*1 App KOSTERS PEOPLE v 20, 1988, Rapids. April at Grand Docket No. 100128. Submitted 20, 1989. applied appeal for. Leave to Decided March first-degree Elroy of two counts of convicted L. Rosters was following jury trial in the Ottawa a criminal sexual conduct Bosnian, alleg- Court, appealed J. Defendant L. Circuit Calvin ing several errors. Appeals The Court of held: hearsay improperly statements admitted 1. The trial court son, victims, five-year-old made of the defendant’s which one by physi- prior him to examination a nurse who interviewed remaining However, because the the error was harmless cian. overwhelming. light against evidence defendant was defendant, against the error and circumstantial evidence direct admitting hearsay testimony of the nurse was harmless doubt, juror beyond no would have voted for a reasonable since acquittal. expert testimony properly com- admitted 2. The trial court allegedly pubic paring and those taken from defendant hairs victim, diaper almost the second defendant’s found following daughter, two-year-old defendant’s visitation with the of its child. The evidence was relevant admissible important tendency more existence of other facts to make the probable probable it the evi- or less than would be without dence. brief, prosecution reference witness 3. The inadvertent having polygraph taken a was harmless. No to defendant’s prejudice resulted therefrom. prosecutor improperly questioned as to his defendant 4. The questions preference. The were irrele- sexual orientation and ques- properly line trial terminated this vant and the court jury tioning. instructed the The trial court should have however, disregard answers; the failure to so instruct was requiring counsel did not not error reversal because defense counsel, and defense on redirect for a curative instruction _ask References 623, 776-819,884; 2d, Appeal 264- Error Evidence §§ §§ Am Jur 266, 496,1091; 471-506. Trial Witnesses § §§ Rosters questions. examination, to the same answers the same elicited prejudice therefrom. resulted No allowing its discretion did not abuse trial court 5. The leading five-year-old son prosecutor to examine defendant’s questions. *2 errors did not the trial court’s effect of 6. The cumulative
deprive fair trial. of a defendant Affirmed. J., that the errors It is his belief dissented. W. R. beyond a reasonable doubt. not harmless were which occurred properly allowed the trial court While he believes leading five-year-old prosecutor son defendant’s to examine disagrees admit the questions, it harmless error to that was he interviewed the child. hearsay the nurse who statement was, itself, testimony addition, in so nurse’s that the he believes find the He would also prejudicial mandate a retrial. as to questioning improper as to prosecutor’s of the defendant prosecuto- prejudicial preference to be sexual orientation expert testimony that the He would also find rial misconduct. that, if it concerning pubic even hairs irrelevant and was preju- relevance, outweighed by its any such relevance had reverse. dicial effect. He would Exception. Hearsay — — Treatment Medical 1. Witnesses hearsay exception does not to the rule treatment The medical necessary reasonably to apply statements which were (MRE 803[4]). diagnosis treatment medical — — Circumstantial Evidence. 2. Law Evidence Criminal arising there- inferences evidence and reasonable Circumstantial satisfactory proof of ele- to constitute from are sufficient offense. ments of a criminal — Appeal — — 3. Harmless Error Reasonable Criminal Law Jury.—Doubt retried if it is a defendant must be Error is not harmless and complained reasonably possible the errors that in a trial free of defendant; acquit might a juror voted to have of even one overwhelming, proof aside was so must stand if the conviction error, jurors find would that all reasonable from the taint of guilt beyond doubt. a reasonable — 4. Relevant Evidence. Evidence having any tendency to make the is evidence Relevant evidence consequence any to the determina- fact that existence probable probable than it would or less of the action more tion 401). (MRE without the evidence 175 Opinion of the Court Polygraphs. — 5. Evidence evidence; polygraph not admissible as of a test are results however, brief, polygraph to a is harm- inadvertent reference less; polygraph by is not mention of a a witness the mere grounds for a mistrial. — — 6. Trial Cross-Examination Relevant Evidence. any may A matter relevant to witness be cross-examined 401). (MRE 611[b], issue in the case MRE Appeal Preserving — 7. Question. disregard jury A trial court’s failure to instruct questions requir- is not error defendant’s answers to irrelevant ing counsel fails to ask for a curative reversal where defense counsel, examination, instruction and defense on redirect elicits questions. the same to the same answers Leading Prosecuting Attorneys — — — 8. Witnesses Questions Children. prosecutor trial discretion to allow the It is within the court’s asking leeway questions young fair amount of children chief; leading questions may in his be used in the called case develop necessary to the direct examination a child extent (MRE light age 611[c]). of the child’s *3 Kelley, Attorney General, J. Frank J. Louis Wesley Nykamp, Caruso, General, Solicitor J. Prosecuting Attorney, Gregory Babbitt, As- and Prosecuting Attorney, people. sistant for the Dodge Dodge), (by Catchick & David A. for de- fendant. P.J., and R. Before: and W. Weaver, McDonald JJ.
