171 P. 102 | Cal. | 1918
A demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the court below, and thereupon judgment was given for the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals.
The prayer of the complaint is that a certificate of purchase and patent issued by the state to Amelia C. Johnson for the lands described, be declared illegal and void, and canceled; that the conveyance of the lands afterward made by Johnson to the defendant be declared void, and that the plaintiff be adjudged to be the owner of the lands, free of any right or claim of defendant thereto, and for such further relief as may seem proper.
The complaint consists of two counts, each relating to the same subject matter. The facts stated in the first count are as follows: The land described consisted of 507.45 acres and belonged to the state. It was a part of the land uncovered by the recession of the inland lake known as Tulare Lake, and was subject to sale under the provisions of the act of March 24, 1893, providing for the sale of land uncovered by the recession of inland lakes. On December 3, 1904, a certificate of purchase of said land was issued to Amelia C. Johnson in pursuance of said act. Said land was then suitable for cultivation, that is, it was ready for and susceptible of immediate occupation, and was by ordinary farming processes fit for agricultural purposes. Amelia C. Johnson was not then and never had been an actual settler on said land or any part thereof. When she made her application and received the certificate therefor, she knew that said land was suitable for cultivation. On June 13, 1906, a patent was issued to her for said land in pursuance of said certificate, and on July 23, 1907, without any valuable consideration, she conveyed said lands to the defendant herein. Defendant and its directors and officers at the time of receiving said deed well knew that then, and at the time said land was so applied for by Johnson and patented to her, it was suitable for cultivation, as aforesaid. *532
The second count of the complaint relates to the same purchase, and alleges the same facts. It adds thereto the further statement that with her said application Amelia C. Johnson made an affidavit stating that she desired to purchase said land for her own use and benefit and for no other person or persons whatsoever, and that she had made no contract to sell the same to any person, but that in truth and in fact she made said application and affidavit at the instance and for the use of a syndicate of several persons, then organized for the purpose of acquiring in that manner from the state of California, without any settlement thereon, the said lands and other lands, which were then, and at all times referred to, suitable for cultivation; that said syndicate, with full knowledge of all of said facts, aided the applicant in procuring her certificate of purchase, and thereafter, in pursuance of said purpose, procured the making of said conveyance by said Johnson to the defendant, and that the defendant claims said land by virtue of said conveyance and not otherwise.
The complaint was filed on May 22, 1914. This was less than ten years after the issuance of the patent. The demurrer was based on the grounds that neither count of the complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that each of the causes of action set forth therein are barred by sections 315, 318, 319, and subdivision 4, of section 338, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 3 of article XVII of the constitution is as follows: "Lands belonging to this state, which are suitable for cultivation, shall be granted only to actual settlers, and in quantities not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres to each settler, under such conditions as shall be prescribed by law."
The act of 1893 required that the applicant for such land should accompany his application with an affidavit stating that he desires to purchase the same for his own use and benefit, and for the use and benefit of no other person, and that he has made no contract to sell the same; that upon the filing of said application the surveyor-general should cause the county surveyor of the county in which the land lies to make an actual survey thereof, and establish the corners connecting the same with the United States survey, and should file with the surveyor-general a copy of his field-notes and plats, and a statement under oath, showing whether or not the land is occupied by any actual settler, and that if the *533 lands are suitable for cultivation without reclamation such lands shall be sold only to actual settlers, in tracts not exceeding 320 acres. It provides for the formation of reclamation districts to reclaim such of said lands as should not be suitable for cultivation without reclamation.
It will be observed that the legislature has followed the constitutional mandate, and has authorized sales of such lands only when the conditions of the constitution are fulfilled. The surveyor-general is given authority to sell land suitable for cultivation, in tracts not exceeding 320 acres to one person, and to persons who are actual settlers thereon, and not otherwise. Before making a sale of such land the duty rests upon him to ascertain its character, and if it is suitable for cultivation, to make the sales only to the persons, and in quantities, authorized by the statute. In making this inquiry he is acting as the agent of the state with authority to determine the fact. It would seem to follow, therefore, that in the absence of fraud or mistake such as would authorize an application for relief in equity, the state is bound by his decision thereon. Such is the uniform rule of decision regarding patents issued by the officers of the United States in pursuance of acts of Congress giving them similar authority. (Gage v. Gunther,
The first count does not allege that the decision of the surveyor-general was made by reason of any mistake, and it is not claimed by the attorney-general that this count is based upon the theory of equitable relief on the ground of mistake. It is based solely on the theory that no power exists in any state officer to grant land of that character to one not an actual settler, or in excess of the prescribed area. For these reasons we think the first count does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The addition in the second count of allegations of fraud on the part of the purchasers, and of knowledge thereof on the part of the present owners, clearly bring it within the rules regarding fraud, and render that count good as a cause of action to set aside the patent upon the ground that it was procured by actual fraud.
The main controversy upon this appeal arises over the question whether or not the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Section
In support of their claim regarding the statute of limitations, the defendants rely on People v. Blankenship,
The judgment is reversed.
Sloss, J., Victor E. Shaw, J., pro tem., Melvin, J., Wilbur, J., Richards, J., pro tem., and Angellotti, C. J., concurred. *537