*1 The cited events. later about concerned become initially did not Hoerr not establish that testimony does Only Hoerr’s to enter house. authorize defendant statement, inexplicable stipulation admitted counsel, purpose. can serve that defense element establishing same any Without evidence develop need crimes, had no of both defendant only served stipulation Defense counsel’s further defense. provide case and State to undermine defendant’s 208 Ill. proof missing. it was piece with the critical F.2d 219, citing Stephens, United States v. at (5th circumstances, Under these 233 n.2 Cir. part not have been admitting Hoerr’s statement could Thus, strategy. respectfully trial I any legitimate tactic portion opinion concluding dissent from the trial stipulation defense counsel’s was matter of sound strategy. tactics or
(No. 94479. (The Il- In re et of the State of al., People D.F. Minors F., linois, Appellant.) v. Lashawn Appellee, 18, 2003. Opinion December filed *2 J., C.J., FREEMAN, joined by specially concur- McMORROW *3 ring. Burnette, A. and Edwin A. Fry Rita Public Defend- (Karen ers, Florek, Margaret Assistant Public Chicago of Defender, of counsel), for appellant. Attorney General, Springfield, of and Madigan,
Lisa (Linda Devine, Attorney, Chicago A. of D. Richard State’s General, Woloshin, Chicago, of Attorney Assistant Goldfarb, and Peter Malt- Nancy Renee Grauer Kisicki ese, counsel), Attorneys, Assistant for State’s People.
Patrick T. Murphy, Charles E Golbert and Kass A. Plain, of the County Office of the Cook Guardian, Public of Chicago (Amy Halbrook, student), law for appellee minors. opinion
JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the of the court:
In this we must appeal proper determine time frame which conduct will be assessed purposes deciding for “unfit,” whether that parent 1(D) (m) under the grounds set forth in section of the (750 (West 50/l(D)(m) 2000)). Adoption Act ILCS appellate court determined that the proper time frame is the nine-month period following adjudi the trial court’s abuse, cation neglect, dependency, and upheld the trial finding court’s of unfitness. 3d 112. For App. affirm. below, discussed we reasons
BACKGROUND Respondent, F., Lashawn is the mother of two 25, 1992, children July born and March A 1994. telephone call the child abuse line in September hot 1994 brought family attention the Depart- (DCFS). ment of Children and Family Following Services investigation, in January DCFS took temporary custody children, and the State petition filed a wardship County the Cook circuit adjudicatory 16, 1995, court. At the hearing on June circuit court entered a finding that the children were neglected. abused and The court noted that both children positive tested for cocaine at birth and drug use and mental condition created an injurious environment and substantial risk of harm to the children. 14, 1996, At on dispositional hearing February circuit court the children adjudged wards placed were guardianship DCFS. children *4 placed in with relative of subsequently foster care respondent. filed a 1, 1999, supplemental the State
On November to right guardian of a for appointment petition terminate i.e., respon- to petition adoption, consent to filed, was petition At the time the rights. parental dent’s serving three-year recently begun had respondent of Corrections Department in the Illinois sentence hearing A to determine of a stolen vehicle. possession under the vari- an unfit respondent whether was August commenced grounds alleged by ous State her incarceration prior 2000. indicated that Evidence her had maintained contact with 1999, respondent any engage failed to recommended children but had The circuit court services, including drug rehabilitation. 1(D)(m) of respondent pursuant found unfit to section Act, in to make “reasonable that she failed Adoption to correct the conditions which were basis efforts” children, failed to make for the removal of her ILCS toward their return. See 750 progress” “reasonable (West (D)(m) determined, The circuit court 50/1 however, not in the best interests of was parental rights terminated. respondent’s children be appealed finding the circuit court’s Respondent unfitness, her the court assessed conduct arguing wrong respondent during finding time frames. l(D)(m), the circuit court considered unfit under section only progress efforts and evidence 16, 1995, following its June the nine-month neglect. Respondent main- adjudication of abuse assessing tained, however, begin that the date to proper the date circuit court progress her efforts and was 14, 1996. February dispositional entered its order: evidence although maintained that Respondent further was the return of her children of her toward February period beginning limited to the nine-month the conditions of her efforts correct evidence children’s removal was not limited which led *5 228
that period. Rather, nine-month the circuit court should have considered evidence her of efforts from February 14, 1996, 18, through August 2000—the date of fit ness hearing. According to respondent, had the circuit court considered evidence of her conduct this 54- period, month the court would not have found her unfit. The appellate rejected respondent’s arguments and affirmed of judgment the circuit App. court. 332 Ill. 3d 112. respondent’s We allowed petition for leave to ap (see 315) peal 177 Ill. 2d R. and now affirm.