Peterson,* Following jury trial, P.J. defendant Weaver, first-degree of two counts of criminal was convicted 28.788(2). conduct, 750.520b; sexual MCL MSA For each defendant received concurrent sen- count thirty-five years prison. He tences of seven to appeals right. as of We affirm._
* sitting Appeals assignment. judge, Circuit on the Court of v Kosters op Opinion the Court charged abuse of with the sexual was Defendant daughter yet not two was His his two children. alleged abuse, his years time of the old at the testimony of de- In addition to was five. son fense testimony witnesses, trial included evidence at five-year-old son, Patricia of defendant’s practical McNees, nurse who inter- a licensed examined he was viewed the son before pe- physician, Banfield, the children’s Dr. Francis expert in diatrician, Hickok, Dr. David a medical Margaret Kosters, abuse, defen- area of child investiga- police ex-wife, in the involved dant’s in his own behalf. tion. Defendant testified
i appeal, that the trial court defendant asserts On improperly hearsay statements which admitted agree that this McNees. We son made Nurse MRE have been excluded under should 803(4), reasonably were not since the statements diagnosis necessary treatment. See to medical App 39, Wilkins, Mich However, 815 the error was harmless evidence lv den remaining
because the overwhelming. against defendant was gave five-year-old son direct testi- Defendant’s against though mony testimony his father. Even the child’s inconsistent, it was credi-
was at times particu- jury fact, it. In this ble and believed multiple incidents of abuse over a lar case of inconsistency period very time, the child’s lends credibility testimony, to his since it tends to show memory boy relying on his child’s prelearned delivering and adult-incul- and was *4 testimony. cated explicit. boy’s testimony The child testi-
The finger put his into his fied that he saw his father 175 Mich op Opinion the Court vagina, in three were while all little sister’s girl’s both touched defendant the bathroom area), (groin "privates” boy’s and buttock and the and that defendant in nail him with a touched reasonably genital maintained area. It cannot genitals touching a child’s adult that an nail is tion or imagina- range normally within Young experience five-year-old child. of a five-year-old do not often child like this children see, things read about ever, on television or if such in them books. testimony, there child’s direct
In addition to the of defendant’s ex-wife also the was the was examining physician. abuse The fact of sexual clearly children. The exam- shown as to both findings vaginal ining physician penetrations his testified to daughter injuries to defendant’s repeated penetrations to both children. and of anal against de- Further, evidence the circumstantial strong. It is well established fendant was circumstantial evidence arising inferences
and reasonable
satis-
are sufficient to constitute
therefrom
factory proof
of a criminal offense.
of the elements
Johnson,
v Frank
(1985), den
The instant case is
People Nichols,
hi it was contention defendant’s reject We also *6 witness a prosecution reversal requiring error had that defendant on cross-examination to state previous conjunction polygraph taken a charge. abuse sexual request to defense counsel’s responding
In by advised she had been jury when she tell that, in their Department Sheriffs County Ottawa by abused sexually had not been opinion, son El- defendant, replied: "When defendant’s ex-wife coun- Upon defense the lie-detector test.” took roy instruction, the trial court’s objection sel’s her answer. rephrased ex-wife defendant’s instruction, but de- a curative trial court offered refused it when the court declined fendant the lie-detector passed that he had the jury advise test. (lie-detector) test are of a polygraph The results People v Michigan. as evidence
not admissible
Frechette,
(1968).
