People v. LooneyPeople v. Looney
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Dunn
delivered the opinion of the court:
At the January term, 1923, of the circuit court of Rock Island county an indictment was returned against John P. Looney, Harry M. Schriver, John K. Scott, Thomas Cox, Lawrence Pedigo and Robert Kinner for conspiracy to furnish punch-boards and other gaming devices to divers persons and divers keepers of houses of prostitution and to protect them from arrest and keep them free from police molestation while they were engaged in the city of Rock Island in the keeping, maintenance and operation of such gaming devices, saloons, gaming houses and houses of prostitution. Looney was not arrested, Kinner was granted a severance and the cause was continued as to Scott. The other defendants, Schriver,
The Attorney General, by his assistants, appeared before the grand jury while it was investigating the charges upon which the indictment was returned, and after its return represented the People as well in the motions made preliminary to the trial before the jury as in that trial itself. The plaintiffs in error made a motion to quash the indictment and also objected to the appearance of the Attorney General and his assistants, making a motion that they be required to show by what authority they appeared for the People. The motion to quash was based- chiefly on the participation of the Attorney General in the proceedings before the grand jury. Both motions were denied and the denial of them is among the errors assigned. Since the act in regard to Attorneys General and State’s attorneys expressly authorizes the Attorney General to advise the several State’s attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office, and, when in his judgment the interest of the people of the State requires it, to attend the trial of any party accused of crime and assist in the prosecution, there is no basis for an objection by a defendant to the appearance of the Attorney General after the return of the indictment. The trial referred to is not merely the proceedings beginning with the empaneling of the jury and ending with the verdict, but includes all the preliminary and subsequent proceedings arising in the progress of the case. It is not only the duty of the Attorney General in the case specified in the statute to attend the trial before the jury but to assist in the prosecution. His services are not limited to consultations and advice, but include whatever assistance may be desirable and beneficial to the prosecution. Since there are a hundred and two counties in the State and courts are in session at the same time in many of them, the Attorney General cannot be present in person in all of them and must necessarily be represented, at timesj by his assistants. The State’s
Much space is taken up in the record, and more in the briefs, with the question of the right of the Attorney General to appear before the grand jury. The statements in the motion to quash were sworp to on information and belief by one of the plaintiffs in error and did not prove anything as to what took place in the presence of the grand jury. The report of the grand jury of the previous term, referring to crime conditions in Rock Island, was introduced in evidence on the hearing of the motion, as were several newspaper articles on the same subject which had been circulated widely before the grand jury met and during its session. It was shown that a citizen’s committee had raised by popular subscription a fund of $35,000 “to clean up Rock Island,” to be used in paying expenses in connection with the investigation and prosecution of crime, and it was claimed that the Attorney General’s assistants were to be paid out of this fund.’ These assistants testified on the hearing of the motion that they represented the Attorney General, only, and looked to him for their compensation. Objections to questions asked as to the source of the Attorney General’s funds were sustained. Such questions were incompetent. Whether the assistant attorneys general were paid or not paid was immaterial. A defendant charged with crime cannot call upon the State’s attorhey or Attorney General to disclose the source from which the funds required to pay the expenses of investigating and prosecuting him in particular or crime in general
An indictment cannot be quashed because of public sentiment in the community or of public excitement because open crime has been committed and gone unpunished or because newspapers or individuals or associations have denounced crime or individuals charged with crime. A grand jury is an accusatory body. It does not try persons charged with crime. It only investigates, and if sufficient criminating evidence is presented makes accusation, which is an indictment. So it is not a ground of challenge of a grand juror that he has formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt of a prisoner. (Musick v. People, 40 Ill. 268.) Our statute authorizes the grand jury to make presentments upon the information of not less than two of their own number without the necessity of their being sworn and to find indictments upon the sworn testimony of one member, the same as in the case of other witnesses. An opinion of the guilt of the prisoner, therefore, cannot be a ground of challenge. Neither will a court inquire into the competency of evidence or of witnesses before a grand jury or the sufficiency of the evidence to justify an indictment unless all the witnesses were incompetent. People v. Bladek, 259 Ill. 69; People v. Duncan, 261 id. 339.
It is insisted, however, that the mere presence of the Attorney General before the grand jury is a reason for quashing the indictment. We have seen that the statute gives the Attorney General authority to assist in the prosecution. “Prosecute” and “prosecution” have been variously defined. It is said in 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.)
