*1 Plaintiffs, fact, in had possession. January unsuccessfully moved to obtain At a permanent injunction possession. hearing motion, the trial had not shown were en- plaintiffs they court stated titled to since the contract was the extent the possession executory determined, permanent not and the motion for purchase price had been Thus, plaintiffs denied. since have estab- injunction subsequently right should not be faulted for possession, pos- lished their defendants sessing legal title. they to which hold property de
Lastly, argue complain that defendants cannot Millers it dur lay helped requesting stay proceedings because cause they time However, have not included the ing appeal. the second defendants dismiss, they In motion to raise in their claim of laches. their stay of time that 22/s-year period the defense of laches on the basis re this was filed. While defendants did elapsed since court’s decision after the delay that does make them quest stay, responsible failed to do was decided and does not show that defendants have appeal equity. Du rеasons, of the circuit court of judgment
For the foregoing Page County affirmed.
Affirmed. J.,
SEIDENFELD, P.J., LINDBERG, concur. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE STATE OF PEOPLE OF THE LASHMETT, Defendant-Appellant. DAN D. District No. 4 — 83—0318
Fourth 30, 1984. 1, 1984. Rehearing August August Opinion filed *2 GREEN, J., specially concurring. Schildman, Jacksonville,
William S. of appellant. for Robinson, Ronald F. Attorney, (Robert State’s of Winchester J. Bider- Paul, man and Denise M. both of Attorneys Appellate State’s Service Com- mission, counsel), People. of the court: opinion TRAPP delivered of
JUSTICE theft, felony of three guilty A found defendant Dan Lashmett jury misconduct, The trial court practice. counts of official and deceptive imprisonment terms of months’ sentenced defendant concurrent misconduct, theft, and deceptive prac- one count of official felony $5,800 tice, in restitution. defend- appeal, and ordered him to On pаy impeach in him to refusing ant trial court erred allow argues the jury verdict returned Federal guilty State’s witness with a of an We testimony accomplice. on the refusing jury instruct affirm. 1982, defendant, commissioner of Road District April
In early of Winches- vice-president No. 4 in Scott asked Robert County, Staples, Bank, loan. Defendant told he wanted Staples ter National for a for the along equipment truck two other pieces used with purchase need a copy that would Staples road district. advised defendant authorization before and the highway superintendent’s the bill of sale the loan. giving Brown, superintendent told Richard a new truck. purchase needed to road district
highways, *3 in mind. he had a truck already informed Brown that Defеndant also financing. Brown getting it after purchase Brown told defendant to using a red truck, he had seen defendant never checked out the but Chevrolet, purchase. defendant intended which assumed two-ton a for truck brought a bill sale On the same defendant day, a McQuire check No. drew McQuire, of Road District Geraldine clerk McQuire Both and Auto Sales. $5,800 Lindsey fоr to Dean payable the check. signed a gave Staples on 15. He April also bank Defendant returned to truck with of sale described a 1976 of sale a truck. The bill bill for defend- on the bill of sale and serial number 416060H794129. Relying Chevrolet, Staples was a 1976 two-ton ant’s that the truck statement $7,500, $5,800 represented purchase for of which executed note and Brown morning, thе note that signed Defendant price of truck. McQuire in the signed day. and it later from the of title later, McQuire received a certificate
A few months title, how- 15. The April The on title was State. date of transfer ever, truck with serial number International described re- never the title to bank. She McQuire delivered 416060H794129. truck'. title a 1976 Chevrolet ceived a for red driving defendant while he 1982, police stopped
In May truck. Illinois state Paul Brown testi- police Corporal Chevrolet (V.I.N.). fied the truck was its vehicle identification number missing investigated Brown and discovered the truck had been stolen. Brown home, tags also testified that some V.I.N. were found at defendant’s and he to the 1971 was recovered. tag believed V.I.N. Chevrolet it, The 1971 plates Chevrolet had on but those were municipal plates registered to a 1965 dump truck which the road district owned. 14, 1982,
On In- May County Scott sheriff the 1968 impounded $1,200 ternational An truck. estimated its at appraiser present value $5,700 and it stated sold for when The title probably history new. the truck showed defendant it sold it Lindsey. owned to Dean Lind- then transferred title sey signature road district. Dеfendant’s as appeared commissioner on the to transfer title from Lind- application Thus, to the sey road district. the road district owns defendant’s 1968 truck, $5,800 International while liable to the for for the purchase bank of a 1976 Chevrolet truck.
