delivered the Opinion of the Court.
T1 In this appeal, we review the court of appeals opinion in People v. Laeke, --- P.3d -- (Colo.App.2010). That court held that when the prosecution has conceded that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, a defendant has a statutory right under Colorado's insanity statutes to a jury trial on both the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity. The court of appeals further held that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) is entered without a trial.
12 After reviewing Colorado's insanity statutes and our precedent concerning the affirmative defense of insanity, we hold that a defendant does not have a statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and his аffirmative defense of insanity when he enters a plea of NGRI and the prosecution concedes that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The legislature articulated its intent when it amended the insanity statutes. The explicit legislative wording did not include an intent to create a substantive statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and the affirmative dеfense of insanity after it has been established that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. In addition, we hold that the Constitution is not violated by the entry of a judgment of NGRI without a trial on the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity. Our holding rests upon Colorado's long-standing precedent permitting a finding of NGRI without a jury trial and also because a judgment of NGRI operates as an acquittal of the charges. Hence, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court to return it to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
{3 Respondent Abel Gebre Laeke was charged with one count of criminal attempt to commit unlawful sexual contact and one count of indecent exposure as a result of events that the People allege occurred while he was a patient at the psychiatric ward at Denver Health Medical Center in 2004. At a preliminary hearing, the county court found probable cause to believe that Laeke committed the crimes and bound the charges over for proceedings in the district court. A trial court is required to hold a preliminary hearing if there has been no grand jury indictment or preliminary hearing prior to the entry of a plea of NGRIL § 16-8-103@8), C.R.S. (2011). This mandatory hearing operates as a "check" on the People by requiring that there be some showing of evidence that the accused in fact committed the acts al
T4 At arraignment, Laeke's attorney sought to enter a plea of NGRI over Laceke's objection, pursuant to section 16-8-108(2), C.R.S. (2011). See Hendricks v. People,
T5 A doctor at the Colorado Mental Health Institute initially opined that Laceke was presently legally incompetent. After Lacke was restored to competency, the prosecution stated that it would stipulate to the plea of NGRI, thereby agreeing that Lacke was insane on the date of the commission of the offense. Laeke's counsel again asked the court to accept the NGRI plea over Laeke's objection. The court asked Laeke if he had anything he'd like to say, and he responded "I think [my attorney] summed it up for me but I'm hoping to prove that I didn't do this in trial." Based on the prosecution's stipulatiоn and the mental health evaluations before it, the district court accepted the NGRI plea over Laeke's objection and then found Laeke NGRI. The court then committed Laeke to the Department of Human Services.
T6 Laeke appealed, and the court of appeals held that Laeke was deprived of his right to a jury trial. The court of appeals held that Laeke had both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial on the merits and his affirmative defense of insanity. The court of appeals reasoned that a defendant has a right to a jury trial on an NGRI plea as well as a right to a jury trial on a felony charge. Concluding that those jury trial rights could not be waived by defense counsel's rеquest to the trial court to accept the stipulation of Laeke's insanity at the time of the offense, that court held that a personal waiver by Lacke was the only way that a jury trial could be waived. Because Laceke did not waive his right to a jury trial, the court concluded that a constitutional violation had occurred. The court of apрeals therefore reversed the district court's finding of NGRI and remanded the case for a jury trial. The People petitioned this court for certiorari review, which we granted.
Colorado's Insanity Defense
T7 Our interpretation of Colorado's insanity statutes requires discussion of the General Assembly's statutory amendments made in the mid-1990s. When an insanity plea is entered for offenses committed before July 1, 1995, Cоlorado requires a bifurcated trial procedure whereby the issues of sanity and guilt are tried separately to different juries. § 16-8-104. The issue of sanity is tried first. Id. If a defendant is found to have been insane at the time of the commission of the offense, then no trial on the merits is held and the defendant is committed to the Department of Human Services. § 16-8-105(4). If the jury does not find defendant insаne, then the case proceeds to a trial on the defendant's guilt. § 16-8-105(8).
18 Effective in 1996, the legislature promulgated section 16-8-101.5 and related amendments to Title 16, which created a unitary trial system to be used when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised in cases involving offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995. Under this procedure, a defendant's sanity and guilt are decided in оne trial. § 16-8-105.5. The legislature ex
T9 Under this unitary system, when the affirmative defense of NGRI has been raised, the jury is given a special verdiet form containing interrogatories, § 16-8-105.5(8). The jury first decides the question of guilt, and if the jury concludes that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more felony charges, then the jury does not answer the special interrogatories on insanity. § 16-8-105.5(8). The rationale of this provision rests upon the principle that to find guilt where an insanity defense is presented, the jury must find that the People have proven all of the elements of the offense, including the mens rea, and have also proven the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering the special interrogatories superfluous. If, however, the jury finds the defendant not guilty, then the jury must answer the special interrogatories as to whether it found the defendant not guilty solely because of the affirmative defense of NGRI. § 16-8-105.5(8). If the jury found the defendant NGRI, then the court must commit the defendant to the custody of the Department of Human Services. § 16-8-105.5(4).
