Case Information
*1 Filed 8/27/14
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B248383 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA393121) v.
MICHAEL LOFCHIE,
Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Clifford L.
Klein. Affirmed.
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and Mathew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, Gary S.
Lincenberg and Benjamin D. Lichtman for Defendant and Respondent.
Crowel & Moring and J. Daniel Sharp; University of California Los Angeles Office of Legal Affairs and Kevin S. Reed; University of California Los Angeles Office of the General Counsel and Charles F. Robinson, Karen J. Petrulakis, Stephen P. Morrell, Mark Morodomi, and Elizabeth C. Yap as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
The issue presented in this case is whether a University of California [1] faculty member may be criminally prosecuted under Government Code section 1090 [2] for participating in a decision to hire his wife as a program assistant for a four-week summer study abroad course. We conclude that he may not, and for reasons we discuss affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the information under Penal Code section 995.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Michael Lofchie (Lofchie) has been a faculty member at the University of California at Los Angeles since 1964. He was chairman of the political science department in 2008. In July 2008, Lofchie taught a four-week summer session abroad course and participated in a decision to hire his wife, Kelly Comras Lofchie (Comras), as a program assistant for the 2008 summer session. Comras was hired by the University’s Office of Summer Sessions and was paid $3,100 plus a per diem for her expenses.
Richard Anderson, another professor in the political science department, also taught a class in the University’s 2008 summer session. When Anderson learned that Comras had been hired as a program assistant, he objected, first to Lofchie, and then to the person who succeeded Lofchie as chairman of the political science department. Anderson also filed an anonymous whistleblower complaint and met with the University’s director of compliance and the dean of the social science division. When the University’s administration rejected his complaint, Anderson brought the matter to the attention of the Los Angeles County District Attorney.
The district attorney, on behalf of the People of the State of California, [3] filed an information charging Lofchie with a felony violation of section 1090, alleging he was “financially interested” in a contract made by him in his official capacity to hire Comras as a program assistant in the summer of 2008. Lofchie filed a motion under Penal Code [1] Hereinafter, the University of California, or simply, the University.
[2] All further statutory references are to the Government Code, unless stated otherwise. Section 1090 may be referred to as section 1090 or Government Code section 1090.
[3] The district attorney is referred to hereinafter as the People.
section 995 to set aside the information on various grounds, including that article IX, section 9 of the California Constitution (hereafter article IX, section 9 or Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9) precludes the Legislature from regulating the employment practices of the University of California through Government Code section 1090; that section 1090 does not apply to a University of California professor; and that a more specific statute, Public Contract Code section 10516, preempts application of Government Code section 1090. The People opposed the motion.
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted Lofchie’s motion to set aside the information. This appeal followed.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Lofchie and the Regents of the University of California (the Regents), to whom we granted leave to file an amicus brief, both argue that section 1090 does not apply to the University because it is not the “state” within the meaning of the statute, but rather a constitutionally created public trust subject to legislative control in only specifiсally enumerated areas that do not include internal hiring decisions. The Regents further contend University of California employees are already subject to internal conflict of interest policies, including policies that address conflicts of interest in decisions involving spouses and family members, and that the district attorney’s expansive interpretation of section 1090 would render the statute an unconstitutional interference with university autonomy. Lofchie also contends the People forfeited the right to argue on appeal that he is a state employee because they took the opposite position in the trial court below; that Public Contract Code section 10516 supplants Government Code section 1090; and section 1090 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
The People contend they did not forfeit any argument that the University of California is a state entity and Lofchie is an employee of the “state” within the meaning of section 1090. The People further contend article IX, section 9 does not exempt the University from regulation under Government Code section 1090, and Public Contract Code section 10516 does not preclude application of section 1090.
DISCUSSION
I. Forfeiture
Lofchie argues that the doctrines of waiver and invited error preclude the People
from pursuing this appeal because they expressly conceded in the trial court below that he
is not a state employee. The doctrine of waiver precludes a party from changing its
position and adopting a new and different theory on appeal because “‘“to do so would not
only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing party.”’” (
Saville v.
Sierra College
(2005)
The People аcknowledge that they took inconsistent positions in the proceedings below regarding Lofchie’s employment status, at times conceding he is not a “state employee,” but rather a “public employee” subject to section 1090. They argue, however, that both Lofchie and the trial court understood the People’s position to be that University employees such as Lofchie are subject to section 1090, that Lofchie suffered no prejudice, and that there was no invited error on the part of the trial court.
