4 Park. Cr. 217 | Superior Court of Buffalo | 1854
By the Court,
The law distinguishes, defines, and names different offences. One definition cannot comprise two distinct offences. The uttering of forged paper for value, and with a felonious intention to defraud, cannot be the felonious obtaining of money or property by a false token or pretence. It may well be that the prisoner was acquitted upon the ground of a variance between the indictment and proof, or upon an exception to the form or substance of the indictment ; and, if so, he may be indicted anew for the same offence, for nothing but an acquittal upon the merits and the facts, can shield him from a second indictment for the same crime. (2 B. S., 701, §§ 24, 25.) If the instrument is not within the statute of forgery, he never could have been legally liable for forgery in making or in uttering it, and whether acquitted or convicted upon such a charge, remains liable to the indictment before us If the instrument was within the statute, he cannot, under any circumstances, be held liable, under the statute against cheats, for a fraud perpetrated by the use of it.
The English statutes name the instruments, the forgery of which they denounce. The better opinion seems to be that our statute was intended to include all the instruments so named,
We are never called upon to determine whether, in legal construction, the false instrument, or writing, is an instrument of a particular name or character. It is a matter of perfect indifference whether it possesses or not the legal requisites of a bill of exchange, or an order for the payment of money, or the delivery of property. The question is whether, upon its face, it will have the effect to defraud those who may act upon it as genuine, or the person in whose name it is forged. It is not essential that the person in whose name it purports to be made should have the legal capacity to make it; nor that the person to whom- it is directed should be bound to act upon it if genuine, or have a remedy over. Ho man is bound to receive a bank bill in payment, and yet forging a bank bill is felony. So is forging a bill purporting to be of a bank which has, in fact, no existence. Though all the parties to a bill of exchange are purely fictitious, if it be passed as genuine, it is regarded by the law as a forgery. The law looks only to the falsity of the instrument, and the fraudulent use of it as genuine. But if I err in this, I err only to this extent: that though where the parties to it are fictitious, there can perhaps be no forgery of the instrument, yet still the felonious uttering of it as true must be within the statute. A married woman’s request to her husband for money by the bearer may surely be forged; and so may an infant son’s request to his father or guardian, for a remittance, or a coat.
I have no doubt that, upon its face, the instrument is within the statute. Mrs. Williams, whose act it purports to be, must
The facts are that the Mrs. Williams intended by the signature, was, at the time of the forgery and of the uttering, the wife of one Samuel Williams, and the mother of one Samuel Williams, Jr., a minor, then at work for others for wages. The order was presented to the son, as the request of his mother, was capable of inducing him to honor it, and he did honor it. The fraud was perfected and injured the son or the father in his property. I cannot avoid the conclusion that the prisoner was liable to punishment, under our statute, for forging this paper, and for uttering it as true. He cannot, therefore, be hable to punishment for a distinct felony—that of obtaining money by uttering the paper and falsely pretending that it was true.
If my brothers should be of opinion that this paper is not within our statute of forgery, or deem it expedient to postpone passing upon the question directly raised by the demurrer, we may inquire into the sufficiency of the indictment
Judgment for the defendant.