64 Cal. 256 | Cal. | 1883
It does not appear that Mrs. Brandon, who was called as a witness by the defendant, objected to testifying to all that she knew in regard to the burglary for which he was on trial. Nor does it appear that her husband objected to her testifying. His counsel, Mr. Carson, stated that, from the commencement of the trial, he had interposed no objection whatever. On being informed by the court that at that stage he had a right to interfere, if he so elected, Mr. Carson replied: “ I would much prefer not to have Mrs. Brandon examined.” She was a competent witness, and the only question which could possibly arise was whether she could be compelled to testify to any fact which might implicate her husband in the offense with Avhich the defendant was charged. And such evidently Avas the opinion of the court, which held that the witness might “be examined on any matters touching the case” except those “relating to her husband”; but would “not permit her to testify as to any matters in Avhich her husband was implicated in the crime for which the defendant was on trial.” It is of this that the defendant complains. There was a separate information pending in the court, in which the husband of the witness Avas charged with the same burglary for Avhich the defendant was on trial. But said husband was not in any sense a party to the action or proceeding in which his wife was called as a witness. If he had been, his wife could not have been a Avitness for or against him, unless both he and she consented thereto. (Penal Code, § 1322, Code Civ. Proc. § 1881.) And it is claimed by the attorney-general, “that although the husband of the Avitness was not a party to the proceedings then before the court, the
This is the provision of the Code upon the subject, and it must prevail: “All statutes, laws, and rules heretofore'in force in this State, whether consistent or not with the provisions of this Code, unless expressly continued in force by it, are repealed and abrogated.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 18.)
“A wife cannot be examined, for or against her husband, without his consent.” But when may she be said to be examined for or against him? If examined in an action or proceeding to which he was a party, she would undoubtedly be examined for or against him. Any witness examined in an action or proceeding is examined for one party and against 'the other therein. No witness is said to be examined for or against any one not a party to the action or proceeding in which such witness is called to testify. And the testimony of a witness is not evidence for or against any one not a party to the action or proceeding in which such testimony is given. If the husband of this witness had been a party to the action on trial she could not have been examined at all without his consent. She could not then have been examined in regard to any matters whatever, because if relevant her testimony would be, in some degree, for or against him. Not being a party to the action her testimony could not be used for or against him.
Thus far we have considered the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure as if it wei’e the only one relating to the subject. But it is not. There is a provision of the Penal Code
On this as on nearly every other subject to which the Codes relate, they are simply declaratory of what the law would be if there were no Codes. (State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 206; Comm. v. Reid, 8 Phila. 385; Same v. Patterson, 8 Phila. 609; State v. Briggs, 9 R. I. 361; Royal Ins. Co. v. Noble, 5 Abb. Pr. Rep. 55; Rex v. Inhabitants etc. 6 Maule & S. 194; Same v. Inhabitants of Llangunnor, 2 Barn. & Adol. 616; Regina v. Halliday, 8 Cox C. C. 298; Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bing. 184; Regina v. Williams, 8 Car. & P. 286; Higbee v. McMillan, 18 Kan. 136; 1 Greenleaf Ev. 342; Roscoe’s Cr. Ev. 148; 1 Wharton Ev. 425; Wharton’s Cr. Ev. 396, 402; Schouler on Husband and Wife, 85.)
“ On the whole,” says Schouler, “ the prevailing tendency of late years in both England and America is to regard the domestic confidence or the ties of a spouse as of little consequence compared Avith the public convenience of extending the means of ascertaining the truth in all cases; such facilities being increased, it is believed, by hearing Avhat each one has to say, and then making due allowance for circumstances affecting each one’s credibility.” (Schouler on Husband and Wife, 85.)
On the cross-examination of Patrick Brandon, who as before stated was charged in a separate information Avith the same burglary for which the defendant Avas on trial, the counsel for
Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
McKinstry, J., Thornton, J., Myrick, J., McKee, J., and Ross, J., concurred.