PEOPLE v LARDIE; PEOPLE v HUDICK
Docket Nos. 101640, 102742
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 9, 1996
452 Mich. 231 | 551 N.W.2d 656
Argued March 5, 1996 (Calendar Nos. 8-9).
PEOPLE v HUDICK
Docket Nos. 101640, 102742. Argued March 5, 1996 (Calendar Nos. 8-9). Decided July 9, 1996.
Jash E. Lardie was charged in the Grand Traverse Circuit Court under
Gerald D. Hudick was charged in the Detroit Recorder‘s Court with involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle and with causing death by operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The court, William Lucas, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss the charges, but held the trial in abeyance pending the outcome of the defendant‘s appeal. The Court of Appeals, FITZGERALD, P.J., and MICHAEL J. KELLY and JANSEN, JJ., denied leave to appeal (Docket No. 176774). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice RILEY, joined by Chief Justice BRICKLEY, and Justices LEVIN, CAVANAGH, BOYLE, and MALLETT, the Supreme Court held:
1.
2. The Legislature designed the statute to punish drivers when their intoxicated driving caused the victim‘s death. Therefore, the elements of the crime that the people must prove are: the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the defendant voluntarily decided to drive while knowing that an intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance had been consumed and that intoxication might result, and the defendant‘s driving while intoxicated was a substantial cause of the victim‘s death.
3. Because
Justice WEAVER, concurring, stated that the defendant‘s manner of driving, and any change in that manner attributable to the defendant‘s intoxicated state, is not an element of the offense; rather, the causation element requires the people to prove that the death resulted from the defendant‘s commission of the culpable act prohibited by the statute, which occurs when a person becomes intoxicated, decides to drive, and actually does drive. None of the companion provisions of the statute consider the manner, or the change in manner, in which a vehicle is being operated. Instead, they turn on the driver‘s condition or status while operating the vehicle. The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended causation to turn on the fact that the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated, rather than the changed manner in which, or how, the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated. The people need only prove that the defendant‘s operation of the vehicle while intoxicated, not the defendant‘s
Unlike statutes such as felonious driving and negligent homicide that prohibit similar conduct, the clear language of the OUIL causing death statute contains no reference to the manner in which the defendant operated the vehicle. In enacting this OUIL causing death statute, the Legislature sought to prohibit and punish all intoxicated driving that results in a fatality, not just intoxicated driving that is performed in a manner that the people can prove is different from that particular defendant‘s typical and sober operation of a vehicle in the same situation.
Therefore, Michigan Law imposes two distinct duties on drivers: to drive reasonably and not to drive while intoxicated. There is no such thing as safe, or nonculpable, driving while intoxicated; any intoxicated driving is a violation of the duty all motorists owe to those with whom they share the road—to drive only when not intoxicated, or to suffer the consequences.
Lardie, affirmed.
Hudick, affirmed.
207 Mich App 615; 525 NW2d 504 (1994) affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Dennis LaBelle, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people in Lardie.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O‘Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Janice Joyce Bartee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people in Hudick.
Running, Wise, Wilson, Ford & Phillips, P.L.C. (by J. Bruce Donaldson and Douglas J. Donaldson), for Lardie.
Barry A. Resnick and Darryl Fink for Hudick.
Amici Curiae:
Gregory E. Smith for Mothers Against Drunk Driving of Michigan.
Roger L. Conner, Robert Teir, and Timothy Burke for the American Alliance for Rights & Responsibilities.
RILEY, J. In these cases, consolidated on appeal, we are asked to consider the constitutionality of a Michigan statute,
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
PEOPLE v LARDIE
On May 22, 1993, defendant Lardie drank alcohol and smoked marijuana at a party at his parents’ home.2 Defendant was seventeen years old. He left his home at approximately 1:50 A.M. to give several people from the party a ride to one of their cars. From the physical evidence, defendant apparently drove the car off the paved road and traveled about 130 feet on the shoulder. The car hit a small tree and then, traveling another sixty or seventy feet, struck a larger one, killing the three passengers in the back seat, Jason Stutesman, Kendra Tiernan, and Erinn Tompkins. Lardie had an estimated blood-alcohol level of 0.12 percent or greater at the time of the accident and tested positive for marijuana use. The medical expert testified that taking these two substances together creates a “synergistic type impairment,” multiplying the impairment rather than just adding to what each would cause alone.