64,
68; 155
830
380 Mich
NW2d
brief,
to a
However,
poly-
inadvertent
reference
People
Tyrer,
19 Mich
harmless.
graph is
484;
(1969),
385 Mich
app
dis
51; 172 NW2d
(1971).
of a
The mere mention
NW2d
for mistrial.
grounds
is not
a witness
polygraph by
People
Paffhousen,
346, 351; 174
20 Mich
(1970).
(1969),
lv den 383 Mich
NW2d 69
respon-
ex-wife was
of defendant’s
The answer
the jury
Because
phrased question.
a poorly
sive to
defendant
charge
did not
police
knew
v Kosters
Opinion
Court
allegations,
following
it is not reason-
the earlier
jury
have believed
to assume that
could
able
pass
test. The matter was
defendant did
again,
or
either
the witness
not mentioned
polygraph
reference to defendant’s
counsel. The
and was therefore harm-
and inadvertent
brief
required
supra.
Tyrer,
reversal is
less.
No
prejudice.
no
See
v Alvin
defendant shows
Johnson,
424, 436-437; 240
NW2d
(1976),
cert den 429
reh den
on MRE matter to an issue the case.
611(b), MRE 401. Since there is no known child and the sexual connection between orientation of those who abuse
sexually children, abuse *7 prosecutor’s questions appear the to have been correctly irrelevant and the trial court terminated questioning. line of this also have instructed the
The trial court should
disregard
jury
Stin-
to
the answers. See
v
son,
719,
513
726-727;
318 NW2d
Mich
(1983).
However,
lv den
Because required. Robinson, v not 562-563; (1972). argument reject defendant’s
alsoWe allowing the in its discretion trial court abused five-year-old prosecutor son examine defendant’s to questions. leading the trial It within was prosecutor judge’s a fair young to allow discretion asking questions leeway amount People Hicks, in his case chief. called children 2 Mich App 461, Our NW2d prosecutor’s matter shows review of this leading than no more direct examination necessary age given witness questions only prosecutor’s were uneasiness. leading develop necessary to the extent 611(c). light age. testimony MRE of his witness’s VI argument the cumula- is that Defendant’s final deprive errors was to of the trial court’s tive effect disagree. trial. We defendant of a fair allowing hearsay court’s error of The trial harmless, as was of Nurse McNees was mention of defendant’s the having and inadvertent brief Regarding polygraph. the court’s taken a following give instruction a curative failure questioning improper prosecutorial to defen- as orientation, defense counsel waived sexual dant’s request by failing objection a curative instruc- by proceeding line of the same tion and questioning himself. together cannot be said errors taken
These three
*8
Kosters
by
Peterson,
Dissent W. R.
J.
cumulatively to have denied defendant a fair trial.
Smith,
220, 225;
See
NW2d 156
light
lv den
McDonald, (dissenting). W. R. I am unable to say that the errors which occurred herein were beyond Indeed, harmless a I reasonable doubt. prejudicial require view one error as so as to in reversal itself. clearly
No case could more demonstrate our problems attempting in to deal with the sexual abuse of small children context traditional prosecution. of a criminal The children here in- daughter, volved were following who, defendant’s son and separation divorce, a bitter were only periodic with defendant for visitation. That they subjected depravity had been to acts of sexual vagi- was clear. The medical evidence established penetrations injuries daugh- nal to defendant’s physical ter, and both children showed effects of repeated penetrations. prosecu- anal It was the perpetrated tion’s claim that such abuse was during the children visitations with defendant.1 instigated previous investigation Defendant’s ex-wife had alleged son, investigation sexual abuse defendant of their dropped was passed for lack of evidence and in the course of which defendant polygraph examination. Reference to the "lie-detector test” ground appeal the ex-wife has been raised as a but I find no clearly error. The reference was inadvertent a context *9 App 748 175 Mich 758 by J. W. R. daughter yet years of was not two
Defendant’s
age
son was
a
Defendant’s
not witness.