We agree that there was neither prejudice nor invited error. Lofchie successfully opposed the People’s arguments in the trial court below that section 1090 applied to him as either a “state employee” or a “public employee.” The trial court’s memorandum of decision expressly rejects the People’s argument that University of California employees should be included as employees of the “state” within the meaning of section 1090.
Finding no grounds for forfeiture, we address the merits of the parties’ contentions.
II. The legal framework
A. Section 1090
Section 1090 provides:
“Members of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not be financially interested in any *5 contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members. Nor shall any state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees be purchasers at any state sale or vendors at any purchase made by them in their official capacity.
“As used in this article, ‘district’ means any agency of the state
formed pursuant to general law or special act, for the local performance of
governmental or proprietary functions within limited boundaries.”
Section 1090 “represents the Legislature’s decision to codify the common law rule
prohibiting public officials from having a personal financial interest in the cоntracts they
form in their official capacities. [Citation.]” (
People v. Wong
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1433, 1450.) A contract is made for purposes of section 1090 if the public official “had
the opportunity to, and did, influence execution [of the contract] directly or indirectly to
promote his personal interests. [Citation.]” (
People v. Sobel
(1974)
There are both civil and criminal remedies for violations of section 1090. Contracts made in violation of the statute may be voided by any party, except the interested party. (§ 1092.) Persons who willfully violate section 1090 are subject to criminal sanctions, including a fine of up to $1,000, imprisonment in state prison, and disqualification from holding any office in the state. (§ 1097.) [4] [4] Criminal sanctions for violation of section 1090 are set forth in section 1097, which states: “Every officer or person prohibited by the laws of this state from making or being interested in contracts, or from becoming a vendor or purchaser at sales, or from purchasing scrip, or other evidences of indebtedness, including any member of the governing board of a school district, who willfully violates any of the provisions of such laws, is punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, and is forever disqualified from holding any office in this state.”
B. Article IX, section 9
The University of California is a public trust established pursuant to article IX, section 9. [5] Article IX, section 9(a)(f) provides in pertinent part:
“(a) The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as ‘The Regents of the University of California,’ with full powers of organization and government, subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its funds and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and such competitive bidding procedures as may be made applicable to the university by statute for the letting of construction contraсts, sales of real property, and purchasing of materials, goods, and services. . . .”
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(f) . . . The university shall be entirely independent of all political
or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its
regents and in the administration of its affairs . . . .”
The California Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]rticle IX, section 9, grants
the regents broad powers to organize and govern the university and limits the
Legislature’s power to regulate either the university or the regents.”
[6]
(
San Francisco
Labor Council v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.
(1980)
[6]
In contrast, the Legislature possesses comprehensive powers of regulation “over
the California State University, which ‘“is subject to full legislative control and has
‘only such autonomy as the Legislature has seen fit to bestow.” [Citation.] . . .’”
(
Native American Heritage Com. v. Board of Trustees
(1996)
Courts have recognized not only the broad powers accorded to the Regents to
govern the University of California, but also the University’s “general immunity from
legislative regulation.” (
Labor Council, supra
,
The Regents and the University of California are not completely exempt from legislative regulation. As discussed, article IX, section 9 delineates three areas in which the University and the Regents are subject to legislative control -- insuring the security of its funds, compliance with the terms of its endowments, and competitive bidding *8 procedures made applicable to the University by statute for awarding construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchase of materials, goods, and services.
Apart from the forms of legislative control specifically listed in the California
Constitution, there are only three areas in which the Regents and the University of
California are subject to legislative regulation. The California Supreme Court has
enumerated these three areas as follows: “First, the Legislature is vested with the power
of appropriation, preventing the regents from compelling appropriations for salaries.
[Citations.] [¶] Second, it well settled that general police power regulations governing
private persons and corporations may be applied to the university. [Citations.] For
example, workers’ compensation laws applicable to the private sector may be made
applicable to the university. [¶] Third, legislation regulating public agency activity not
generally applicable to the public may be made applicable to the university when the
legislation regulates matters of statewide concern not involving internal university
affairs. [Citation.]” (
Labor Council, supra
,
The People contend section 1090 falls into the third category of permissive
legislative regulation of the University delineated by the Supreme Court in
Labor
Council
, because prohibiting state employees from engaging in self-dealing when
contracting on behalf of the state is a matter of “statewide concern.” The People further
contend the term “state” as used in section 1090 includes the University of California
and that Lofchie is a “state” employee. Whether Lofchie and the University come
within the ambit of section 1090 is an issue of statutory interpretation that we review
de novo. (
Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist.
