291 P. 1004 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1920
This is a suit in equity and was commenced by the state of California, through its attorney-general, by the filing of a complaint on the twenty-first day of November, 1914, for the purpose of obtaining a decree annuling a patent to certain state lands, the defendant having acquired title to said patent through certain mesne conveyances coming down from the original patentee. The patent in question was issued on November 23, 1904. Summons in the action was issued June 14, 1915, and was served on September 10, 1918. A notice of motion to dismiss the action was served on the attorney-general on the twenty-fifth day of September, 1918. The ground of the motion was: "That the summons and the complaint in said action were not served upon the defendant until more than three years after the commencement of said action, and that also on account thereof the above-entitled court no longer has jurisdiction over said action."
The court below granted the motion, and from the order granting said motion the people prosecute this appeal.
[1] The order dismissing the action was based upon section
The provisions of said section are mandatory, and if the section applies to the state, then the trial court lost jurisdiction of the action and could proceed no further therein, except to dismiss the action. In fact, the right to a dismissal becomes absolute where the summons has not been served and returned within the time prescribed by the said section (Sharpstein v. Eells,
The contention of counsel for the appellant is, however, that section
The section, it will be observed, contains no express provision that the state shall be bound thereby. It is well settled and well understood that a state is not bound by statutes of limitations, unless by express words or by necessary implication such statutes make the state subject to their provisions or restrictions.
Statutes of limitations are, in a strict or legal sense, statutes of repose, and "are such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought *75 upon certain claims, or within which certain rights may be enforced." (Wood on Limitations, 3d ed., sec. 1.) The same author further observes: "Those statutes which merely restrict a statutory or other right do not come under this head (i. e., under the head of 'statutes of limitations'), but rather are in the nature of conditions put by the law upon the right given. Thus, a statute that prescribes the term of court at which an indorsee of a note is required to sue the maker in order to hold the indorser liable (McDaniel v. Dougherty,
The general legislative policy of California is that the state shall be bound by its statute of limitations with respect to the bringing of actions for the enforcement of any and all such rights as may accrue to the state. (Code Civ. Proc., sec.
The object intended to be attained by section
In the early case — Dupuy v. Shear,
It was obviously upon precisely the same theory or for the identical reason which it is declared in the above excerpt *77
supports the inherent power of the court to dismiss actions because of inexcusable delay in their prosecution that section
We have not been able to persuade ourselves that any other but a negative reply to that question may reasonably be returned. We are of the opinion rather that the section involves only a condition to which all litigants, including the state itself, must conform to entitle them, after they have commenced an action, to proceed further with the prosecution thereof. The provisions of the section, in other words, involve merely a matter of procedure — that is, the regulation of the conduct of the parties plaintiff with respect to actions after the commencement thereof for the same reason or purpose which is at the bottom of many other provisions of the code as to procedure, to wit: to facilitate or bring about a final or as speedy a disposition of the litigation as possible or as is deemed by the legislature to be consistent with the rights, not alone of the plaintiff, but also of the adversary party or parties, and also to clear court calendars of cases as expeditiously as possible, thus and thereby preventing an accumulation upon such calendars of actions in which, by reason of long delays in their prosecution, it may become difficult, if not in some instances impossible, to adjudicate the issues according to the real merits or justice of such causes. Indeed, the terms of the section are, in their nature and purpose, analogous to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which prescribe a time limit within which a bill of exceptions, or a notice of appeal, or a notice of intention to move for a new trial, or petition for a hearing in the supreme court after a cause has been heard and decided by a district court of appeal, must be filed. It surely will not be contended by counsel for the state that these last-mentioned provisions are *78 not alike applicable to the state, as a litigant, as to private individuals likewise invoking the power or aid of the courts or who are compelled to appear therein to contest rights asserted against them.
The above view or construction of section
We do not believe that the legislature intended that any such situation should arise with respect to litigation inaugurated by the state for the purpose of determining whether title to its lands has been legally acquired by those who have at least a color of title to such lands or a paper title upon its face perfectly valid. In this immediate connection, we may appropriately consider for a moment the asseveration of the attorney-general that "it was not the purpose or *79
intention of the legislature, in adopting it (sec.