Lindsey at trial for the State. Lindsey, owner of Dean’s Auto & Body Morgan Auto Sales had known County, defend- ant for three four years. 14, 1982, April defendant came to Lind- sey with a If proposition. Lindsey purchased defendant’s 1968 Interna- tional $5,700, truck for then he could resell it to the road district for $5,800 keep filling extra out the paper work. $100 did not understand defendant did not sell his to the why directly truck district, defendant stated it except coming would look better the clerk from a car dealer rather than himself.
Lindsey agreed to the transaction and wrote a bill of sale. On up $5,700 wrote check seeing without the truck. Lindsey dated his check April 16 because the were already banks closed on $5,800 the 15th. gave Defendant a check for drawn from the road district’s account. Both checks were cashed. also filled out a title transfer and a sales tax return application reporting the sale of a 1968 International truck to the road district. testi- fied both he and signed the sales tax in front return of a notary.
Defendant’s signature the title transfer appears application both and the notarized sales tax return. of the Lindsey’s carbon bill of copy *4 sale was produced. also There are two differences Lindsey’s between copy copy the received. The on Staples transfer date copy had changed been from 14 April April Lindsey to 15. admitted he changed the date so it would to the on the other docu- correspond date ments. Lindsey’s was for a 1968 had copy Staples’ copy truck while been altered to read Lindsey changing denied thоse numbers. 344 from substantially the differed
Defendant’s version of transaction for four five acquainted Lindsey Defendant had been with Lindsey’s. drive agreed good to find a four-wheel years, Lindsey and in 1981 to in several vehicles for for trade defendant. Defendant pickup 1971 December, took defendant’s Lindsey possession In pickup. the had re- not the title because dеfendant get Dodge pickup. Lindsey did from title the State. yet the and had received cently bought pickup also Lindsey in March 1982. took defendant’s 1975 Cadillac Lindsey the Lindsey In had April, 1973 pickup. took from defendant’s parts title. wanted, yet he have clear that did defendant but pickup had Defendant, therefore, Lindsey to for the vehicles paid be asked $5,700 for those vehi- to defendant agreed pay taken. already Lindsey signed truck. Defendant cles defendant’s 1968 International plus Lind- gave tax return. He then title and a blank sales blank application to vehicles. title the but the titles the other kept the to 1968 truck sey the 1971 Chevrolet bought further he stolen Defendant in- road March defendant from for the district. In truck the Lind- he to a truck for road district. buy formed intended Barrow, defendant to the farm of Rick where directed defendant sey the to truck defendant a red truck. Barrow later delivered saw two-ton it. the on road dis- Defendant used truck so defendant could test drive agreed the defendant April trict first part April. business took bill of sale $5,800. for He truck from buy num- changing McQuire then to the Defendаnt bank. McQuire had the bill of sale. Defendant also bers from 1968 1976 on from plates so transfer license write check to State he could municipal plates 1965 truck to the new truck. He dump placed driving the new while he was truck. Police later stopped plates. the 1971 Chevrolet with the municipal trial, Department At Revenue produced Kentucky truck Rick Bаrrow bill of sale. It transferred a 1976 Chevrolet from a Ken- produced Dean’s Auto Sales on 1982. Defendant also showing title Rick as the owner of a two-ton tucky Barrow him these documents given Chevrolet. Defendant claimed had documents to give in the first Defendant did not these May. week police police when Chevrolet because they impounded did road him for documents. Defendant not know the never asked his International truck. district owned son, his Lashmett, Dan defendant’s corroborated father’s Jeffery father testimony. looking In March Lashmett and his were them to Barrow’s truck district. directed new owned the truck. Barrow farm. Barrow assured the Lashmetts
345 allowed a the road district to test drive truck for week. Lashmett himself truck оn district Other wit- used the business. defense nesses a they using saw road district workers red two-ton Chevrolet truck in and May. testified he know Rick Barrow. He anyone did not named
denied defendant the title bill of sale. He also giving Kentucky denied of defendant’s or truck. Lind- taking possession Dodge Cadillac sey trucks, not stated he did deal in and he never sold defendant large a red two-ton truck. his father was a road district commis- Although sioner, claimed he not know it be unusual for a com- did would missioner to sell his truck to the road district. Finally, Lindsey to knowing that defendant intended defraud the road district when he agreed defendant’s transaction. proposed 5, 1983, a January jury Federal returned a verdict guilty against trial, however, for mail yet fraud. had not completed been at time of trial judge defendant’s trial. The had to hear post-trial trial, motions and sentence At Lindsey. defendant ar- gued verdict was admissible jury’s impeach as a Linsey prior conviction. judge The refused to admit evidence because Lindsey’s conviction yet was not final.