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
1486, 1491.) Whether the University is constitutionally immune from legislative
regulation under section 1090 is a legal issue also subject to our independent review.
(
Goldbaum, supra
,
A. Statutory construction analysis
1. General principles
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain
the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (
Select Base
Materials v. Board of Equalization
(1959)
2. Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of section 1090 reflect an intent to include the University of California
Section 1090 does not define the term “state.” The term is defined elsewhere in sections of the Government Code that govern the construction of that code. (§§ 5, 18.) Section 18 defines “State” as “the State of California, unless applied to different parts of the United States,” in which case “it includes the District of Columbia and the territories.” (§ 18.) But that definition is unhelpful in determining whether the University of California is considered the “state” and whether a University professor is a “state employee” within the mеaning of section 1090.
Because the language of section 1090 provides no definitive answer as to whether
it applies to the University of California, we turn to the legislative history and the
purposes to be achieved by the statute. (
People v. Coronado, supra
, 12 Cal.4th at p.
151.) In addition, the statute must be construed “ ‘with reference to the whole system of
*10
law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ [Citation.]”
(
Select Base, supra
,
The legislative history for section 1090 contains no expression of intent to include
the University of California and its employees within the ambit of the statute. The
predecessor statute to section 1090 was enacted in 1851, before the University of
California existed,
[7]
and applied to government officials only. It prohibited “any
government official or legislator from being ‘interested in any Contract made by such
Officer or Legislature of which he is a member . . . in the discharge of his official duties.’
[Citations.]” (
Lexin v. Superior Court
(2010)
The People argue that the language of section 1090 has been interpreted broadly in
order to uphold the strong public policy against public officials having a personal
financial interest in contracts they form in their official capacities, and that the terms
“state” and “state employee” should therefore be broadly construеd to include the
University and its employees. It is true that section 1090 has been construed broadly with
respect to the scope of contractual or financial interests it covers (see, e.g.,
Stigall v. Taft
(1962)
but also planning and preliminary discussions]; People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 322-323 [prohibited financial interest can be direct or indirect]), but not with respect to the scope of individuals covered. (See Klistoff v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 469, 480, fn. 2 [section 1090’s “application is expressly restricted to the public officials enumerated in that statute”].)
In
People v. Christiansen
(2013)
Given the absence of clear and unequivocal legislative intent to include the University of California within the ambit of section 1090, we, like the court in Christiansen , will not judicially expand the scope of the statute to include the University and its employees.
As support for their argument that section 1090 applies to the University, the People cite other statutory schemes, such as the Political Reform Act, section 11000, and the California Environmental Quality Act, which apply to a “state agency” and which have been applied to the University even though the University is not expressly included in the statutory definitions for “state agency.” That other statutory schemes, with different statutory definitions, have been applied to the University is not a valid basis for concluding that section 1090 applies in the instant case. [8]
[8] The definition of “state agency” as used in section 11000 is expressly limited to title 2 of the Government Code. Section 1090 appears in title 1. (§ 11000, subd. (a).)
3. There is no case law applying section 1090 to the University
There is no case law applying section 1090 to the University of California or its
employees. The People cite
People v. Darby
(1952)
Darby
held that an elected member of the Los Angeles Board of Education was
both a “City officer” and a “state officer” under section 1090. The elected board member
was a “City officer” because the Los Angeles City Charter so prоvided. He was also a
“state officer” because the City of Los Angeles was empowered by the California
Constitution to determine the manner in which Board members were elected or
appointed, as well as the duration of their terms, qualifications, compensation, and
removal. The court in
Darby
reasoned: “An officer is a state officer if the tasks
performed by him are accomplished for and on behalf of the state notwithstanding the
fact that his duties were restricted to a particular geographical portion of the state.
[Citation.] The school district is a state agency and its board members are state officers.”
(
Darby, supra
,
The court in
Elliott
reached the same conclusion with regard to members of the
City of Los Angeles School Board, noting that “[t]he term ‘state officers’ is not limited to
officers whose jurisdiction is coextensive with the state but applies generally to persons
clothed with functions which affect the public and duties assigned to them by state laws.
