consider such factors trial court considered six factors in determin by spoken interrogating as the words the ing Lynn's request for counsel to have been officer; by suspect the words used the (1) unambiguous: during the came counsel; referring response the officer's advisement; (2) Lynn the Miranda knew suspect's counsel; the reference the degree intended; first charges assault were speech patterns suspect; of the the content (8) (4) custody; was in asked interrogation; of the the demeanor and tone about speak his mother and wanted to with officer; interrogating of the suspect's the (5) her; Huston had reminded several during behavior interrogation; point the at statement; times he need not make a counsel; suspect which the invoked who was (6) and Huston had at least twice described present during interrogation; the and the the assault as "brutal." suspect's youth, history, criminal back ground, distress, nervousness or feelings and T 11 The words used were similar to of intimidation powerlessness. People or v. by those used the defendant in People v. Broder, 323, (Colo.2010); 222 P.3d 327 Harris, Rome 234, 235, 191 Colo. 552 P.2d 11 ro, 953 P.2d at 555-56. (1976), asked, who get "When can I a law yer?" We affirmed the trial suppres court's 18 If the accused's statements case, sion order in that holding that concerning ambigu counsel are "request constituted a for an attor ous, police may engage inquiry limited ney" placed police which officers on no with the purpose accused for the sole tice the defendant intended to exercise determining whether the accused has re rights. his constitutional Id. at 552 quested Broder, an attorney. 222 at P.3d emphasized P.2d at 12. that the 329; People Benjamin, 732 P.2d "adequate" though even it was not "in (Colo.1987). instance, 1170 In this the inter sophisticated legally the most or proper rogation must immediately except cease form. Id. at 552P.2d at 12. " very questions limited designed clarify ambiguous clarify statement or to ac 112 Harris controls the outcome of this cused's regarding wishes presence case. While we also found factors such as Bradshaw, 458; counsel. Benjamin, youth, timidity, inexperience P.3d at play Harris, 32 P.2d at 1171. But even this limited the trial court in present case 7 inquiry possible only ambiguous after an found several other contributing factors guidance to officers proof provide and to Lynn's request unambiguousness interrogations." 512 U.S. cases, already conducting have we In other counsel. 458-59, 114 If we were to legal factors to have of these several found distinguish Lynn's question to Huston from unambiguity. question of significance the defendant Har (significance the similar P.3d at 458 See ris, inject would considerable confusion interrogator about asking the we of the accused the function of the into the law thwart of the charge and the class of the the nature objective inquiry. offense); (2005) coming (significance Lynn's unambig- responded 15 Huston advisement); People v. during the Miranda ("When can I talk to law- vous Richards, 83, 86, P.2d Colo. characterize as yer?") with what (1977) pressure (significance of purpose for the sole of deter- limited very nature of the accused placed on requested the accused mining whether interrogation). It custodial incommunicado ("You lawyer? to talk to a attorney want the other particularly significant, on is not that, you want to talk say I'm done. Do You hand, phrased as a Lynn's request was now?"). and our own But Davis to a interpreted might possibly be question which interrogator law do not allow the case present. than the future rather to involve the any inquiry, no matter how pursue sort of (finding an at 457 See limited, clarify an accused's statement re- to in the de request for counsel unambiguous unless the statement is am- garding counsel imperative" sen a "future use of fendant's here, Where, request biguous. as the is tence, talk to an attor going "I'm to have to follow-up permissi- unambiguous, no such is this."). ney about ble. Harris, Lynn older than 113 While was {16 Furthermore, follow-up Huston's was jus with the criminal prior contact and had not, fact, an limited to clarification are not sufficient to system, those facts tice Lynn's to his search for question. Added of Harris hold distinguish this case from ("You clarity lawyer?") talk was want to to that, "serupulously honor" order nudge get Lynn to decline to talk a subtle have ceased rights, Huston should Miranda attorney instead continue answer- to an following Lynn's question, questioning - ("You that, say questions I'm ing Huston's lawyer?" See Brad can I talk to "When done."). way, case is similar to In this this Harris, shaw, P.3d at 456-57. As Richards, interrogator reinitiated where the broadly, reasonably interpreted question, unambiguous request questioning after an as a for counsel. could be construed innocuous-sounding re- with the for counsel Harris, 237, 552 P.2d at 12 191 Colo. at See (Richards) "if he mark to the defendant -13. talking, glad I would be to listen." felt like {14 af- at 568 P.2d at 1174. We argue that "did 194 Colo. The Huston the statements suppression firmed the of ques recognize as some sort "[ilf after this remark because rights," and made regarding the Defendant's tion subtly police may try to secure waiver equivocal. But we regarded it as therefore requested has an rights after the accused repeatedly "[the held have by attorney, rights guaranteed Miranda an accused invoked the whether illusory." Id. at 568 P.2d at objective inquiry"-which is to would be counsel is the "limited bearing It is for this reason that no on say, Huston's state of mind has 113 P.3d at 791. What limit- inquiry. our in Broder must be inquiry" we outlined Lynn's question "could ed request- matters is whether is strictly to whether the accused for reasonably points construed" as a attorney, and not venture into ing Harris, the ac- case, influence counsel, it of Miranda law in this like Richards, the inter- response. As in (quoting 953 cused's Id. at can. by subtly 556). overstepped Supreme rogator this case States P.2d at As United restating prevent Lynn from making attempting to purpose of explained, has Court attorney. to talk to an his desire inquiry objective is avoid difficulties "Itlo ("If Lynn's follow-up conclusion, I 1 20 In serupu- Huston did not after?") this, lously Lynn's unambiguous talk to a honor do can I also Instead, counsel. he inquiry. incriminating to our The fact that "la obtained irrelevant pres- statements from without might equivo counsel ter be construed as statements ent, contrary Lynn's unambiguous re- ambiguous not relevant [is] cal or quest. trial The court was therefore correct question" of whether an earlier statement suppress Lynn's statements. Kleber, unambiguous. was (Colo.1993). words, In other P.2d IIH. responses fur postrequest