and was
questionable
years
a witness. The
five
competency
old and was
recognized
is
children as witnesses
of
2
requires
by
that
trial court
the
a statute*
special
under the
when a child
make
examination
age
years
produced
to deter-
ten
is
as a witness
of
intelligence
whether the child “has sufficient
mine
obligation to tell
the truth to be
sense of
and
testify.”3
safely
to
admitted
the
claim error
in
trial
does not
Defendant
testify.
to
He does
court’s
contend, however, that,
to allow
son
decision
given
susceptibility
the
of
give
by
young child to
an answer wanted
such a
allowing
questioner,
judge
the trial
erred
the
leading questions
prosecutor.
by
the
the use of
leading questions
of
that a number
record shows
passed
apparent
jury
to
the
that defendant had
the
which it had
test
be
to
prejudice
him
that
could
been no
to
the
so
there
have
Johnson,
424;
People
240
729
Alvin
396 Mich
NW2d
reference.
(1976).
v
600.2163;
People, 10
MSA
And see Washburn v
2MCL
27 A.2163.
(1880);
(1862);
People,
286;
44 Mich
6 NW
Mich 372
McGuire v
(1902);
Minchella,
Beech,
622;
People
v
129 Mich
NW 363
(1934).
123;
735; ALR
the
268 Mich
255 NW
Whether
statute
the
has
adoption
MRE 601 has not been considered since
been overridden
Dixon,
of
of the Rules
Evidence
James
[cf.
contemplates
(1980)],
clearly
MRE
that
was made on other the of not errone which was ous. People, See Coon v 99 Ill W. R. however, trial, the shows
The course legitimacy the exist about the concerns that testify, particu- competence young to children might put larly their into fear that words the leading questions during only by mouths, trial not pretrial suggestion. but testimony conduct about his father’s The son’s "touching,” primarily couched terms using by using doll, sometimes demonstrated designate genitals "private” the to the word meaning having apparently a dual the word "butt” anus, either or area of of particular meaning buttocks being always from clear tending part his That record. guilt may as thus be summarized show defendant’s unspecified Sunday, the children follows: anOn house; the a ladder at son carried were from the climbed it to look saw defendant defendant’s garage the side of the house and window; the son the bathroom finger
put daughter’s his in the "private”; day in the later that both children were and, had after son bathroom with defendant gone bathroom, touched his son defendant pants zipping up "private” on his and also before son’s put his hand his son’s butt and inside daughter (indicating groin touched his area); had his son buttock defendant once touched area) genital (indicating had a nail and *11 daughter also; one touched with nail and no his way else touched the son the defendant had ever touched him. testimony only direct
The of the son was bearing guilt. His testi- evidence on defendant’s mony supported by circumstantial evidence: (1) through opportunity that his defendant had particularly rights acts, visitation to commit the occasions, 24, on June June and June three (2) that, after each of these visitations with People v Kosters W.R. vaginal defendant, the mother observed irrita- (3) daughter; tion on the that after the June 18 (a) changed visitation with defendant the bling pubic mother daughter’s diaper and found two hairs resem- therein, hairs which hairs later were (b) police, to the and which delivered expert compared hairs and with found similar to hairs (c) defendant, and taken from that told defendant daugh- a detective that he had been alone (4) during ter 18 visitation; June that it would unlikely injuries that the to the children could custody have occurred while their mother’s any there never were males in the house grandfather, other than the maternal and that during last half of June the children had been presence only out of the mother’s twice then and (5) babysitter only with a an hour; female that tending had defendant cate made statements to indi- guilt to a detective the effect that he did doing anything not remember like he was accused doing asking possible and it if was to do some- it; (6) thing like that remember friend, defendant made statements to a when dis- cussing charges, to the effect even if he people acting did it were like it was the most (7) thing happen; terrible that could hearsay statements were attributed to the son as primarily through acts, to defendant’s offered testimony of Patricia McNees.