. . . [¶] The matter of education is of statewide concern and is one of the responsibilities
of the state government.” (
Elliott, supra
,
Unlike the City of Los Angeles in
Darby
and
Elliott
, the University of California
is not a political subdivision of the state invested with a portion of the state’s
governmental power -- it is a public trust. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9.) The purpose of
designating the University as a public trust was to insulate it from state government,
ensuring that the University and its faculty would be “entirely independent of all political
or sectarian influence.” (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9(f).) Our Supreme Court has recognized
*13
the “unique constitutional status of the University of California” (
Miklosy v. Regents of
University of California
(2008)
4. The
Williamson
rule does not apply
Lofchie argues that section 1090 must be construed with reference to Public
Contract Code section 10516, a statute he claims allows University professors to make
contracts in which they have a financial interest. Lofchie further argues that the more
specific provisions of Public Contract Code section 10516 supplant the general
provisions of Government Code section 1090 under a principle of statutory interpretation
known as the
Williamson
rule, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
In re
Williamson
(1954)
“Under the
Williamson
rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a
special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted
exclusively under the special statute. In effect, the special statute is interpreted as
creating an exception to the general statute for conduct that otherwise could be
prosecuted under either statute. [Citation.] ‘The rule is not one of constitutional or
statutory mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial interpretation when two statutes
conflict.’ [Citation.]” (
People v. Murphy
(2011)
Public Contract Code section 10516 provides:
“No officer or employee of the University оf California shall engage in any employment, activity, or enterprise from which the officer or employee receives compensation or in which the officer or employee has a financial interest if that employment, activity, or enterprise is sponsored or funded, or sponsored and funded, by any university department through or by a university contract unless the employment, activity, or enterprise is within the course and scope of the officer’s or employee’s regular university employment. No officer or employee in the university shall contract on his or her own individual behalf as an independent contractor with any university department to provide services or goods. This section *14 shall not apply to officers or employees of the university with teaching or research responsibilities, nor shall it apply to student employees for payment for additional campus activities or engagements outsidе of the scope of their primary university employment.”
An officer or employee of the University “who corruptly performs any official act” in violation of Public Contract Code section 10516 is guilty of a felony. (Pub. Contract Code, § 10522.)
Lofchie argues that the exemption accorded by Public Contract Code section 10516 to “officers or employees of the university with teaching or research responsibilities” allows a University professor to participate in the making of a University contract in which he has a financial interest. That exemption, Lofchie claims, conflicts with section 1090, to the extent section 1090 applies to University employees.
Public Contract Code section 10516 does not proscribe the same conduct as that prohibited by Government Code section 1090. Public Contract Code section 10516 does not preclude an employee from making University contracts in which the employee is financially interestеd. Rather, it prohibits “any employment, activity, or enterprise ” in which the employee has a financial interest “if that employment, activity, or enterprise is sponsored or funded . . . by any university department through or by a university contract . . . .” (Pub. Contract Code, § 10516, italics added.)
The prohibition on contracts imposed by Public Contract Code section 10516 precludes a University employee from contracting “ on his or her own individual behalf as an independent contractor with any university department to provide goods or services.” (Pub. Contract Code, § 10516, italics added.) Government Code section 1090, by contrast, applies only to contracts made by state employees “in their official capacity.” The two statutes do not conflict because they govern different types of conduct.
Public Contract Code section 10516, moreover, must be construed “‘with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part.’” ( Select Base, supra , 51 Cal.2d at p. 645.) The statute is not part of the Government Code, but rather, рart of chapter 2.1 of division 2 of the Public Contract Code, entitled “University of California *15 Competitive Bidding.” That chapter governs competitive bidding requirements in University contracts for construction projects; contracts with private architects, engineering, environmental, and construction management firms; contracts for the sale of real property owned by the University; and contracts for the procurement of goods, services, and materials involving an expenditure of more than $50,000. (See Pub. Contract Code, §§ 10500-10506; 10509; 10510.4-10510.9; 10511-10513.) The $3,100 employment contract at issue here does not come within any of the foregoing categories.
Because Public Contract Code section 10516 and Government Code section 1090 govern different types of conduct, and the two statutes can be construed so that they do not conflict, the Williamson rule does not apply.