ANALYSIS In a proceeding to terminate parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the State must first demonstrate, by convincing evidence, clear and that parent is “unfit” under or grounds one more of the set 1(D) (750 forth in of section the Adoption Act ILCS 50/ 1(D) (West 2000)). (West 29(2) 2000); 705 ILCS 405/2 — (2002). C.W., In re 198, 199 Ill. 2d 210 present In the case, the State that alleged respondent was unfit under l(D)(m). the grounds contained in At section the time the State filed its petition terminate (November 1(D)(m) parental rights 1999), section defined part unfitness relevant as: by parent “Failure to make reasonable efforts to cor- rect the conditions that were the for the basis removal of parent, the child from the or to progress make reasonable toward the return of the child the parent within 9 adjudication months after an of neglected or minor abused under of Section 2—3 the Juvenile Court Act of or 1987 dependent minor under Section 2—4 of that 750 Act.” 50/l(D)(m) (West 1998). ILCS January 1, 2000, On two after State filed months its petition, legislative an earlier amendment to section l(D)(m), adopted took effect. See Pub. Act 91— January eff. 2000. The 2000 of version 1(D)(m) part defines unfitness in relevant as: (i) parent
“Failure to make reasonable efforts the removal the basis for correct the conditions were (ii) or reasonable parent, make of child from the parent to the within return of the child progress toward the or adjudication neglected abused an months after Act of 1987 2—3 Court Section Juvenile minor under (in) Act, or under 2—4 dependent or minor Section of the child toward return to make reasonable during any period after the end to the 9-month initial period following 9-month 2—3 of the neglected abused minor under Section or dependent Act minor under Sec- Juvenile Court (West 2000). 50/l(D)(m) 750 ILCS tion 2—4 of Act.” third Thus, of the statute included a version wording of the earlier ground of unfitness. possible *6 grounds, reasonable-progress reasonable-efforts and that however, exception unchanged, remained agree that parties Roman numerals had been added. The l(D)(m), in effect the 2000 version of which was section this hearing, applicable at the time of the fitness is to case. l(D)(m) objective construing in primary
Our
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Respondent a it concluded that the nine-month assess when applies the reasonable-efforts parent’s fitness both (i) reasonable-progress and the ground subsection (ii). maintains that ground Respondent subsection 1999, intended, with its amendment 1(D) (m) rigid nine- “removing the by “overhaul” section 230
month evaluation period in the reasonable efforts ground,” and that this is evident from the phraseology of is, construction the 2000 statute. That 2000 version “sets forth three separate grounds, enumerated a specifying time for the second and third but not D.F., (2000).1 the first.” In re 461, Ill. 317 3d App. 464-65 1(D) (m) A plain language reading or literal of section supports position that the nine-month evaluation a applies only parent’s reasonable court, and not reasonable efforts. A however, is not bound literal language of statute produces a result clearly expressed inconsistent with legislative intent, or yields unjust absurd consequences contemplated by legislature. not People Hanna, v. re Detention 207 2d (2003); Ill. 497-98 Lieberman, 300, 312, Ill. Collins v. (2002); 201 2d 319 Board Fund, Trustees Firemen’s & Annuity Benefit Hudson, v. (1993); People see also (1970) (rules Ill. 2d statutory construction must yield when intent is otherwise indicated). 1(D)(m) reading A yields literal of section result inconsistent with the legislature’s statements public policy and purpose contained in both the Juvenile (705 (West 2000)) seq. et Court Act ILCS 405/1 —1 (750 (West 2000)). seq. et Act Adoption ILCS 50/0.01 tangentially respondent effectively 1TVenote concedes *7 1(D) that, (m) prior under version in one effect —the petition respondent’s parental when State filed its to terminate rights applied nine-month contained in the statute —the equally progress. to a reasonable efforts and reasonable If so, that were not argument, then that the intended to “overhaul” and “remove” the nine-month evaluation 1999, in reasonable efforts when it amended the statute agree would make little sense. We that the nine-month 1(D)(m) prior applied contained in the version of section to both progress ground. the reasonable efforts and reasonable See In re (2000). D.L., Act is to of the Juvenile Court stated purpose A removed been for minors who have permanency secure op- “at the earliest parents their custody from the 2000). (West 2(1) In further- ILCS portunity.” 405/1 — Act provides Court purpose, the Juvenile ance of this can Adoption Act under if a of unfitness ground in some instances met, appropriate be may be it 705 ILCS rights.” of parental termination “expedite 405/ 2000). 2(1) (West of the “Liberal construction” 1— stated Act, carry legislature’s out the Juvenile Court 2(4) ILCS and is mandated. 705 purpose policy, 405/1 — (West policy govern- and purpose The statement of juvenile court hearings also reflects that ing adjudicatory proceedings are time sensitive: recognizes that
“Purpose policy. and abuse, neglect, adjudication of or delay serious in the harm to the minor and dependency grave cases can cause health, safety family and best and that frustrates the permanent interests the minor and the effort establish purpose in of this Section is homes for children need. The that, Adoption the federal As- to insure consistent with 96— and Child Welfare Act of Public Law sistance amended, Act, of this the State of Il- the intent just speedy manner to determine linois will act in minor, including for the providing interests of the best minor, need, safety identifying reunifying of the families at families where the minor can be cared for home without endangering safety and it is in the minor’s health minor, and, if of the reunification is not best interests health, safety of the consistent and best interests minor, finding home for the minor.” permanent another 14(a) (West 2000). 705 ILCS 405/2 — Act that it “shall be Adoption expressly provides the Juvenile Court Act of construed concert with (West 2000). Thus, Adoption 1987.” 750 ILCS 50/2.1 light legislature’s stated Act must be construed brought an juvenile proceedings be policy by the This notion is reinforced expeditious conclusion. proceedings under legislature’s express statement *8 Act Adoption “shall receive priority over other civil in being hearing,” cases set for and that appealable under Adoption orders Act prosecuted “shall be and (West heard expedited on an basis.” 750 ILCS 50/20 2000). Finally, the legislature has determined that “[i]t in the persons best interests of be adopted” to that Act Adoption be “construed and interpreted so as not to result time extending beyond limits those set forth [tjherein.” (West 2000). 750 ILCS 50/20a light
In of these clear legislative statements of policy conclude, and purpose, is difficult to respondent do, would have us that the legislature intended to remove nine-month assessing reason- able efforts to correct the conditions led to the replace it, instead, removal of the child and with an unlimited unspecified, open-ended, and essentially of time. reading Such literal only statute could result delaying child’s permanent placement and cannot be reconciled legislature’s with the expressly policy juvenile stated to expedite proceedings. of the public guardian, “[djelay words is antithetical purpose to the policy of these two statutes.” 1(D) (m) language tension the literal between of section legislative and the policy that animates the Juvenile Adoption Court Act and the compels Act us use recently extrinsic aids construction. As this court observed: “ language, ‘[I]f the clear when read in the context
statute as a whole of the commercial or other real-world *** activity points is regulating, statute to an result, unreasonable courts do not consider themselves by “plain meaning,” bound but have recourse to other interpretive in an tools effort make sense ” Hanna, 499, quoting v. statute.’ 2d at Krzalic (7th Title, Republic 314 F.3d 879-80 Cir. Accordingly, legislative history we turn to the of l(D)(m). failure to make a parent’s first added of unfitness ground as a efforts
reasonable 1973. At eff. October Pub. Act 1973. See 78— after the 24-month time, specified statute *9 time frame as the relevant neglect an efforts a made reasonable assess whether 4, 9.1— 1973, par. ch. Ill. Stat. progress. Rev. reasonable 1(D)(1). 24-month 1977, the legislature In the shortened 558, Act eff. 12-month See Pub. period. to a 80— in place remained 1, 1977. The 12-month October for the next decades. two l(D)(m), section 1997, legislature
In amended to a nine- the 12-month evaluation changing 28, 25, Act eff. June period. month See Pub. 90— (section 1(D)(m) amendments), January 1, and eff. (all amendments). 1(D)(m) change This to section other adopted Act one of measures Adoption was several 165, part as of House Bill which legislature Act, only not but several related Adoption amended (20 Act ILCS Family acts: the Children Services (225 (West 1998)); the Act of 1969 Child Care 505/1 (West 1998)); Child Neglected the Abused and ILCS 10/1 (325 (West 1998)); and the Act ILCS Reporting 5/1 (705 (West Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ILCS 405/1 —1 1998)). 165, of House Bill Through passage Compact enacted the on also Interstate (45 (West 1998)). short, Adoption Act ILCS 17/5—1 approach Bill a aimed at comprehensive House 165 was in an “mov[ing] along through system cases fashion,” that had been particularly cases expedited Assem., system. 90th Gen. “languishing” (state 24, 1997, 174, Proceedings, April at House Dart); see also 90th Ill. Gen. Representative ments of 22, 1997, 18-19 Assem., May at Proceedings, House Dart). (statements Representative again noted, already As l(D)(m). amended section See Pub. Act eff. 91— January amendment, 2000. Unlike the prior which part measure, was comprehensive the 1999 amend l(D)(m). ment only affected section This amended ver sion of the statute —which is the version at issue here— simply provision added permitting finding of unfitness the parent where to make fails reasonable dur ing any nine-month period after the initial nine-month period. Significantly, legislative the brief history contains nothing to indicate that Assembly General intended l(D)(m), to “overhaul” respondent claims. See Assem., 6, 1999, 91st Ill. Gen. Senate Proceedings, May (statement at 37-38 of Senator Karpiel explaining limited amendment). Indeed, reach of the legislature left intact language setting forth the period. nine-month time The legislature merely added additional language to the statute, numerals, end of the and inserted Roman break ing up the now-lengthy text.
