People v. Kamack CA2/2
B337227
Cal. Ct. App.Jan 9, 2026Check TreatmentFiled 1/9/26 P. v. Kamack CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B337227
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. YA069698)
RAMELLE LARON KAMACK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Vacated in part
and remanded with directions.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Kathy S. Pomerantz and Lauren
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
______________________________
In 2010, a jury convicted Ramelle Laron Kamack (Kamack)
of murder and attempted murder and found true gang
enhancements and gang-related firearm enhancements. He was
sentenced to serve 75 years to life in prison. In 2023, the
Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recall and resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1),1 based
on Kamack’s “exceptional conduct while incarcerated.” The trial
court recalled the sentence and resentenced Kamack to 40 years
to life.
On appeal, Kamack argues the trial court abused its
discretion by not further reducing his sentence. He also contends
that Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill 333) applies to his case and compels vacating the true
findings on the gang enhancements and gang-related firearm
enhancements.
Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22 to require the
People to prove additional elements that were not previously
required for a gang enhancement under section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1), and a gang-related firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1). Because the evidence
in Kamack’s 2010 trial does not support the imposition of gang
enhancements and gang-related firearm enhancements under
Assembly Bill 333, we vacate the jury’s true findings on those
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
enhancements, vacate Kamack’s sentence, and remand for
further proceedings. Our disposition renders moot Kamack’s
other arguments.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On July 3, 2007, Adriel Deayon (Deayon) drove her
coworker, Joshua Davis (Davis), home. (People v. Kamack
(Oct. 7, 2011, B222456), 2011 WL 4639897, at p. *2 [nonpub.
opn.] (Kamack).) “As Davis and Deayon sat in Deayon’s car,
Davis’s cousin, Trevon Greer [(Greer)], pulled up behind them
and parked. Davis got out of Deayon’s car and spoke with Greer
briefly while Deayon waited in her car. Davis then went to the
driver’s side window of Deayon’s car and leaned into the window
to speak with her. At that moment, another car pulled next to
Deayon’s car. Deayon saw sparks and heard four or five gunshots
coming from the direction of the other car. . . . After the shots,
the car sped away. She saw Davis fall.” (Ibid.)
“From the driver’s seat of his car, Greer heard eight or nine
gunshots and saw flashes coming from the rear passenger
window of the other car. Greer identified the car as a silver
Jaguar . . . .” (Kamack, supra, B222456, 2011 WL 4639897, at
p. *2.)
“Davis died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. He
was shot in the head, back, and thigh.” (Kamack, supra,
B222456, 2011 WL 4639897, at p. *2.)
Within minutes of the shooting, the silver Jaguar was
spotted from a sheriff’s helicopter. (Kamack, supra, B222456,
2011 WL 4639897, at p. *2.) Sheriff’s deputies conducted a stop
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of the Jaguar on the ground. (Ibid.) Kamack was in the driver’s
seat, Martell Byrd (Byrd) was in the front passenger seat, and
Calvin Phipps (Phipps) was in the backseat. (Ibid.) The three
suspects were placed in the rear of a patrol car, where they made
incriminating statements. (Ibid.) “A subsequent examination of
the Jaguar revealed it had graffiti written in dust on the rear
window and on top of the car. The writing included ‘Inglewood
Family Blood,’ and ‘CK’ with the letter ‘C’ crossed out.” (Id. at
p. *3.)
After their arrest, Kamack and Byrd were put in the same
holding cell, and their conversation was recorded. (Kamack,
supra, B222456, 2011 WL 4639897, at p. *3.) They continued to
make incriminating statements, including Kamack remarking:
“ ‘We should have (inaudible) soon as we got that first “CK”
instead of trying to go on another one.’ ” (Ibid.) Phipps later
joined Kamack and Byrd in the holding cell. (Ibid.) “Byrd said, ‘I
know I should never try to get another CK . . . . But I was trying
to be greedy. I was trying to get two in one night.’ Phipps
replied, ‘That would’a been nice.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Detective Kerry Tripp testified as a gang expert for the