The of defendant’s ex-wife was that on police 26, 1986, June she went to the with her suspicions hairs said had she she daughter’s diaper found in the A June 18. daughter detective advised her pediatrician, pediatrician, take to a her day. which she did the same Dr. previously Banfield, had exam- daughter ined the prior complaint in connection with the ex-wife’s
of sexual abuse defendant and *12 by J. Peterson, W. R. evidence to substantiate found no that occasion complaint. however, he did find On June the physical referred her above and evidence noted the Michigan Hickok at the Southwest Dr. David saw Dr. Hickok Center Health Education (smhec). following day, daughter 27, and June the the findings. physical to his testified that sometime also testified Defendant’s ex-wife ques- June, after she had in late and thereafter father, the son told her about his tioned for the son July first time defendant’s acts. On about by 1, the a detective and son was interviewed taped, gave no he informa- interview was video but by indicating defendant.6 On sexual abuse tion July 18, to the smhec clinic to was taken son Hickok, and Dr. Hickok testi- Dr. examined be repeated findings anal his indicative fied to penetration. It was on this occasion son practical nurse, Patricia was interviewed McNees. that she had talked to defen-
McNees testified talking to the son. She was ex-wife before dant’s nature of the ex-wife’s accusations aware of the against prior to the defendant and of an incident related against
complaint by the ex-wife her hus- she claimed that son had tried band which put penis his mouth said he into sister’s and daddy After it that was what did.7 did questions, general about McNees told son some touches, gave good good although explaining bad, who and out daddies. She also
touches she left "protective video” was offered in evidence. The so-called services seen, portion portion audio was defective the video could While could not be heard. this incident. McNees testified that Defendant’s ex-wife testified to it, that act he denied she she asked persisted, saying, too? son about such an before, this time "He it didn’t he? Did he do it did answered, put your “I The son don’t did he mouth?” What know,” upset. became People v Kosters Dissent W.R. explained that bad touches could be inside or *13 outside clothes. She then obtained the son’s state- given ments that defendant had inside his clothes or when his clothes were him bad touches
off, that happened bedroom, it in the that defendant did any on, not have his clothes that defendant touched (the son’s) wet, bottom and made it that he wiped paper, his bottom with toilet and that what slimy. was it was white and The son also told "pee pee” McNees that defendant once touched his Later, nail. McNees asked the son if it you,” yes. "hurt when he did and he said Repeated questions son about how defen- produced dant touched him his responses. sister uncer- finally tain, or nonverbal no McNees if asked the son anyone, his dad had asked him not to tell replied, "yes.” to which he McNees then drew statements from the son that his dad would get spank mad and would him. pretrial
A motion to exclude of hearsay McNees as was denied. The motion was again renewed at trial and It was overruled. is the prosecution testimony, contention of though hearsay, 803(4), was admissible under MRE provides: following are not hearsay excluded
rule, though even the declarant is as available witness: (4) purposes Statements made of medical diagnosis
treatment or medical treatment. in connection with purposes of Statements made for medi- diagnosis cal treatment or medical in connection describing history, with treatment and medical or past the present pain, sensations, or symptoms, or or inception general or character of the cause or external source reasonably thereof insofar as nec- essary diagnosis to such and treatment. App 175 W. R. 803(4), originally proposed, followed as
MRE
803(4)
verbatim,
Evidence
Rules of
§
Federal
complete
representing
of Michi-
reversal
an almost
adopted
ultimately
gan precedent.8
our Su-
As
seq.
