People v. JonesPeople v. Jones
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Rarick
delivered the opinion of the court:
This case presents the question of whether waiver applies to issues raised for the first time on appeal from the dismissal, at the first stage of proceedings, of a petition filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (
On remand, defendant was found fit to stand trial following a hearing. She then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 22 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder and 8 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery. After the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, she again appealed and her
In December 1999, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing that she was not admonished regarding the possibility of consecutive sentencing by either the trial court or trial counsel, resulting in a deprivation of due process and effective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s petition was summarily dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit by the trial court pursuant to section 122 — 2.1(a)(2) of the Act (
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a method by which a defendant may challenge his conviction or sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 140 (2000); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1997).
“An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the earlier judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights inthe proceedings that produced the conviction or sentence being challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). Considerations of res judicata and waiver limit the scope of post-conviction relief ‘to constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated.’ People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992).” McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d at 140.
In cases where the death penalty is not involved, adjudication of a postconviction petition follows a three-stage process. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). The instant case was before the circuit court at the first stage of this process, during which the court is required to review the petition within 90 days of its filing and determine whether it is frivolous or patently without merit.
In People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), this court recently examined whether a defendant had waived review of an issue which he had failed to present in his postconviction petition. In De La Paz, the circuit court had dismissed the defendant’s petition upon the State’s motion at the second stage of proceedings, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, and we granted the defendant leave to appeal. Initially, we noted that “¡jjust as the legislature has set forth what must be contained in a petition,
However, this court has long recognized that we may, in appropriate cases, reach issues notwithstanding their waiver, and we may assume that the legislature understood this fact when it enacted
In view of the principles noted above, this court, in De La Paz, addressed the defendant’s waived postconviction issue on the merits because it concerned the retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), an important question upon which our appellate court was divided and the waiver of which the State had chosen not to argue. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 433, 435. However, unlike in De La Paz, the waived issues raised by defendant in the present case do not involve our authority and duty to resolve conflicts or our responsibility to maintain a uniform body of precedent. Therefore, while defendant urges this court to address these issues on the merits, where we find no
We are alternatively asked by defendant to reverse the appellate court’s finding of waiver of her newly raised issues, in light of the fact that defendant’s petition was on appeal from its summary dismissal at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. Here, the appellate court, citing People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 147 (2000), noted that a defendant is generally precluded from adding an issue while the matter is on review, because
Defendant argues before this court that McNeal and Davis are distinguishable because they both involved postconviction petitions that had advanced beyond the first stage of proceedings. Specifically, she contends that while
Defendant further contends that principles of due process and fundamental fairness require that waiver of
As this court stated in People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998), “[t]he question raised in an appeal from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, any issues to be reviewed must be presented in the petition filed in the circuit court. See
However, this holding does not leave a postconviction petitioner such as defendant entirely without recourse. A defendant who fails to include an issue in his original or amended postconviction petition, although precluded from raising the issue on appeal from the petition’s dismissal, may raise the issue in a successive petition if he can meet the strictures of the “cause and prejudice
As this court reasoned in Pitsonbarger-.
“Section 122 — 3 of the Act does not forbid the filing of a successive petition. Rather, it provides that ‘[a]ny claim’ not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. [Citation.] Thus, the fundamental fairness exception applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole. [Citation.]” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462.
See also People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d 331, 338-39 (2002) (where defendant provided no reason why certain claims raised in his second postconviction petition could not have been included in his first petition, the additional claims were waived).
Thus, in the instant case, the appellate court did not err in restricting itself to a review of the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of the claims advanced in defendant’s petition, and in declining to address defendant’s newly raised issues. Rather, absent an overriding concern such as was present before this court in De La Paz, the mechanism for defendants to assert waived claims when fundamental fairness so requires is the successive post-conviction petition. See Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458-59; De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 452 n.4 (Thomas, J., specially concurring). We therefore hold that defendant’s contentions of constitutional error, not raised in her original petition, were forfeited on appeal from the circuit court’s first-stage dismissal of
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.
Affirmed.