Defendant has applied for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals order directing the trial court to immediately revoke his bond. He аrgues that his pending application for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court is an “appeal” for the purpose of MCL 770.8, so that he remаins entitled to be free on bond. We hold that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not an appeal within the meaning of MCL 770.8. We thus affirm the judgment оf the Court of Appeals.
i
In 1999, defendant conditionally pleaded guilty
1
to a charge of possessing 225 or
The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal for laсk of merit in the grounds presented. 2 This Court also denied leave to appeal. 3 Defendant then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which it denied. 4
The prosecutor then movеd in the trial court to revoke defendant’s bond. While that motion was pending, defendant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28 USC 2254. The prosecutor argued before the trial court that the federal habeas corpus proceeding was an independent civil action rather than a continuation of direct appellate review, and that the trial court therefore no longer had authority to continue bond. The trial court denied the prosecutor’s motion, but increased defendant’s bond to $100,000.
The prosecutor then filed an emergеncy application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the trial court tо immediately revoke defendant’s bond and remand him to the custody of the Department of Corrections. 5 Defendant then filed in this Court an application for lеave to appeal and a motion for a stay of proceedings. We denied the motion for stay while we considered the application for leave to appeal. 6 We now affirm.
n
Defendant argues that he is entitled to remain at liberty during the pendency of his application for a writ of habeas cоrpus because the federal proceeding is an appeal for the purpose of MCL 770.8.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretatiоn that we review de novo.
Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc,
MCL 770.8 provides:
During the time between the trial court judgment and the decision of the court to which an appeal is taken, the trial judge may admit the defendant to bail, if the offense charged is bailable and if the offense is not an assaultive crime as defined in section 9a of this chapter.
This definition does not describe the instant relationship in which state courts are not “inferior” to or “lower” than federal courts, and federal courts are not “superior” to or “higher” than state courts. Rather, such courts constitute separate systems of justice.
28 USC 2254 does not grant federal courts the power of appellate review of state court convictions. Rather, it provides for an original proceeding in a federal court challenging the custody of a person who is detained under a judgment of a state court. It sets forth a process of “application” for a writ and denominates one who seeks a writ as an “applicant” rather than an “appellant.” In short, the statute does nоt provide for direct or appellate review of the state court judgment of conviction and sentence. 28 USC 2254(a)-(h).
Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has explained:
The whole history of the writ — -its unique development— refutes a construction of the federal courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations. State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon proving that their detention violatеs the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against state action by the Federal Constitution. [Townsend v Sain,372 US 293 , 311-312;83 S Ct 745 ;9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963), overruled in part on other grounds Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes,504 US 1 ;112 S Ct 1715 ;118 L Ed 2d 318 (1992).]
Similarly, Michigan case law has long distinguished applicаtions for the writ of habeas corpus from appeals from criminal proceedings:
Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding the main purposе of which is to cause the release of persons illegally confined, to inquire into the authority of law by which a person is deprived of his liberty. Applicatiоn for the writ of habeas corpus is not made in the criminal proceedings; it is made in a new and independent civil action instituted to enforce a civil right, the right tо liberty. [People v McCager,367 Mich 116 , 121;116 NW2d 205 (1962) (citations omitted).]
See also
In re Palm, 255
Mich 632, 634;
A federal district court considering an application under 28 USC 2254 is simply
Accordingly, we hold that an application for a writ of habeas corpus does not constitute a criminal “appeal” within the meaning оf MCL 770.8. A court’s authority to grant a bond under MCL 770.8 is limited to the time during the appellate process, and federal habeas corpus proceedings are not a continuation of that process.
in
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Notes
Conditional pleas are permitted under MCR 6.301(C)(2) (permitting conditional pleas to preserve for appeal specified pretrial rulings and entitling the defendant to withdraw his plea if the specified pretrial ruling is overturned on appeal); see also
People v Reid,
Unpublished order, entered August 30, 2000 (Dоcket No. 228299).
Jones v Michigan,
Unpublished order, entered April 4, 2002 (Docket No. 239673), clarified, unpublished order, entered April 22, 2002 (clarifying that the prior order had immediate effect under MCR 7.215[F][2]).