Respondent great weight on the places addition *10 numerals, the Roman similarly which function to tradi a punctuation punctuation tional statute. of statute, however, text. Smith v. to its subordinate (1918). County Logan, is, 284 Ill. 171-72 That of of statute, “[i]n construction punctuation its is to unless given weight be considered and inspection from of the whole it is it apparent act must be disregarded order to arrive at the intention the legislature.” of added.) Ames, Illinois Bell Co. v. Telephone (Emphasis (1936). Ill. Adop 364 368 Our of both the inspection Act, tion Act and the Juvenile Court well as the legisla l(D)(m), history tive of section indicates the legislature’s shorten desire to ongoing of time which must make reasonable efforts and Giving great weight be deemed unfit. to the addition of would, concedes, the Roman numerals as respondent “ending point analysis make the the reasonable efforts legislature intended that had the believe limitless.” We departure historical treatment from its a radical such policy, express statements this issue and its directly appropriate have done so would resorting statutory language, to the use of than rather “(ii)” “(in).” “(i),” argues
Respondent amendment that the 1999 further (m) 1(D) appellate court’s reaction to the was a (1998), App. L., re 298 Ill. 3d 905 in In Davonte decision purportedly statute and created misconstrued the which People Ill. Hickman, v. in the case law. See a conflict (where (1994) enacted after 2d are statutes judicial opinions published, presumed be are must prevailing knowledge of the acted with law). case giving appeal L. in Davonte
The events rise to l(D)(m) that arose under the version of section contained (D)(m) period. a 12-month evaluation See 750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1992). court, at the At issue whether the trial was hearing, fitness progress could consider evidence of period. the date the
outside the 12-month From neglected, trial to the date of the court found Davonte hearing, years passed. fitness four had The trial court efforts, on the rather than the focused mother’s recent neglect, following adjudication 12-month prove mother and ruled that the State had failed l(D)(m). unfit under section holding reversed, are
The First District that “courts allowing only from the 12-month restricted to evidence following neglect in determin an App. ing parental L., at 924. Davonte fitness.” legislative history appellate reasoned that the 1(D)(m) to shorten the indicated an intent of section *11 parent’s period a conduct of of time from which evidence lengthen may L., it. 298 considered, not to Davonte be parent App. Further, should not be al Ill. at 924. a 3d 236 circumvent
lowed to his her or own unfitness a because delay in bringing bureaucratic case to trial allows time to take corrective action. Davonte parent additional L., 298 Ill. 3d App. at 922. The evidence of the mother’s during conduct period relevant 12-month indicated was an “clearly she addict and no showed almost L., interest in Davonte’s care or welfare.” Davonte Ill. Davonte L. Significantly, 3d at 925. App. departed from appellate court decisions in other districts which had held that period merely specified 12-month period following of rehabilitation child’s removal the parent unfit, before which could not be found but that a court could consider of the parent’s evidence postadjudication period. conduct the entire See cases). L., Davonte 298 Ill. at App. 3d 923-24 (collecting L., stating We affirmed Davonte in part: relevant “The plainly par- statute states that a if the unfit ent fails to make either reasonable efforts to correct the conditions led the child’s removal or reasonable progress toward return the child within 12 months after adjudication neglect, abuse, an dependency. or ef- Giving plain l(D)(m), fect to the language we conclude provision, the relevant of time under in this which the be efforts must assessed measured, period following is the 12-month adjudication. merely
If the provide had meant alleging time petition minimum before which a *** particular ground filed, legisla this could be then the simply explicitly petition ture could have stated that a parental rights ground to terminate on specified sec 1(D)(m) tion must be filed or more months after the wardship, suggesting any without limita on tion from which the evidence could be drawn. way, In that parents evidence efforts made after passage presented.” of the time limit could still be In re (2000). D.L., Davonte Following appellate court’s decision L., D.L., our prior but decision *12 the l(D)(m), resulting in the version of section amended the maintains that Respondent here. at issue statute legislature that the indicates timing of the amendment “conflict-creating interpretation” to the intended correct (m) 1(D) adopted in court appellate that the of section is, that a trial legislature intended Davonte L. That ef- parent’s to evidence allowed consider be and not postadjudication period, the entire forts statute, as 9 months specified the 12 or simply held in Davonte L. legislature’s arguendo,
Assuming, 1(D)(m) fact, by was, triggered amendment to section L., disagree in Davonte we court’s decision appellate intended to remove legislature that the respondent period assessing parent’s for the nine-month evaluation that, history legislative reasonable efforts. The indicates immediately of the 1999 amend adoption to prior l(D)(m), Karpiel ment Senator explained to section permit the amendment intended to trial courts was dur parent’s progress evidence of a reasonable consider periods speci other than the nine-month then ing Assem., fied Senate in the statute. See 91st Gen. (statement 6, 1999, of Senator Proceedings, May at 37-38 objective by Karpiel). legislature accomplished this (m) 1(D) unfitness to section adding ground third parent’s make reasonable based on failure “to parent during any the return of the child to the toward 9-month after the end the initial 9-month added.) (D)(m) (West period.” (Emphasis 750 ILCS 50/1 intended, legislature respondent If the had also as argues, permit trial to consider evidence of courts initial nine-month reasonable efforts outside the have amended the then the could period, fashion; it did not. ground reasonable-efforts in similar 1(D)(m) of section cannot reading Because a literal legislature’s expressions clear be reconciled with policy and purpose in the Juvenile Court Act Adoption Act, and the legislative history of section l(D)(m) evinces no intent depart from its efforts to long-standing expedite juvenile court proceedings, conclude, we did the appellate court, as 1(D)(m) the 1999 amendment Adoption Act retained the nine-month of a assessment parent’s reasonable efforts.