The people charged Lardie with three counts of causing death by operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
[H]olding the drunk driver accountable for incapacitating injury or death, without allowing the jury to examine his mental state, denies him basic due process, eliminates the jury as the arbiter of morally-culpable conduct, deprives the Court of facts necessary to fashion a proportional sentence, and erodes individual freedom. The record before this Court is insufficient to support such a draconian approach to this social problem created by drunk driving.
If OUIL Causing Death, a 15-year felony, is countenanced as consistent with due process requirements of the Michigan and United States Constitutions, then that determination must be made by an appellate court. This trial court sees neither a basis in law or principles of moral culpability, nor evidence of need for easier convictions that would justify holding a drunk driver accountable for a death without allowing the jury to evaluate his mental intent.
The people appealed by right in the Court of Appeals. In an opinion per curiam, the Court of Appeals reversed because it concluded that the statute was constitutional.3 In so concluding, the Court determined that the statute was not a codification of a common-law offense, but, rather, it characterized the statute as a “strict liability, public welfare offense” without an element requiring the people to prove mens rea.4
Defendant Lardie appealed the decision to this Court, which granted leave. The case was argued with Hudick.5
PEOPLE v HUDICK
On March 6, 1994, at approximately 1:30 A.M., on a rainy night, defendant Hudick was driving a truck in
The people charged Hudick with involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle and, under
Hudick applied for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. After holding the application in abeyance pending the outcome of Lardie, the Court denied the application on April 3, 1995. Hudick applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which granted leave to hear this case with Lardie.9
ANALYSIS
I. MENS REA OF THE CRIME
A
The statute at issue, established by 1991 PA 98, provided at the time of these accidents in pertinent part:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both. [
MCL 257.625(4) ;MSA 9.2325(4) .]10
In order to determine whether a statute imposes strict liability or requires proof of a mens rea, that is, a guilty mind, this Court first examines the statute itself and seeks to determine the Legislature‘s intent. People v Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 185; 487 NW2d 194 (1992). In interpreting a statute in which the Legislature has not expressly included language indicating that fault is a necessary element of a crime, this Court must focus on whether the Legislature nevertheless intended to require some fault as a predicate to finding guilt. Id. In this statute, the Legislature did not expressly state that a defendant must have a criminal intent to commit this crime.
Criminal intent is ordinarily an element of a crime even where the crime is created by statute. People v Rice, 161 Mich 657, 664; 126 NW 981 (1910).
I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but this is not by any means a universal rule. One may be guilty of the high crime of manslaughter when his only fault is gross negligence; and there are many other cases where mere neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations . . . impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible. [People v Roby, 52 Mich 577, 579; 18 NW 365 (1884).]
Specific intent is defined as a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, whereas general intent is merely the intent to perform the physical act itself. People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 573-574; 339 NW2d 461 (1983); People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 639, 644; 331 NW2d 171 (1982).12 For a strict-liability
B
In both Lardie and Hudick, the people argue on appeal that the statute did require proof of a mens rea: The people claim that the statute requires proof that the defendant had the general intent to commit the underlying misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. Where a statute is a codification of the common law and that common-law crime includes a mens rea as an element, this Court will interpret that statute to require a mens rea even if the statute is silent regarding knowledge as a necessary element. See Quinn, supra at 185-186. The people in Lardie claim that this statute was a codification of the common-law crime of involuntary manslaughter caused by intoxicated driving as articulated by this Court in Peo-ple v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 273; 183 NW 177 (1921). The Court of Appeals decided that the statute was not a codification of the common law.13
In Townsend, the defendant was driving while intoxicated and struck and killed a pedestrian. This Court concluded that the information charging the defendant with involuntary manslaughter was sufficiently definite to inform him of the offense on which he would be tried because “[t]he information clearly show[ed] that defendant was engaged in an unlawful and culpably negligent act and that such act directly contributed to the death of [the victim].” Id. at 274.14 In so concluding, this Court reasoned that “[i]t is gross and culpable negligence for a drunken man to guide and operate an automobile upon a public highway, and one doing so and occasioning injuries to
The Court distinguished the case from an earlier involuntary-manslaughter case, in which the death was caused by a person speeding in an automobile, where the Court had found the instructions to be erroneous. In People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 181; 148 NW 400 (1914), the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter if it found that he was exceeding the speed
The statute is designed to deter motorists from deciding to drive after they have become intoxicated. Therefore, the culpable act that the Legislature wishes to prevent is the one in which a person becomes intoxicated and then decides to drive. The statute is not designed to prevent “voluntary intoxication.” The Court in Townsend, supra at 272, not only addressed the evil of intoxicated driving, but also focused on the vice of voluntary intoxication, identifying it as a violation of common decency and good morals since the time of Noah. Unlike Townsend, the statute unambiguously seeks to punish the harm
Moreover, the statute at issue creates a threshold of 0.10 percent alcohol content, above which the defendant is considered to be in the same category as someone “under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” This aspect of the statute does not come from the common law, but is a statutory creation.
