*1 CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing judgment For the of the circuit court of Will reversed, County is and the cause is remanded to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
Reversed remanded with directions.
SLATER, P.J., BRESLIN, J., concur. ILLINOIS, THE THE Plaintiff-Appellee, PEOPLE OF STATE OF JONES, Defendant-Appellant. ROBERT D.
Fourth District No. 4 —98—0704 Argued August 3, Opinion Rehearing November filed 1999.— 2000.— denied *2 STEIGMANN, J., dissenting. (argued), Appel- Allen both of State
Charles M. Schiedel and H. Andrews Office, Springfield, appellant. late Defender’s (Norbert Goetten, Schmidt, Attorney, Rob Springfield John P. State’s J. Attorneys Biderman, (argued), Ap all of State’s ert J. and David E. Mannchen Office, counsel), Feople. for the pellate Frosecutor’s the court: opinion JUSTICE COOK delivered the PRESIDING Defendant, Jones, degree the first charged Robert D. (720 (West 1992)) Dickerman, Henry of Dr. who murder ILCS 5/9—1 Defen- August from home in on disappeared Springfield this court re- jury August dant was convicted at a trial but Jones, and remanded for a new trial. judgment versed that 1998) order under (February (unpublished 4—96—0855 No. 23). convicted Supreme Following Rule remand Court to 85 trial in June 1998 and sentenced degree jury of first murder at a Defendant affirm. years prison. appeals. We
I. BACKGROUND Defendant doing had been some repairs painting to and Dicker- man’s home at the time Dickerman disappeared. After the disappear- ance, it was discovered that a number of Dickerman’s checks were missing $6,845 and that checks totaling had been made out to defen- dant. eventually pleaded $4,200 forging check Department was sentenced to the of Corrections.
Defendant was interviewed a number of 6, 1992, times: on October by a Federal Investigation agent; 12, 1993, Bureau of on vari- detectives; Springfield ous on July while in the Big Muddy Center, by detectives; Correctional Springfield County jail; while the Franklin on August jail; while August 16, 1994, and on when he was served with an arrest warrant degree for first murder. Jones, argued that the trial in admitting court erred statement into evidence because it was made
during the plea negotiations, course of in violation of Supreme Court 402(f) (134 402(f) (“[N] Rule Ill. 2d R. either the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea, judgment or shall be against admissible the defendant criminal proceeding”)). During the July 1994, interview, defendant had asked the detectives to inform the Attorney State’s that he would plead guilty manslaugh ter in 10-year return for a sentence. In the August interview, *3 the exactly detectives asked defendant to write out what deal he would willing accept. be to Defendant two-page setting wrote out a statement forth the deal he accept ultimately would and that statement was read Although into evidence at trial. the investigators had told defendant they negotiate could not a plea, they say they relay did would the Attorney’s information to the State’s office. We concluded that two-page clearly defendant’s handwritten statement demonstrated his to willingness plead guilty exchange for concessions and a plea- 402(f). related pursuant statement inadmissible to Rule In present appeal, argues his defendant that the trial court erred July 27, 1994, on remand when it admitted into evidence the and 16, 1994, statements, August which defendant asserts were also argues related. Defendant also that the court erred when it refused to ruling reconsider its in the trial first the two statements were admissible.
A. The July Interview the July serving prison defendant was his term for while conviction, forgery a detective told defendant’s mother to tell defen- murder, if than he thought degree dant that he his crime was less first to requested subsequently Defendant detectives. with speak should disappear- Dickerman’s regarding detectives Springfield meet with ance. deal, but the to make interview, sought
During authority
plea.
to
have
they
him
did not
detectives advised
that he
Attorney
inform the State’s
detectives to
Defendant asked
a 10-
in return for
manslaughter
involuntary
guilty to
plead
would
The detec-
concurrently
his federal sentence.
to run
year sentence
Attorney.
the State’s
message
to
they
take
indicated
would
tives
the mur-
he knew
did not have
the detectives
told
Defendant
previously advised
though he had not been
even
weapon,
der
(Dick-
investigated as a murder.
being
disappearance was
Dickerman’s
1992, at
September
had been found
remains
decomposed
erman’s
hiking area
fishing
in a
25-foot-high
bluff
of a 20-
the bottom
Louis.)
the blood found
inquired about
Defendant also
of St.
southwest
there.
told blood was found
though he was never
in the bathroom even
August
in the week of
detectives that earlier
told the
agreed
Both men
forgeries.