preme
803(4)
MRE
Court,
MRE removes (1) hearsay medical statements: kinds three history; (2) pain past present symptoms, or or (3) inception general charac- or sensation; and thereof. It does or source ter of the cause external *14 requirements. justify upon In order to the so two propo- statement, its the out-of-court admission of first, establish, the statement nent must particular purpose, i.e., medical for for a made diagnosis in connection treatment or for medical treatment, and, second, that statement the with diagnosis reasonably necessary such was treatment. to requirement, the Michi- In this second gan rule, than the federal rule is more restrictive requires only the be reason- statement diagnosis pertinent ably or treatment. to require- of the rule the first The rationale lies upon person is the belief that ment and founded seeking a "motive to dis- medical treatment has part truth because his treatment will close the depend upon says.”9 true, If this be the what he sufficiently to be statement should be considered 8 Evidence, Michigan hearsay adoption the of Prior to the of Rules histories, pain past symptoms, or and causes of medical statements thereof were condition physician contemporaneous Hearsay of inadmissible. statements except to by when made the the declarant were admissible litigation. purposes notes. of See the Committee for (CA 2, 1940). States, Meaney 538, United 112 F2d v Rosters by W. R. trustworthy of fact.10 the finder to considered be requirement, origin the of the second ("pertinent,” reasonably FRE; "nec- statement MRE) ("or,” diagnosis "and,” essary,” MRE) FRE; to such objective It is an treatment, more obscure. focusing of the state- the medical relevance test at to an issue than on its relevance rather ment seemingly re- unrelated to the first trial and is quirement, of mind of on the state which focuses the declarant.11 inception, describing or cause
Statements
pain
symptoms,
of
or sensation
external
source
attributing
of
fault would
the realm
which enter
803(4)
MRE
inadmissible under
to be
seem
(1)
only
the rule allows
statements
three reasons:
general
rather
than of
character
about
(2)
speciñc
cause;12
statements
character
generally
fixing
motivated
fault are
(3)
obtaining
purpose
treatment;13 and
medical
objective viewpoint of
statements,
from the
such
adoption
Co,
Evidence
sufficiently
ought
Weinstein, Evidence, 803(3)[5],p
from cases
633 F2d
803(6),
contrary
need
would
was
a red
the court held
ment made for the
accusatory
[12]
13
hearsay
There are
This
"Thus a
In United States v
not for the
*15
not be admissible in evidence.
light.”
to be
qualify
or relied
treating
to MRE
view,
(Chadboum rev),
(CA8, 1980),
reliable
dealing
rule such as
sufficiently
Advisory
patient’s
nature,
but
frequent
that a declarant’s statement
Michigan
upon by
or
course,
not his statement
purpose
purpose of
to be
766
W. R.
medicine,
to
irrele-
would seem
be
practice
diagnosis.14
to treatment
vant
Nick,
(CA 9,
In United States v
1199
604 F2d
Shell,
States v Iron
and United
1979),
633
77
F2d
(CA
(1981),
8, 1980),
with the
reasonable for the
on the infor-
physician
rely
to
[Id.,
diagnosis
p
mation in
or treatment.
84.]
court, however,
say:
also went on to
important
It
note that
statements
happened
concern what
rather
than who assaulted
pertinent
her. The former
most cases is
diagnosis and treatment while the latter would
related.[15]
[Id., p
seldom,
ever,
if
sufficiently
84.]
Michigan
appli-
Four
cases have considered the
14
Co,
179, 187;
8, 1981).
Bradbury
(1983);
v Ford Motor
123 Mich
(CA
v Hollocber,
214
Roberts
664 F2d 200
identify
The statements recounted in
Iron Shell
Nick and
did
Shell, hearsay
assailant. Consistent with this dictum
Iron
identity
statements as to the
under FRE
of an assailant have been excluded
803(4)
or similar state rules either because such informa
"sufficiently
(reasonably pertinent)
tion is not
related”
to medical
diagnosis
and treatment or because the statement was not made
(with
motive)
purpose
obtaining
declarant for
medical
True,
(Maine, 1981);
treatment. See State v
declarant’s into the motives questioner. Reutter, 313; Citing Galli v 148 Mich 803(4). Advisory Note to PRE Committees Dissent W. R. cases, then, affirm of hearsay
These the use 803(4), but, statements under MRE because of the questions appeal, in which were raised on way they leave much unsaid or assumed. There is a question further has not been addressed any of those cases and that is whether the state- ment is itself of such a nature as to qualify inception admission: Is the statement one of or past or a general cause or external source present symptom, pain or sensation? That Zysk and Rinesmith question was not discussed in contemporane- is or probably injury pain, cause, ous with the statement were obvious. In Freiburger, however, Wilkins is put one hard guess past present pain what or or symptom, existed for accusatory sensation which the state- ment could attribute a cause. before statement summary, hearsay 803(4),