Furthermore, the Legislature created its own statutory penalty for a violation of this statute. The statute does not adopt the manslaughter penalty provided by
Finally, there is no basis from the legislative history of this statute to conclude that the Legislature was attempting to codify Townsend, or the common law more generally, when it created this criminal offense. Consequently, we conclude that this statute was not codified from the common law, and so cannot look to it alone to determine if there is a mens rea requirement.
C
Where the offense in question does not codify the common law and omits reference to the element of intent, this Court will examine the Legislature‘s intent in enacting the legislation to determine whether there is a mens rea requirement. Quinn, supra at 186. Before the passage of 1991 PA 98, the people could
For either of these crimes, the Legislature likely believed that under Michigan law the people must prove some form of negligence. For negligent homicide, the people must prove that the driver was negligent or driving at an unreasonable speed. See People v Paulen, 327 Mich 94, 99; 41 NW2d 488 (1950). See also CJI2d 16.14.25 For involuntary manslaughter, the
Under the plain language of
D
We must then determine whether the Legislature intended to make this a strict-liability crime, not requiring proof of any fault other than the act of driving while intoxicated, when it eliminated the element of gross negligence. In interpreting this statute, the Court of Appeals in Lardie, supra at 618, concluded that the Legislature did not require the people to prove either general or specific intent, but imposed a penalty as a matter of strict liability. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Legislature intended to create a strict-liability offense because it omitted any reference to criminal intent when it amended the statute.29
The amici curiae briefs urge us to conclude that this is a strict-liability offense.
enacting
In eliminating this requirement, the Legislature likely wished to require proof of a criminal intent for the criminal act of intoxicated driving. The presumption of gross negligence from the act itself is only reasonable if the defendant (1) voluntarily decided to drive and (2) drove knowing that he had consumed an intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance and, therefore, knowing he could be intoxicated.31 Under common-law involuntary manslaughter, the people must prove three elements in order to establish gross negligence to a jury:
- Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another.
lic, (5) the opportunity to ascertain the true facts, and (6) the difficulty encountered by prosecuting officials in proving a mental state. [Id. at 190-191, n 14, citing LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 3.8, pp 244-245.]
- Ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand.
- The omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another. [People v Orr, 243 Mich 300, 307; 220 NW 777 (1928).]
Under the statute at issue, the Legislature‘s determination that as a matter of law the act of driving while intoxicated is gross negligence would only satisfy this definition if the driver voluntarily chose to drive with the knowledge that he had consumed alcohol.
The Legislature may also have had reservations about the ability of the people to prove the third prong of the Orr test because a defendant‘s irresponsible decision to drive while intoxicated is not necessarily “likely to prove disastrous.” (Emphasis added.) See CJI2d 16.18(4).32 The Legislature reasonably may have decided that the voluntary act of driving while intoxicated is grossly negligent because it “shows a culpable indifference to the safety of others . . . .” See People v Campbell, 237 Mich 424, 428; 212 NW 97 (1927).