prosecution. He said that Phipps was a member of the Inglewood
Family Blood[] criminal street gang, whereas Kamack and Byrd
were members of the Avenue Piru Blood gang. These two Blood
gangs were friendly, and it was not unusual for members of the
two gangs to commit crimes together. The location where the
shooting occurred was claimed by a rival gang, the 111th Street
Neighborhood Crips. Detective Tripp found no evidence that
Davis was a gang member, however. The detective testified that
‘CK’ stands for ‘Crip killer.’ Detective Tripp was of the opinion
that the charged crimes were committed for the benefit of the
4
Blood gangs. The shooting would raise the status of the
participants within their gang.” (Kamack, supra, B222456,
2011 WL 4639897, at p. *4.)
Detective Tripp testified about four predicate offenses. In
the first, Ryan Brown (Brown) was convicted of attempted
murder. In the second, Davion Hays (Hays) was convicted of
murder and two counts of attempted murder. In the third,
Efeosa Idemudia (Idemudia) was convicted of robbery. In the
fourth, Michael Irvin (Irvin) was convicted of robbery. Brown
and Hays were members of the Inglewood Family Blood gang.
Idemudia and Irvin were members of the Avenue Piru Blood
gang.
B. Procedural History
In 2010, a jury found Kamack guilty of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and willful, premeditated, and
deliberate attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). On
both counts, the jury found true firearm enhancement allegations
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e)(1)) and that the crimes were
committed for gang purposes (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
The trial court sentenced Kamack to a total term of 75
years to life in prison, comprised of 25 years to life for the
murder, a consecutive life term for the attempted murder, and a
separate 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement under section
12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), attached to each count.2
Other enhancements were imposed and stayed. On direct appeal,
this Court struck 10-year gang enhancements on both counts and
ordered corrections to the abstract of judgment. (Kamack, supra,
2 In the trial court and on appeal, the parties misstate
Kamack’s aggregate sentence as 82 years to life.
5
B222456, 2011 WL 4639897, at p. *19.) In all other respects, the
judgment was affirmed. (Ibid.)
In August 2023, the Secretary of the CDCR sent a letter to
the trial court recommending that Kamack’s sentence be recalled
and that he be resentenced pursuant to section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1).3 The Secretary wrote that Kamack had
“exhibited exceptional conduct through [his] ability to obey rules
and regulations” and had “demonstrated a commitment to [his]
rehabilitation through voluntary participation in various self-
help programs, and vocational and educational programs.”
Kamack had remained disciplinary free since February 2014.
The Secretary did not recommend a particular sentence.
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County joined in the
Secretary’s request for recall and resentencing, contending that it
was “in the interests of justice to resentence Kamack to a term
which will result in his release into a residential reentry
program.” The District Attorney asked the trial court to
resentence Kamack, on count 1, to the midterm of six years for
the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive
term of 10 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) firearm
3 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes a trial court,
“at any time upon the recommendation of the [S]ecretary” of the
CDCR to “recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered
and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had
not previously been sentenced, . . . provided the new sentence, if
any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” The court may, in
the interests of justice, “[r]educe a defendant’s term of
imprisonment by modifying the sentence” and “[v]acate the
defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily
included lesser offense or lesser related offense . . . .” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3)(A)–(B).)
6
enhancement, and on count 2, a concurrent midterm sentence of
three years for the lesser crime of assault with a firearm. The
District Attorney requested that all remaining premeditation,
firearm, and gang enhancements be stricken. Kamack joined the
CDCR’s and the District Attorney’s requests for recall and
resentencing.
At the hearing on February 21, 2024, the trial court
recalled the sentence but rejected the parties’ proposal that
Kamack be resentenced to a 16-year determinate term. The court
explained that, in addition to rehabilitation, a purpose of
imprisonment is punishment, which should be proportional,
reasonable, and fair. Kamack had “killed one person, . . .
attempted to kill another, and he was . . . principally armed with
a firearm in this case.” One family had “lost a loved one for the
rest of their lives[.]” The court was “persuaded by how well
[Kamack] ha[d] been doing in prison” and had also “taken into
consideration his youth.”4 Nevertheless, the court did not “think
this [was] a time served case[,]” as “[16] years on two very serious
charges” was not “a reasonable proportional sentence.”
The trial court exercised its discretion to strike the
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) firearm
enhancement, and resentenced Kamack to serve 25 years to life
on the murder and a consecutive 15 years to life on the attempted
murder. The court stayed the remaining firearm enhancements.
Kamack’s appeal is timely.
4 Kamack was 20 years old when he committed the
underlying crimes.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A. Assembly Bill 333
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), is a gang enhancement,
mandating additional punishment for “a person who is convicted
of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang
members[.]” Firearm enhancements under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), can apply vicariously to an aider and
abettor when the prosecution pleads and proves that the
defendant violated section 186.22, subdivision (b). (§ 12022.53,
subd. (e)(1); see also People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946,
953.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 333 “change[d] . . .
the law on gang enhancements” by amending section 186.22.