found to be admissible under MRE proponent thereof has laying burden foundation which the trial judge, pursuant 104(a),21 MRE may questions prelim- determine the (1) to admission: Is the content of the state- inary nature, qualified i.e., ment of the of medical one or of or history, past present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or of the inception general or character (2) of the cause or external source Did thereof? purpose declarant make the statement for the diagnosis medical treatment or medical connec- (3) tion with medical treatment? Does the informa- tion meet the objective being medical test of rea- sonably diagnosis and treat- necessary medical ment? case,
In the instant
things
none of these
Brubaker,
State v
184 Mont
I cannot hearsay overwhelming receipt was harmless of this into evidence say circum- that there was error. To ignores guilt that the the fact stantial evidence daughter referred to was Dr. testified that defendant’s Banfield specialist whose child abuse than what he Dr. Hickok was a the clinic because testimony Banfield) (Dr. weight given greater in court would for evalua say. that the referral was would He also testified knowledge any he no and that had tion and not for treatment daughter. plan for the treatment purpose her was to to interview Nurse McNees said that While subsequent physical Dr. Hickok and examination focus the formulate a medical treatment possible plan referral for and also for practical counseling, may question nurse to the credentials of one necessity. proof objective She provide of medical the foundation of Act, interpretation Protection of the Child to a mistaken also testified 25.248(1) thought seq., seq.; she et MCL 722.621 et MSA identity compelled of abuse and her to obtain evidence abuser. necessity bearing gave the medical Dr. Hickok no contemplated any or to there information indicate such treatment. *20 175 Peterson, R. J. W. merely evidence was of that circumstantial
thrust opportunity prove to commit the defendant’s parental visita- he exercised his offenses because rights because, if ex-wife is to defendant’s tion oppor- believed, could had the no one else have tunity which, conclusion to commit the offenses—a might credibility assumed, her is she be- even if personal could not know of her own lieve but knowledge. only testimony of the The the son was guilt. That evidence of defendant’s testi- direct mony downright inconsistent, sometimes con- was despite tradictory, even on direct examination guidance leading questions. may that of While surprising testimony five-year- not be of proof agree inconsistency child, I that is old cannot credibility. statements of Which of the inconsistent sug- credible, rendered more that which is thus gests guilt suggests or that which innocence? To jury say that the son was credible and begs question. question, him believed jury may rather, is have been led to whether incriminating testimony of believe his erroneously hearsay. admitted We must determine "whether there is a reason- complained possibility able the evidence is,
might conviction”, to the have contributed might convincing whether it have aided in juror guilt otherwise undecided of the defendant’s beyond reasonably If it reasonable doubt. is that, possible in a trial free of the error com- of, might plained jury even one such member have defendant, acquit then the error voted not harmless, and the defendant must be retried. Swan, [People (1974).] Entirely apart herein, from other error the testi- mony prejudicial as to Nurse McNees was so v Rosters R. Dissent W. retrial. Her did more than mandate testimony. She recounted corroborate events about son’s testify, which he did events greater weight may well have carried testimony. jury And, if the mony than did his the testi- facially questionable young children is competence, trustworthy it not rendered more peril rendition. The its secondhand is not alone hearsay, in the usual frailties of but also that the repetition greater may words on weight be accorded *21 credibility they and are heard from everything not; a witness who is the child is ma- responsible, professional, expert, good ture, of memory, seemingly objective impar- detached, and qualities credibility tial. The of attached to the relayer may of the words be attributed to the words themselves.23