Moreover, in creating this irrebuttable presumption of gross negligence from the wrongful act, the Legislature intended to deter drunk driving and, therefore, must have intended that the people prove that the driver voluntarily, i.e., “willing[ly],” decided to com-
Furthermore, this crime does not fit the definition of a public-welfare strict-liability offense despite the
In Quinn, supra at 187, this Court explained that a statute creating a misdemeanor with a maximum two-
Also, the penalties for public-welfare strict-liability crimes generally are “relatively small” and do no “grave damage to an offender‘s reputation.” Staples v United States, 511 US 600, 617-618; 114 S Ct 1793; 128 L Ed 2d 608 (1994), quoting Morissette, supra at 256.40 Whereas, the penalties under this statute are
Consequently, consistent with the Legislature‘s decision to presume gross negligence as a matter of law and its desire to deter intoxicated driving, the Legislature must reasonably have intended that the people prove a mens rea by demonstrating that the defendant purposefully drove while intoxicated or, in other words, that he had the general intent to perform the wrongful act.41 Where a statute requires a “criminal mind” for some, but not all, of the elements of the crime, the statute does not impose strict liability. Quinn, supra at 187, citing United States v Freed, 401 US 601; 91 S Ct 1112; 28 L Ed 2d 356 (1971). Because the statute requires proof of a mens rea, it does not impose strict liability. Rather, we conclude that the statute requires the people to prove that a defendant, who kills someone by driving while intoxicated, acted knowingly in consuming an intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and acted voluntarily in deciding to drive after such consumption.
II. CAUSATION
The statute provides that a defendant is guilty of this crime when, “by the operation” of his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he “causes the death of another person.”
The concurrence claims that the victim‘s death is “always avoidable” because the driver could have decided not to drive at all. Post at 273, n 11. However, this interpretation eliminates any substantial connection between the fault and the resulting death. The Legislature seeks to prohibit intoxicated driving because of the danger that such driving poses to the safety of the community. The concurrence would allow the statute to impose this fifteen-year penalty when that fault played no role in causing the accident, permitting the driver‘s fault to be merely coincidental with the victim‘s death.
We agree with the concurrence that “[t]he Legislature drafted the statute so that the intoxicated driver would be responsible for all consequences that flow from his decision to drive while intoxicated.” Post at 276. We further conclude, however, that a victim‘s death was one of the consequences of a driver‘s decision to drive while intoxicated only when the driver‘s intoxication was a cause of that death. This is the crime that merits swift and sure punishment, not the unavoidable killing of another with a vehicle.
III. DUE PROCESS—SUFFICIENCY OF MORAL CULPABILITY
A
Defendant Lardie argues that the general intent to commit a misdemeanor (the mens rea) cannot be transformed into the bad intent sufficient for due process purposes to justify a fifteen-year felony, unless the people demonstrate that this culpable decision (deciding to drive the vehicle while intoxicated) was the cause of the victim‘s death.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that there are due process limitations on the state‘s police power to impose a penalty for a violation of a law when a person charged with the crime did not have a criminal intent. See Lambert v California, 355 US 225, 228; 78 S Ct 240; 2 L Ed 2d 228 (1957) (the defendant, a convicted felon, violated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring felons to register with the city when she failed to do so within five days of arriving because she had no actual knowledge of the provision).52 However, as we noted in part I, this is not a strict-liability statute. Therefore, any limitations
B
Defendant also relies on this Court‘s analysis in Datema, supra at 602, and in People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), in arguing that the statute violates due process.
C
Moreover, even if the analyses of these cases were relevant to examining whether this statute violated defendants’ due process rights, we do not believe that this statutory crime is inconsistent with the principles found in the common law as articulated by Aaron and Datema.54
In Datema, supra at 601-602, this Court examined the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, which elevates a misdemeanor to involuntary manslaughter if that wrongful act causes another‘s death, in a case in which a defendant committed an assault and battery that unexpectedly resulted in the death of the victim. This Court upheld the common-law misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine under the facts of the case because (1) “[the] rule requires a jury finding beyond
retaining a certain kind of misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. In doing so, we required that the common-law definitions meet the requirements of “individual moral culpability” found in the criminal law, see Aaron, supra at 733, which we conclude is at least as stringent as the standard of basic fairness that might be required by substantive due process. See Cordoba, n 52 supra. Consequently, by concluding that this statute is consistent with Michigan common-law principles, we avoid determining what the due process limitations are, if any, on a criminal statute that requires proof of a mens rea.
