Dеfendant appeared before a one-man grand jury, convened by the Wayne County Circuit Court, and, after being sworn, refused to answer the following questions:
(1) Are you familiar with East Jefferson Avenue in the City of Detroit, or by that I mean the location of East Jefferson Avenue in the City of Detroit?
(2) Have you ever given any money, gift or gratuity or any othеr thing of value directly or indirectly or through any other person or persons to any candidate for a public or political office in the City of Detroit or the County of Wayne?
(3) Have you ever made a political contribution to any candidate for public office in the State of Michigan?
(4) Are you married or single?
To defendant’s asserted privilеge “[not] to be a witness against myself,” the grand juror ruled the questions were not incriminating and directed defendant to answer. Immunity from prosecution was not offered or granted to defendant pursuant to MCLA § 767.6 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.946).
Upon defendant’s continued refusal to answer, a four-count bench warrant issued charging defendant with contempt for each question which he refused to answer. He was arraigned before another judge of Wayne Circuit Court, stood mute, and moved to dismiss and quash the grand jury warrant on the grounds that: Count I was in fact self-incriminating ; Count II was merged with Count III and, therefore, was not properly brought against defendant; *28 Count III was in fact incriminatory; and Count IV was outside the scope of thе grand jury investigation and provided no legal basis for prosecution. By supplemental motion to dismiss, defendant alleged that Becorder’s Court and not the Wayne County Circuit Court was the proper court to hear the criminal charge, pursuant to MCLA § 726.11 (Stat Ann 1962 Bev § 27.3561).
Defendant waived trial by jury and a record was made by stipulation consisting of the оrder creating the grand jury, defendant’s testimony before the grand jury, and newspaper clippings relating to defendant’s background. On April 26, 1967 — after termination of the grand jury — defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt and fined $250 on each count.
Defendant appealed and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (McGregоr, J., with Fitzgerald, J., concurring; J. H. Gillis, P. J., dissenting).
The issues presented by this appeal are:
(1) Whether defendant, not having been granted immunity, properly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to the propounded questions?
(2) Whether the judgment of criminal contempt subsequent to the termination of the grand jury deprived defendant of a statutory right to purge himself? (MCLA § 767.5 [Stat Ann 1954 Bev § 28.945].)
(3) Whether venue was improperly laid in Wayne Circuit Court?
There are several situations by which a witness may find himself charged with contempt of a grand jury. The only kind we are concerned with in this *29 case is that of a witness appearing before a judicial inquiry and refusing to answer certain questions put to him.
The constitutional standard against compulsory self-incrimination made binding upon the states in
Malloy
v.
Hogan
(1964),
“The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support а conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.
Blau
v.
United States
[1950],
See, also,
In re Cohen
(1940),
Our determination, therefore, must turn upon whether, from reading the record as a whole, defendant was justified in reasonably apprehending danger from a direct answer or whether he mistakenly apprehended the hazard of incrimination.
The second and third questions asked by the grand juror manifestly sought to elicit answers admitting at least a transfer of “money, gift, or gratuity # * # [or] political contribution.” The inculpatory ramifications of an answer to these questions is not subject to dispute when understood in the context of the ordered purpose of the grand jury.
1
An affirmative answer to either question propounded by the grand juror would have provided an essential element of the offense of bribery. See
People
v.
Ritholz
(1960),
*31
Although the people candidly recognize this point, they argue that these questions were innocuous because they “were not in the context of a specific payment of money to a specific individual.” This wholly ignores what was lucidly stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Blau
v.
United States
(1950),
“Whether such admissions by themselves would support a conviction under a criminal statute is immaterial. Answers.to the questions asked by the grand jury would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of petitioner for violation of (or conspiracy to violate) the Smith Act. Prior decisions of this сourt have clearly established that under such circumstances, the Constitution gives a witness the privilege of remaining silent. The attempt by the courts below to compel petitioner to testify runs counter to the Fifth Amendment as it has been interpreted from the beginning.
United States
v.
Burr,
25 Fed Cas, Case No 14,692e, decided by Chief Justice Marshall in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia;
Counselman
v.
Hitchcock
[1892],
We hold that defendant properly invoked his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as to questions 2 and 3. We further hold that judicial sanction for the assertion of his constitutional right in the form of contempt proceedings was invalid and reverse the judgments of conviction on Counts II and III.
*32 On the other hand, a review of the record discloses that questions 1 and 4 were not of the type which could logically, though mediately, link defendant by his answer to a definite element of the involved offenses. In no sense was the chase getting too hot or the scent too fresh. United States v. Weisman (CA2, 1940), 111 F2d 260.
While the safeguards against self-incrimination are vigilantly and vigorously protected, thеy do not sanction every chimerical danger viewed by defendant as a link in the chain of evidence. As stated by our Court in
In re Schnitzer
(1940),
“The tendency to incriminate must be a reasonable one; an answer may not be withheld because it might possibly under some conceivable circumstances form part of a crime.”
We conclude as to questions 1 and 4, that despite their questionable relevancy, defendant should have responded to the questions. His adamant but unjustified assertion of silence properly subjected him to the court’s exercise of its power to punish contumacious conduct.
