Defendant pleaded guilty of two counts of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401X2) (a)(iv), which were charged in two separate informations. In exchange, a third information charging the same offense was dismissed. For one conviction, defendant was sentenced to two to twenty years’ imprisonment. For the other conviction, defendant was sentenced to three to twenty years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the other sentence. Defendant appeals these convictions and sentences as of right. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant contends that his sentences are disproportionate to the circumstances of the crimes and his personal history. He asserts that his actions were those of a "purchaser” rather than a "dealer” and that the offenses should have been at the extreme low end of the scale of seriousness, particularly in view of the relatively small amounts of cocaine._
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We note, as did defendant, that his sentences were within the guidelines recommendation of one to five years. These sentences are therefore presumptively valid.
People v Broden,
In
People v Milbourn,
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering his three- to twenty-year sentence to be served consecutively to his two- to twenty-year sentence.
MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) provides in relevant part:
*209 A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony. [Emphasis added.]
On appeal, defendant argues that the phrase "another felony” should be interpreted to mean a different and distinct felony, not an additional felony under the same provision of the controlled substances act. Upon careful consideration we cannot agree with defendant’s interpretation of this provision. The plain meaning of the term "another” includes both "additional” and "different or distinct.” See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe Fifth Edition (1979). Therefore, "another felony” would include the commission of an additional felony violation of the same controlled substances provision, the commission of a different felony violation of the controlled substances act, or the violation of any other felony provision. Furthermore, this interpretation does not render MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) meaningless. The two statutes address separate and distinct situations. Although imposition of consecutive sentences is mandated under MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) when a defendant commits a felony while other felony proceedings are pending, MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) governs when a defendant commits certain controlled substance offenses and another felony, irrespective of pending felony charges.
People v Mamon,
In his appellate briefs, defendant states that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges because of the delay in his arrest. Contrary to his assertions, the trial court’s ruling with regard to this issue is in the record. Never
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theless, defendant fails to argue the merits of this allegation of error in any of the three briefs filed by him in this appeal. Consequently, we deem the issue abandoned.
City of Midland v Helger Construction Co, Inc,
As his last issue, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to find entrapment following an evidentiary hearing. In a lengthy opinion in which the then newly released
People v Jamieson,
The Court: . . . [W]hen you juxtapose those facts against what I have in this record — and the only indication by Officer Joyner is that on September 9 of 1989, she asked Mr. Kent if he knew where she could find some coke. He said to look in his pants pocket, but then said if she had the money, he could get it. She did have the money. She drove them there, and he entered Hugo’s bar and returned with one-and-a-quarter grams and gave her back the difference in cash of the $300 that she gave to him.
She further testified that there was no date. There was no purchasing of drinks, no special kind of pressure or request or anything at all placed upon the Defendant by her. She testified that she saw the Defendant 15 or 20 times and only spent any time with him on three occasions and each of those three occasions were when the Defendant purchased drugs for her. Other than that, it was simply a waitress/bar/patron relationship.
The Court: ... I don’t think the mere question by a waitress saying do you know where I can get some coke would ordinarily incite, if you will, or cause a reasonably law-abiding person to go ahead and violate the law, but I did consider [that risk *211 discussed in footnote 19 of Jamieson], Mr. Jereck, when I read those statements.
A trial court’s finding following an entrapment hearing will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.
Jamieson, supra,
p 93. Recently, in
People v Fabiano,
Although the Fabiano Court remanded that case to the trial court, we are convinced that such a result is not warranted on the facts of this case. In contrast to Fabiano, the facts presented here did not present even a "close case” of entrapment, let alone a "very close case.” Furthermore, although the trial court applied the "average law-abiding person” standard, the trial court’s opinion reflects its awareness of Justice Brickley’s position regarding the reaction of a person in defendant’s "shoes” to the police conduct in question. Lastly, the trial court did not find that the police conduct was reprehensible. On the basis of our review of the record, such a finding would clearly have been in error. Therefore, we conclude that it is unnecessary to remand this case for consideration of whether entrapment exists under the "second prong” of the test as defined in Fabiano. We are *212 convinced that, under either test, the evidence presented failed to establish entrapment. Hence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.