The statute at issue, like Datema, supra at 602, requires that there be a “causal relationship” between the defendant‘s culpable state of mind, i.e., intentionally driving while intoxicated, and the resulting death. See part II.
In the present cases, however, the underlying crime, driving while intoxicated, is not a specific-intent crime. Nevertheless, the crime is malum in se as this Court explained in Townsend, supra at 273. The Court in Datema specifically decided not to address this question for the common law in which the underlying crime that caused the death was malum in se, but did not involve an intent to injure:
We do not resolve whether an act that was malum in se at common law but that does not involve the intent to injure can furnish the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter.
. . . Unanticipated and unusual situations arising from death caused by the commission of offenses defined as malum in se at the common law but that do not require an intent to injure must be dealt with case by case. [Id. at 607-608.]
In comparing this statute to gross-negligence involuntary manslaughter under the common law, we conclude that this statute does not conflict with the basic premise of “individual moral culpability” from the common law articulated in Aaron even though it imposes a fifteen-year felony for an act that would only lead to a ninety-day misdemeanor (for a first-time offense) if it did not cause the death of another. The only difference between causing death by operating a vehicle while intoxicated and the crime of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle is that under the common law the people must prove gross negligence, whereas under the statute the people
IV. APPLICATION TO LARDIE AND HUDICK
In each of these cases, there is evidence that the driver was intoxicated while driving, his driving was impaired, and he killed another person while so driving. Lardie and Hudick do not claim that they did not voluntarily drive while intoxicated or that they did not know that they consumed alcohol before they drove. However, they may do so on remand. More-
Although for different reasons than the Court of Appeals offered in Lardie, we affirm its decision to reverse the trial court‘s ruling. Moreover, in Hudick, the Court of Appeals properly denied leave to appeal after the trial court concluded that the statute was constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The statute,
BRICKLEY, C.J., and LEVIN, CAVANAGH, BOYLE, and MALLETT, JJ., concurred with RILEY, J.
WEAVER, J. (concurring). I join in the majority‘s holding that the OUIL causing death statute1 is consti-
However, I write separately because I disagree with the majority‘s use of the term “intoxicated driving” in the third element, the causation element, to include not only the culpable condition of being intoxicated, but also the change, if any, in the particular defendant‘s manner of driving.3 The majority‘s definition of “intoxicated driving” is contrary to the plain language of the statute and undermines the legislative intent. To avoid this mistake, the third element should be more precisely defined as: that the operation of the vehicle by the defendant, while ”under the influence,”4 was a cause of the victim‘s death.5 Further, I
A
The relevant parts of the statute, which established the third element, provided:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles . . . within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both.6
This statute is the fourth of nineteen subsections within the driving while intoxicated, and reckless driving provisions, set forth in
The other relevant subsections of
(1) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles . . . within this state if either of the following applies:
(a) The person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance.
(b) The person has a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol.
(2) The owner of a vehicle or a person in charge or in control of a vehicle shall not authorize or knowingly permit the vehicle to be operated upon a highway or other place open to the general public . . . within this state by a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or who has a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol.
(3) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public . . . when, due to the consumption of an intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or a combination of an intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, the person‘s ability to operate the vehicle is visibly impaired.
*
*
*
(5) A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public . . . within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes a long-term incapacitating injury to another person is
guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or both.7
As the emphasized portions of these subsections indicate, none consider the manner, or the change in the manner, in which the vehicle is being operated. Instead, these companion provisions of the OUIL causing death statute turn on the driver‘s condition or status while operating the vehicle.8 While the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding that the statute imposes strict liability, the Court was correct in asserting:
The crime of OUIL causing death contains the same elements as OUIL with the only additional element being the aggravated circumstances of death resulting from the prohibited conduct . . . .9
where the prohibited conduct was acting upon the decision to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.8 Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the section of
defendant may be convicted of OUIL even if he is observed driving in a normal fashion. People v Walters, 160 Mich App 396, 402-403; 407 NW2d 662 (1987). Thus, OUIL is a status crime which focuses only on the fact that the defendant operates an automobile while he is intoxicated. [People v Crawford, n 8 supra at 350.]