B. Constitutional analysis
Given the University’s “unique constitutional status,” we must construe section
1090 with reference to article IX, section 9 in a manner that harmonizes the statute with
that constitutional mandate. (
Select Base, supra
,
Section 1090 does not regulate the University’s fund security, endowment terms,
or bidding procedures. Of the additional categories of permissible legislative regulation
identified by the Supreme Court in
Labor Council
, the People concede that section 1090
potentially comes within only one -- legislation regulating public agency activity not
generally applicable to the public. Such legislation may be made applicable to the
University only when it “regulates matters of statewide concern not involving internal
university affairs.” (
Labor Council, supra
,
1. Case law regarding “matters of statewide concern” versus “internal university affairs”
The distinction between “matters of statewide concern” subject to legislative
regulation and “university affairs” within the exclusive control of the Regents was first
made by the California Supreme Court in
Tolman v. Underhill
(1952)
The California Supreme Court invalidated the University’s оath, concluding that
“state legislation has fully occupied the field and that university personnel cannot
properly be required to execute any other oath or declaration relating to loyalty than that
prescribed for all state employees.” (
Tolman, supra
,
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of legislative control over the
University of California in
Regents of University of Cal. v. Superior Court of Alameda
County
(1976)
More than 20 years after
Tolman
, the California Supreme Court revisited the
distinction it had made between matters of “statewide concern” and “university affairs”
by identifying one area of permissible legislative control over the University as follows:
“[L]egislation regulating public agency activity not generally applicable to the public
may be made applicable to the university when the legislation regulates matters of
statewide concern not involving internal university affairs. [Citation.]” (
Labor Council,
supra
,
After
Labor Council
, courts of appeal have sought to define the boundaries of
legislative control over the University by identifying those matters that are “of statewide
concern” and those that involve “internal university affairs.” In
Coutin v. Lucas
(1990)
The court in
Coutin
also sought to reconcile the differences in language used by
the Supreme Court in
Tolman
and in
Labor Council
to define the limits of legislative
control over the University: “The phrasing of the limitation in [
Labor Council
], as
matters of statewide concern ‘not involving internal university affairs’. . . does not mean
that the university or one of its colleges is immune from the effects of legislation of
paramount state concern merely because that legislation may in some fashion affect the
institution’s internal affairs. The Supreme Court in [
Labor Council
] relied upon
[
Tolman
] as authority for this formulation of an area of legitimate legislation regulation.
Tolman
recognized the hegemony of the legislature in matters of statewide concern
‘which are not exclusively university аffairs.’ [Citation.]
Tolman
nowhere indicates that
legislation on matters of manifest statewide concern will be inapplicable to the university
merely because it also relates to the internal affairs of the university. Indeed, the impact
of
Tolman
is that legislation on subjects of general statewide importance applies to the
university
unless
the matter is
exclusively internal
to the university. [Citations.]”
(
Coutin, supra
,
The court in
Coutin
then applied one commentator’s suggested approach for
determining what matters constitute “exclusively University affairs” within the Regents’
exclusive governing powers, using the following three factors: “‘(1) the centrality of the
subject matter to the functioning of the University as a university; (2) the degree of
*19
impairment of the Regents’ ‘full’ powers of governance; and (3) the interest advanced by
the legislative enactment.’ (Horowitz,
supra
, 25 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 36.)” (
Coutin,
supra
,
Other courts have sought to establish the boundaries of legislative regulation over
the University by identifying those matters that are exclusively university affairs. Courts
have recognized, for example, that “the evaluation of scholarship and the grant or denial
of tenure or promotion, unlike the ascertainment of loyalty, is a defining act of singular
importance to an academic institution,” precluding application of a statute that would
require the University to disclose documents generated during the faculty peer review
process. (
Scharf v. Regents of University of California
(1991)
2. This contract does not involve a matter of statewide concern and its application impinges upon exclusively internal University affairs
Under the principles set forth above, we cannot conclude that section 1090 as
applied to the University in the circumstances presented here involves a mаtter of
statewide concern. Determining what policies and procedures should govern conflicts of
interest in the University’s decisions to hire program assistants for a four-week summer
study abroad course is not a matter of “transcending statewide concern.” (
Coutin, supra
,
Application of section 1090 to criminally sanction Lofchie infringes upon the Regents’ and the University’s exclusive powers of self-governance. In the exercise of its “full powers of organization and government” (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9), the University has adopted detailed conflict of interest policies, including policies and procedures governing the employment of relatives and near relatives of University employees. [9] Among these policies is a general restriction on staff participation in employment decisions involving a spouse or other near relative. The policy states: “A member of the University staff shall not participate in the processes of rеview and decision-making on any matter concerning appointment, promotion, salary, retention, or termination of a near relative.” Violation of the University’s conflict of interest policy is also a violation of the University’s faculty code of conduct and subjects the violator to potential discipline, including written censure, suspension without pay, demotion, or dismissal. The University’s policies accord its administration flexibility, however, in determining whether a violation has occurred and in sanctioning any violation. Disputes over the existence of a violation, or appropriate discipline, are “resolved on a case-by-case basis.”
