54 Barb. 342 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1865
Lead Opinion
When the evidence is offered to show that the prisoner killed the deceased in self defense, and that he feared the deceased intended to attack him, the rule is that the prisoner must have had reasonable ground for believing the deceased intended to take his life or to do him bodily harm,-and that there was reasonable ground for supposing the danger imminent that such design would be accomplished, although it should afterwards appear that no such design existed—that there was no real danger of its being perpetrated. ■ (See various authorities in Pfomer v. The People, 4 Park. C. R. 558.)
The city judge charged, “If he thinks his life is in imminent peril, he has a right to'act upon that thought and take life; but if he does it, it is at the risk of a jury saying, when all the facts are developed before them, whether he was justified in forming that opinion or not. If you are satisfied from the evidence that the circumstances did not warrant the conclusion that he arrived at, and that he took life, it is no justification, and you have a right to convict. It is not his impressions alone, but the. question is whether those impressions were correct. If they were
I cannot avoid the conclusion that the latter part of these instructions may have led the jury to suppose'if the opinion or impressions formed by the prisoner were wrong, and that he was not in reality in danger of some great bodily injury, that his impressions would afford him no protection.
The question of justification in forming such opinions is not properly for the jury; but the true question is whether there were reasonable grounds for thinking so; whether the conclusion was true or not. If he had no reasonable grounds for forming such an opinion, he was not protected; but if he had such reasonable grounds, then,' although Such impressions were incorrect, he was excused.
It is true that subsequently, when requested to charge in the words of the statute, that if the” jury believed that when the prisoner struck the blow, he had a reasonable ground to apprehend a design to do him some, bodily harm &c., then he was justified in striking the blow, and it was' their duty to acquit, he replied, “ I have charged already
I think the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered,
Leonard, J., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) The prisoner was indicted for the murder of his wife, by stabbing her in the ■neck with a knife.
On the trial, after the evidence on the part of the people had been given, the prisoner’s counsel offered to prove that the general character and habits of the deceased were those of a quarrelsome,. fighting, vindictive and brutal nature, and that the prisoner knew it, and that the deceased was of great strength.
The evidence as to general character, being objected to, was excluded by the city judge. The prisoner’s counsel then offered to show that the deceased was of a quarrelsome, vindictive and brutal character. This evidence was also objected to and excluded by the city judge.
I think the evidence as to general character and as to character was properly excluded, for the simple reason that if the evidence had been received, it would not have justified or tended to justify the commission of the alleged act or crime for which the prisoner was being tried. "When this evidence was offered, there was no evidence tending to show that the deceased, on the occasion when she lost her life, assaulted the prisoner; on the contrary, the evidence which had been given on the part of the people tended to show conclusively that she did not on that occa
The case of Reynolds v. The People (17 Abb. 413) could not properly be referred to as an authority to show that the evidence as to the character of the deceased in this case should have been received; for in the first place, the court did not decide, or intend to decide, in that case, that the evidence to show that Mathews, the deceased, was a dangerous, violent and quarrelsome man, would have been admissible had it appeared that the prisoner was acquainted with him and his character. In the opinion it was remarked that perhaps if this had appeared, the evidence would háve been admissible; but the court had no occasion to decide whether it would or would not, and certainly the court would not have held it to have been admissible, under any circumstances, without further examination. Again, the offer in. the case of Reynolds was to show that he was a dangerous, violent, quarrelsome man, and the offer was made under very different circumstances. My recollection is, that the affray in which Mathews lost his life took place suddenly, on a public highway, after dark, and that when the offer was made, the evidence tended to show that Mathews and his party-were the attacking party.
Moreover, the formal ruling of the city judge on the question of evidence as to character of the deceased, in the principal case, could not have prejudiced the prisoner, for he was permitted to prove, and did prove, that his wife was a woman of great muscular strength, and had been in the habit of quarreling with him, and upon several occasions had struck him. Indeed, I think it may be said, though the district attorney repeatedly objected to proof •as to the character of the deceased as a quarrelsome, brutal woman, yet that her character was in fact as fully proved as though he had made no such objection. It is not probable that the prisoner would have produced any other or
The exception to the remark of the city judge in his charge, that “ the law presumes malice from the mere act of killing,” &c., is evidently founded on a misconception, of the purpose of the city judge in making the remark. He did not intend that the jury should understand from' the remark, that in this case, after all the proofs were in, the law presumed malice from the mere act of killing. Looking at the remark in connection with what he had said previously, and with what he said immediately after, it is evident that the jury could not have been misled by the remark. In making the remark he stated a mere abstract principle of common law, and his object in stating it was to show the jury that it was a question for them, under the evidence in the case, whether the legal presumption from the mere act of killing had been removed by the evidence in the case.
The question whether the act of killing, which the prisoner confessedly did commit; was, under the evidence, murder in the first or second degree, or manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, I think was fairly submitted to the jury.
Upon the theory that the jury might come to the conclusion that Mary Driskol, one of the prisoner’s witnesses, in stating that the deceased struck the prisoner with a poker before he gave her the fatal blow, testified to the truth, the city judge charged the jury,- in substance, that it was for them to say whether the prisoner was justified in believing or forming the opinion that his life was in danger ; that the question was not as to what his impressions were in fact, as to his life' being in danger, but whether the evidence showed that he was justified in having such impressions—whether the impressions were correct. How, though I think it must be conceded that the distinction
The court was asked by the prisoner’s counsel to charge the jury “that if-the jury have a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, as to what degree of guilt to convict, it was their duty to convict of the lesser degree.” The court did not charge this in words, but said to the jury, “ that is a matter for your determination. If you are not satisfied that he intended the act, as I said before, you can find him gully of either of the lesser degrees.” I think this was right. It seems to me that it would have been wrong to have charged the jury that it was their duty to convict of the lesser degree, in any view they might take of the case.
• Upon the whole, after giving this case that careful examination which its importance demands, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the conviction of the prisoner must be affirmed.
Conviction set aside, and new trial ordered..
Ingraham, Leonard and Sutherland, Justices.]