One of the duties of the Attorney General of Montana prescribed by statute was that he should, when required by the public service or directed by the Governor, assist the county attorney of any county in the discharge of his duties. The district court having denied the Attorney General the right to appear before the grand jury he applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the order of the district court judge was valid or void. In the case in the district court the Attorney General attempted to appear before and advise the grand jury and interrogate witnesses in regard to bribery charges made by certain members
It is unnecessary to discuss the common law powers of the Attorney General. He has the statutory power to assist the State’s attorney. The State’s attorney in this State has always exercised the power of calling witnesses and examining them before the grand jury, and this power is not now questioned by the plaintiffs in error. Neither is it denied that his assistant has the same power, for the motion
There were three counts in the indictment, the first of which charged that the defendants on November 15, 1921, conspired to do illegal acts injurious to the public police,— that is to say,, then and there to unlawfully and knowingly offer for sale, sell, lease, loan and deliver to divers persons and divers keepers of gaming houses, punch-boards, being gambling devices used for the purpose of playing upon and winning and losing money and other articles of value. The second count set out a number of ordinances of the city showing the distribution of official powers, the existence and duty of various officers and fixing penalties for various offenses. It then averred that Harry M. Schriver was the mayor, Thomas Cox the chief of police, and John K. Scott
Evidence was produced by the prosecution which tended to show that there were a large number of saloons, houses of prostitution and gaming houses in Rock Island; that John P. Looney had conducted there for some years a scandalous weekly paper, which by reason of its scandalous character and the methods which he adopted he had used successfully for purposes of intimidation, blackmail and levying tribute upon his victims. Cy Hazlett, a depraved person without character, reputation or shame, had worked on the paper as a reporter and writer and had written many of the scurrilous articles which appeared in the paper. His testimony and scandalous writings occupy a great part of the 3000 pages of the record. His wages were $15 a week, and he testified that in September, 1921, he told Looney he was not getting money enough. Looney told him the paper was not paying but he would see that Hazlett was either put into, some poker game or something else where he could make money. Later Looney said he had arranged to get Hazlett the exclusive punch-board concession for Rock Island. They had a talk as to how the proceeds were to be distributed, and it was agreed that Hazlett should have twenty-five per cent, the defendant Pedigo (who was to be associated with him) twenty-five per cent and Looney fifty per cent. Looney said that John K. Scott, city attorney, and Tom Cox, chief of police, were to be in on his fifty per cent. Hazlett and Pedigo put punch-boards in many of the saloons and gaming houses in the fall of 1921 and collected from the keepers the proportion which they fixed as their share of the profits. Where punch-boards were already installed they told the keepers that Hazlett had the
Although the purpose of the alleged conspiracy in regard to punch-boards had thus been carried out by January x, 1922,- much evidence was introduced by the prosecution, over the objection of the plaintiffs in error, of events occurring after that time for the assumed purpose of proving the plaintiffs in error guilty of a conspiracy to use their official powers to refrain from arresting and prosecuting the keepers of saloons, gaming houses and houses of prostitution who were named and other keepers whose names were unknown, and to protect, save and keep them free from police molestation and attack while they were engaged in keeping, maintaining and operating saloons, gaming houses and houses of prostitution, and to use their official powers with corrupt partiality to the persons named and other keepers of saloons, gaming houses and houses of prostitution. Evidence was introduced as to the existence, maintenance and operation of such places during the year 1922 with the knowledge of the plaintiff in error Cox, who was the chief of police; the use Of police officers by Looney to make illegal arrests which he directed; the giving of a Eord car (which was in the custody of the police waiting to be claimed by its owner) to Looney, who sent it to his ranch in New Mexico; the public demand for the removal of Cox from office; the effort of the board of police commissioners to remove him and of the plaintiff in error Schriver to prevent his removal; the publication by Dan Drost of a rival paper, the Tri-City Journal, of the same character as Looney’s paper, the Rock Island News; the murder of William Gabel on July 31, 1922, and of John C. Looney, the son of
These matters were all gone into at length and in great detail, and it is claimed by the plaintiffs in error that they were all incompetent. They claim that the three counts of the indictment charge only a conspiracy in regard to the placing, maintenance, keeping, use and operation of punch-boards, and that the occurrences mentioned had no connection with any such purpose but all arose after the conspiracy in regard to punch-boards had accomplished its purpose and was no longer in existence. This construction of the indictment is incorrect. It is true that the indictment refers to only one conspiracy, and that conspiracy was with reference to punch-boards, but the three counts vary in the statement of the purposes of the conspiracy. Besides the purpose to place punch-boards in saloons and disorderly houses the second count goes into further detail, and charges, in substance, the purpose of the conspiracy to use the powers of the offices of mayor, chief of police and city attorney (1) to coerce the purchase and operation of punch-boards by the keepers of saloons and disorderly houses; (2) to refrain from arresting and prosecuting such keepers; (3) to protect, save and keep them harmless from molestation while engaged in keeping punch-boards, slot-machines, gaming devices, saloons, gaming houses and houses of prostitution; and (4) to use the powers of said offices with corrupt partiality to keepers of saloons, gaming houses and houses of prostitution. The third count charges as the purpose of the conspiracy the acceptance and receiving of bribes to induce the doing of the same things mentioned in the second count.