It is next argued by defendant that the imposition of a sentence after the termination of the grand jury was unlawful as depriving him of his statutory right to purge himself. MCLA § 767.5 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.945). 2
*33 This argument misapprehends the nature of the contempt order here involved. Unlike the order in Colacasides, supra, which imposed coercive imprisonment conditioned upon either purgation or the expiration of the grand jury, the order in the instant case was punitive in design and effect.
The United States Supreme Court in
Bloom
v.
Illinois
(1968),
“Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” (P 201.)
The crime in the instant case was complete prior to charge and, upon conviction and sentencing by the trial judge, the sentence imposed was placed beyond the court’s power to amend.
People
v.
Fox
(1945),
Defendant frames the last issue as whether venue was improperly laid in Wayne Circuit Court. He then proceeds to discuss the question of whether Recorder’s Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction of all prosecutions and proceedings on behalf of the people of this state for crimes, misdemeanors and offenses arising under the laws of this state and committed within the corporate limits of the City of Detroit.
Although the terms are sometimes erroneously used interchangeably, “venue” has nothing whatsoever to do with “jurisdiction.” Instead it is concerned only with the
place
of trial of an action within the state.
Peplinski
v.
Employment Security Commission
(1960),
Defendant’s argument challenging the jurisdiction of the Wayne Circuit Court is that the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit by statute has “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all prosecutions and proceedings * * * for crimes # * * committed within the corporate limits of the City of Detroit * * * ,” with certain exceptions not pertinent. MCLA § 726.11 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3561). Defendant argues that criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense of the word. Bloom v. Illinois, *35 supra. He, therefore, concludes that jurisdiction over a prosecution for сriminal contempt occurring in the City of Detroit lies in Recorder’s Court.
While contempt, like other crimes, is an affront to society as a whole, it is more directly an affront to the justice, authority and dignity of the particular court involved. Accordingly, the court with jurisdiction over the proceedings wherein the alleged contempt оccurred has jurisdiction over contempt proceedings.
MacLean
v.
Harp
(1933),
Criminal contempt is also distinguishable from other crimes in that:
“There is inherent power in the courts, to the full extent that it existed in the courts of England at the common law, independent of, as well as by reason of statute * * # , which is merely declaratory and in affirmation thereof, to adjudge and punish for contempt * * * . Such power, being inherent and a part of the judicial power of constitutional courts, cannot be limited or taken away by act of the legislature,
nor is it dependent on legislative provision for its validity or procedures to effectuate it.” In re Huff
(1958),
The United States Supreme Court imposed more stringent due process requirements on proceedings to punish witnesses for contempt of Michigan’s “one-man grand jury” in the cases of
In re Oliver
(1948),
“The trial judge answered * * * [the claim] by holding that the state statute barring him from trying the contempt cases violated the Michigan Constitution on the ground that it would deprive a judge of inherent power to punish contempt. This interpretation of the Michigan Constitution is binding here.” (P 135.)
Three years later, this Court in In re Huff, supra, held that constitutional courts had the power to adjudge and punish for contempt and that such power сannot be limited or taken away by act of the legislature, nor is it dependent upon legislative provision for its validity or procedures to effectuate it.
We hold that the Wayne County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to try defendant for criminal contempt.
The convictions on Counts I and IV are affirmed. The convictions on Counts II and III are revеrsed.
(for affirmance). With Division 1 divided and this Court correspondingly separated, I concede that the presented questions of alleged self-incrimination * are susceptible of plausible argu *37 ment each way. Yet I think Mr. Joseph asks that we venture too far into an already overdeveloped area of judicial unreality to find that any answer to any one of these innocuous questions, each of which was answerable either way by a single word, might or could import some “link” in some chain of evidence needed to support a prosecution against him.
Believing as I do that the majority opinion below reasoned to the right result (
Notes
The declared purpose of the grand jury is recited in the amended order granting the Attorney General’s petition for a grand jury as: “ * * * conducting an investigation to determine whether the crime of attempted bribery, the crime of bribery of public officers and employees, the crime of acceptance of a bribe by рublic officers and employees, the crime of offering a reward to a public officer or employee to omit to perform acts for a consideration, reward or inducement, the crime of wilful neglect by a public officer or employee, the crime of conspiracy to accept a bribe by public officers or employees, and to solicit bribes, the crime of conspiracy to obstruct justice by private persons and public officers and employees, and crimes relating to vices and gambling * * * .”
“Any witness neglecting or refusing to appear in response to such summons or to answer any questions which such judge may require аs material to such inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a contempt and after a public hearing in open court and conviction of such contempt, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000.00 or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 1 year or both at the discretion of the court: Provided, That if such witness after being so sentencеd shall offer to appear before such judge to purge himself of such contempt, the judge shall cause such witness to be brought before him and, after examination of such witness, the judge may in his discretion commute or suspend the further execution of such sentence.”
In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, that is to say:
*34 “If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act whiсh can be given effect without the invalid portion or application, provided such remaining portions are not determined by the court to be inoperable, and to this end acts are declared to be severable.”
The questions:
“1. Are you familiar with East Jefferson Avenue in the City of Detroit, or by that I mean the location of East Jefferson Avenue in the City of Detroit?
“2. Have you ever given any money, gift or gratuity or any other thing of value directly or indirectly or through any other person or *37 persons to any candidate for a public or political office in the City of Detroit or the County of Wayne?
“3. Have you ever made a political contribution to any candidate for public office in the State of Michigan?
“í. Are you married or single?”