"an accused's may not interrogation be used to cast ther Accordingly, affirm we the order of clarity on the ini retrospective doubt trial court. Smith, (quoting itself." tial 490). 105 S.Ct. U.S. dissents, Justice COATS and Justice EID joins in the dissent. recording, Based on the Huston's in- any terrogation of eliminates doubt COATS,dissenting. Justice seeking "serupulously that Huston was not 122 Because I majority mis- believe Instead, Lynn's request for honor" counsel. controlling states the regard federal law with length proceeded explain why he he meaning to both the and effect of an unam- thought alleged should confess to the biguous counsel, and is led your it," "I assault. want to hear side of he this misunderstanding appropriate fed- said. what I want to hear "[TJhat's from eral to a standards result believe would not you. your complete I want to hear side of Court, Supreme be condoned I re- Apparently it." concerned that spectfully dissent. top focusing part on the of the Miranda Although 123 it has been criticized for enumerating Lynn's rights, waiver form Hu- see, doing past, e.g., so the "no, enjoined, you got sign ston but to the 452, (Colo.2007) 460 n. 1 bottom." This series of remarks and actions (Coats, J., dissenting), majority the onee by Huston demonstrates that he was not again unselfconsciously conflates the "seru- making a limited purpose the of test, pulously honor" applies only which to determining Lynn requesting whether was a right the invocation of a defendant's to re lawyer. contrary, clearly To the he was during main silent interrogation, custodial Lynn trying rights to convinee to waive his bright rule, with the "Edwards line" see Ed writing prompt divulge and to to his Arizona, 477, wards v. 451 U.S. 101 S.Ct. alleged account of the assault. 1880, (1981), 68 L.Ed.2d 378 applies, which Lynn's request for a was not contrast, to a defendant's invocation of his ambiguous; it was assertive in tone and said right to counsel. While the latter standard ambiguity. Listening without tape to the provides an prohibition against even stricter clearly discloses that it was Huston who at- former, interrogation further than the inject tempted ambiguity by to suggesting he distinction significance is not without for the help Lynn would with the DA if would majority's, holding light played of the role despite request talk to him his clear for a very that distinction in Supreme lawyer. "get Huston said he going would Court's choice to denying risk an inarticulate figure with going the case and out what I'm defendant bright the benefits of the line rule it, to tell the DA." If he knew side of clarity rather than a risk loss of and of ease "present he would that with the case." But application by forcing officers to make diffi if lawyer, got wanted to talk to a "I judgment cult about what a suspect calls States, go." really simply clarifying See Davis v. Huston was not wants. United Rather, attorney. 512 U.S. for an S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 362 he stated a " consequence (1994). choosing to invoke Largely 'rigid' pro of the because counsel, right his Edwards, that phylactic Huston could no rule" of the Davis Court longer help him. expressly applicable only it held to be where 114 S.Ct. for counsel. right actually invoke his does accused (or his 2350. might he be whenever counsel-not as) invoking be understood could By simply changing the word "would" 1 25 114 S.Ct. Id. at right. that "could," changes meaning majority effect forgiving less of the Precisely because a "unambiguous request" from rule, line a number of bright the Edwards single interpretation to with a reasonable to extend the have declined jurisdictions interpre- one reasonable request with least right to of the Davis to invocation holding of among interpreta- tation other reasonable R. La Wayne as well. See silent remain may susceeptible-the of which it also be tions 6.9(g) § al., Procedure Fave et Criminal 3d ambiguity precisely and very definition of Supp.2011). ed.2007 usage in opposite Supreme of the Court's muddying the distinc 24 In addition to majority's if statement of Davis. Even guarantees of the Miranda tion between incorrect, however, I could the law were not silent, right remain and a right to counsel specific agree application with its not majority flatly misstates I believe majority in this case. Whatever the Davis, by relying on our own holding of about the defendant's actual surmise actually pre-dating holdings, some prior intent, clearly question his couched question how to Davis's resolution timing rather than the immediate terms see, unambiguous requests, than handle less As has been noted provision of counsel. Harris, 234, 552 P.2d e.g., People v. 191 Colo. elsewhere, 113 P.3d at 796 see (1976), holding on literally its stands (Coats, J., dissenting), never re- Miranda Supreme express In Court head. attorney provided quired that an be immedi- its McNeil ly reconsidered statement ately only questioning upon cease but Wisconsin, 171, 111 S.Ct. 501 U.S. for the of counsel. As a assistance (1991), effect that "invoca L.Ed.2d 158 matter, police departments do not practical counsel 're the Mirando tion of keep on retainer at the sta- defense counsel minimum, some statement quires at tionhouse, and therefore the expres reasonably to be an can be construed requested, may provided, one will onee be of an a desire for the assistance sion of vital to a defendant's rational assessment " 459, 114 attorney, 512 U.S. at options. only Not would it therefore be his intended explaining precedents that its never take the defendant's reasonable to questioning when require the cessation value, impute to it an at face but instead understand officer would ever reasonable counsel, light in for of the immediate demand invoking suspect "might" be only that demand, "rigid" prophylactic effect of such Far conclud right to counsel. Id. from his requiring it would the immediate cessation as majority, that what matters ing, as does the all further conversation with the defen- question "'could whether a defendant's matter, dant, would, practical have de- as reasonably construed as very of the information prived the defendant ¶ counsel," maj. op. (quoting at 14 from Peo sought. he (Colo.2005) v. 113 P.3d 788 ple Finally, majority's pre-occupation (Colo.1998)), 953 P.2d 550 investigator's follow- with breadth that for a Supreme held instead Court conjunction with its assertion up questions, unambiguous, a counted as to be ambiguous police may respond to state- that articulate his desire to have defendant "must concerning to counsel ments sufficiently clearly that a present counsel in a limited with the ac- engaging circumstances police officer reasonable purpose determining cused for the sole to be a re understand the statement would requested an attor- the accused has whether attorney." (emphasis add quest for an ed). clearly ney, maj. op. at a third level of could not more Rather than "create majority completely demonstrate questioning prevent police prophylaxis Davis, of Davis. In grasp import fails to lawyer," might want a suspect took head- Supreme Court any the United States assign conse expressly declined Court clarifying limited equivocal on the whether ambiguous or quence at all to an questions required, would sometimes be or permitted,