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).) “In order to demonstrate the ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ element of a ‘ “criminal street gang,” ’ [citation] the statute now requires, among other things, proof of at least two enumerated predicate offenses ‘committed on separate occasions or by two or more members’ which ‘commonly benefited a criminal street gang,’ and that the common benefit be ‘more than reputational.’ [Citation.] The revised statute also provides, ‘[e]xamples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lamb (2024)16 Cal.5th 400
, 448 (Lamb).)
8
Assembly Bill 333’s substantive changes to section 186.22
apply retroactively to all nonfinal cases under In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. (People v. Lopez (2025)17 Cal.5th 388
, 396 (Lopez); Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207.) This includes final judgments that are reopened because a sentence is vacated or a commitment is recalled for resentencing. (See Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 398 [“A defendant whose sentence is vacated ‘ “regain[s] the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed[,]” ’ and the judgment becomes nonfinal”]; People v. Salgado (2022)82 Cal.App.5th 376
, 378 [following a recall and
resentencing under former § 1170, subd. (d), the criminal
judgment was no longer final, and the defendant was entitled to
the benefit of Assembly Bill 333].)
Kamack argues that he is entitled to the benefits of
Assembly Bill 333’s ameliorative changes to section 186.22.
Applying de novo review, we agree.5 (People v. Corpening (2016)
2 Cal.5th 307, 312 [the application of law to undisputed facts is a
question of law subject to de novo review].)
When Kamack’s sentence was recalled, “the trial court
regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment
was appropriate for him, and [Kamack] regained the right to
appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus
became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present
posture . . . .” (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162.) 5 The People argue that Kamack forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. We consider the merits of this claim because it affects Kamack’s substantial rights (§ 1259), and to forestall his possible ineffective assistance of counsel claim (see People v. Welch (1999)20 Cal.4th 701
, 759–760; People v. Monroe (2022)85 Cal.App.5th 393
, 400).
9
Pursuant to Assembly Bill 333, the imposition of a
section 186.22 gang enhancement now requires proof “that the
benefit to the gang was more than reputational,” which
“essentially adds a new element to the enhancement.” (People v.
Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 668 (Sek).) As the parties agree, the evidence adduced at Kamack’s trial was insufficient to establish that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang beyond enhancing its reputation.6 (See Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 455 [“the absence of evidence concerning the circumstances of the predicate offenses and the actual common benefit to the gang suggests a rational juror could have found the omitted requirements to be unsupported”].) Accordingly, we must vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), as well as the true findings on the gang-related firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1). (People v. Lee (2022)81 Cal.App.5th 232
, 239–240; People v. Perez (2022)78 Cal.App.5th 192
, 206, fn. 11.)
“ ‘Because we do not reverse based on the insufficiency of
the evidence required to prove a violation of the statute as it read
at the time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution
will not bar a retrial. [Citations.] “ ‘Where, as here, evidence is
not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have
rendered it irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is
6 In reaching this conclusion, we have reviewed relevant
portions of the reporter’s transcripts from Kamack’s trial. The
People concede that, “although Detective Tripp testified about
two predicate crimes committed by Avenue Piru Blood gang
members, the evidence did not show that any of the prior offenses
benefitted the gang in a way that was more than reputational.”
10
proper and the reviewing court does not treat the issue as one of
sufficiency of the evidence.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”
(Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 669–670.) On remand, the
People may retry Kamack on the gang enhancements and gang-
related firearm enhancements under the law as amended by
Assembly Bill 333.
B. All Other Issues Are Moot
Whether the People decide not to retry the enhancements,
or at the conclusion of such a retrial, Kamack is entitled to a full
resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893[“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances[]’ ”]; see also People v. Valenzuela (2019)7 Cal.5th 415
, 424–425 [“the full resentencing rule allows
a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing
a defendant”].) Accordingly, our vacating the gang enhancements
and gang-related firearm enhancements renders moot all other
arguments made by Kamack in this appeal.
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III.
DISPOSITION
The true findings on the gang enhancements (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)) and gang-related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(e)(1)) are vacated. The sentence is vacated, and the
case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the
enhancement allegations under the law as amended by Assembly
Bill 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the
conclusion of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full
resentencing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
SIGGINS, J.*
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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