We now turn to the second issue in this appeal: whether, argued by respondent, the nine-month evalu period begins ation on the date the circuit court enters *13 dispositional (here, 14, 1996), or, its February order as by court, held the appellate period begins the nine-month on adjudication the date the circuit court enters its neglect, (here, 16, abuse or dependency June 332 App. Ill. 3d at 120-24. matter,
As a preliminary we argument consider the County guardian raised Cook public respon dent waived review of this issue. The record indicates that, following close of evidence during the fitness to portion proceeding terminate rights, parental respondent argued that evidence her reasonable efforts and should be considered 16, 1995, 14, beginning February June or 1996. Respon did object dent not when the court used the earlier date. Thus, agree public guardian respondent we with the People Villarreal, waived review of this issue. See v. 198 (2001) (where 209, Ill. 2d 227 a party acquiesces manner, proceeding given party is not a posi tion to claim v. prejudice thereby), quoting People Schmitt, 128, (1989); Kownacki, 131 2d Ill. 137 Parks v. (2000) 164, (“Questions Ill. 180 193 2d not raised in the argued ap trial court cannot be for the first time on peal”). waiver, however, rule of limitation on v.
parties and not on the court. Dillon Evanston Hospital,
239 (2002). may 483, reviewing A Ill. 2d 504-05 199 in furtherance of its of waiver considerations override body uniform a sound and to maintain responsibility Schwartz, 203 Co. v. Rule Insurance precedent. Golden Jordan, Inc. v. 456, (2003), quoting Jackson Ill. 2d 463 (1994), 240, quot Ill. 2d 251 Mayer, & 158 Leydig, Voit Dillon, (1967); 199 Raben, 223, 2d 225 Hux v. 38 Ill. ing Ingredients also v. Food 505; 2d at see Unzicker Ill. Kraft (2002) (declining waiver apply 2d 203 Ill. Corp., fully law briefed was one of and was where issue uniformity in the that there is a lack argued). We note date from which assess appropriate case law to l(D)(m). Compare, e.g., fitness under section (2000) D.S., (using Ill. 3d 1027-28 App. In re M.A., date), In re dispositional order as start date of (2001) (using of neglect date App. date). We, therefore, choose ad as start this on the merits. dress issue (m) 1(D) provides that a will be deemed
Section or the failure to make reasonable efforts unfit based on an adjudication 9 months progress “within after *** minor.” dependent or abused minor neglected added.) 50/l(D)(m) (West 2000). 750 ILCS (Emphasis legislature actually intended argues that the Respondent the court enters begin for the nine-month when date the dispositional order because is the its *14 abuse, is “com neglect, dependency or D.S., 1028. App. See 313 Ill. 3d at plete.” statutory referring to the language believe the We as the date neglect, dependency abuse or adjudication of clear and period begins nine-month is on which the Nonetheless, doubt ex- any the extent unambiguous. provi- those ists, it is reference to quickly dispelled adjudicatory govern Act that sions of the Juvenile Court dispositional hearings. and Act, “Date Court titled 2—14 the Juvenile
Section for Adjudicatory Hearing,” provides that a peti- “[w]hen filed minor abused, tion is alleging neglected is or dependent, an adjudicatory hearing shall com- be 14(b) menced within 90 ***.” days 705 ILCS 405/2 — (West 2000). Section “Findings adjudi- titled and 2— cation,” in part: states relevant
t</1 ) [***]
* * * hearing After the evidence the court shall determine abused, whether or not the minor neglected, depen- or *** dent. abused, If the finds neglected, court minor is or dependent, the court then put shall determine and in writ- ing the supporting factual basis that the determination finding That appear ***. shall in the order the court. abused, If the court finds that the child has been neglected dependent, or the court shall admonish the parents they cooperate Department must with the Services, Family Children and comply terms of plan, the service require correct the conditions that care, the child to be or parental risk termination of rights. (2) (1) If, pursuant Section, to subsection of this ***
court determines that the minor is either abused or neglected dependent, the court shall set then a time not days entry than finding later after the *** dispositional hearing ***.” under Section 2—22 21(1) (West 2000). ILCS 405/2— turn, that, Section states dispositional “[a]t the 2— hearing, shall determine whether it is public best interests of minor and the that he be court, and, made a if he ward is to be made a ward court, of the determine proper disposi- the court shall health, safety tion serving best interests 22(1) (West minor and the public.” ILCS 405/2 — dispositional At the hearing, may the court evidence, helpful competent consider all “even not though *15 hearing.” 705 ILCS adjudicatory the the purposes 2000). 22(1) (West 2—23 forth section sets Finally, 405/2 — disposi- at the may that be entered the kinds of orders (West 2000). ILCS hearing. tional 405/2 —23 Act the Court foregoing Juvenile provisions distinct envisioned two demonstrate the trial hearing, which the hearings: adjudicatory the at neglected, child abused whether the is court determines at the hearing, and which dependent, dispositional or the the child should be made trial court determines whether and, so, disposition. if proper a ward of the court the legislature also demonstrate foregoing provisions distinguishing identifying at and between adept was l(D)(m) Act, the Adoption hearings. two section ne- clearly “adjudication identified *** minor” abused minor or glected dependent 2000)) added) (D)(m) (West (750 as (emphasis ILCS 50/1 We period begins. the nine-month evaluation date claims, not respondent are persuaded, intended this to refer to the legislature actually language order entered. dispositional date is l(D)(m) Further, reading of section could lengthen would time which For ex- progress. demonstrate reasonable efforts and case, trial court ample, present adjudged in the and on 1995. The neglected children abused June dispositional eight its order months trial court entered February 14, later on 1996. If the evaluation does entered, begin parents order dispositional not until the is “free postadjudi- have a immediate pass” will contrary legisla- to the clearly cation result period —a juvenile policy purpose expediting ture’s stated and for children proceedings seeking permanency 14(a) ILCS “just speedy” in a manner. 705 405/2 — (West (m) 1(D) reading that our section
