delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Lyle Kelchner, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse pursuant to section 12 — 16(c)(l)(i) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 16(c)(l)(i)) and was sentenced to an extended term of 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant contends on appeal that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an extended term of 10 years’ imprisonment.
On July 15, 1989, defendant was charged by information with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The information alleged that defendant, who was 17 years of age or older, committed an act of sexual conduct with the victim, who was under the age of 13, in which defendant knowingly fondled the vaginal area of the victim through her clothing for the purpose of defendant’s sexual arousal.
On October 24, 1989, a jury trial was held. Thе first person to testify was the victim. The victim stated she was 10 years old and that on July 15, 1989, she had been swimming in Mendota, Illinois, with her sister, defendant, his wife, and their baby. After the party finished swimming, they returned to defendant’s apartment, which was located at the Alpha Motel in Dixon, Illinois. The victim testified that it was still light outside. The victim also stated that two adults, Kent and Linda, and their child Ricky were also present at defendant’s apartment.
After having something to еat, the victim, her sister, and Ricky went outside to play. The adults were still in the house. Defendant came outside and came up behind the victim and grabbed her. The victim testified that she recognized defendant when he ran past her to go back into the house. She also stated that defendant grabbed her where “I go pee and he squeezed.” This incident lasted about two seconds. The victim further testified that later when it was dark, dеfendant again came up to her from behind and again grabbed her “where I go pee and he squeezed.” The victim stated that defendant did not merely brush the back of her pants, but reached in between her legs to her crotch. The second incident lasted about a second, and again the victim said she saw defendant as she turned around and he was going back into the house.
At the time these incidents occurred, the victim testified that the only other people outside were her sister, who was pushing defendant’s baby around, and Ricky. The victim stated that during the second incident in question her sister was in the driveway with defendant’s baby and the victim was over across the driveway. During both incidents, Ricky was “down the hill” from the victim. The victim testified that the incident made her feel “mad” and “angry.”
The next witness to testify for the State was Officer Jean Miller of the Dixon, Illinois, police department. She testified that she had interviewed the victim and arrested defendant and that defendant lived at the Alpha Motel in Dixon, Illinois, which is located in Lee County. After Officer Miller testified, the State rested.
Defendant moved for a directed verdict which the trial court denied. Defendant then called Kent Fortner as a witness. Fortner testified he had been defendant’s friend for about five years. He stated that оn the day in question he was helping defendant install a television antenna. He stated that he was outside most of the time and only went inside the apartment once or twice. He recalled that while he was working and when defendant was outside, the girls would tease defendant by calling him by his brother’s name, Frank. When this happened, defendant would tickle the victim under her arms. Fortner stated that he never saw defendant touch the viсtim anywhere but under her arms and that when defendant was outside, Fortner could see him at all times.
However, on cross-examination, Fortner admitted that his work on the antenna required that he twist the antenna wires, move the antenna to provide for better reception, and look into the house to see how the television channels were coming in on defendant’s television set. In spite of these activities, Fortnеr maintained that defendant was in his sight at all times when defendant and the girls were outside. After Fortner testified, the defense rested.
In rebuttal, the victim said that during the incidents in question Fortner had been inside the apartment. The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction.
During the sentencing hearing, the court noted that defendant was eligible for an extended term pursuant to section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Cоde of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)(1)) as defendant had previously been convicted in Illinois of the same or greater class felony. The trial court also found that defendant was eligible for the extended term because the “offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2).
The trial court reviewed factоrs in aggravation. In referring to the factor “caused or threatened serious harm” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(a)(1)), the trial court stated:
“The statute is clear in regard to the questions the Court has to consider. That the Defendant’s conduct cause or threaten serious harm. Well, I suppose that depends upon whether — how you interpret the phrase serious harm. There is no question that the studies in this country show that sexual abuse of children cause [sic] serious harm, which has a lasting effect, sometimes for their entire lives, and there are flashbacks. It occurs and continues to occur and effects [sic] their relationships with male figures, or female figures depending upon which sex they are, and that sometimes the counseling process goes for many, many years before the child — the affects [sic] of this conduct can be mitigated.”
The trial court reviewed mitigating factors concerning defendant. It referred to a letter attached to the presentence investigation report from the Sinnissippi Mental Health Center written in May 1986. The letter indicated that defendant could not be evaluated for treatment until he changed his position of denial for the offense of sexual abuse. The trial court noted defendant's attitude then and the likelihood that defendant would commit the crime again. The court also referred to studies concerning pedophiles which showed that they continue to engage in the same conduct.
After balancing the need to protect society against defendant’s rehabilitative potential, the trial court ordered that defendant be given an extended sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
Defendant contends on appeal that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the complainant’s testimony was not clear and convincing and there was no corroborating evidence. Previously, cases have held that where a defendant denies wrongdoing, a conviction of sexual abuse will be upheld only where the complainant’s testimony is clear and convincing unless it has been substantially corroborated by other evidence. (See People v. Diaz (1990),
A reviewing court will not set aside a conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. (Collins,
Furthermore, it is the jury’s function to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in their testimony. (Eyler,
Defendant claims he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because: (1) the complainant was inconsistent in her testimony about where she was touched; and (2) there was not a reasonable inference from the evidence that defendant acted with the intent to arouse or gratify himself sexually. Defendant argues no intent was shown where there was only casual touching between the victim and himself and where defendant would be taking an absurd risk in fondling the complainant when there were witnesses outside, including Fortner, who would have been able to observe the illegal activity.