The object of the evidence of things occurring after January 1, 1922, and of other events having no connection with the placing of punch-boards, was to prove the charge that the defendants conspired to protect, save and keep free from police molestation and attack the keepers of saloons
The defendant in error contends that the motive for the attempts to kill Drost was not any remark about Looney’s daughter but was hostility to Drost because of his publication of the Tri-City Journal with the avowed purpose of driving “the Rock Island vice syndicate and their blackmailing paper out of the tri-cities” and being after them “with both tooth and nail” until this is done. There is no contradiction of the evidence that the Tri-City Journal was not published until January 12, 1922, and that the attempts on Drost’s life were in the fall of 1921. Parts of the Tri-City Journal itself, with its bitter vituperation and charges of blackmail, vice and crime, were admitted in evidence over the objection of the plaintiffs in error, though they were not evidence of anything in regard to this case but the malevolence of the publisher. It is argued on the part of the defendant in
Two rifles, a double-barreled shot-gun, a revolver and some hand grenades which were in Looney’s office in his residence were introduced in evidence. They were not admissible. They had no connection with the charge in the indictment and no tendency to prove the conspiracy charged or any act in relation to such conspiracy. The mere possession of fire-arms in Looney’s home was not evidence against him.
Hazlett and L. C. Smith followed the plaintiff in error Cox and Helen VanDale one night in 1921 while they were riding in an automobile. She was the divorced wife of Smith, a prostitute and keeper of a house of prostitution. Smith also testified to conversations with Cox in regard to permitting him to keep a house of prostitution, and to Cox’s
William Gabel was .a saloon-keeper in Rock Island. He was murdered on the street in front of his saloon just before midnight on the night of July 31, 1922. There were no eye-witnesses of the murder, and evidence was offered by the prosecution, and admitted, of all the circumstances attending the homicide. R. C. Goss was the narcotic agent of the Federal government who had been investigating violations of the anti-narcotic law in Rock Island prior to June 30, when he went to Chicago. He came back to Rock Island on July 20 and remained there until after the murder of Gabel. He saw Gabel in his saloon and also at Goss’ office in the post-office, and Gabel delivered to him nine checks. He was staying at the Como Hotel, and evidence was admitted that cars were going back and forth around the hotel on the afternoon and evening of July 31, patrolling the block. Counsel for the People assume in their brief that Looney and his son were causing these automobiles to patrol the block for the purpose of shadowing the Como Hotel, where Goss, Unger, Hazlett and Gabel were quartered. Albert H. Unger was a Federal prohibition agent who was at the Como Flotel on July 31, 1922, with Goss, and he testified that defendants Schriver and Cox came to Goss’ room about four o’clock in the afternoon and talked with Goss in regard to an article in the Rock Island Argus newspaper relating to the conditions of vice in Rock Island. They asked Goss if he authorized the statement, and he said he did. They also asked Goss if he had anything on the police department of Rock Island, and he said he had not. Harry Prince, a prohibition agent, who had come to Rock Island that day to make investigations of violations of the liquor law in Rock Island, Davenport and other places, was also there. Unger saw John P. Looney about five o’clock in the evening opposite the Como Hotel, on the east side of the
All this evidence was incompetent. There was nothing connecting the homicide, or any of the circumstances testified in connection with it, with the charge for which the plaintiffs in error were on trial. The counsel for the defendant in error argued that there was nothing improbable ■ about the assumption that all this was Looney’s work, because he was so much the ruler of Rock Island and so immune from prosecution that
It was also error to admit the evidence in regard to the murder of John C. Looney on October 6, 1922. No connection of the defendants was shown with it. Other evidence to which objections were made was also improperly admitted, but in view of what has been stated it is unnecessary to discuss the objections in detail.
Error is assigned on the giving and refusing of instructions. Instruction 12 advises the jury as to the third count of the indictment, that this count charges a conspiracy to receive bribes for the purpose of causing the mayor, chief of police and city attorney to furnish punch-boards to keepers of gambling houses and for the further purpose of doing the other acts mentioned in that count, in violation of their official duties. The instruction then charges that if the jury believe from the evidence under that count, beyond all reasonable doubt, that any two of the persons charged in that count conspired, combined and agreed tor gether that
Objection is made to other instructions given on behalf of the People, but the criticism made of them is not of such a character as to require further discussion, in view of what we have said.
Objection is also made to the refusal of a number of instructions asked on behalf of the plaintiffs in error. A great number of instructions were asked by the defendants, less than half of which were given, but enough were given to inform the jury fairly as to the questions of law arising
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.