People v. LeePeople v. Lee
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2008, the State charged defendant by information with one count of
II. ANALYSIS
We first address defendant‘s argument he should have been sentenced within the sentencing range for Class 2 felonies pursuant to the rule of lenity because section 5-8-1(a)(5) of the Unified Code (
Section 5-5-3(a) of the Unified Code (
Defendant contends section 5-8-1(a)(5) of the Unified Code (
In criminal prosecutions, the rule of lenity requires ambiguities in statutes to be resolved in a defendant‘s favor. People v. Harper, 392 Ill. App. 3d 809, 820, 331 Ill. Dec. 282, 910 N.E.2d 691, 700-01 (2009). Particularly, where no legislative history exists to aid the court in determining whether the legislature intended an enhancement provision to apply to a given charge, the court can apply the rule of lenity. People v. Fields, 383 Ill. App. 3d 920, 922, 322 Ill. Dec. 699, 891 N.E.2d 990, 992 (2008), citing People v. Owens, 240 Ill. App. 3d 168, 170-71, 181 Ill. Dec. 86, 608 N.E.2d 159, 161 (1992).
Because defendant contends these two statutes conflict, thereby creating ambiguity, this presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148, 154, 300 Ill. Dec. 34, 843 N.E.2d 292, 296 (2006). The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 156, 300 Ill. Dec. 34, 843 N.E.2d at 297. Both of the
Our supreme court instructs us “`the legislature has the authority to set the nature and extent of penalties. Courts will not interfere with such legislation unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the very broad and general constitutional limitations applicable.‘” People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 221, 215 Ill. Dec. 679, 664 N.E.2d 76, 84 (1996), quoting People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542, 48 Ill. Dec. 228, 416 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1981). In this case, it is reasonably possible to give both of the sections of the Unified Code harmonious effect. The supreme court has stated the General Assembly‘s purpose in enacting section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code was to “punish recidivists more severely” than first-time offenders. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 228, 215 Ill. Dec. 679, 664 N.E.2d at 87. Recidivism “`is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for * * * increasing an offender‘s sentence.‘” Fields, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 923, 322 Ill. Dec. 699, 891 N.E.2d at 993, quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1230, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 368 (1998). According to our supreme court, the legislature intended with the passage of section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code to enhance the punishment for certain offenders based on their record of criminal convictions. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 222, 215 Ill. Dec. 679, 664 N.E.2d at 84. In addition, our supreme court has held a trial court has no discretion in the application of section 5-5-3(c)(8). Id.
The First District recently tackled this very question. See Fields, 383 Ill. App. 3d 920, 322 Ill. Dec. 699, 891 N.E.2d 990. In Fields, the defendant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 2 felony, carrying a sentencing range of not less than three nor more than seven years’ imprisonment. Fields, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 922, 322 Ill. Dec. 699, 891 N.E.2d at 993. However, because he qualified for Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code due to his prior convictions, defendant was required to be sentenced to at least 6 years and not more than 30 years’ imprisonment. Fields, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 922-23, 322 Ill. Dec. 699, 891 N.E.2d at 993. Declining to apply the rule of lenity, the First District found, in affirming the defendant‘s Class X sentence:
“[W]here it has been determined that the legislature‘s intent was to make section 5-5-3(c)(8) mandatory and a defendant‘s current and prior convictions fulfill the statutory requirements of that section, the defendant is properly sentenced as a Class X offender.” Fields, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 923, 322 Ill. Dec. 699, 891 N.E.2d at 993, citing Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 222-23, 215 Ill. Dec. 679, 664 N.E.2d 76.
We agree with the reasoning in Fields. A consistent, long-standing body of authority recognizes the sentencing provisions of section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code (
If this burglary conviction had been defendant‘s first criminal conviction, the sentencing range would have been not less than three years and not more than seven years in prison.
While in some situations, the expression of one thing in a statute can be construed to mean the exclusion of things unexpressed, this aid to the construction of a statute is subordinate to the rule that legislative intent controls in interpreting a statute. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 117, 291 Ill. Dec. 674, 824 N.E.2d 250, 256 (2005). As stated earlier, our supreme court has made clear the intent of the legislature was to punish recidivist criminals more harshly than first-time offenders. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 228, 215 Ill. Dec. 679, 664 N.E.2d at 87. As for defendant‘s argument the rule of lenity requires this court to vacate defendant‘s sentence and remand this case for the trial court to sentence him to between three and seven years in prison, our supreme court has stated it is well settled the rule of lenity “does not require a court to construe a statute `so rigidly * * * as to defeat the intent of the legislature.‘” In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 142, 298 Ill. Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008, 1019 (2005), quoting People v. Washington, 343 Ill. App. 3d 889, 903, 279 Ill. Dec. 368, 800 N.E.2d 436, 447 (2003). Construing these two sections of the Unified Code in the manner requested by defendant would defeat the intent of the legislature.
The fallacy of defendant‘s argument is further demonstrated when one considers the extended-term-sentencing provisions found in section 5-8-2 of the Unified Code (
Defendant next argues he should have only received a two-year term of MSR because he was only convicted of a Class 2 felony. This court has held that defendants subject to mandatory Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code based on prior convictions are required to serve a three-year MSR term. People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18, 243 Ill. Dec. 645, 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000). Defendant asks this court to
In Pullen, the defendant committed five counts of burglary, a Class 2 offense (
The Pullen court noted the only felonies involved were burglaries, and burglary is explicitly defined as a Class 2 felony (
We agree with the State that Pullen does not undermine our decision in Smart, which involved section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code and not sections 5-8-4(c)(2) and 5-8-2 of the Unified Code. If a defendant satisfies the provisions of section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code (
Lastly, we note our decision in Smart, reaffirmed here, is in accord with decisions of the First and Third Appellate Districts.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.