*1 LAMB, Subject Involuntary a Person Admis- re JOHN Asserted Illinois, Lamb, (The People Petitioner-Appellee, sion of the State of v. John Respondent-Appellant). Second District No. 2 — 89—1153 Opinion September INGLIS, J., specially concurring.
REINHARD, J., dissenting. *2 Coffin, Guardianship Commission, William of & Advocacy E. of Elgin, appellant. for Johnson,
Gary Attorney, (William V. State’s of Geneva L. Browers and Stevens, Marshall Attorneys M. both of Appellate State’s Prosecutor’s Of- fice, counsel), of the People. for McLAREN the opinion
JUSTICE delivered of the court: John Respondent Lamb from an order appeals of circuit court finding him to a to person subject involuntary Respond admission. ent (1) raises issues on whether appeal: two the trial court’s order because the failed reversed State to follow of the Mental and Developmental (Mental Health Disabilities Code Health Code) (Ill. et seq.); Rev. 1 — 100 and (2) whether the State failed to clear and prove convincing evidence was expected to inflict either respondent reasonably injury on himself or on another. Because State did not comply with statu tory procedural requirements, reverse the we circuit court. 17, 1988, male,
On was August respondent, 42-year-old transfer- Page red from the to the Health County jail Elgin Du Mental Center (EMHC) he was unfit to trial. adjudicated Respondent stand was of violating protection prohibited arrested for order him from contact with his had a of having parents. Respondent history his threatening parents to kill down their house. burn 1, 1988, On filed the for involun- petition December State The petition admission. asserted was respondent psychotic, addition, delusional In grandiose. was respondent uncooperative with treatment and refused to medication. doctors take His described no his respondent having insight into condition. On paranoid 9, 1988, December the trial court ordered that was respondent subject admission. involuntary 8, State petition, February the second dated asserted failing through had of to follow respondent history outpa- This tient treatment and had to be interviewed. was his sev- refused 2, 1989, February enth 1983. On respond- admission since Respondent ent had become combative and had be restrained. was diagnosed to the as a addition certificates paranoid schizophrenic. EMHC, of two health also filed a treat- from the State professionals dated On February February respondent again was to be a admission. person subject found
The petition State filed third for admission on April 10, 1989. In filed the two EMHC petition, addition court, 28, 1989, certificates and a treatment The on found plan. subject was admission. ap- next set of documents of record this 25, 1989, On October filed the two peal. again EMHC certif- addition, icates and a involuntary admission. In a notice to respondent was also filed. The State did not file a treatment plan. 27, 1989,
On on October the court held a petition. Arturo Fogata, respondent’s that he psychiatrist, testified evaluated respondent. According to Dr. Fogata, delusions persecution and continually being brought talked about to the mental health center without court order or ar- witnesses. gumentative and had a history aggression. He was also found *3 hoarding large straightened screw, paper clips, four-inch a door with a stopper edge, and a flat stone sharp sharpened with edge. Dr. Fogata further that respondent testified did follow after- care treatment and plans did not take his medication. Respondent’s last act of physical aggression 1989, respondent was when hit a staff Respondent and, member. forced had been to take medication since been July voluntarily medication taking his and partic- in the ipating programs. Fogata that, EMHC Dr. if opinion was of respondent released, go was he into a cycle would characterized by the failure to take medication by aggression. and Dr. his Fogata based on pattern of with noncompliance outpatient in conjunction with the onset of delusions after failure to take Fogata medication. Dr. that respondent believed could not pro- vide for his basic needs and that he if again would harass his parents he were According Fogata, released. to Dr. the mental health center was the least for restrictive environment respondent.
Dr. Fogata explained the treatment respondent. Un- der the mental health center find plan, respond- would a place ent so his treatment could be stay outpatient monitored. Fogata would be in a hoped respondent placed community 728 months. within four to six program
service ill- from a mental suffered respondent The trial court found illness, expected be and, reasonably as a result of that could ness another. Respondent harm on himself or physical inflict serious admission, was deter- and EMHC involuntary therefore Respondent timely mined to the least restrictive environment. his appeal. admission first contends the order for
Respondent face of the record that it is on the apparent must be reversed because followed. In Health Code were not certain of the Mental provisions contention, argues this support respondent the notice of hear when it served failed to follow the Code provides the Mental Health Code on him. Section 3—706 of ing receipt after hearing days set a date within five the circuit court shall that notice of the court shall direct certificate and of the second “[t]he (Ill. Rev. respondent.” hearing upon be served time and place notice of Here, filed the 706.) the State 3— for invol the certificates and at the same time as hearing State, first, the Thus, the State made two errors: admission. untary date; second, the court, instead of the set the court’s direction. served the notice on without that where no two cases for the proposition cites is filed and the the petition tice issued and served before has been admission court, the order of set the trial objected never though reversed even 961-62; Ill. 3d re Price (In service. improper court, following This Price 3d King (1986), statutory noncompliance the rule that “any reiterated King, renders procedures Ill. App. Splett (1990), erroneous and ineffective.” 3d reliance reconsider our however, that we should argues,
The State Accord- “ill-reasoned.” those King opinions on Price formality.” is “an State, empty of formal notice the lack ing to the In re J. W. the rationale of apply us to urges The State considered notice be formal proceeding, (in juvenile participate actual notice and have parties waived where the interested *4 proceedings. commitment in the to proceedings) formal no that State’s characterization with the disagree We in explained Splett, As we an hearing empty formality. tice of the is meaningful in statute of the the notice mandatory requirements of a se- last-minute, possibly notification oral the protecting against Splett, 3d at dated, respondent. committed involuntarily with the State’s assertion that the involun disagree We hearing. juvenile can with a procedure equated commitment be case, within 120 a hearing days In a the must hold a juvenile court 1989, 37, 805— hearing. (Ill. ch. par. written demand for a Rev. Stat. 14.) addition, if minor is the court adjudicated delinquent, the 1989, (Ill. release the minor to the of his Rev. Stat. custody parents. 37, contrast, ch. in an par. 23(1)(a)(1).)By 805 — filing be five proceeding, days must held within 91½, 706.) ch. If (Ill. par. second certificate. Rev. Stat. 3 — finds the to to court be and the least alternative for is the health restrictive treatment mental center, the court must order that remain hospitalized. 91½, (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. admis par. 811.) 3 — sion the time to is proceeding, prepare significantly shorter, and the interest at stake is much more liberty compelling than a juvenile proceeding. Therefore, in strict adherence the statu tory requirements of the Mental Health is necessary. argues further that be re must because
versed the State failed to file a plan required by treatment as (Ill. 91½, section 3—813 par. Rev. Stat. ch. 813). The 3 — that responds the failure to file a plan treatment was not reversible plan error because a treatment was in for respondent. effect A plan treatment formulated in does April qualify not “current” treatment for a in plan hearing held October 1989. The requires statute that “the facility director shall file with the court current includes plan which an evaluation of the patient’s progress and the which benefiting extent he is from treatment.” (Ill. at the hear testimony ing showed condition improved since the Thus, the hearing. April treatment plan was not sufficient.
