*1 Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Luna
,
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Caption DRESHAWN LUNA, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Second District
No. 2-12-1216 Filed September 29, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 10-CF-4004; the Hon. Mark L. Levitt, Judge, presiding. Review Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Cause remanded. Counsel on James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Jaime L. Montgomery, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant. Appeal
Michael G. Nerheim, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Diane L. Campbell, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People. *2 Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION ¶ 1 In 2012, a jury convicted defendant, Dreshawn Luna, of first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2010)) for crimes that he committed on July 4, 2010, when he was age 15. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms totaling 51 years for the first degree murder conviction (26 years for the murder, plus 25 years as an enhancement for personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused death) and 10 years for the aggravated battery conviction. On appeal, this court rejected defendant’s arguments concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, the constitutionality of his sentence, and the jury instructions supporting the firearm enhancement. However, we vacated a DNA fee and conducted, per defendant’s request, an in camera inspection of sealed medical documents. People v. Luna , 2015 IL App (2d) 121216-U. Presently, this case returns to us, following our supreme court’s entry of a supervisory
order, directing us to vacate our prior judgment, consider the effect of People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, on the issue of whether defendant’s sentence constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence, and determine if a different result is warranted. People v. Luna , No. 119310 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order). For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing. I. BACKGROUND A. Trial Detailed facts concerning the trial proceedings were set forth in our prior order, and we
need not repeat them here.
Luna
,
further finding that he personally discharged the firearm used in those crimes. B. Sentencing On October 12, 2012, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and
proceeded to sentencing. The State emphasized that defendant had a history of repeated delinquency (which included committing burglary with his older brother at age nine), that an expert deemed him as potentially having antisocial personality disorder, and that, while detained, defendant had demonstrated a continued lack of respect for authority. The State argued that, in terms of mitigation, there was “absolutely nothing” to consider, and it requested a term of 90 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel disagreed with the State’s position and argued that “the mitigation is
everywhere.” Counsel emphasized that defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense. Counsel explained that, while the presentence report included that defendant entered the system at age nine, it also reflected that he was a charming, funny kid who related to his peers, was close to his family, received good grades, attended church, and actively participated socially. Counsel argued that the court was sentencing someone who was “not fully formed” at the time of the crimes and related the principles that had been enunciated in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012), just a few months earlier. Namely, counsel argued that juveniles (1) lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness and impulsivity; (2) are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures from family and peers; (3) lack the ability to extricate themselves from crime- producing settings, as they have limited control over their environment; and (4) do not have a fully formed character like adults, and their actions are less likely to evidence irretrievable depravity. Moreover, counsel pointed out that defendant’s impulsivity had, in fact, been noted in the presentence report and that there was “not an ounce of planning” in this tragic crime; rather, it reflected the momentary, impulsive act of a 15-year-old, as opposed to a premeditated act. In addition, defendant came from a broken home, his mother did not have time to adequately assist him with issues, and, accordingly, starting at a very young age, he was exposed to gang and crime culture and was in and out of counseling and treatment, without progress. Counsel argued that the sentencing scheme at play, which subjected a juvenile offender to the same sentence as an adult, improperly removed youth from the court’s meaningful consideration. Counsel requested a sentence below the mandatory minimum, arguing that, under , the mandatory sentence that defendant faced was inappropriate for a juvenile. The court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms totaling 51 years for the first