We observe consistent opinion with this court’s in D.L. As discussed above, in D.L., we held that then 12-month set 1(D) (m) forth limited the evidence a trial court consider may determining a parent whether is unfit *16 ground. D.L., under this at Ill. 2d 10. In identifying period the correct of time from which evidence could be case, drawn that we referred the period to 12-month beginning with the date the adjudged court the minor the neglected date the court dispositional entered its —not recognize order. We our that determination the correct date to begin evaluating the D.L., conduct although necessary opinion, to the did not address a point argued specifically by parties. the Having squarely ad now, point good dressed that we find no to depart reason from our in D.L. decision matter,
aAs final turn respondent’s alternative we the argument finding that trial court’s of unfitness was against the weight manifest As already the evidence. held, the appropriate time the is nine months fol- lowing the adjudication neglect Thus, and abuse. the relevant only purposes evidence for the unfitness find- is ing respondent’s evidence the during conduct 16, 1995, June through Respondent, March 1996. however, not challenge sufficiency does the of this evidence. respondent Instead focuses on evidence of her during conduct dispositional nine months after the entered, i.e., 16, 1996, order was February through evidence, maintains, November 1996. This she find Plainly, insufficient her unfit. argu- ment the mark by focusing wrong misses on the evidence.
We note that appellate reviewed suf ficiency of the evidence from the time period correct concluded finding trial court’s of unfitness was against weight not the manifest evidence. 332 Ill. App. appellate at 124-26. The court stated: involuntary ‘[t]he
“We understand termination of parent’s rights step permanently is a drastic severs that reason [Citation.] For relationship.’ parent-child the exist- record to ensure carefully have reviewed we of unfitness convincing evidence ence of clear and periods. statutorily relevant time dictated *** any to consider permitted not The trial court was by section period dictated outside the nine-month evidence l(D)(m). Thus, [outside and efforts Lashawn’s to the fitness determina period] time are irrelevant this 30, 2001, January during the tion. As Lashawn admitted do; supposed I hearing. everything T have done that was I it, know, span in the time had you I didn’t do but know, too And, honestly, probably it’s too little you do it. ” App. 3d at 126. late.’ reversing cogent argument no Respondent provides finding of unfitness.
CONCLUSION above, we hold that For the reasons discussed 1(D)(m) in section nine-month evaluation Act, Act effec- as amended Public Adoption 91— 1, 2000, applies tive to both reasonable- January *17 and ground reasonable-progress ground, efforts assessing a ef- begin parent’s the date on which to court enters its progress forts or is the date the trial abused, depen- the minor or adjudging neglected, order dent, than the date the trial court enters its rather We, therefore, the appellate order. affirm dispositional court.
Affirmed. FREEMAN, concurring: specially JUSTICE time frame dur- majority proper holds that conduct is assessed to determine ing parent’s which is “unfit” is the nine-month parent whether adjudication neglect, court’s abuse following the trial the nine- majority also holds that dependency. is found applicable parent month whether failed to make “reasonable parent “unfit” because the efforts” to correct the conditions that led to the removal children, of the or whether the parent failed to make progress” “reasonable toward the return of the children. 50/l(D)(m) (West 2000). See 750 ILCS Insofar as it ap- plies parent’s to a efforts to correct the conditions led to children, the removal of the the majority’s holding is contrary to the express language of the statute and to the legislature’s clearly stated intention. Because the majority’s construction of the statutory provision gives short shrift to the work of the legislature, and because the majority does not give due consideration to the state, interests of the the child and the family preservation and reunification, I join portion cannot this of the majority opinion.
ANALYSIS
The majority opinion must be
understood
L.,
context of In re
Davonte
(1998),
245 1(D) unfit (m), a that, parent to section pursuant held neglect, if, adjudication months of an within twelve abuse, fails to make reason dependency, parent or the conditions led to able efforts to correct or toward removal of the child reasonable D.L., 10. The of the child. In re 191 Ill. 2d at return the trial at the may by evidence that be considered hearing concerning parent’s fitness is limited to that adjudication following conduct the twelve months abuse, D.L., or In 191 Ill. 2d at neglect, dependency. re finding 10. there several for a grounds Because were unfitness, concurring I filed a in the separate opinion However, reached I majority. disagreed result holding majority the plain language of 1(D)(m) that may limits evidence be consid hearing concerning ered a fitness matters parent’s following conduct the twelve months an adjudication abuse, I neglect, dependency. or noted that, L., exception with the of In re Davonte the various panels appellate court that had considered the is that, in determining sue had held whether a is an person,” may “unfit a trial court consider the conduct the entire of time between the abuse, of neglect, dependency and the fit hearing. D.L., (Freeman, J., ness In re 2d at 14 191 Ill. specially concurring), citing P., In Ill. App. re 307 Latifah (1999), 558 3d withdrawn and at 315 Ill. republished (2000); H.C., 1122 In App. App. 3d re 305 Ill. 3d 869 (1999); Y.B., (1996); A.P., In re 285 Ill. 3d 385 In re App. (1996); J.T.C., Ill. 592 App. App. 277 3d In re 273 Ill. 3d (1995); D.J., (1994); 193 In re 262 Ill. 584 In App. 3d re S.J., C.R., App. (1992); 233 Ill. 3d 88 In re 221 Ill. App. (1991); S.G., (1991); 3d In In App. 373 re 216 Ill. 3d 668 M.S., (1991); M.C., re 210 Ill. 3d In 201 Ill. App. re (1990); A.T., (1990); App. App. re 3d 821 R.S., (1988); Allen, In re 174 Ill. In re App. 3d 132
246
(1988);
App.