The State further asserts failure to file a current treat- is excused plan Fogata testified about the treatment held, plan and the We in the discharge plan. recently context of sec- tion such not cursory for a testimony substitute 3— (In Blume a formal incorporated report. (“[T]he suggest statute does sub- compliance sufficient, stantial we would cannot condone to prepare failure a formal which present report was intended assist the trial court making disposition”).) The failure file a formal direc- prepared by report facility *5 730 so the court results in an error person by
tor or directed do Blume, 197 Ill. 3d at 558- App. which is neither harmless nor waived. 59. follow the (1) strictly require conclude that the failure
We treat (2) ments for to file current notification the circuit this court the of plan requires judgment reverse of passage In of our of these issues and the disposition court. view time, other contention. appellate we need not consider conclusion, the recent trend of we are disturbed with deeply Mental Health concerning Elgin cases admission at 163; In re In re Hatala (1990), App. 200 Ill. 3d (EMHC). Center See In re Blume 159; 197 Ill. Walker (1990), App. Ill. 3d (1990), App. Splett (1990), 552; 194 Ill. 3d 391. App. 3d State, link each of these cases is that The common between reasons, followed the relatively simple proce has not unknown danger keep potentially in our Mental Health Code to dures outlined ous, they ap in a where can receive persons facility unstable mentally The safety. jeopardizing public’s treatment without propriate proceed notice of court dealing Mental Health has sections with 91½, 3—706), at par. Stat. ch. ings (Ill. Rev. patient dur for an addi and when a period petition ion of the initial admission ch. (Ill. tional of treatment must be period a current 813), with the need include par. along 3 — 813(a)). These (Ill. with the Rev. petition in interests given liberty detailed very are all In re Price 3d (See volved in these cases. in mandates statutory to follow willing The State must be re will be dangerous persons the possibility order to eliminate treat necessary receiving leased from the EMHC without it files whereby implement procedure ment. The State wish to well in advance of to continue an of these some eliminating thus period, expiration previous “last-minute” problems. is reversed. County of Kane the circuit court
Reversed.
INGLIS, J., concurring: specially this case. I am filed in holding
I concur with the concerning trend of cases involun- the recent disturbed with very I agree Health Center. with Jus- Mental Elgin at the from protect public done to something tice McLaren the release of without first potentially dangerous persons, receiving treatment, necessary due to the State’s failure to with comply statutory requirements.
I also note that I Justice agree Reinhard’s dissent Splett (1990), (Reinhard, J., dissenting), ap- peal allowed 132 Ill. 2d I Although agree with the dis- sent, I will follow the majority opinion Splett to stare pursuant de- movere, cisis et non quieta supreme at least until the court decides the case. I do inso order to avoid further confusion in this difficult area. REINHARD,
JUSTICE dissenting: *6 For the reasons I (1990), which stated Splett Ill. App. J., 3d 391 (Reinhard, dissenting), appeal allowed 132 Ill. 2d 553, I continue to dissent from the holding that the failure rec- ord to show that notice of the time and place involuntary ad- mission was served on and his attorney requires reversal of the commitment even where respondent and his attorney appeared at the scheduled and did not raise any issue of the lack of proper notice.
I also dissent from the balance of the holds that the judgment must be reversed because the State failed to file a current section required by 3 — 813 of the Mental Health (Code) (Ill. 813). Although the record not does show that a current treatment plan was formally filed in strict compliance with Code, section 3—813 of the point below, raised of Dr. transcript Fogata’s at testimony commitment hearing indicates that a current treatment plan exists on which he was questioned by assistant State’s Attorney and defendant’s counsel. I do not approve While of the failure to file for I mally plan, would find there has been substantial statute, compliance with the has not suggested how he was prejudiced these circumstances. In re Smoots Cf. Ill. App. 3d
Finally, although not reached in the majority opinion, the respond- ent contends that the trial court’s order for involuntary was not supported clear and convincing record, evidence. On this I disagree would affirm the order of commitment.