We first conclude that the complainant’s testimony was not inconsistent. Defendant argues that complainant made varying statements as to where she was touched. For example, when asked where she was touched during both incidents, complainant responded that defendant came up behind her and grabbed and squeezed her “where I go pee.” When asked to further elaborate exactly where she was touched, complainant stated it was “in the middle” of her crotch and where her “legs came together.” She further stated that defendant did not simply brush the back of her pants but had reached through from her back side. These statements, far from being inconsistent, indicate that the complainant was describing the same area each time she was asked where she was touched. Therefore, we find no inconsistencies in her testimony about where the complainant was touched.
Next defendant contends that the evidence did not show that he acted with the intent to arouse or sexually gratify himself because the complainant’s testimony did not specifically indicate where she was touched and evidence was presented that defendant had been seen tickling the complainant in a nonsexual manner. Defendant also contends that an inference can be made that defendant would have been taking an incredible risk to touch the complainant in an illegal manner with the variety of witnesses that were outside at the time of the incidents in question. Again we do not find defendant’s argument persuasive.
We first note that defendant’s intent may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from defendant’s conduct. (People v. Goebel (1987),
Defendant also argues that because of the number of people present outside when the acts occurred, defendant’s intent to commit the charged offense is even less likely considering the likelihood that defendant would be caught in the act. We disagree. Even though some people were outside during defendant’s criminal acts, they were not in a position to watch defendant and the victim at all times. The victim’s sister was outside, but the victim testified that her sister was in the driveway while she was on the other side of the driveway. Ricky Fortner, the son of Kent Fortner, was alsо outside, but the victim testified that he was “down the hill” from the victim. Kent Fortner testified that he was outside and observed defendant at all times; however, he admitted that he was also working on the television antenna. In addition, the victim testified that at the time the incidents occurred Fortner was inside the apartment. Finally, the duration of the illegal acts in question was only about two seconds; therefore, it can be inferred that defendant would be highly likely to commit the crime without detection even •with other people outside. Thus, in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that all the elements of the crime were present.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an extended term of 10 years’ imprisonment. Generally, a trial judge is given broad discretion in the sentencing of a defendant, and absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be altered upon review. (People v. Perruquet (1977),
Defendant cоntends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an extended term based upon its finding that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, eh. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)(1).) He asserts that the evidence does not support this finding. The State does not claim that the brutal or heinous factor was present in the offense.
In addition to noting the existence of the brutal or heinous behavior factor in the offense, the trial court also referred to the factor that an extended term was applicable where defendant was previously convicted of the same or greater class felony within 10 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)(1).) The trial court noted defendant’s two prior convictions in 1986 of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and the record supports that finding. Defendant concedes that he was eligible for an extended term due to his prior convictions.
Sentencing decisions are matters of judicial discretion which must be afforded great weight and deference, and so long as the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, the sentence will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Sanford (1983),
Defendant argues that there is no basis in the record to support the trial court’s finding that his conduct “caused or threatened serious harm.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(a)(1).) He points out that there was no testimony or other information such as a victim-impact statement which indicated any physical or psychological harm to the victim. Instead, the trial court relied upon unidentified studies which allegedly showed that children of sexual abuse are harmed and then found that defendant’s conduct caused оr threatened serious harm.
The trial court’s reference to “studies in this country” concerning the harm to sexual abuse victims appears to be a personal observation on how the phrase “serious harm” may be interpreted in considering this aggravating factor. (See People v. Bosley (1990),
While it was improper for the trial court to consider defendant’s conduct caused serious harm based on this factor, the reliance by the trial court on an improper factor in aggravation does not always rеquire a reviewing court to remand the case for resentencing. (People v. Harvey (1991),
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court’s conclusions regarding his attitude towards the crime and the likelihood he would commit the offense again were based on insufficient and improper evidence. He claims there was no real information about his lifestyle in 1986 which led to those crimes nor was there any evidence that he was advised to make changes or that he had accomplished any changes. Defendant also points to the trial court’s reference to unidentified studies on pedophiles as improper.
In imposing sentence the trial court may consider many factors including defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits and age. (Perruquet,
The trial court reviewed the 1986 letter from the Sinnissippi Mental Health Center which provided that defendant could not be evaluated for treatment because of his denial of the crime. The trial court acknowledged that defendant’s attitude may have been different then, but also noted that it did not know whether defendant claimed innocence now because he did not make a statement. Defendant had not shown any remorse. Defendant had committed aggravated sexual abuse again. The trial court had a presentence investigation report on defendant and was aware of defendant’s history and background. The 1986 letter indicated that unless defendant acknowledged his crime, he could not even be evaluated let alone treated. This information showed defendant’s lack of desire to change his behavior in 1986 through treatment. Defendant’s present offense showed a failure to change his behavior since that time, i.e., he again committed a sexual abuse offense. There was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could base its considerations of defendant’s attitude towards the crime and the likelihood of its re-occurrence.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on unnamed “studies” about pedophiles which showed that it was difficult to rehabilitate them. (People v. Harris (1989),
Although defendant argues that the sentence is counterproductive to his rehabilitation, the difficult task of fashioning a sentence which strikes a balance between the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the offender is best left to the trial court. (People v. Burton (1984),
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
REINHARD, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.