People v. LeePeople v. Lee
OPINION
Here we hold that arson of an inhabited structure or property (
Paul Hyun Lee appeals from a judgment, following court trial, of one count of arson of an inhabited structure or property (
FACTS
Ventura County Sheriff‘s Officer John Steele was called to the scene of a fire in a residence. When he entered the house, he had difficulty seeing due to the smoke. When he called out, appellant responded and emerged from within the house. Officer Steele questioned appellant outside the house and appellant said that he had started fires in his bedroom and by the front door. He said several times that his reason for setting the fires was to kill himself. Appellant appeared confused and seemed to respond somewhat strangely. He gave contradictory answers about whether he intended to kill himself and whether he knew where he lived. The officer thought appellant had mental problems.
The criminal proceedings were suspended at one point when the court declared appellant incompetent under
Appellant‘s counsel moved the court in limine to instruct that the arson was a specific intent crime and to allow defense counsel to introduce psychiatric testimony regarding whether appellant had formed the specific intent. The court ruled that arson is a general intent crime and denied the motion. Appellant submitted his case on the preliminary hearing transcript and several exhibits. The court found him guilty as charged. [[/]]*
DISCUSSION
1. Arson of a Structure Is a General Intent Crime
The defense theory was that appellant did not have the specific intent to burn a structure as prohibited by
In In re Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1059, the trial court found that two minors had recklessly set a fire within the meaning of
The reviewing court in In re Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1063, noted that California cases which preceded the present separate treatment of
The Stonewall court concluded that “willfully and maliciously” as applied to the wrongful acts of arson means an intent to set fire to or burn or cause to be burned, a standard distinguishable from “recklessly,” which means an
In re Stonewall F.‘s discussion of the requisite intent or standard of culpability for arson of a structure did not remain unchallenged. In People v. Glover (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1479 [285 Cal.Rptr. 362], the reviewing court stated that Stonewall F. does not correctly state California law and that arson remains a general intent crime. The Glover court also reviewed the history of arson statutes in California, as well as other jurisdictions, and noted that the “general rule of law throughout the country has been that unless a jurisdiction‘s arson statute requires a particular intent, arson is a general intent crime.” (Id., at pp. 1482-1483.)
Glover recited the California test set forth in People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456-457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370], for ascertaining whether a crime requires a specific or general intent, discussed the definition of “willfully and maliciously” under statutes and case law, and concluded that “[s]ection 451, subdivision (b) which defines the particular punishment range to be imposed against a person who causes an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn does not require any specific intent.” (People v. Glover, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1483.)3 Glover weakened the precedential value of its opinion by holding alternatively that any error in failing to instruct on specific intent was harmless.
Glover was followed shortly by People v. Lopez (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1840 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 317], which avoided openly disagreeing with In re Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 1054, by finding that Stonewall F.‘s discussion of intent was dicta. Lopez did, however, embrace People v. Glover‘s analysis and held that People v. Glover, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1476, correctly states the law concerning the intent required for commission of the offense described in
The recent case of People v. Fry (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1334 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 43], recognized the conflict of authority concerning whether the crime of arson requires a specific intent. (At p. 1338.) After discussing both In re Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 1054, and People v. Glover, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1476, Fry took a middle ground and stated that “[c]learly the arson statute requires something more than a general intent or willingness to do the proscribed act.” (People v. Fry, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.) The reviewing court in Fry agreed with People v. Glover, supra, that “the something more is not the specific intent to burn a particular piece of property. The Legislature defined the crime of arson, and we do not consider it appropriate to add an element they did not see fit to expressly require. Rather, to convict a defendant of arson, the trier of fact must find only that he or she acted willfully and maliciously in setting fire to, burning, or causing to be burned a structure, forest land, or property.” (Id. at p. 1339.)
(1) We agree with People v. Fry, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1334, and People v. Lopez, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 1840, that the analysis in People v. Glover, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1476, is the better reasoned view and more in keeping with the line of authority in California case law prior to In re Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 1054. “Maliciously,” as defined in
Unlike the facts in In re Stonewall F., supra, the burning of the structure here was not “causally distant from the proscribed act[s]. . . .” (208 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1066.) Appellant set three or four fires in different places inside the house and admitted that he had started the fires. Moreover, appellant‘s argument is unpersuasive that if he intended to kill himself by setting the fires, he is not necessarily guilty of arson, especially if he did not intend to burn the house. Appellant assumes that somehow he intended to kill himself without burning the house. There is no evidence to support that theory. Even assuming appellant set the fires for the purpose of killing himself, his intent under his own reasoning would have been to burn the
[[2., 3.]]*
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The judgment is affirmed.
Gilbert, J., and Yegan, J., concurred.
Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 15, 1994. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.