Doolan,
3d 950
In re
(1981); Edmonds, (1980); In re 85 Ill. In App. 3d 229 re (1978). Austin, App. 61 Ill. 3d 344 response L., 905, to In re Davonte Ill. App. Adoption the amended the Act as follows: any person’ person
“D. ‘Unfit means whom the court child, regard shall find to be unfit to have without to the placed adoption. likelihood that the child will be for grounds any following: are or more of unfitness one of the
* * * (m) (i) parent Failure to make ef- reasonable forts to correct the conditions that were the for basis (ii) the of the child from the or parent, removal make progress reasonable toward the return of the parent adjudica- child the within 9 months after an neglected tion of or abused minor under Section 2—3 dependent of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or minor (Hi) Act, under Section 2—4 of that to make reason- progress par- able toward the return the child to the of during any period ent 9-month the end the after of period following adjudication initial 9-month of neglected or abused minor under Section 2—3 of dependent Juvenile Court Act 1987 or minor under of 2—4 If plan Section that Act. a service has been of required established as under Section 8.2 of the Neglected Reporting Abused and Child Act to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal the child from the if those services were available, then, Act, purposes this ‘failure to progress make reasonable toward return (I) parent’ parent’s child to the includes failure to substantially obligations fulfill his or her under the plan brought and correct the service conditions adjudica- the child into care within 9 months after tion Section 2—3 or 2—4 of the Juvenile Court under (II) Act of 1987 and to substan- failure obligations tially his or her under service fulfill brought plan and correct the conditions that the child during any period the end into care 9-month after following adjudication the initial 9-month Act 2—4 the Juvenile Court 2—3 or under Section original.) Pub. Act (Emphasis 1987.” 91— (codified at 750 ILCS January § eff. 50/ 2000)). 1(D)(m) (West amend- history on the brief, legislative Although following ment statement: contains *** Bill amends the House “SENATOR KARPIEL: parental unfitness grounds It amends the Adoption Act. make toward to include failure to reasonable any parent during nine-month return of a child to the nine-month fol the end of the initial period after neglected, of the child as abused or lowing the Act, Adoption they present At under the dependent. —the only in the nine-month from court can use evidence *20 And adjudication filing period to the of termination. hearing maybe isn’t till since the termination sometimes later, really like to hear —be able to year court would during period. the other —the rest of the hear evidence good parent. This can be or bad for a—a Sometimes really get their period, perhaps they first nine-month don’t well, they together act too and then the termination —at only hearing, the court can use a bad evidence of—of their being they parent, fitness for or it can be that start out good they slowly go and then back to their start —start ways good old bad and that’s not so for the kids. So either way, but the court would like to be able to use the entire time, period. look at the that entire And evidence Assem., that’s all bill does.” 91st Ill. Gen. Senate (statements 6, 1999, Proceedings, May of Senator 37-38 Karpiel). Karpiel’s legislature’s
Senator statement reflects that, L., to In re Davonte understanding prior the courts progress by of reasonable made considered evidence filing and the adjudication neglect between parent parental rights. of the for termination of petition intention that legislature’s statement also reflects the to allow the courts to Act be amended Adoption made progress consider evidence of reasonable nine-month between the parent during any termination adjudication neglect and the date of the hearing. protect wanted to parent who failed to make progress during the initial nine- month period following adjudication of neglect, but made reasonable during any subsequent nine- month period. time, At the same wanted protect the child whose made progress during the initial nine-month period but reverted to negative in any behavior subsequent period. nine-month case, is, the present this court once again, inter- l(D)(m). preting the language of section The trial court found respondent unfit in that she failed to make “reasonable efforts” to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children and failed to make “reason- progress” able toward the return of the children. See 750 50/l(D)(m) (West 2000). ILCS In finding respondent unfit, the trial court only considered evidence of respon- dent’s efforts and progress during the nine-month following neglect. abuse and On ap- peal, respondent argues that of her evidence efforts to correct the conditions led to the removal children should not be limited to the nine-month prescribed for a parent’s progress toward the return aof Respondent child. argues also that both the trial court’s finding of upon unfitness based respondent’s failure to make “reasonable efforts” and failure make “reasonable are progress” against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The majority agrees that plain language “[a] or literal 1(D) (m) reading of section supports posi tion that the nine-month only evaluation applies to a parent’s reasonable progress not a However, efforts.” Ill. 2d at reasonable 208 230. majority notes this court “is not bound the literal language of a statute that produces a result inconsistent clearly intent, expressed legislative yields or that unjust absurd or not consequences contemplated by
249 majority notes legislature.” Next, the Ill. 2d at 230. 208 purpose Act is Juvenile Court that a “stated permanency been removed minors who have secure op custody parents, ‘at the earliest of their from the 2000).” (West 2(1) portunity.’ ILCS 405/1— “[a] majority literal read then holds that The 2d at 231. 1(D)(m) yields ing inconsistent with a result of section policy purpose public legislature’s statements of (705 ILCS Juvenile Court Act in both the contained 405/ (750 (West2000)) Adoption seq. Act ILCS and the 1—1 et (West2000)).” seq. Ill. 2d at 230. et 50/0.01 majority necessarily holding, arriving at its argument rejects respondent’s change in the evidence of unfit
intended to effectuate
Initially, major
may
that a trial court
consider.
ness
ity
great weight
“Respondent places
the addi
on
notes:
similarly
numerals,
which function
tion of the Roman
punctuation
punctuation
in a
The
statute.
traditional
to its text.” 208 Ill. 2d
statute, however, is subordinate
amending
majority
that, in
then claims
at 234.
legislature only
an additional
statute,
wanted to add
ground
make reasonable
unfitness,
is,
failure to
during any
nine-
the child
toward the return of
initial nine-month
after the end of the
month
period.
