People v. LeitgebPeople v. Leitgeb
Appellant, Ernest Leitgeb, was convicted in a jury trial of the unlawful killing of one Eugene Kasmer by means of a vehicle being driven with gross negligence. He appeals from the judgment and an order denying his motion for new trial. Defendant was prosecuted under section 192, subdivision 3(a) of the Penal Code. The sole issue of fact was whether he was grossly negligent in the operation of his car.
In appellant’s opening brief the case is summarized as follows: “According to defendant and his witnesses, defendant was driving wеst, on Sunset, on the street car tracks (the center traffic lane of the street), at about 25 miles per hour, when the decedent, crossing the street from south to north, suddenly appeared out of the darkness in front of the car. Defendant and his witnessеs testified that defendant immediately applied his brakes, but was unable to avoid the accident. The prosecution’s witnesses testified that defendant, driving about 40 miles per hour, in the lane immediately north of the car tracks (lane 2 of the three west bound traffic lanes), suddenly veered to his left through the street ear safety zone, immediately in front of an on-coming street car, and hit decedent, who was standing at the extreme westerly end of that zone.”
The points on appeal are stated as follows: “ (1) That the testimony for the prosecution is so incredible as not to justify
The fatal accident occurred at about 6:30 p. m. at the intersection of Portia Street and Sunset Boulevard, in Los Angeles. Portia Street, running north and south, intersects at right angles and deadends with Sunset Boulevard, an east-west arterial. Portia Street is 40 feet widе, and Sunset Boulevard is some 76 feet in width. Of the two crosswalks extending across Sunset Boulevard at this intersection, the one on the east side of Portia is unmarked and 9 feet in width, and the one on the west side of Portia is marked and 17 feet wide. The northwest and northеast corners of the intersection are lighted by ornamental light standards and these lights are supplemented by lights from a gas station located on the northeast corner, and by lights from the windows of a drugstore situated on the northwest corner. There arе also lighting standards on the south side of Sunset Boulevard, at the intersection. Visibility is good in the whole intersection. Pacific Electric streetcar tracks are laid east and west along Sunset Boulevard. On the northeast corner is a safety zone for westbound traffic, extending east 57 feet from the east edge of the unmarked crosswalk. There is a similar safety zone for eastbound streetcar traffic on the south side of Sunset Boulevard. There was evidence that conditions of visibility at the safety zone on the northeast corner were very good.
Mr. Burt Lehan, an engineer in the Engineering Department of General Motors, testified that on November 10, 1945, at 6:30 p. m., he was in his car waiting for an opportunity to turn left from Portia Street onto Sunset Boulevard. He saw the decedent, wearing dark clothes, standing inside the safety zone located on the northeast corner of the intersection about two feet from its west end. He first observed the appellant’s car when it was approximately 15 feet frоm decedent Kasmer. Appellant was driving west on the north side of Sunset Boulevard between the safety zone and the north curb. Because of the rapidity with which events transpired, the witness was unable to form an estimate of the speed of appellant’s car. Appellant’s car was parallel to and either very near or just inside the safety zone, the witness being unable to distinguish because of the oblique.angle of his vision. As appellant’s ear neared the intersection it turned to the left, аngling across the west end of the safety zone. The paths of the wheels of ap
Appellant testified that he was driving in the left-hand lane of trаffic on the streetcar tracks at approximately 25 miles per hour; that there were several automobiles but no streetcars ahead of him; that when he arrived at the intersection of Portia and Sunset Boulevard, the decedent steрped in front of his car; that he had not seen the decedent prior to the time decedent stepped in front of the car; that he applied his brakes immediately upon seeing the decedent and that his brakes were in good mechaniсal condition. The impact was on the left front portion of the car, damaging the grill, radiator ornament and left front fender. He testified that he stopped his car, got out and found decedent lying about 15 feet to the rear of the car. His testimony was corroborated by
An attack is made upon the testimony of all. the witnesses for the prosecution as incredible. The principal features of this testimony were in that of Parr, who estimated defendant’s speed at 40 miles an hour, in the testimony of Lehan that decedent was standing inside the safety zone at the time he was-struck, and in that of the witness Lederman, who hаd noticed, a person wearing a dark suit standing in the safety zone immediately prior to the accident. When defendant’s charge of .' incredibility of the testimony of these witnesses is examined*, it is found to consist of an argument that' their testimony was proved to be untrue by-the contradicting evidence of defendant and his witnesses. The testimony of the State’s witnesses was no more incredible than the testimony of the witnesses for defendant. While the versions of the two sets of witnesses were in direct conflict, the accident could have happened exactly as related by the State’s witnesses or just as it was described by defendant and his witnesses. The testimony of Parr was positive and clear. Defendant argues that Parr’s streetcar was nowhere near Portia Street when the accident occurred, and that he could not have witnessed it. He does not rely upon any inherent weakness in Parr’s testimony but only upon the testimony of his own witnesses. One defense witness testified that after the accident she walked toward the east and saw a streetcar coming from the east about a block from Portia Street, another testified that the streetcar did not arrive until about 15 minutes after the accident, and another testified that; it was more than a block to the east when the accident occurred', and did not arrive for six or seven minutes thereafter. Other-witnesses were not questioned as to whether they observed the; streetcar. Arguments of the same nature are made concerning the testimony of thе prosecution’s other witnesses that the decedent was in the streetcar safety zone at the time he was struck and are equally without merit.
Defendant’s remaining point is that, giving full effect to the evidence of the prosecution, it was insufficient to prove gross negligence. The verdict of the jury is a conclusive determination, so far as this court is concerned, that the accident occurred in a manner consistent only with the evidence which tended most strongly to establish gross negligence оf defendant in the operation of .his ear. We are therefore obliged to
The court defined gross negligence as follows: “It is such degree of negligence or carelessness as to amount to the want of slight diligence, an entire failure to exercise care or the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an entire indifference to the property and persons of others and a conscious indifference to all consequences.” Defendant does not question the correctness of this definition. His argument that his conduct, as described by the People’s witnesses, does not measure up to this definition of gross negligence is again an argument on the facts. It is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether conduct in a given situation evidences negligence and, if it does, whether it is gross, ordinary, or slight negligence. We could interfere with the finding of the jury only if we were convinced that freedom from gross negligence was so clearly established by the evidence that reasonable minds сould not differ upon the question.
(Malone
v.
Clemow,
The judgment and order denying new trial are affirmed.
Desmond, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.