304 N.Y. 468 | NY | 1952
Lead Opinion
When we reversed the prior judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that the defendant’s confession to Dr. Helfand was coerced as a matter of law, we thereby ruled it out for any further consideration on the issue of defendant’s guilt (People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353). By this ruling we did not invalidate the statements subsequently made by defendant to other persons and specifically left their validity open for separate consideration by a later jury as an issue of fact whether all or any of such statements depended on the mental coercion practiced by Dr. Plelfand and then “ only if the jury were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such coercion had ceased to influence defendant could they consider the later confessions # * * (Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra) [322 U. S. 596].” (People v. Leyra, supra, p. 366.)
At the prior trial it had also been contended that a statement by Dr. Helfand contained a promise of leniency which might be attributed under the circumstances to the District Attorney. This required no definitive ruling from us as we had already declared the confession invalid for coercion, but we did not thereby overlook the possible influence of the alleged promise on the later statements, by way of inducement, and just as in the case of the mental coercion, we specifically left it for the jury to consider separately in the light of any promise of leniency, for it was only in that manner that due process could be afforded (Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401).
According to the record now before us, the Helfand confession was again received in evidence “ merely on the question as to whether or not whatever statements the defendant made * * * were inspired ” by Dr. Helfand, an issue raised by defense counsel. This was received after the trial court had cautioned counsel at length, followed by a most explicit and detailed instruction to the jury as to its illegality phrased in most simple and understandable language that they might n< consider it on the issue of guilt under “ any circumstances ”, but were limited to a consideration of its effect on the later confessions, and that these too were to be entirely disregarded if found to be dependent upon it in any respect whatsoever, a distinction which each individual juror signified that he understood.
In this manner and by this means the defendant’s statement to Dr. Helfand was effectively insulated from the jury for consideration on the issue of guilt and was made available to them for the sole and limited purpose of saying whether or not the later statements made to others were dependent in any way on coercion or inducement, coupled with the clear and positive instruction that if so found to be, it was “ worthless as evidence ”. Such submission for separate consideration was in obedience to our specific ruling at the prior trial.
When the Trial Judge charged that as a matter of law a promise of leniency had been made by Dr. Helfand, he did not thereby make that statement “ the law of the case ” to such an extent as to deprive the jury of the benefit of his instruction as to “ carry over and inducement That was the precise issue they were required to pass upon. The 11 law of the case ” governing the jurors in their deliberations is to be found in the charge in its entirety and is not to be taken from a ruling concerning the limited nature and effect of a single item of evidence, particularly, when the point said to be prejudicial, as here, has been specifically excluded. The law governing the retrial of this case was explicitly laid down by us at the prior trial which was that the statement to Dr. Helfand was coerced and worthless as evidence. The circumstance that the Trial Judge also said it was worthless, because a promise had been made as a matter of law, did not in any way prejudice the defendant. It was, if anything, to his advantage.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). To see this ease whole and in proper focus, it must be borne in mind that defendant’s conviction rests solely upon his confessions and that the trial court so charged the jury, advising that, absent those confessions, “ defendant must be acquitted, for the reason that the Court rules, as a matter of law, that all of the other evidence in the case * * * even if accepted by the jury as true, is insufficient upon which to predicate a verdict of guilty. ”
The trial judge charged unequivocally that Dr. Helfand had promised defendant, “ in order to induce him to confess,” that he would not be prosecuted for murder in the first degree, that such promise was authorized by the district attorney and that defendant confessed in reliance upon it. Consequently, as the trial court went on to charge, that confession was inadmissible as a matter of law. (See Code Crim. Pro., § 395.) In view of that charge'— which, of course, became the law of the case — it follows, as a matter of ineluctable logic, that any and all other confessions to the district attorney or those associated with him in the investigation and prosecution of this very homicide, must also be deemed to have been induced by that promise, and likewise inadmissible. Accordingly, when the court further instructed the jury that it might find that the confessions to assistants of the district attorney and to a police captain — made within an hour or two after immunity had been promised — had not been induced by the promise, it pursued a course that was not only opposed to logic, but incompatible with the law of the case. That was error highly prejudicial to defendant.
Nor does the existence of the confession that defendant made to Herrschaft, his friend and business associate, change the situation or permit an affirmance. True, that confession may stand in a category different from those made to prosecutor and police; other considerations, considerations separate and apart from the district attorney’s promise, may have prompted defendant to confess to his friend. I am willing to assume, therefore, that the court was warranted in leaving to the jury the question whether or not the promise induced defendant’s confession to Herrschaft, but that does not dispose of the matter. Since the jury also had before it the two confessions made to
I would reverse the judgment and order a new trial.
Lewis and Desmond, JJ., concur with Dye, J.; Froessel, J., concurs for affirmance under the provisions of section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Fuld, J., dissents in opinion in which Lottghran, Ch. J., concurs; Conway, J., not sitting.
Judgment of conviction affirmed. [See 304 N. Y. 844.]
