People v. LeftenantPeople v. Leftenant
Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, his statements to the police were properly admitted into evidence. His inculpatory statements to the police during their interview with him after his arrest were made after an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) and were not the product of coercion (see People v Liles, 243 AD2d 729, 730 [1997], cert denied sub nom. Lyles v New York, 525 US 857 [1998]). The defendant’s much later statements to the police were not in response to an inquiry, and the defendant was not provoked, encouraged, or induced to speak. These statements were spontaneous and not the product of interrogation and, as such, were admissible (see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476, 479 [1982]; People v Farrell, 13 AD3d 644 [2004]).
Since the hearing testimony established that the defendant was arrested outside the home where he was staying as an overnight guest, there was no Payton violation (see Payton v New York, 445 US 573 [1980]; People v Reynoso, 2 NY3d 820, 821 [2004]; People v Roe, 73 NY2d 1004, 1006 [1989]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see
The defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed the People to elicit evidence that a non-testifying codefendant made a statement to the police is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see
The defendant’s contention that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence photographs and a videotape depicting the crime scene is partially unpreserved for appellate review, as the defense counsel specifically stated at trial that he had no objection to the introduction of one of the pictures (see
The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]).
As the People correctly concede, the defendant’s sentence imposed upon the conviction of murder in the second degree (felony murder) must be modified to run concurrently with the sentence imposed upon the conviction of robbery in the first degree, as the robbery constituted the underlying felony for the felony murder conviction, and was a material element of that crime (see
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Florio, J.P., Crane, Fisher and Dillon, JJ., concur.