The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended causation to turn on the fact that the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated, rather than the changed manner in which, or how, the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Therefore the defendant‘s culpability arises and should be evaluated in light of the defendant‘s culpable decision to drive while intoxicated.11
[e]very person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and thereby injuring . . . . [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, involuntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant operated the motor vehicle “in a grossly negligent manner.”12
However, the OUIL causing death statute does not contain similar language that manifests a legislative intent to tie causation to the specific manner of oper-
C
In enacting this statute, the Legislature sought to prohibit and punish all intoxicated driving that results in a fatality, not just intoxicated driving that is performed in a manner that the people can prove is different from that particular defendant‘s typical and sober operation of a vehicle in the same situation. The statute is aimed at prevention and deterrence.14 As the legislative analysis reveals, this statute was enacted because
The majority‘s definition of causation creates an unintended loophole and diminishes the chances of swift and sure punishment by requiring the people to prove that, in a similar situation, that particular defendant, if sober, would not have caused the death. I disagree with the majority‘s assertion that
there is no reason to penalize an intoxicated driver with a fifteen-year felony when there is an accident resulting in a fatality if that driver, even if not intoxicated, would still have been the cause in fact of the victim‘s death. There would be no reason because it would not prevent that fatality from occurring again.16
The Legislature enacted the statute so that the burden of prevention rests clearly and heavily with the party most capable of avoiding fatalities, the intoxicated person who decides whether or not to drive. The Legislature drafted the statute so that the intoxicated driver would be responsible for all consequences that flow from his decision to drive while intoxicated.17
In essence, Michigan law imposes two distinct duties on drivers—to drive reasonably18 and not to drive while intoxicated.19 If, as the majority acknowledges, there is an “irrebuttable presumption of gross negligence”20 in driving while intoxicated, then intoxicated driving is never safe or reasonable conduct. Therefore, there is no such thing as safe or nonculpable driving while intoxicated. Any intoxicated driving is a violation of the duty all motorists owe to those with whom they share the road—to drive only when not intoxicated, or to suffer the consequences.21
Notes
This amendment does not substantially change the statute for the purposes of our analysis. Michigan courts have recognized that aA person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state, in violation of subsection (1) [under the influence of intoxicating liquor] or (3) [a person‘s ability is visibly impaired because of intoxicating liquor], and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both.
Furthermore, I believe that the Legislature also drafted this provision with the reasonable belief that deaths from intoxicated driving are never so remote as to preclude criminal liability. This belief is evidenced by the irrebuttable legal presumption that the decision to drive while intoxicated is grossly negligent. Id. at 252-253. As recognized by the majority
The moral culpability for the person who decides to drink and drive, where any reasonable person must recognize that he is creating a grave risk to himself and others, corresponds to the punishment of a fifteen-year felony when that decision causes the death of another. [Id. at 266.]
Arguments regarding the remoteness or unavoidability of causing death after making this culpable and inherently dangerous decision to drive while under the influence are most appropriately addressed to the court at the sentencing stage of the trial. At this stage, where justice and notions of fairness require, the court may choose to impose the minimum sentence under the OUIL causing death statute—a $2,500.00 fine.
Furthermore, the majority‘s causation element rewards the individuals who typically drive in a careless or unsafe fashion when sober. As long as the typically careless, inattentive sober driver operates the vehicle in a characteristically poor or unsafe manner while intoxicated, the people will not be able to prove that intoxication caused the change in the manner of operation that, in turn, was a substantial cause of the victim‘s death. However, those individuals, who typically drive in a careful and alert manner, as evidenced by a good driving record and history, are more likely to be convicted under the statute for any intoxicated driving that varies from their sober, careful driving where this variation is a substantial cause of the victim‘s death.