even to determine whether a sus

pect actually intended to the inter

cession of counsel. U.S. at emphatically 2350. It answered the by holding, justices with four

dissent, unambiguous the event of an counsel, questioning no further

any permitted; kind would be anything than an unambiguous

event of less

request, duty no of clarification would arise

at all. good Id. While it be considered

practice clarify, for the benefit of an inar suspect, ambiguous request,

ticulate duty any

officer has no to do so or to limit in

way questioning. his further inAnd the case request, unambiguous duty

of an his is to questioning altogether.

cease further today's

1 27 I am holding aware is not misapplied,

the first time this court has or

virtually ignored, in favor of its own

pre-Davis case law. Because the Miranda clearly law,

doctrine is a matter of federal as

to which suggested any this court has never corollary,

state constitutional related howev-

er, I majority approach continue to view the respectfully be error. therefore dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justice EID

joins in the dissent.

K9SHRINK, LLC, a Colorado limited

liability company, Clark, and Gail

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

RIDGEWOOD MEADOWS WATER AND ASSOCIATION,

HOMEOWNERS

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10CA0640. Appeals,

Colorado Court of

Div. VII.

June

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Lynn

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Jun 18, 2012

Citation: 278 P.3d 365

Docket Number: 12SA97

Court Abbreviation: Colo.