People v. Jorgensen

Jan 22, 2014
Versions:113 A.D.3d 793
978 N.Y.S.2d 361
978 N.Y.2d 361
Stevenson v. Stevenson THOUGHTS: The user wants me to convert a legal document from a PDF/OCR source into a specific semantic HTML format. 1. **Analyze the source document**: * The document starts with a fragment of a case (page 793, first paragraph). * Then there is a full case caption for “The People of the State of New York v Shawn Green“. However, it‘s just a short memorandum. * Then there is another case caption: “The People of the State of New York v Jennifer Jorgensen“. This is the main opinion provided. * The document continues with the Jorgensen case on pages 794 and 795. * It ends with a caption for “The People of the State of New York v Kwok Sze” and a fragment of that opinion. * According to the instructions: “If the document contains multiple opinions (e.g., end of one case and start of another), convert only the MAIN opinion — the one with a complete case caption and full opinion body. Skip partial content from a previous case that appears at the beginning of the document.” * Wait, the instruction says “the MAIN opinion“. Both “Green” and “Jorgensen” seem to be complete short opinions (or memorandums). However, “Jorgensen” is the much longer, more substantial one. Usually, “MAIN” refers to the one that is complete. * Looking at “Shawn Green“: It‘s a very short memorandum. It has a caption and a body. * Looking at “Jennifer Jorgensen“: It‘s a multi-page opinion. * Looking at the first fragment: It belongs to a previous case (People v. something). * Actually, usually in these New York reports, these are individual entries. I will focus on “Jennifer Jorgensen” as it is the primary content spanning most of the pages. The prompt says “convert only the MAIN opinion — the one with a complete case caption and full opinion body.” Jorgensen fits best. Green is also a full opinion but it‘s tiny. * Wait, looking at the layout, these are summaries of decisions. “Green” is a short paragraph. “Jorgensen” is a multi-page decision. I will convert “Jennifer Jorgensen“. 2. **Extract Case Info for Jorgensen**: * Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jennifer Jorgensen, Appellant. * Short Name: People v. Jorgensen * Citation: 978 NYS2d 361 * Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (implied by the format “AD3d” in citations and the judges listed). Based on “AD3d 1133” etc, this is likely the Second Department (common in these volumes). I will check judges: Skelos, Balkin, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix. Yes, these were Second Department judges around 2014. * Date: Not explicitly on the page, but I‘ll stick to what‘s there. The citation is 978 NYS2d 361. * Judges: Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Lott, JJ. (Wait, that‘s at the end of Jorgensen). * Wait, looking at page 793, “The People... v Shawn Green” has judges “Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Hinds-Radix, JJ.” * “The People... v Jennifer Jorgensen” starts on 793 and ends on 795. The judges for Jorgensen are “Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Lott, JJ.” 3. **Reflow and Pagination**: * Page 793 starts with Jorgensen caption. * Page 794 is the middle of Jorgensen. * Page 795 is the end of Jorgensen. 4. **Tag Citations**: * Case Citations: People v Contes, People v Heinsohn, People v Hall, People v Jenneman, People v Hart, People v Patti, People v Danielson, People v Mateo, People v Bleakley, People v Romero, People v Erskine, People v Laigo, People v Massie, People v Blair, People v Wilson, People v Crimmins, People v Arena, People v Rogha, People v Kurtz, People v Wongsam, People v Gross, People v Galloway, People v Ashwal, People v Almonte, People v Svanberg, People v Safian, People v Evans, People v Armonte, People v Robinson, People v Harris, People v Stanley, People v Suitte. * Law Citations: CPL 470.15 [5], CPL 470.05 [2]. 5. **Clean text**: * Rejoin hyphenated words: “de- fendant‘s” -> “defendant‘s“, “pre- scription” -> “prescription“, “prejudi- cial” -> “prejudicial“, “toxicological wit- ness” -> “toxicological witness“, “instruc- tions” -> “instructions“, “chal- lenged” -> “challenged“. 6. **Drafting HTML**:

Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant‘s guilt of manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Heinsohn, 61 NY2d 855, 856 [1984]; People v Hall, 68 AD3d 1133 [2009]; People v Jenneman, 37 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]; People v Hart, 266 AD2d 698, 700 [1999]; People v Patti, 229 AD2d 506, 507 [1996]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury‘s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant‘s contention that she was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of certain evidence relating to her prescription drug history is partially unpreserved for appellate review since she failed to object to the introduction of some of the challenged evidence (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Erskine, 90 AD3d 674, 675 [2011]; People v Laigo, 70 AD3d 970, 971 [2010]). In any event, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in admitting the majority of the challenged evidence, since it was relevant and not unduly prejudicial to the defendant, or was “reasonably necessary to correct the misleading impression” conveyed by the incomplete testimony the defense elicited from its expert toxicological witness (People v Massie, 2 NY3d 179, 184 [2004]; see People v Blair, 94 AD3d 1403, 1404 [2012]; People v Wilson, 293 AD2d 767, 768 [2002]). To the extent that the testimony concerning the risks one of the prescribed medications poses to pregnant women may have been improper, the introduction of such testimony was harmless, as the evidence of the defendant‘s guilt was overwhelming and there is no significant probability that this testimony contributed to her conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]). Furthermore, the introduction of this testimony did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

The defendant‘s claim that certain comments made by the prosecutor during her opening statement and summation were improper and denied her a fair trial is largely unpreserved for appellate review since she either failed to object to the remarks she now challenges, made only a general objection, objected on grounds other than those currently raised, or failed to request additional instructions when the court gave curative instructions, and she failed to move for a mistrial on the specific grounds she now asserts on appeal (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Arena, 70 AD3d 1044, 1047 [2010]). In any event, the challenged portion of the prosecutor‘s opening statement was not improper since it was “a fair outline of the stark facts” (People v Rogha, 213 AD2d 266, 266 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]), served to introduce the People‘s theory of the case, and was consistent with the evidence they proceeded to present (see People v Kurtz, 51 NY2d 380, 384 [1980], cert denied 451 US 911 [1981]). In her summation, the prosecutor did not impermissibly attempt to shift the burden of proof (see People v Wongsam, 105 AD3d 980, 981 [2013]; People v Gross, 78 AD3d 1196, 1197 [2010]). With respect to the remaining challenged summation remarks, they constituted fair comment upon the evidence or fair response to the defense summation (see People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 399 [1981]; People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110 [1976]), or “were not so flagrant or pervasive as to deny the defendant a fair trial” (People v Almonte, 23 AD3d 392, 394 [2005]; see People v Svanberg, 293 AD2d 555 [2002]). To the extent that any prejudicial effect may have resulted from the challenged remarks, it was ameliorated by the court‘s instructions (see People v Galloway, 54 NY2d at 399; People v Safian, 46 NY2d 181, 190 [1978]; People v Evans, 291 AD2d 569 [2002]; People v Armonte, 287 AD2d 645, 646 [2001]; People v Robinson, 83 AD2d 887 [1981]).

The defendant‘s contention that the imposed sentence was improperly based on the crimes of which she was acquitted is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Harris, 101 AD3d 900 [2012]; People v Stanley, 50 AD3d 1066, 1067-1068 [2008]) and, in any event, is without merit (see People v Harris, 101 AD3d at 900; People v Robinson, 250 AD2d 629, 629 [1998]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.

Final check: - Case name matches caption. - Court: Citations show N.Y. App. Div. (AD3d). - Pagination: at start, inside Jenneman citation, inside opening statement para. - Citations: Checked for pinpoints. - Formatting: Italicized case names. - Removed caption blocks from body as they are in metadata. - Rejoined hyphens. - No footnotes present in this case.