Analysis
T10 Laeke argues that the court of appeals reached a cоrrect result by holding that he had both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial, although his arguments urge slightly different reasons than those relied upon by the court of appeals. Lacke contends that a statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity is conferred on defendants who plead NGRI, based both upon the language of the statute аnd the change of procedure which occurred in 1996. He also argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by entering a judgment of NGRI without a jury trial. Upon review of our statutory regime for the affirmative defense of insanity, we disagree.
111 A defendant's right to a jury trial is an issue of law and therefore we review this issue de novo. See People v. Pitts,
1.
12 Turning to Lacke's argument regаrding the existence of a statutory right to a jury trial, Laeke initially contends that the court of appeals correctly construed Colorado's insanity statute to confer on Laeke a statutory right to a jury trial both on the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity, even where the People conceded that he was insane at the time of the commissiоn of the offense. Laeke contends that by enacting the changes in procedure in 16-8-105.5, the legislature created a substantive statutory right to a jury trial. Laeke points to the new procedure in 16-8-105.5(8), whereby the jury "decide[s] first the question of guilt," instead of the previous procedure where the jury first considered sanity alone. Laceke argues that this change meаns the issue of guilt must be decided before a verdict of NGRI and therefore the trial court's finding of NGRI without first conducting a trial on guilt violated his statutory right to a jury trial. This argument is unavailing for two reasons.
{13 First, Laeke is incorrect that under section 16-8-105.5(8), the trier of fact exclu
{I 14 Second, the plain language of the statute indicates that the legislative intent of the changes to the insanity statutes was not to create a substantive right to a jury trial. The wording regarding the legislature's intent in enacting the changes to the insanity statute, explicitly codified in section 16-8-101.3, is clear. The General Assembly's intent was:
[Tjo combine the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity and the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition into the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity and to create a unitary process for hеaring the issues raised by said affirmative defense to apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995.
§ 16-8-101.3. In other words, the 1996 changes were intended to create a unitary trial to replace the former system of bifurcated trials when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised. Nowhere in its stated intent does the legislature indicate an intent to create a new statutory right to a jury trial on the merits when the plea of NGRI is at issue.
115 Historically, we have construed the affirmative defense of insanity to permit a court to enter a finding of NGRI without first determining guilt. See People v. Anderson,
16 Laeke also argues that he is entitled to a jury trial based on the language in section 16-8-105.5(2), which provides that upon the receipt of the report of the sanity examination, "the court shall immediately set the case for trial." However, the same wording existed in the earlier statute and remains codified in section 16-8-105. We have never construed this language to confer a substantive right to a jury trial when insanity is uncontested. Rather, section 16-8-105.5 (and its predecessor, section 16-8-105) simply set forth the procedure to be followed when an insanity defense has been raised-as indicated by their titles, "Prоcedure after plea for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995" and "Procedure after plea for offenses committed before July 1, 1995." §§ 16-8-105, -105.5; see Martinez v. Continental Enters.,
117 Our fundamental responsibility when we interpret a statute is to give effect to the Gеneral Assembly's purpose or intent in enacting the statute. Martin v. People,
2.
118 We next address the second issue of the court of appeals holding: whether the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution was violated when the trial court found Laeke NGRI without a trial on the merits or his affirmative defense of insanity in these cireumstances. The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury requires "criminal conviе-tions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the erime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Hill,
€ 19 Prior to the change in procedure under the insanity statutes, defendants found to be insane at the time of the commission of the offense during a sanity trial were routinely committed to thе Department of Human Services without a merits trial. § 16-8-105(4); People v. Hill,
1 20 The fact that Laceke's NGRI plea was entered over his objection does not change this result. See Les v. Meredith,
Conclusion
121 For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court to return it to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. We granted certiorari to review the following issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a defendant has a statutory right, under section 16-8-105.5, C.R.S. (2011), to a jury trial when the district court enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity over the defendant's objection and the prosecution stipulates to that plea.
2. Whether the defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial when the district court enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity over the defendant's objection and the prosecution stipulates to that plea.