Defendant was convicted by a jury of burning a dwelling house, MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267 (arson), and burning of insured property, MCL 750.75; MSA 28.270. Sentenced to concurrent terms of 3 to 20 years for the former offense and 3 to 10 years for the latter, defendant appeals as of right.
First, defendant argues that his convictions for both offenses violate the Michigan and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. The double jeopardy clauses prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense.
North Carolina v Pearce,
The statute defines burning of insured property as follows:
"Any person who shall wilfully burn any building or personal property which shall be at the time insured against loss or damage by fire with intent to injure and defraud the insurer, whether such person be the owner of the property or not, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10 years.” MCL 750.75; MSA 28.270.
Arson is described in the following statutory language:
"Any person who wilfully or maliciously burns any dwelling house, either occupied or unoccupied, or the contents thereof, whether owned by himself or another, or any building within the curtilage of such dwelling house, or the contents thereof, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 20 years.” MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267.
We agree with another panel of this Court that the Legislature did not intend these offenses to be punished separately.
People v Hanna, 85
Mich App 516;
We must now decide whether when the jury found that the defendant was guilty of burning insured property it necessarily found that he was guilty of arson. We conclude that it did. On the facts of this case, the insured property set ablaze by defendant was also a dwelling house. See
Peo
*154
ple v Losinger,
Defendant suffered two convictions for one offense. His state constitutional right to be free from double punishment was violated as a result. We adhere to this conclusion even though the sentencing court imposed concurrent sentences. A double conviction is "double punishment”:
"The 'double punishment’ proscribed for committing one offense includes the conviction and not merely the sentence. The second conviction punishes appellant in several ways, including parole considerations, impeachment at subsequent trials, habitual offender treatment, etc. 'We recognize that even the entry of judgment and the imposition of a suspended sentence of imprisonment is additional punishment.’ Thompson v State, 259 Ind 587, 592;290 NE2d 724 , 727 (1972).” People v Martin, supra, pp 310-311.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction on the higher charge of burning a dwelling house and vacate defendant’s conviction on the lower charge of burning insured property. See People v Stewart (On Rehearing), supra, p 550.
Defendant next argues that the admission of oral testimony relating to defendant’s insurance coverage of the burned property violated the best evidence rule. This evidence is relevant to only the charge of burning insured property. Because we *155 have vacated the conviction on that charge on other grounds, we need not decide this issue.
Finally, defendant contends that certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument require reversal. During his closing argument, the prosecutor addressed what he believed to be the defense attorney’s attempt to discredit the testimony of two prosecution witnesses. As the prosecutor framed it, the defense’s strategy was to show that these witnesses lied in order to secure a reward offered by the insurance company. To this argument, the prosecutor responded:
"[T]hey’re not testifying because they wanted that reward, they’re testifying because they have a sense of duty and obligation to come forward with the events that they saw. Those events I described to you. But were they really thinking about a reward? If they wanted money, they could tell you that he went in there, he went in the window, I saw him pour the gasoline around, I saw him put a match to this. They didn’t tell you that, but they told you exactly what they saw. They don’t have any motive to try and lie to you. They’re just citizens doing their sense of duty in the sense of obligation to — telling you what they saw to close this case.”
Defendant did not object to these remarks and so appellate review is foreclosed unless our failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.
People v Duncan,
Defendant argues that in these remarks the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of his witnesses. A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses nor place the prestige of his office behind them.
People v Erb,
Vacated in part and affirmed in part.