*1
64, 65 L. Ed. 2d at
Roberts, 448 U.S. at
nal proceedings.”
practical
115—15 is a
607,
JUSTICE (No. 87131. ILLINOIS,
THE THE PEOPLE OF STATE OF Appel- LEMONS, lee, v. HENRY BRUCE Appellant. Opinion April filed *2 RATHJE, J., joined by HEIPLE, J., dissenting. Yuhas,
Daniel D. Deputy Defender, Gary and R. Peter- Hart, son and Catherine K. Assistant Defenders, Office Defender, of the State Appellate Springfield, appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and (Joel Brett Irving, State’s Attorney, Pittsfield D. Ber- tocchi, General, Solicitor and William L. Browers Barrio, Adrian Attorneys General, J. Assistant of Chicago, counsel), People. for the JUSTICE MILLER delivered the of the court: opinion a 1997 in Following bench trial the circuit court of of ag- Bruce Lemons was convicted County, Henry Pike officer. He was gravated battery resisting peace for the ag- to an extended term prison sentenced term for 364-day and a concurrent battery gravated peace officer. a 1984 The of the extended-term sentence was basis February to which defendant was convicted In 1985, and sentenced to 18 months of probation. probation defendant’s was revoked. September record to indicate the of that revocation. disposition fails In probation November was revoked He resentenced in 1990 when the again. January was extended for 24 judge months. 1991, a third to revoke his August petition filed. A on that hearing petition was not held until October at which time defendant’s probation was revoked and he to 54 months in was sentenced from 1991 to prison. (During period was absent from Illinois and committed various crimes released, in other states before Defendant returning.) from nine prison July having served months of *3 his sentence. In five after August days release from the Department Corrections, of charged aggravated battery was with and peace officer. After a trial he was found of guilty bench charges; both he was sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment on December
The defendant appealed, contending that the circuit in imposing court erred an extended-term sentence the prior predi- because conviction on which the court old, in years cated that sentence was more than 10 viola- tion in of the contained section provisions 5—3.2(b)(1) (730 the Unified Code Corrections 5— 5—3.2(b)(1) (West 1996)). ILCS 5/5 — court, af justice dissenting, The with one appellate Ill. firmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence. 303 App. petition 3d 259. The defendant filed a for leave to appeal argued that the of the extended- term sentence constituted reversible error because it prior years based on a conviction more than old, excluding spent custody. granted time in We (177 315(a)) petition appeal for leave to Ill. 2d R. appellate now affirm the court.
DISCUSSION purpose whether, issue before us is for the prior extended-term conviction, based on a 10-year period imposed limitation in section 5—5— 3.2(b)(1) began of the Unified Code of Corrections to run on the date defendant was first sentenced for the 1985 burglary, began or if it to run on the date the defendant was last sentenced when his sentence of last revoked on October 5—3.2(b)(1)
Section of the Unified Code of Cor- impose rections authorizes a trial court to an extended- following term in circumstance: “When a any felony, defendant is convicted of after been previously convicted in Illinois greater felony, of the same or similar class class years when such conviction has occurred within 10 after excluding spent custody conviction, time in (West 5—3.2(b)(1) ***.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — argues February Defendant that the date of apply his sentence of should eligible sentencing. if determine he is for extended-term plain reading He asserts that under a statute, his improper prior sentence was because his conviction was old. urges apply The State us to limitation imposed from the October proba- 1996, date defendant was resentenced when his statutory tion was revoked. The State that the asserts *4 applied definition “conviction,” of the word as to section
159 5—3.2(b)(1), ambiguous. further main- The State sentencing of date, instead use the initial tains that to crime of date, for the defendant’s final the policy burglary embodied the considerations would defeat results. statute and lead absurd in the extended-term agree below, the forth we with For the reasons set extended-term sentence of a State proper. on defendant A final sentence was on October for the 1985 conviction imposing an extended- Therefore, the time limitation for expire until October term sentence does not statutory construction is to The cardinal rule of meaning give plain effect to the of a stat ascertain inquiry begins language ute, and that with the of the (1988). 119 Ill. 2d 447 statute itself. Hare, v. People legislative The most reliable indicator of language intent is the of the statute. 155 Ill. 2d Bole, People (1993). Where that intent can be ascertained from language given statute, it effect will be without resorting to other aids construction. People v. Robin (1982). 89 Ill. 2d 475-76 son, Section of the Unified Code of Cor- 10-year period begins rections states that the to run on “previous expires the date of the conviction” the Unified of Cor- later. Section 5—1—5 of Code rections defines conviction as “a of conviction upon plea guilty upon entered of or a a finding guilty by offense, rendered verdict or legally of an jury by competent juris- constituted court try jury.” diction authorized to without a case (West (West 1996); ILCS 720 ILCS 5/2—5 5/5—1—5 purpose this court that for the stated Robinson, determining 10-year period, “the date of a conviction entry is the date of order.” Robinson, question 89 Ill. 2d at 477. The here turns on whether *5 160
first order sentencing or the final order ap plicable. The appellate court applied the rule in Robinson to the date of the defendant’s last sentencing date for the underlying crime, in 1996, October instead of his original sentence in February 1985. The panel believed that 31, October 1996, date was the relevant date because probation once has been revoked the original sentence no longer exists, and the court is free to impose any sentence it could have originally imposed. People Miller, v. 109 Ill. (1982). 255, 3d App. 256-57 Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the defendant qualified for extended-term Robinson makes clear that the date sentencing. agree. We of a conviction is the date of entry of the sentencing or Robinson, der. 89 Ill. 2d at In case, the present sentencing order occurred on 31, 1996, October because is the date probation was revoked and a final sentence pronounced on defendant for commit ting burglary. date of convic tion crime, then, for that is October
We further agree with the State that to use the Feb- ruary 26, 1985, date that the original probation was handed down would lead to effect, absurd if results. a violates his and could postpone resentencing on the probation, revocation of he would escape later under the extended-term statute provisions. Robinson,
As we stated in
“The aim of recidivist
statutes
is to impose harsher
sentences
on offenders
whose repeated convictions have shown their resistance
to correction.
Realistically,
[Citation.]
one can assess an
offender’s
tendency
when,
recidivism only
served
sentence,
his
he has returned
to society; his
behavior while in custody can hardly be viewed as a reli
able indicator of the likelihood of his committing another
Robinson,
offense
when released.”
CONCLUSION stated, appellate For the reasons court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. RATHJE, dissenting: JUSTICE 5—3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Cor Section 5— of an extended-term rections authorizes any a defendant is convicted of prison “[w]hen in Illinois felony, previously after been convicted same or similar class when such conviction has greater felony, class conviction.” years occurred within 10 after added.) 5—3.2(b)(1) (West 730 ILCS (Emphasis majority case, In this the trial court —and 5—5— affirms —an extended-term sentence under section 3.2(b)(1), bat though aggravated even occurred 12 tery conviction after I majority, conviction. Unlike the believe says precludes means what it the imposition of an extended-term sentence based upon a 12-year-old conviction.11 therefore dissent.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.
(No. 88014. RONALD al., et MORRISON Appellees, v. C.G. WAG- (C.G.
NER et al. Wagner, Appellant).
Opinion April filed *7 very least, 1At the application the State’s insistence that clear,” “imprecise,” “far from “vague” under the facts of this case mandates a decision in (1999) People Whitney, defendant’s favor. See 188 Ill. 2d (any ambiguity in penal statute must be construed favor).