Two other claims of error must be considered. improper prosecutorial by One involves conduct questioning suggest defendant so as to that he had preference sodomy. objection, a natural On prosecutor conceded that he had no evidence that engaged in defendant anal sex or homosexual prejudicial The conduct. of unfounded insinuation merely innuendo on cross-examination is not hearsay young A further concern about statements of chil apparent spontane dren is ous when the out-of-court statements are not systematic professional interrogation result but from a or The about subject litigation. potential suggestion the which is a matter of for false peril leading questions obviously greater when the questioning equivalent supervision is done without court or and safeguards. psychiatrist expressed A child testified for the herein defense opinion suggestive that McNees’ interview was so slanted and only that not but that were the statements obtained from the son unreliable might any he statements make thereafter would be contami- planted McNees, by by might nated ideas an effect which be cumula- interrogation tive or reinforced persons similar of the child other is, perhaps, peril before or after the McNees It interview. similar to that which is of concern in where cases adult witnesses Gonzales, hypnotized. have been Cf. (1982). NW2d 743 W. R. prosecutorial
irrelevancy miscon- matter of but denied the insinua- that defendant duct. fact response and on to the cross-examiner tion both in redirect examination render the miscon-
does not nonprejudicial. Ball, 33 Mich duct 288; 189 NW2d colleagues agree my with I Neither do expert admissibility so-called specialist. police laboratory testified He the state that he compared ex- the hairs which defendant’s daughter’s diaper wife said she found specimens defendant, micro- that hair taken from specimens scopic that examination showed they that were characteristic were similar they pubic hairs, that, therefore, Caucasian He ac- from the same source. could have come knowledged say he could not probability that there was that they any certainty from or came Timely appropriate objection the same source. objection testimony, made 702, MRE under MRE should have been sustained 401 and MRE 403. 702, if court Under MRE the trial determines recognized spe- technical, scientific, or other knowledge given field, it does in a cialized exist *22 findings may opinion expert testify as to his or allow an knowledge if assist the trier of will deter- fact either to understand the evidence or to question The threshold mine fact issue. expertise comparison in hair state of scientific Frye-Davis trial under the or ing, test24was not raised at appeal. Assuming validity on of test- such proper appropriate witness, it was for the on being foundation, hairs as Cauca- to describe the knowledge help pubic hairs, sian for that would People v Young, [24] Frye [418] Davis, v United Mich 343 Mich 1; States, 348; [54] [805] [72] US NW2d (1983). App [269] DC (1955). 46; 293 F 1013 And see People (1923); v 775 People Kosters v R. W. testimony about to understand the trier of fact Beyond finding this, however, of such hairs. say expert. To further role for there was no might from defendant is or that not hairs could jury necessary help the evi- understand that the hairs were does not determine dence and defendant, fact in issue. from any all, at If that has relevance outweighed by prejudicial effect of relevance is superficial testimony from a witness
scientific
expert.
such,
As
it should be
characterized as an
MRE 403.
excluded under
panels of
Court have demonstrated
Various
this
inconsistency in the
of circum
some
consideration
identity
of
from so-called scien
stantial evidence
tific
comparison
hair,
tests of
blood and semen and
any, proof
probability
required
what, if
as to
is
People
e.g.,
See,
to make such evidence admissible.
App
Sturdivant,
128; 283
669
v
91 Mich
NW2d
(1979)
(1979);
People
,
dency
[material]
existence of
make the
to
probable
probable
than it would
or less
. .
. more
suggests
Evidence
the evidence.”
be without
probability
greater
does not
nor lesser
a
neither
That was
irrelevant.
and is
that definition
meet
adoption
prior
MRE 401 and still
to the
the law
People
311; 67
Nichols,
NW2d
is.
(1954),
showed
evidence which
blood test
held that
particular
of a
the father
man could be
that a
disprove pater-
prove
tendency
or
had no
child
nity
irrelevant and inadmissi-
therefore
and was
suggestion
is distin-
that Nichols
As to the
ble.26
guishable
paternity
case, I know of
it
is
suggest
authority
of evidence
the rules
no
paternity
logic
relevancy
different
or the
cases. Other
sexual conduct
than in criminal
cases
transform
can no more
the hairs
evidence about
probability
expert’s "possibility”
than
complainant
in Nichols
could
Mr.
at
relations with
Nichols
that she had sexual
conception.
a time coincident with
I would reverse._
Watkins,
(1979), concurring opinion of Justice and the Young, tests there that if the blood reliable, scientifically as there would still involved were established a relevance question to be resolved.