The conviction of witness may be shown for the of purpose affecting 38, of credibility (Ill. 1981, the witness. Rev. Stat. ch. par. 1.) Generally, only convictions be may proved impeachment 155— of purposes, arrests, indictments, and proof or actual commis charges, sion of a crime not are People (1963), admissible. v. Mason 28 Ill. 2d 396, 400, 192 835, N.E.2d 837.
Defendant argues the amounts a conviction. Section jury verdict 2—5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines conviction: “ ‘Conviction’ means a of conviction or sentence en- judgment plea
tered a or a or of upon upon finding guilty verdict guilty offense, of an or legally jury by rendered constituted by competent court of the case with- jurisdiction try authorized 1981, 38, out a Ill. Rev. ch. 2—5. jury.” par. Stat. sentenced, been the issue is yet Because had conviction,
whether a that it jury verdict wе hold equals judgment ju does not. The renders in a case. The judge, jury, judgment still ry’s judge verdict is not final until the court it. The must accepts law, is properly determine whether the verdict consonant with the is fall, rendered, evidence, stand, suffer is and is to supported by Vaughn v. response (People modification in to a motion. post-trial Indeed, (1981), 913, 914, 681, 683.) 92 Ill. 3d section App. N.E.2d states: 102—14 of thе Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 “ an the court ‘Judgment’ adjudication means if the is that guilty adjudication is or not guilty pronounced by it the sentence guilty includes 14.) ch. (Ill. par. the court.” Rev. Stat. 102— case, therefore, comprises judgment In a criminal the sentence 378, 381, 71 Ill. 375 N.E.2d People (1978), the court. v. Allen 2d finding (Peo than mere contemplates guilt. A more conviction 276, 281, 446 Ill. 3d ple Grоgan (1983), App. ex rel. v. Lisinski it all, at anything “If the term ‘conviction’ means 1254.) N.E.2d it is on the court level. Otherwise means a conviction finalized trial *6 18, simply People Spears (1967), App. 83 Ill. 2d v. not a conviction.” 67, 26, 226 71. N.E.2d concerning defendant contends cross-examination appeal, show Lind reasonably tended to
Lindsey’s Federal trial would have interest, bias, testify falsely. (Peoрle Eddington or v. motive sey’s note, however, 46, 1185, 41, 1187.) 2d N.E.2d We (1979), 77 Ill. 394 interest, bias, Lindsey’s or motive on defendant never asserted emphasized similarity the at trial. In his offer of part proof, Defendant as charge mail fraud and the offense at bar. between the toward un predilection crime demonstrated Lindsey’s prior serted ex that Defendant never raised the possibility truthfulness. showing there is no his Where pected leniency testimony. in return for con leniency, of cross-examination a witness has any expectation that (Peo tend to show bias or interest. cerning charges would not pending 84, 598, 600.) 82, 3d 390 N.E.2d ple (1979), App. v. 72 Ill. Snyder the the Moreover, Attorney the State’s had neither nor author power in the of the Federal sentencing hearing to determine outcome ity 304, 891, 307, v. 85 (1980), App. court. Siler Ill. 3d 406 N.E.2d (People therefore, not rea 894.) sentencing hearing, could Lindsey’s pending willingness testify. affected his sonably have court conference, the trial refused defendant’s At the instruction Illi- Defendant tendered accomplice. of an testimony instruction on the Criminal, Instruction, 1981), ed. which (2d No. 3.17 Pattern Jury nois states: of involved in the сommission says he was
“When witness is defendant, testimony witness sub- a crime with the with caution. by you should be considered It ject suspicion in the light in of the other evidence be examined carefully should case.” with com voluntarily, is knowingly,
An one who accomplice committing in the of- offender principal mon with the intent unites
347 221, 308, 313.) 211, N.E. 344 Ill. 176 v. Hrdlicka (1931), fense. (People to a cau entitlеs defendant an accomplice A that a witness is finding testimony. reliability witness’ regarding tionary instruction is to believe the witness cause probable is whether there test .The v. accountability theory. (People on as a or an guilty, principal either 31, 476, 35.) N.E.2d The court is 465, 97 Ill. 2d (1983), Cobb In Attorney. of the or State’s police the determination bound its own whether cause stead, probable the court should determine 119 Ill. 3d charge (1983), App. existed v. Allen People witness. 336, 186, 192, 456 N.E.2d 340. re mental state accountable, a must have person
