*1 No. 27737 v. Petros Demetrios Latsis People of the State of Colorado (578 1055) May Decided
Dale Tooley, Wunnicke, District Brooke Attorney, Chief Appellate Moore, Deputy, Assistant, O. Otto for plaintiff-appellant. Enwall,
Michael R. for defendant-appellee.
En Banc.
MR. JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court. An charged defendant, information the district court Petros Dem- Latsis, etrios with six counts. first four counts were dismissed hearing. after preliminary The fifth and charged sixth counts de- separate fendant two offenses of solicitation of the crime aggravated 18-2-301, robbery. Section C.R.S. 1973.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss solicitation ground counts on the the statute is unconstitutional for reasons of and over- granted breadth by the court. attorney The district appeals from this ruling.
The criminal solicitation provides: “Criminal solicitation. Except as bona fide acts of persons author- investigate ized law to others, detect the commission of offenses by guilty person of criminal commands, induces, solicitation if he entreats, another persuade or otherwise promote or facil- accomplice, or with intent to felony, principal whether as strongly and under circumstances itate intent.” Section unconstitutionality perti- holding provided district court’s follows: nent reads, as to bona fide acts ‘Except
“8. The investigate detect the commission by law to persons authorized vague intelligence must .’ is in that men of common by others offenses of ‘bona fide.’ ‘ a reads, guilty of the statute which “9. The portion induces, entreats, commands, or at- otherwise if he criminal solicitation felony, princi- .a whether as tempts promote or facilitate the commission accomplice, with intent to pal crime . . .’ is not *3 states, . . and under circum- the statute ‘. portion “10. of the statute unconsti- strongly corroborative of that intent’ renders stances following for the reasons: tutional criminal legislature has not all solicitations of all prohibited
“a. The acts, of ‘with intent to only solicitations felonies crime and corrobora- supplied). of that intent’ (emphasis tive of is no in statute which would enable a person
“b. There standard the circumstances are intelligence ‘strongly understand common of that intent.’ unprotected of certain kinds Although proscribes speech, statute “c. the kinds of terms what state in understandable solicitations of fel- it does not way is no are not. There citizen and what kinds are prohibited onies of ‘strongly corrobrative are in what ‘circumstances’ may know advance issue, of the statu- which is of this critical Determination that intent.’ definition, basis. judges juries case-by-case on a left to tory includes an unconstitutional the statute therefore of “d. Subsection crime.” power to define a judiciary to the crimi ruling and hold that the agree the court’s We do not is constitutional. statute nal solicitation interest recognized important the ruling, the district
In its activity” “preserving peace preventing the the state liberty to solicit another that “there noted solici- “does not then held the statute The court crime.” constitution- cover and therefore of lawful acts tation ally protected set forth test of as long-standing applied court then — can intelligence whether men of common several decisions
in our they must or whether its application, readily understand 414 Blue, 95, People
guess meaning. v. speculate as its 190 Colo. Court, 385; People v. District 78, 1254; Howe P.2d 185 Colo. 521 P.2d People, 1040; P.2d People, v. 178 Colo. 167 Colo. Self v. Heckard, v. 619; People 448 P.2d
As heretofore set forth in the court felt intelligence that men of common would have to agree of the words “bona fide.” We do not with this conclusion. Although derivation, the term is Latin commonly it is readily used and faith; denoting good honesty, [r]eal, understood or with .. ac “[i]n tual, Dictionary (4th . . .” Black’s Law genuine 1968). rev. ed. That legislature might have used a synonym does not render constitutionally infirm. That a provision might a statute re glance quire quick comprehension more than a for full does not render the Blue, People vague. impermissibly terms therein used supra. Nor do we with the court’s conclusion that the use of the modifying phrase “and under corroborative of that unconstitutionally vague intent” makes operative portion of the statute specifically which the court view, found not to be In our the modi fying phrase relates to the burden upon to present quan tum of evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the accused acted with the specific intent or facilitate the commission of a crime. In other words, it is not sufficient to show merely that the accused solicited the crime; rather, commission of a surrounding sufficient circumstances presented overt act of solicitation must be which corroborate that the act the requisite done with specific fact was intent. This to an protects accused and statute is benefit those whose may actions innocently jest. is, been motivated or course, have done It for the *4 determine whether the to circumstances shown were “strongly alleged corroborative” of the intent.
The district court also found that this constituted an “unconstitutional delegation to the judiciary legislative power to de fine a process crime.” Due of law requires legislature that the provide suf ficiently precise guide standards judge to jury deciding whether a crime has been committed. Failure to do so may well constitute an unlaw delegation legislative ful Bolles v. People, power. P.2d 80. There are an variety infinite of corroborating circumstances which could not reasonably have been catalogued by legislature. The trier of fact being is not upon called crime, to define a is rather only being told what quantum of evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that requisite Thus, criminal intent present. we conclude there has not been an unlawful power.
Defendant further contends statute is unconstitutionally The court, overbroad. district 5 of its concluded as follows: to to liberty solicit “5. There lawful acts solicitation of not does a crime. constitutionally protected to cover not therefore does regard. has not this Defendant with the court’s conclusion We constitutionally protected may proscribe how the statute demonstrated be without merit. regard to conduct, argument in this we find his to the district remanded and the cause is reversed judgment 5 and 6. to counts information as directions to reinstate dissent. ERICKSON and MR. JUSTICE GROVES MR. JUSTICE participate. PRINGLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. dissenting: GROVES JUSTICE MR. following por- regard I the reason that dissent for respectfully
I the statute as unconstitutional: tion of to per- if he . . guilty of criminal solicitation
“[A] promote intent to felony . . . with suade another strongly commission of that facilitate the Section of that intent.” corroborative “with intent to can understand a solicitation
I addi- it with the crime.” I do not understand the commission a certain strongly corroborative of that intent.” tion: “and under circumstances been tried and has retired assume that the case has Let us attempted to an- It finds that the defendant its verdict. consider with intent facilitate the a certain other it that must also then determine perceives crime. It of that commission “under circumstances defendant were whether the acts judge’s find the to the instructions intent.” It looks corroborative.” of “circumstances definition those judge who submitted I am the juncture, imagine I that At element define the additional I written to What should have instructions. finally conclude I I strongly corroborative.” “under may have been. legislative intent just perceive am unable vague. “It is a basic unconstitutionally Therefore, me the statute if its pro- for is void that an enactment process of due principle City Rockford, Grayned clearly defined.” not hibitions are (1972). 33 L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. U.S. joins in dissent. this ERICKSON
MR. JUSTICE