32 Cal. 433 | Cal. | 1867
The testimony is entirely circumstantial. We have read it carefully and find nothing which directly connects the defendant with the homicide, assuming that one was committed. Where such are the conditions it is of vital importance to the defendant that the jury should be instructed fully and clearly upon the question of reasonable doubt; for the evidence must not only be consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but inconsistent with every other rational conclusion. (People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 154.) It is true that the Court, in a general way, at the request of the District Attorney, instructed the jury that they must be convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt or acquit; but nothing was said as to what the law means by a rational doubt. The defendant, if he so desired, was entitled to a full and clear instruction upon that subject, both as to the fact of homicide and the participation of the defendant. His counsel prepared one which, so far as we can discover, is not only without any substantial objection, but is not even obnoxious to criticism. It seems to have been prepared with unusual care and precision. It was nevertheless refused. The Attorney-G-eneral concedes that it is sound and that it would have been better to have given it, but claims that the law upon the subject is sufficiently stated in the instructions which were given. We do not think so. We have held that it was not error to refuse to give an instruction, though unobjectionable in all respects, where the jury have been already instructed fully upon the point to which the instruction is directed ; but we have done so with reluctance, and we have repeatedly
Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.