It will be observed that the section is in such sweeping language as to admit of no other construction than that the legislature intended not to except from its operation any litigant or any action by whomsoever commenced. It reads: "No action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be further prosecuted," etc. This means, of course, that all actions, regardless of who the party plaintiff may be, shall not be further prosecuted, etc. If the question as to the legislative intent were important in the solution of the problem herein submitted, we are prepared to say that our construction of the section for the purpose of ascertaining that intent would lead us to the reverse position of the attorney-general upon that proposition. The state has, through its legislature, bound itself in express language to the terms of many of the provisions of our statute of limitations, and it is proper and, indeed, a cardinal rule of statutory construction, that a particular provision of a statute which may be in ambiguous phraseology should, to get at its purpose and intent, be read and considered in the light, not only of other provisions of legislative enactments upon the same subject, but in view of the legislative policy affecting the subject as established by the statutory law generally. Thus viewing the section, the conclusion would seem to be reasonable, if not irresistible, that had the legislature intended that the state should be exempt from the operation of its terms, there would have been incorporated into the section express language or words to that effect. [3] To be more explicit, we thus formulate the proposition now in our minds: That, where the legislature has established a particular policy with respect to a particular subject of legislative cognizance, which policy is in derogation of that of the rule of the common law, all the law or sections of the code bearing upon or pertaining to that particular subject should be read and considered together, or as a whole, or by the light of each other, if the language of any one section or part of the law is so dubious or uncertain as to render its meaning or the legislative intent at the bottom of it lacking in clearness and certainty. Of course, the proposition here suggested merely goes to the question of the intention of the legislature and would be *80 wholly without force or merit if the state were not in any case made by express legislative mandate subject to or bound by the statute of limitations. But, in considering the nature or purpose of a statute such as the one with which we are here dealing, the question of the intention of the legislature in enacting it is not controlling or, indeed, of very great importance. The legal nature of the condition or restriction prescribed by the statute as affecting the primary right or the remedy to enforce such right is the all-controlling factor in determining the legal nature of the disabilities which the statute imposes upon litigants. We, therefore, fall back and wholly rely upon the proposition first above declared, that the section merely involves a matter of procedure as to the conduct of an action after it has been commenced.
[4] That the state, when it voluntarily becomes a suitor in its courts and so brings an action for relief of any character, is subject to or bound by the same rules of procedure or practice as to the prosecution of such actions as govern and apply to litigants suing in their individual capacities, is well settled.
In Commonwealth etc. v. Helm,
In State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Board of Commrs.,
The supreme court of the United States, in Louisiana v.Jumel,
While expressing no definite opinion on the question, the appellate court of the first district, in Anderson v. Nawa,
The supreme court denied a hearing in that case without comment.
In his reply brief the attorney-general declares: "The question in this case is not, as announced by respondent, whether the state may proclaim that rules of procedure do not apply to it, but rather the question before this court is: Can the state be held liable for the negligence of its agents, because those agents failed to comply with rules of procedure relating to the time within which acts must be done?" But, as has already been indicated herein, the real question here is not whether the state may be bound by the negligence of its agents, but whether the state, having commenced an action to enforce a claimed right against a citizen, may unreasonably postpone bringing it to issue and a final disposition according to the procedure prescribed by the law. *82 [5] Of course, every litigant who has committed his case to the care of a lawyer must suffer from the negligence or default of his attorney in complying with procedural rules required to be observed to preserve the rights of parties in actions pending before the courts, and the negligence of an attorney in the management of a case in court whereby his client suffers some loss or injury is imputable to the client himself, since the legal relation existing between client and attorney is that of a principal and agent. No less is true of the legal relationship existing between the state and its attorney, and, while it may be that there is negligence involved in the omission of the state's attorney to proceed with the prosecution of this case according to the diligence or requirements pointed out by the statute in question, we can see no less reason for holding that such negligence or default is not to be imputed to the state itself than that similar negligence or default by an attorney representing a private suitor in a pending action should not be imputed to the latter. But be that as it may, the simple question here is, as stated, whether the state is or is not bound by a matter of procedure or practice in the conduct of litigation instituted by it after it has commenced an action in court to enforce some right, and, as above indicated, our conclusion is that it is.
The attorney-general, in support of his position on this appeal, cites a large number of cases, of which we need name the following only: Vrooman v. Li Po Tai,
We have found nothing in those cases which has led us from the conclusion above indicated. None of the cases named is directly in point here nor is any such claim made by the attorney-general. Most of them merely declare the following rules: That there is no presumption that the state is barred, and, therefore, that the statute of limitations must be construed, if possible, so as not to apply to the state; that the state is not bound by a statute of limitations unless there are words in the statute or some other statute clearly making the state subject to the limitations prescribed by *83
the statute; that the state is not bound by general words of a statute which would operate to establish a right of action against it; that "the state is not bound by general words in the Political Code upon the subject of taxation, which would operate to trench upon its sovereign rights, injuriously affect its capacity to perform its functions, or establish a right of action against it." (Reclamation Dist. No. 55 v. County ofSacramento,
We conclude that the order appealed from should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Burnett, J., and Nicol, P. J., pro tem., concurred.
A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on August 2, 1920.
All the Justices concurred, except Sloane, J., who was absent. *84