See also People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 477; 418 NW2d 861 (1988); People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923) (“Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but [1] in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or [2] in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or [3] by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty“). The Court in Townsend, supra at 273-274, did not make it clear whether it was relying only on the first or on both the first and second theories of involuntary manslaughter in determining that the information was sufficiently specific. In People v Datema, 448 Mich 585; 533 NW2d 272 (1995), this Court discussed the continuing vitality of the first theory, known as the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, under the common law. This Court concluded that an unlawful act committed with an intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death was a sufficiently culpable state for involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 606. The legislative analysis indicates that the Legislature was frustrated by the difficulty of enforcing the OUIL laws, citing a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimation that “on the average a drinking driver can drive drunk about 5,000 miles before being arrested; only one in a thousand drunk drivers get arrested.” House Legislative Analysis, HB 4827, June 4, 1991.To make the information for involuntary manslaughter good it must allege that the accused was [1] in the commission of some unlawful act or [2] negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or [3] by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty, and that death resulted therefrom. [Id. at 273.]
Id. at 258.If the respondent operated the automobile while intoxicated and, as a direct and natural result thereof, [the victim] received injuries from which she afterwards died, the respondent is guilty of manslaughter . . . . [Id. at 277.]
This Court has recognized that “‘Every person driving upon the public highway, or in other places frequented by others, is bound to exercise reasonable care and caution to prevent injury to others.‘” People v Traughber, 432 Mich 208, 217; 439 NW2d 231 (1989), quoting People v McMurchy, 249 Mich 147, 167; 228 NW 723 (1930).
Despite the suggestion that the people be required to prove that the defendant had knowledge that his action was unlawful, the Court instead concluded that the people must prove that the defendant was grossly negligent, not that he intentionally committed an unlawful act:While it is not the law that, in order to convict the respondent, it must be made to appear that he knowingly violated the statute, because he is bound to know the law, yet there is authority to the effect that he must have been aware, in order to be convicted, that he was doing the unlawful act complained of. [Id. at 192 (emphasis added).]
The Court also explained that gross negligence is “a question for the jury.” Id. at 199.We think the better doctrine is that the question of the speed of the automobile should have been submitted to the jury, in connection with other facts, as bearing upon the question whether he was guilty of gross negligence in the manner in which he ran the automobile. [Id. at 193.]
Ante at 252.Voluntary drunkenness in a public place was always a misdemeanor at common law; and it was always wrong morally and legally. It is malum in se. . . . It was unlawful for defendant to operate his automobile upon the public highway while he was intoxicated; made unlawful by statute, and wrong in and of itself [malum in se], and it was criminal carelessness to do so and he is guilty of manslaughter, provided the death of [the victim] was a proximate result of his unlawful act. [Id. at 273 (emphasis added).]
Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway or upon any other property, public or private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of / You may also consider the lesser charge of] negligent homicide. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on or about [date], at [place].
(3) Second, that the defendant was operating the vehicle [at an unreasonable speed / in a negligent manner].
(4) Third, that the defendant‘s negligence was a substantial cause of an accident resulting in injuries to [name deceased].
(5) Fourth, that those injuries caused the death of [name deceased]. [Emphasis added.]
The Court of Appeals noted that Townsend, supra, had held that driving while intoxicated was gross negligence as a matter of law, but concluded that after People v Reed, 393 Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), all essential elements of a criminal offense must be determined by the jury as an issue of fact. Thinel, supra at 458.The trial court‘s jury instruction on gross negligence was error which requires reversal. The trial judge told the jury in this instruction that it was gross negligence to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Despite the fact that the evidence of defendant‘s gross and culpable negligence was overwhelming, the determination of that fact should have been left to the jury. The failure to permit the jury to make the critical determination as to whether defendant‘s conduct amounted to gross negligence requires reversal and a new trial. [Emphasis added.]
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter in operating his motor vehicle in such a manner as to
cause the death of [name deceased]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (2) First, that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle on or about [date], at [place].
(3) Second, that he operated the vehicle in a grossly negligent manner.
(4) Third, that the defendant‘s gross negligence was a substantial cause of an accident resulting in injuries to [name deceased].
(5) Fourth, that such injuries caused the death of [name deceased]. [Emphasis added.]