The University concluded that Lofchie’s participation in the decision to hire Comras as a summer study abroad program assistant did not constitute a violation warranting discipline under its conflict of interest policy and its faculty code of conduct. [9] We granted the Regents’ request that we take judicial notice of the University’s conflict of interest code, faculty code of conduct, code of ethics, and its policies, guidelines, and personnel manuals implementing those codes.
Allowing the People to sanction Lofchie under section 1090 would infringe upon not only the University’s conflict of interest policies, but its internal disciplinary policies as well. These policies “enjoy a status equivalent to that of state statutes. [Citation.]” ( Regents of University of California v. City of Santa Monica, supra , 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 135.) Their impairment would substantially interfere with the Regents’ full powers of governance over University affairs.
Moreover, it is far from clear whether applying section 1090 to the University in the circumstances presented here would advance the legislative interests underlying the statute. As discussed, neither the plain language of section 1090 nor its legislative history contains an expression of intent to include the University оf California within the ambit of the statute.
3. Municipal home rule cases do not apply The People concede that section 1090 “unquestionably intrudes somewhat into the [University’s] affairs,” but argue that such intrusion does not preclude the statute’s application. They claim the instant case is analogous to municipal “home rule” cases determining when a state statute preempts an ordinance adopted by a charter city or county and urge us to adopt the analysis courts have applied in such cases to distinguish between “municipal affairs” and matters of “statewide concern.”
Charter cities have powers of self-governance similar to those held by the
University of California, in that they “are specifically authorized by our state Constitution
to govern themselves, free of state legislative intrusion, as to those matters deemed
municipal affairs.” (
State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. City
of Vista
(2012)
The California Supreme Court has set forth the following four-part analysis for
determining whether or not a matter falls within a charter city’s constitutional home rule
authority: “First, a court must determine whether the city ordinance at issue regulates an
activity that can be characterized as a ‘municipal affair.’ [Citation.] Second, the court
‘must satisfy itself that the case presents an actual conflict between [local and state law].’
[Citation.] Third, the court must dеcide whether the state law addresses a matter of
‘statewide concern.’ [Citation.] Finally, the court must determine whether the law is
‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern [citation] and ‘narrowly tailored’ to
avoid unnecessary interference in local governance [citation]. ‘If . . . the court is
persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one of statewide concern and that the
statute is reasonably related to its resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the
conflicting charter city measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro tanto and the
Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5(a), from addressing the statewide
dimension by its own tailored enactments.’ [Citation.]” (
State Building, supra
, 54
Cal.4th at p. 556, quoting
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los
Angeles
(1991)
The People urge us to apply the municipal home rule analysis to this case to determine whether section 1090 addresses a matter of “statewide concern” and therefore supplants the University’s powers of self-governance over “internal university affairs.” Because the constitutional autonomy granted to the University under article IX, section 9 is substantially greater than that accorded to charter cities under article XI, section 5, we decline to do so.
Article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution grants charter cities sovereignty
over matters deemed to be “municipal affairs,” but recognizes state legislative
supremacy over matters not within the ambit of that phrase. (
California Federal, supra
,
CONCLUSION
The matter presented here is not one of statewide concern. Allowing the People to
prosecute Lofchie under section 1090 would impair the Regents’ ability to govern and
would contravene article IX section 9 of the California Constitution.
[10]
[10]
In view of our holding, we need not address Lofchie’s arguments that the
information is barred because section 1090 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him
or that we should apply the rule of lenity to preclude criminal prosecution in this case.
(See
Dunn v. United States
(1979)
DISPOSITION
The order dismissing the information is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
____________________________, J. CHAVEZ We concur:
__________________________, P. J.
BOREN
__________________________, J.*
FERNS
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.