To be he must aid offense, diming the offense for the and before quired 38, 2.) Merely showing par. ch. (Ill. its commission. Rev. Stat. 5— offense is not commission an acts facilitated another’s person’s conduct, which facilitated the later It must shown that enough. be offense be committed. Peo offense, intent that such occurred with the N.E .2d Ill. 3d (1980), v. Ware ple App. in the crime. Lindsey knowingly participated
Defendant asserts merely filling paper out Defendant notes took $100 must have known a commissioner work. Defendant concludes father could enter into this transaction because type suggested was also a commissioner. coming from a car dealer the transaction it would look better because however, it was rather than himself. did not believe unusual Lindsey, Finally, commissioner to sell his truck to the road district. defend- high ant too at the time of price contends knew *7 that a 1968 Interna- sale. he had read in paper testi- $1,200 $1,500. tional The remainder his truck was worth however, fact the transac- shows he not aware of this when mony, The price. He never the truck or checked out tion occurred. saw to him he never dealt anything not indicate unusual because price did large. in trucks that defendant, the re aided record Lindsey’s may acts have
While shar Lindsey expressly common intent betwеen them. veals no did testified he with defendant. Defendant ing purpose criminal the dealer through have run the work paper not believe would According to could the road district. ship so defendant defraud The defense case, pro aided defendant. Lindsey unwittingly State’s into buying theory Lindsey duped ceeded on the and the It who both the road district gave stolеn truck. was defendant that he had a 1976 Chevrolet impression purchased the false bank Lindsey’s in the Nothing any knowledge truck. record demonstrates of this part deception or the alteration of the bill of sale. The mere fact that Lindsey took to make a deal look better is insufficient to $100 establish probable cause that accountable for defendant’s of- fenses. reasons,
For foregoing the judgment and sentence of the trial court are affirmed.
Affirmed.
MILLS, P.J., concurs. GREEN,
JUSTICE specially concurring: I in the concur decision to affirm.
I with disagree holding of the majority that the trial court prop- erly give refused the accomplice instruction. admitted that in participated a transaction him a whereby sold truck for $5,700 district, truck, which he then sold to the looking without at the $5,800. He admitted that he knew defendant wished to conceal the fact that the belonged vehicle had to him. Before making purchase $5,000 equipment price district, of a in excess of defendant was required 1981, to take (Ill. 201.7.) Rev. Stat. ch. par. bids. For 6— defendant to knowingly do this was official (Ill. misconduct. Rev. Stat. ch. par. 3.) For aid abet defendant in com- 33— mitting offense with the intent that the offense be committed would make Lindsey as an guilty Ill. Rev. Stat. accomplice. ch. 38, par. 2(c). 5— The concludes that majority statement Lindsey’s provide did not sufficient proof mental Lindsey’s state to require instruction, citing Ware. That case concerns the sufficiency of of mental proof statе to convict on an accountability when all of theory the evidence is cir- cumstantial. Here the proof need show only probable cause. The cir- cumstantial evidence that (1) Lindsey knew that defendant was asking for his participation order to conceal the true nature of the transac- tion, (2) Lindsey proceeded with the transaсtion without examining the vehicle to see if the transaction was bona creates a sufficiently fide strong inference of necessary mental state to make a showing probable cause.
Because of the of the other strength evidence of defendant’s guilt and the flimsy nature of the I explanation given defendant, consider the evidence of defendant’s guilt be overwhelming without Therefore, testimony. give the refusal to the accomplice instruction was *8 harmless error. The affirmance was correct.