In People v Crawford, 187 Mich App 344, 349; 467 NW2d 818 (1991), this Court stated that the offense of OUIL,
MCL 257.625 ;MSA 9.2325 , is proved without regard to the defendant‘s motive or intent. The crime of OUIL causing death contains the same elements as OUIL with the only additional element being the aggravated circumstance of death resulting from the prohibited conduct. Therefore, by extension, we conclude that intent is likewise irrelevant to prove the crime of OUIL causing death.Additionally, we note that the OUIL statute is not a codification of a common-law offense. See People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 273; 183 NW 177 (1921) (it is unlawful by statute to operate an automobile upon a public highway while in a state of inebriation). Thus, this Court is not inclined to read a mens rea requirement into the statute. Quinn, supra. This is especially true because, if the Legislature wanted to add specific or general intent as an element, knowing that the predecessor statute had been construed as a strict liability crime, it would have specifically done so. See People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 644; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). [Lardie, supra at 618; see also People v Trotter, 209 Mich App 244, 248; 530 NW2d 516 (1995).]
(1) the statute‘s legislative history or its title, (2) guidance to interpretation provided by other statutes, (3) the severity of the punishment provided, (4) the severity of potential harm to the pub-
[T]oo many drinkers are irresponsible drivers who are willing to risk current penalties to get behind the wheel. The proposed legislation will deter those drivers by closing technical loopholes in the law, promising swift and sure punishment for drinking drivers, and hiking penalties for troublesome violators[.] [House Legislative Analysis, HB 4827-4828 and SB 314-315, August 14, 1991, p 5 (emphasis added).]
We believe that requiring the prosecutor to prove intent in situations such as the instant one would frustrate the purpose of the statute. Further, it is clear that the Legislature correctly placed the burden on would-be intoxicated drivers as the people in the best position to avoid the potential harm associated with driving while intoxicated. Therefore, in order to preserve the legislative intent underlying the enactment, we are constrained to sustain the OUIL causing death statute as a strict liability, public welfare offense.
This analysis ignores the distinction between general- and specific-intent crimes. If the people were required to prove that a defendant had the intent to place others at risk when he decided to drive while intoxicated, i.e., to prove specific intent, this reasoning would apply. However, the Legislature‘s purpose of deterring people from driving while intoxicated is only advanced when the defendant had the general intent to perform the wrongful act.
[W]e have reasoned that as long as a defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him “in responsible relation to a public danger,” . . . he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation, and we have assumed that in such cases Congress intended to place the burden on the defendant to “ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute.”
The United States Supreme Court also noted that it interpreted public-welfare offenses to require at least “that the defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous or deleterious substance,” and thereby the Court “avoid[s] construing criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict liability.” Id. at 607, n 3.
- illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of antinarcotic Acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations, (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community. [Morissette, supra at 262, n 20.]
[W]hile various reports suggest that the incidence of drunk driving has declined in recent years, as has the traffic death rate, the proportion of fatal accidents in which alcohol was involved has held steady. In other words, alcohol has continued to be involved in roughly half of all fatal traffic accidents in the state (alcohol “involvement” means that someone in the accident, not necessarily a driver, had been drinking). [House Legislative Analysis, HB 4827-4828 and SB 314-315, August 14, 1991, p 1.]
It is the change that such intoxication produces, and whether it caused the death, which is the focus of this element of the crime. The concurrence argues that this conclusion “rewards” the careless or unsafe driver because the people will have a more difficult time proving causation against such a driver. Post at 275, n 13. This is misleading. Under this particular statute, the Legislature punishes drivers when their drunken driving causes the death of another. However, the people may also charge a defendant with involuntary manslaughter, at the same time in charging this crime, if there is a serious question about whether the driver‘s careless or unsafe driving, somehow unrelated to his intoxication, was the cause of the victim‘s death.
[W]here a criminal statute prohibits and punishes conduct not innocent or innocuous in itself, the criminal intent element may be dispensed with if the criminal statute is designed for the protection of the public health and safety and if it has no common law background that included a particular criminal intent. Because citizens are presumed to know the ordinary traffic safety laws and that violating them is dangerous and wrong, Ohio‘s involuntary manslaughter statute, as applied in this case, is based on the obviously wrongful and blameworthy conduct of violating traffic safety laws. Accordingly, it is not the kind of statute that requires a formally stated criminal intent element in order to comport with the Due Process Clause. [Stanley, supra at 404.]
Thus, if this is true for a strict-liability offense, it must also be true of this offense, which requires the people to prove a mens rea, the general intent to commit the unlawful act of driving while intoxicated.