Lead Opinion
Aрpeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Tompkins County (Rowley, J.), rendered June 16, 2010, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree, arson in the third degree and tampering with physical evidence, (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered August 21, 2013, which pаrtially denied defendant’s motion pursuant to, among other things, CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing, and (3) from a judgment of said court, rendered October 18, 2013, which resentenced defendant.
Defendant was indicted in June 2009 on charges of murder in the second degree, arson in the third degree and tampering with physical evidence after he murdered his wife while they were out jogging by cutting her throat with a box cutter and then returned to their apartment and attempted to set it on fire. Only weeks before, defendant and the victim had returned from a honeymoon trip to Costa Rica. During the evening following the murder, the police found defendant alone in his car in a parking lot of a state park. When the officer approached the car, he observed dried blood on defendant’s sleeve and asked him to lower his window. Defendant instead put the car into gеar and led police on a high-speed chase that ended when he drove off the road. When the police got to the car, defendant was unconscious and wearing only a bathrobe; his neck was lacerated and he had a bloodied knife in his hand.
At the jury trial in April 2010, County Court instructed thе jury to consider the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]). Ultimately, the jury convicted defendant on all three counts and the court sentenced him to a prison term of 25 years to life on the second-degree murder conviction and to lеsser, concurrent terms on the arson and tampering with physical evidence convictions. Defendant thereafter moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 and 440.20 to vacate the judgment of conviction and the sentence. Without holding a hearing, County Court denied that part of the motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10. Finding that defendant received an unauthorized sentence on the arson and tampering convictions, however, the court determined that he should be resentenced on said convictions, which it did in a separate judgment. Defendant now ap
Initially, we reject defendant’s claim that County Court erred by failing to order, sua sponte, a competency hearing pursuant to CPL 730.30. Generally, a defendant is prеsumed to be competent to stand trial (see People v Tortorici,
Even if, as defendant now claims, the full extent of his illness was not known because he did not receive adequate medical care until after the trial, a history of mental illness and/or suicide attempts does not compel a finding of incompetency or necessarily require a competency hearing (see People v Duffy,
County Court did not err in denying, without a hearing, defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction based on Houghtalen’s revised evaluation of what he believes defendant’s mental capacity was at the time of the trial. Defendant argues that he was entitled to a hearing on his CPL 440.10 motion as to whether he was capable of understanding and participating in his trial (see CPL 440.10 [1] [e]) and as to whether purportedly newly discovered evidence concerning his mental health would have, if received at trial, rеsulted in a verdict more favorable to him (see CPL 440.10 [1] [g]). On a motion to vacate, a hearing is required if the submissions “show that the nonrecord facts sought to be established are material and would entitle [the defendant] to relief” (People v Satterfield,
The record here contains numerous facts undercutting any assertion that dеfendant, at the time of his trial and the pretrial proceedings, was suffering from any mental condition that left him “incapable of understanding or participating in such proceedings” (CPL 440.10 [1] [e]). Up to and throughout the trial, defendant continuously exhibited an awareness of the nuances of the criminаl justice process, including, as is pertinent to this discussion, the crucial role that Houghtalen, as his forensic psychiatric expert, would play in his defense. Defendant’s forthright disclosures to Houghtalen concerning the dysfunction he observed in his family during his youth, and the mental health symptoms he reportedly experienced in the days and months leading up to his crime, support the conclusion that any psychiatric conditions from which he might have been suffering over the course of the instant criminal action did not prevent him from recognizing that providing Houghtalen with details of his mental health history wоuld bolster his defense, nor from actually supplying such information to Houghtalen.
County Court was aware from the outset of its oversight of this case that defendant’s mental health would be the focus of
As for defendant’s claim under CPL 440.10 (1) (g), even if it can be said that Houghtalen’s recent reevaluation of defendant’s mental health history amounts to newly discovered evidence, it cannot be said that such evidence “could not have been produced ... at the trial . . . with due diligence” (CPL 440.10 [1] [g]). Defendant informed Houghtalen during a midtrial interview that he believed that Houghtalen and his trial counsel were part of a conspiracy against him. No reasonable explanation has been provided for the failure to reassess defendant’s mental health — or the defense’s trial strategy — in light of this disclosure. This is not a situation in which, for exаmple, the People ignored their obligation to thoroughly investigate the crime allegedly committed by a defendant whose trial attorney lacked the resources necessary to mount a viable defense (compare People v Hildenbrandt,
Turning to the question of whether the findings of Houghtalen’s reevaluation were, as a substantive matter, “of such character as to create a probability that[,] had such evidence been received at the trial [,] the verdict would have been
Defendant’s myriad claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the People’s opening and closings arguments were not preserved for our review (see People v Studstill,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent only from that part of the majority’s conclusion that County Court properly denied defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without a hearing.
On a motion to vacate, а hearing is required if the submissions “show that the nonrecord facts sought to be established are material and would entitle [the defendant] to relief” (People v Satterfield,
Here, defendant’s submissions reveal that, in July 2010, after sentencing and while in state custody, defendant again attempted suicide and consequently was involuntarily admitted to a psychiatric center, where he received mental health treatment until he was discharged in August 2011. While Houghtalen initially had determined that defendant was competent to stand trial, he now concludes in an affidavit that, upon review of defendant’s medical records — including those generated while he was treated at the psychiatric center — and after meeting with defendant for an unspecified period of time at the state facility in October 2012, County Court should have evaluated defendant to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Houghtalen explains that, as a result of the treatment received, defendant is now able to fully explain the extent and duration of his psychosis, providing information that he did not disclose prior to trial. Based on what he has learned posttrial, Houghtalen believes that defendant, a “quietly psychotic” individual, would have qualified for an insanity defense (see Penal Law § 40.15). According to Houghtalen, defendant was “morbidly depressed and . . . quite paranoid” during the trial, and his condition interfered with his ability to participate in his defense because, prinсipally, he believed that both his attorney and Houghtalen were part of a larger conspiracy against him. Houghtalen candidly acknowledged that defendant shared this concern during their last interview while the trial was underway, but explains that he did not appreciate the extent of defendant’s mental illness. Correspondingly, defendant explains in an affidavit that it was not until he received treatment, and was diagnosed and given antipsychotic medication, that he was “relieved of much of the paranoid and delusional thinking that [he] struggled with every day of [his] life, . . . since [he] was eight to ten years old.” I note that, although defendant received a standard mental health assessment while in custody before trial, he did not receive any treatment until after his second suicide attempt.
I am mindful that Houghtalen initially conducted a thorough records review, interviewed defendant at lеngth prior to trial and formulated an opinion to support a defense of extreme
Ordered that the judgments and order are affirmed.