intend
did not
Since doctrine, I there are note tion of the “absurd results” the doctrine. As West limitations to the use of Taylor-Hurley explained Virginia Supreme v. Court Mingo County Education, 209 W.Va. Board of (2001),“[t]he results doctrine absurd 551 S.E.2d merely permits reasonable to favor an otherwise a court
construction of the statutory text over a more literal interpretation where the latter would produce a result demonstrably at odds with any conceivable legislative purpose. not, [Citation.] It does however, license to simply ignore or rewrite statutory language on the that, written, basis produces as an policy undesirable result.” I also note the cautionary statement in Suther- Statutory land on Construction that “the absurd results doctrine should be used sparingly because it entails the risk that the judiciary will displace legislative policy on the basis of speculation that legislature could not have meant what it unmistakably said.” 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory 46:07, § Construction at 199 (6th 2000). ed. In present case, I submit that majority result seeks to avoid is not “demonstrably at odds” with purposes and goals in amending the Adoption Act. I also submit there is noth- ing “absurd” in allowing the trial court to consider all evidence parent’s of a efforts to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children. In proceed- these ings, as all other truth-seeking proceedings, it is of great import the trial court access and consider relevant Lastly, evidence. I submit the majority is displacing legislative policy on the basis of speculation. estimation, my the majority fails to give due consideration to the change intended l(D)(m). 1(D) amending section (m)(i), Section the provi- sion concerning parent’s efforts,” “reasonable does not refer to a particular time period. Contrarily, sections l(D)(m)(ii) l(D)(m)(iii), the provisions concerning a parent’s progress,” “reasonable both refer to a time period for assessment of the conduct. “Where one of a statute a particular provision, contains provision omission of the same from a similar section significant to show different legislative intent for the two 2A Singer, sections.” N. Sutherland on Statutory Con- (6th 46:07, § struction at 202-04 ed. “an statutory construction that
It is also a maxim of a statute creates amendatory language change law it change it was intended presumption Co. v. Industrial Weast Construction theretofore existed.” (1984). As this court Comm’n, Ill. 2d *23 Revenue, Department in Co. v. Dairy Modern explained of (1952), 66 that court construes a statute and construc- “When this presumed by legislature, the it is tion is not interfered harmony legislative such in with the that construction is Conversely, legislature, if the the [Citation.] intent. after act, attempts by the in courts construe terms used an act, to define terms as used that the amendment those the presumption reasonable is that court’s construction legislature. original intent of the was not in accord with the the upon court [Citations.] It would then seem incumbent and, appeared if to its reconsider construction act interpretation the the clearly to be at variance with of legislature, tp court’s the harmonize the construction with legislative intent.” Firemen’s recently,
More Collins v. Board Trustees of of Fund, (1993), & Ill. 2d this Annuity Benefit noted that contradicts a “[a]n court that amendment of is indication recent a statute an that interpretation interpretation was that the amend such incorrect and legislature’s clarify original ment was enacted to the intent.” L., sharply
In the court restricted appellate Davonte in a that the trial court could consider the evidence legislature responded to determination unfitness. ruling removing time limitations evidence to correct the conditions parent’s of a reasonable efforts allowing that led to the removal of the child and the trial parent’s to evidence of a reasonable consider any nine- the return of the child progress toward neglect or month between majority should not hearing. and the fitness abuse undo the work of the legislature guise under the of statu- tory construction.
The majority concedes that a
reading
literal
of sec-
1(D) (m)
tion
supports the conclusion
the legislature
that
any
removed
time limitation on
of a parent’s
evidence
“reasonable efforts” to correct
the conditions that
led
Further,
removal
the child.
given
legislature’s
concern,
expressed
statement,
in Senator Karpiel’s
that the trial court be
all evidence
able
review
concern-
ing a parent’s
“reasonable
a
progress,”
reasonable
interpretation
the amendment
the legislature
also intended that
the trial court
all
be able
review
evidence concerning
efforts
to correct
conditions that
led to
removal
of the child.
spite
its concession
regarding
language
amendment,
majority
dismisses
argument
intended
effectuate
l(D)(m).
change in section
authority,
Without citation to
the majority
asserts
Roman
numerals
function
similarly
Then,
to traditional
punctuation
statute.
*24
Smith v.
County
Logan, citing
171-72
of
(1918),
majority
punctuation
the
observes that
the
aof
I
statute
is subordinate
to its text.
Ill. 2d at
234.
note that at least one
to
significance
court would attach
a statute. See Reso
the insertion of Roman
in
numerals
(3d
lution Trust
v.
Corp. Nernberg,
In 284 Ill. the court considered whether the Attorney county 30,000 State’s for a with more than 51,000 but less than inhabitants entitled to receive was $3,500 compensation the sum as county of from the statute, an provided by additional of from sum $400 the provided state. statute as follows: exceeding attorney
“To each State’s in not counties 30,000 inhabitants, per 1,000 sum of the each $100.00 thereof, to major salary inhabitants and fraction the said paid by to be provided in to now law be addition that Provided, however, to the maximum sum be that the State: any shall not any attorney in of such counties paid State’s $2,500.00 per of annum. exceed the sum containing attorney in not less counties To each State’s 51,000 30,000 not than inhabit inhabitants and more than annum; State’s ants, $3,500.00 per each at sum of the 51,000 than torney containing less inhabit in counties not 100,000 inhabitants, the sum of more ants and not than $5,000.00 the which sum shall per aggregate, annum in salary paid is to out of the State include which be the by law; attorney treasury provided to each State’s as now 100,000 not less inhabitants containing in counties than 250,000 inhabitants, the sum of and not more than $6,000.00 annum; in attorney to each State’s counties per 250,000 $10,000.00 inhabitants, sum of more the than 1911-12, Ill. Law 89. per annum.” holding statutory provision compensation the that Attorney containing a of a more than county for State’s 30,000 51,000 than did not include but less inhabitants paid by state, the reasoned: $400 argue in furthér
“Counsel for defendant
error
classes,
statute,
referring
and third
should
to the second
together,
read
and that
‘sum’ in connection
be
word
‘sums,’
class
be
and if so read it
with the third
should
read
clearly
will
refer to counties
of the second and
both
wording
third
Such construction of the
act is
class.
punctuation
contrary
not a
one and is
to the
found
natural
wording
therein. There is
between
which
semicolon
referring
and that
refers to the second class
counties
immediately following.
the third class of counties
legislature,
punctuation
adopted by
while
law
necessarily
the text and is not
remains
subordinate
intent,
controlling
determining
legislative
certainly
ought
totally disregarded,
inspection
be
unless
not to
on
be, it is
it must
order to
apparent
whole act
legislature.