degree murder conviction (26 years for the murder, plus 25 years as an enhancement for personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused death) and 10 years for the aggravated battery conviction. It noted that it was “deeply concerned” about defendant’s *4 lengthy history of involvement in the juvenile justice system, commencing at age nine with a residential burglary, continuing thereafter, and then ending after these crimes, when he was arrested on the street with a loaded weapon. It stated that it considered “very carefully” defendant’s age, the circumstances surrounding his upbringing and home life, the impact of his life on the streets, and his prospects for potential restoration to useful citizenship. Further:
“It appears that throughout [defendant’s] lifetime he has received a great deal of opportunity and benefit from the variety of probation officers and individuals that worked with him. Unfortunately, it appears that *** each effort to prevent this tragedy failed at every turn. That said, the sentence that I fashion today must take into account not only punitive measures *** [but I] also must address prospects for his rehabilitation, and restoration, and useful citizenship [which] I don’t take lightly at all. In fact, I am deeply swayed by the defense’s argument that his age—his tender age and his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration must play a very large role in the sentence that I meet [ sic ] out today. [Defendant’s] conduct, however, in many ways ties my hands. Although he was given the opportunity to succeed at many turns, he has demonstrated repeatedly that he is not willing to conform his conduct to that of which is expected of citizens living in our community. It is true that he is a child in many ways, however, not for purposes of sentencing following conviction of first[-]degree murder and a sentence of aggravated battery with a firearm. Simply not the case.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant moved the court to reconsider his sentence. He argued that the court erred by
not fully considering his age, particularly with respect to the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement and the consecutive nature of the sentence, which, he argued, effectively resulted in a mandatory life sentence and violated . The court then discussed with counsel that the sentencing scheme that existed at the time mandated a minimum 51-year sentence for defendant. After confirming the mandatory minimum, the court continued:
“COURT: And you think what, you think that stands for the proposition that I can disregard Illinois sentencing guidelines?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: [The United States] Supreme Court said that the Louisiana state court should have ignored Louisiana guidelines.
COURT: Okay.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So, yes, I mean, yes, Judge, we think that in light of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, due process clauses of those constitutions, that, yes, that sentencing court should[,] in light of Miller ***, ignore what are called mandatory penalty schemes for juveniles.” Counsel continued, arguing that additional factors in mitigation should have been considered, in that the circumstances were not likely to reoccur, because defendant would never be a juvenile again, which, he opined, was a big factor contributing to the commission of the crimes. He further noted that the court found that 26 out of 27 possible aggravating factors did not apply in this case, which, counsel argued, should lean in defendant’s favor. In response, the State distinguished Miller factually and further argued that the court had sentenced defendant compassionately. The court denied the motion to reconsider. It noted that it had issued close to the minimum
sentence that defendant could have received under the “statutory sentencing schemes that are *5 in place.” The court explained that, although the statutory range for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years, it had imposed upon defendant only 26 years, giving “extreme weight” to the fact that he was a minor, “[albeit] a minor with a delinquent history that is unlike many others.” The court further noted that, with respect to the enhancement for discharging the firearm, it had imposed the absolute minimum, and, finally, that it had imposed “close” to the minimum sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm ( i.e. , 10 years in the 6- to 30-year range). ¶ 16 C. Appellate Proceedings On direct appeal, defendant argued that the mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court
in cases involving first degree murder (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2010)), the application to
juveniles of mandatory firearm enhancements (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d) (West 2010)),
the mandatory consecutive sentencing (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2010)), and the
application of adult sentencing ranges and “truth in sentencing” provisions (730 ILCS 5/3-6-
3(a)(2)(i), (ii) (West 2010) (requiring that he serve 100% of the murder sentence)) did not
permit consideration of his youthfulness at the time of the offense, and thus, his sentence was
unconstitutional. We rejected his arguments.
