69 Cal. App. 4th 313 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1999
Opinion
In 1994, William L. Lynch was charged with eight counts of lewd conduct with a child, all of which allegedly occurred
We express no opinion about the validity of the 1997 amendment as it might be applied to other persons. As we will explain, however, the 1997 amendment—as applied to Lynch—constitutes an unconstitutional (and therefore impermissible) effort by the Legislature to readjudicate a controversy that has been litigated in our courts and resolved by a final judicial judgment.
Facts
By an information filed on March 21, 1994, Lynch was charged with eight counts of violating subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 288
Effective June 30, 1997, the Legislature again amended subdivision (g) of section 803.
As our Supreme Court explained in Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53-54 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 913 P.2d 1046], the Legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon the constitutional functions of the courts—provided that such legislatively imposed restrictions do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of the courts’ functions. But one of the things the Legislature cannot do is to “undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the courts and resolved by final judicial judgment.” (Id. at p. 53; see also Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29
“Our Constitution assigns the resolution of such specific controversies to the judicial branch of government (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) and provides the Legislature with no authority to set itself above the judiciary by discarding the outcome or readjudicating the merits of particular judicial proceedings. As [our Supreme Court] emphasized more than a century ago in the case of Pryor v. Downey (1875) 50 Cal. 388, 405: ‘[H]ad the Legislature gone one step further and, by special enactment. . . commanded the courts which had rendered a judgment in favor of a plaintiff ... to set it aside and to enter a judgment for the defendant, such arbitrary attempt would, at once, have been recognized as an abuse not to be tolerated under our free constitution of government.’ ” (Mandel v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 547.)
The same can be said of this case, and the People’s arguments to the contrary do no more than demonstrate an unwillingness to recognize the further prosecution of Lynch for what it is—a legislative command to the trial and appellate courts to set aside the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of Lynch when Division Four’s decision became final. Such a command is beyond the power of the Legislature. However broad the Legislature’s constitutional power may be, it does not include the right to review and readjudicate final court judgments on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, any other conclusion would “completely deprive court judgments of the respect and deference which the Constitution contemplates each branch of government [would] accord to final actions within the jurisdiction of a coequal branch, and would repose in the Legislature a combination of powers that the constitutional draftsmen specifically intended to forestall.” (Mandel v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 549; see also Oppenheimer v. Ashburn (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 624, 631 [343 P.2d 931] [“the doctrine of judicial supremacy as to the constitutionality of acts of the Legislature is basic to our concept of government”].)
In short, whatever power the Legislature may have to reject judicial decisions with which it disagrees and to make new laws to prospectively abrogate the effect of those decisions (Mendly v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1212 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 822]; Serrano v. Priest (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 188, 200-201 [182 Cal.Rptr. 387]; Matter of Coburn
Disposition
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
Spencer, P. J., and Dunn, J.,
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 12, 1999. Chin, J., and Brown, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be denied.
All section references are to the Penal Code. Subdivision (a) of section 288 provides: “(a) Any person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act, including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part 1, upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.”
In 1972, former section 800 provided that “[a]n indictment for any felony, except murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, the embezzlement of public money, the acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a public employee, grand theft, a violation of Section 209, forgery, or the falsification of public records, shall be found, an information
Section 803 provides for the tolling or extension of time periods and the revival of a cause of action under specified circumstances. Subdivision (g), as it became effective in 1994, provided: “(g) Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this section, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a law enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the age of 18 years, was the victim of a crime described in Section 261, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, 289, or 289.5. This subdivision shall apply only if both of the following occur: “(1) The limitation period specified in Section 800 or 801 has expired. “(2) The crime involved substantial sexual conduct, as described in subdivision (b) of section 1203.066, excluding masturbation which is not mutual, and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim’s allegation. No evidence may be used to corroborate the victim’s allegation which would otherwise be inadmissible during
Section 805.5 provides (as it did then): “(a) As used in this section, ‘operative date’ means January 1, 1985. “(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), this chapter applies to an offense that was committed before, on, or after the operative date. “(c) This chapter does not apply, and the law applicable before the operative date does apply, to an offense that was committed before the operative date, if: “(1) Prosecution for the offense would be barred on the operative date by the limitation of time applicable before the operative date. “(2) Prosecution for the offense was commenced before the operative date.”
In People v. Bunn (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 227, 232-239 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 734], Division Three of the First District reached the same result as Lynch. The ex post facto issue is presently pending before our Supreme Court in In re Davis (S062716, app. pending), and People v. Frazer (S067443, app. pending). (See also People v. Lee (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1014 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 414], review granted July 29, 1998 (S071007).)
Subdivision (g) of section 803 now provides: “(g) (1) Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this chapter, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a California law enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the age of 18 years, was the victim of a crime described in Section 261, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, 289, or 289.5. “(2) This subdivision applies only if both of the following occur: “(A) The limitation period specified in Section 800 or 801 has expired. “(B) The crime involved substantial sexual conduct, as described in subdivision (b) of Section 1203.066, excluding masturbation that is not mutual, and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim’s allegation. No evidence may
Judge of the Municipal Court for the Long Beach Judicial District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.