It is
[Citation.]
reach the real intent of
reading
from a mere
of this statute
obvious
disregard
contrary to what
punctuation
this
would be
*25
intent.
plain legislative
seems to be the
argument
parts
all
give any
If we
to
force to the
are
present
the
statute should
taken
be
into consideration
previous legislation
as well
subject,
as the
on this
it will be
fair
legislature
surely give
assume that the
would
much attention to
reading
present
the
statute as it
reading
would to the
and
wording
previous
legislation
subject.
on this
It
seem be
would
self-evident that the
legislature,
referring
in
specifically to the
to be paid
$400
by
counties,
the State as to two classes of
in
must have had
question
mind the
whether the
was
$400
to be included
salary
paid
excluded in the total
to be
to the State’s at
torneys
counties,
in the various classes of
it
seems the
most
legislature,
reasonable conclusion to
in
hold that the
including specifically
part
this
as a
the
in
salary
$400
two
and being
classes
counties
silent
whether or
as to
not it
be
in
should
the
included
other three classes of coun
ties, did
intend
not
to have it included in
three
said
classes
Smith,
in which was
not mentioned.”
Unlike believe the nine-month apply time does not to a “reasonable ef- *26 of to the removal that led to correct the conditions forts” of the statute is I this construction the note children. remaining provisions of section with the consistent l(D)(m). provides: The section required under plan been a service has established
“If Reporting Neglected of and Child 8.2 the Abused Section basis for the the the conditions were Act correct parent and if those services of the child from the removal Act, then, ‘failure to available, purposes of this were of the child to the return progress toward make reasonable (I) substantially parent’s failure to parent’ includes the the plan and cor- obligations or her under the service fulfill his brought the child into care within rect the conditions that 2—3 or 2—4 adjudication after the under Section months (II) parent’s and the of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 obligations substantially fulfill his or her under failure to brought the plan and correct conditions service during any into 9-month after the the child care period following of end the initial 9-month 2—3 2—4 of the Juvenile Court Act under Section or (codi- 0373, 1, January § 5 eff. 1987.” Pub. Act 91— (West 50/l(D)(m) at fied 750 ILCS plan words, a not been established In other if service has Neglected and Child under section 8.2 the Abused Reporting the conditions that were the Act to correct plan if a is for the removal of child or service basis not recommended services are available established but parent’s parent, to make to the failure “reasonable conditions, either the initial efforts” correct any subsequent period, nine-month or nine-month equated be with the failure make “reasonable cannot progress” The time
toward the return of
child.
plan
play only
is established
comes into
where a service
parent.
provided to
are
services
opinion
majority
interpretation
advanced in
delay
largely
upon
to minimize
the desire
is
placement
based
setting. Delay,
permanent
of the child in
proceeding
only
however,
in a
not the
consideration
where the State seeks the
appointment
guardian
with the right to consent to adoption.
rights
Parental
are
at issue and the fundamental
nature of these rights
requires
just
Supreme
consideration.
so
Court
explained
S.L.J.,
102,
in M.L.B. v.
519 U.S.
136 L. Ed. 2d
(1996),
“Significant
disposition
case,
of M.L.B.’s
the Las-
Department
Services,
[v.
siter
Social
452 U.S.
68 L.
(1981)]
Ed.
Santosky 599, [v. 455 U.S. 71 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1982)] S. convincing’ Ct. 1388 held that a ‘clear and proof constitutionally standard required parental is termina- Id., proceedings. ruling, tion at 769-770. so In the Court again emphasized termination decree is ‘final 455 (emphasis original). irrevocable.’ U.S. at 759 ‘Few action,’ said, forms of state the Court ‘are both so severe Lassiter, and so irreversible.’ Ibid. As in the Court ‘commanding,’ characterized interest as indeed, precious any right.’ ‘far more than property 455 U.S., at 758-759.
Although Santosky yielded both Lassiter and divided opinions, unanimously the Court was that ‘the view parents relationship interest of in their with their children
257 finite class fundamental come within sufficiently is Amend- by the Fourteenth liberty protected interests of J., dissenting). It U.S., was (Rehnquist, at 774 ment.’ 455 consequences ‘[flew the Court’s unanimous view also natural judicial grave are so severance action S.L.J., Id., U.S. at 117- family v. ties.’ at 787.” M.L.B. 488-89, at 564-65. 19, 117 S. Ct. 136 L. Ed. at concerned, as it case, majority present delays adoption in the be, with the potential should however, be must majority, respondent’s children. care, interest in the equally concerned Troxel v. Gran custody, of her children. See and control 49, 57, 65, 56, 120 S. Ct. ville, U.S. 147 L. Ed. 2d (2000). 2054, Supreme Court observed As the Illinois, 645, 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d Stanley v. 405 U.S. (1972), par Ct. “the interest of a 92 S. custody, manage care, in the companionship, ent of his or her ‘come to with a [the courts] ment children respect lacking appeal momentum for when is made to shifting ar merely liberties which derive from economic rangements.’ [Citation.]” reunification,
I note that consistent with the family health, child, safety goal and best interests of the is a (West 14(a) the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/2 — goal, and in of the ir- light In furtherance of the parent-child revocable nature the termination all relationship, the trial court should consider evidence *28 that led to of a efforts to correct the conditions delay I in the removal of the child. also note directly from decisions permanent placement may flow Family by made Children and Services. Department of case, an on present the trial court entered order were and 1995, finding June that the children abused 1, 1999, until to neglected. The State waited November of a appointment a for the supplemental petition file to guardian right adop- to consent the children’s with tion.
CONCLUSION join fully today’s opinion I cannot in because the majority’s contrary construction of the statute is to the legislature’s amending intention in the statute and is express language contraindicated of the statute. fully support, goal understand, While I minimizing spends the time a child in foster care and the process adoption loving time it takes to child’s into a family home, I also understand the value of ties and fam- ily may reunification. Where it be in one child’s interest quickly waiting adopted adoptive family, to be into a may family wounds, in another be child’s interest to heal separation correct the conditions that led to the family, parents help arm the new skills in their parenting parents efforts and reunite child and into family legislature position Our unit. is in the best goals make a determination based on social as to how long quickly at efforts reunification should take and how parenting rights may Unfortunately, be terminated. remedy delays its rush to associated with foster care placement majority adoption process, and the has legislation incompatible goals created social with the our pursue seeks and the delicate balance our right place- has reached between the child’s loving adoptive, home, inment whether familial or parent’s right possible, to reunification where and the protecting caring state’s interest for a ward of the join majority usurpation I State. cannot its legislature. role of the joins special
CHIEF JUSTICE in this McMORROW concurrence.