People v. JonesPeople v. Jones
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in fashioning its Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]). ‘[T]he extent to which the prosecution should be allowed to impeach the credibility of a defendant is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court’ (People v Murad, 55 AD3d 754, 755 [2008], quoting People v Carrasquillo, 204 AD2d 735 [1994]; see People v Bennette, 56 NY2d 142 [1982]). Here, the court‘s Sandoval ruling properly permitted the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant, if he testified, as to the existence of, and facts underlying, his 2003 and 2009 convictions of certain crimes (see People v Brown, 101 AD3d 895, 896 [2012];People v Murad, 55 AD3d at 755; People v Jamison, 303 AD2d 603 [2003]). The fact that the defendant may have been the only possible source of testimony for his defense increased the importance of his credibility and his testimony, and did not mandate a ruling prohibiting inquiry about his prior criminal conduct (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 208 [2002];People v Edwards, 118 AD3d 909 [2014]; People v Lopez, 37 AD3d 496, 497 [2007]; People v Cruz, 21 AD3d 967, 968 [2005]). Nor did the Sandoval ruling otherwise deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial (see People v Cimino, 49 AD3d 1155 [2008]).
Hall, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.