Luna
,
we maintain our original holdings on all issues except the constitutionality of defendant’s
sentence, which we reconsider here. See
Luna
,
collectively, reflect that mandatory life sentences for juvenile defendants violate the eighth
amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). See
Miller
,
*6 The Illinois Supreme Court has also issued decisions that, collectively, reflect that
(1)
Miller
applies to discretionary, as well as mandatory, life sentences (
People v. Holman
,
“determine[ ] that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation . The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) Holman ,2017 IL 120655 , ¶ 46 (citing ,567 U.S. at 477-78 ). Indeed, this State has now codified the factors. Specifically, section 5-4.5-105(a) of
the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) provides that, when a person under 18 years of age commits an offense, the trial court at the sentencing hearing shall consider the following factors in mitigation: (1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any; (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences; (3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma; (4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both; (5) the circumstances of the offense; (6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before the offense; (7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense; (8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and (9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate, although, if a defendant chooses not to make a statement on advice of counsel, a lack of an expression of remorse shall not be considered as an aggravating factor. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016). Here, defendant argues that, in light of the foregoing, his sentence constitutes an
unconstitutional de facto life sentence, as the court was required to impose more than 40 years’ imprisonment without adequate consideration of his youth and its attendant circumstances. The State does not dispute that, per , defendant received a de facto life sentence. Indeed, we agree that the applicable sentencing scheme, at that time, mandated a minimum 51-year sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2010) (range of 20 to 60 years for first degree *7 murder); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2010) (mandatory add-on of 25 years to natural life); 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(b) (West 2010) (aggravated battery with a firearm is a Class X felony); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2010) (range for a Class X felony is 6 to 30 years); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2010) (providing for mandatory consecutive sentences). Moreover, defendant received a 61-year sentence, most of which must be served 100% (730 ILCS 5/3-6- 3(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (West 2010)). As such, defendant received a de facto life sentence. The State nevertheless disagrees that defendant’s life sentence violates the eighth
amendment. It contends that the trial court imposed the sentence only after considering defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances. Specifically, the State notes that defense counsel repeatedly emphasized defendant’s youth and the decision, both at sentencing and when moving the court to reconsider the sentence. The State argues that the court had before it voluminous information (through the presentence report, argument, letters, and the record itself) that allowed it to adequately consider all of the relevant factors attendant to defendant’s youth. In sum, the State contends that the evidence spoke to the circumstances of the offense and to defendant’s youth and immaturity, outside negative influences, home environment, lack of rehabilitation, role in the offense, ability to participate in his defense, and prior juvenile history. As this information was before the court, the State concludes that the court properly considered it prior to sentencing and that, thus, defendant’s sentence is not unconstitutional. We agree that defendant’s youth was considered at sentencing. The court expressly gave
“great weight” to defendant’s youth and was “deeply swayed” by defendant’s “tender age.” It also commented that it had considered his broken family life and the impact on him from street- gang influences. It made findings suggesting that defendant’s juvenile record—which primarily concerned burglary, theft, and revocations of probation—did not bode well for his rehabilitative capacity, as he had not yet reformed his conduct, despite attempts at intervention. The court had evidence before it, such as psychological evaluations and caseworker comments in the presentence report, that defendant was at risk for adult antisocial personality disorder and likely needed long-term residential treatment. Nevertheless, the admission of evidence and argument related to the factors does
not necessarily mean that those factors were adequately considered or evaluated to determine
whether defendant was the rare juvenile simply beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. See,
,
People v. Reyes
,
for discretion in fashioning defendant’s sentence. The court discussed with defense counsel that the statutory minimums at the time did not give it authority to impose upon defendant less than the minimum required by Illinois law, a minimum that now would be considered a de facto life sentence. The court noted that it imposed upon defendant terms on the lower end of the scale for the underlying crimes, as well as the minimum statutory firearm enhancement, but, again, the court understood that it was bound to apply the enhancement. Critically to this case, however, the sentencing scheme for juveniles in this State has changed to now afford sentencing courts discretion to apply that enhancement. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b), (c) (West 2018). *8 Second, the court commented that it could not consider defendant as a child for purposes
of sentencing. However, the framework for sentencing juvenile defendants to life
imprisonment has since evolved. Further, considering a defendant’s youth generally is a far
cry from finding that a defendant is the rare juvenile who committed conduct showing
irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. See, ,
Buffer
, 2019 IL
122327, ¶ 41;
Holman
,
report. He received good grades, he was an enthusiastic participant in group activities, he related to his peers, and he had strong family relationships. The crimes at issue, while horrible and senseless, were consistent with impulsive and immature behavior. The court was able to consider many factors, but it was simply unable to consider defendant’s youth and the attendant circumstances under the framework that has since developed in case law, and did not possess the discretion to impose less than a mandatory de facto life sentence. In sum, courts look to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. See ,
in accordance with this decision. III. CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed in part and vacated in part. The cause is remanded for resentencing. Affirmed in part and vacated in part. Cause remanded.
Notes
[1] The eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) are generally read coextensively. See, , People v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 101.