11, 1992, Dickerman had discovered
in return
around the house
do additional work
that defendant would
after
August
On
pressing charges.
for Dickerman’s
dead
defendant found Dickerman
purchasing supplies,
returning from
Defen-
top
of his head.
spot
of blood on
living
in his
room with
Dickerman,
the house but
so he left
dant was unable to resuscitate
body
on the couch.
evening
place
later that
returned
16, 1994, Interview
August
B. The
interview,
wrote out the
During
August
statement we
accept,
two-page
written
willing
deal he
be
would
day, detectives
The next
erroneously admitted
Jones.
held was
degree
arrest warrant for first
with an
returned and served defendant
than first
if the crime was less
A
told him
murder.
detective
detectives and
speak
him to
to the
it
behoove
degree murder would
detec-
had earlier told the
Because defendant
happened.
them
tell
what
concealing a
manslaughter and
guilty only
tives was
Code of
copy of the Criminal
homicide,
brought
detectives
one of the
and to
the crimes
definitions of
statutory
1961 to show defendant
detec-
murder. The
degree
first
show him the elements of
specifically
August
defendant on
tive had interviewed
occasions, de-
each of those
1994. On
and asked that
out a deal
that he
like to work
fendant indicated
*4
on each oc-
Attorney, and
communicated to the State’s
proposal be
do so.
said
casion the detectives
(Miranda Arizona, 384
v.
rights
given his Miranda
being
After
U.S.
16 L. Ed. 2d
(1966)),
II. ANALYSIS
A. Collateral Estoppel
argues
State
that defendant should have
attacked the
and August
interviews
his first appeal and that
the trial
properly
court
refused to reconsider its decision in the first
interviews,
trial to admit those
on the basis of collateral estoppel.
Certainly
over,
trial court should not be forced to start
after a case is
remanded,
again
and rule
on every
However,
motion.
principles of col
estoppel
lateral
do not
relitigation
bar
of a pretrial
ruling after
remand,
special
where
present.
circumstances are
People Enis,
v.
(1994).
Ill. 2d
A trial court
juris
retains
diction to reconsider an
entered,
order it has
remand,
even after
as
long
pending
as the cause is
Enis,
before the trial court.
163 Ill. 2d at
Viewing
matter
terms of the doctrine of
case,
law of the
there is no bar to the trial
conducting
court
a new
hearing. Enis,
Special present circumstances were in this case that required the trial court to rulings reexamine its on these two interviews the first trial. Our decision in Jones addressed the precise issue that was raised remand after as these two interviews. It not necessary for us to address the other two interviews when we decided Jones. The trial court, which knew after remand ruling that its was erroneous as to interview, the one should have reconsidered its ruling as to the other two interviews to make certain that ruling did not suffer from the same infirmities.
B. Standard of Review Generally, ruling a trial court’s on a motion to suppress evi dence subject to reversal if it manifestly erroneous. *5 (1999). 286, 131, clearly 141 This Nielson, 271, Ill. 187 2d 718 N.E.2d understanding on the manifestly or erroneous is based erroneous test and usually questions mixed of law raise suppression that motions 781, 782 Ill. 713 N.E.2d People Gray, fact. 305 3d (1999). credibility nor of the witnesses.is neither the facts Where 286, Nielson, 187 2d at 718 issue, appropriate. at novo is Ill. de review G.O., 37, 46-47, N.E.2d 141; In re 191 Ill. 2d 727 N.E.2d at see also (2000) (motion 1003, confession suppress 1008-09 may maintain appellate should be reviewed de novo so that courts legal and Even the facts are clarify principles). control of where persons divergent where reasonable could draw inferences undisputed, facts, the trier of any question by from those of fact should be resolved Associates, Inc., Jackson v. Ill. 2d 706 N.E.2d fact. TLC 185 (1998); R.R., 213, 2d Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf (1996). 241, 1260, only is one inquiry 665 N.E.2d 1274 The whether v. Deca may undisputed Reynolds conclusion be drawn from the facts. 235, Hospital, tur Memorial 660 238 277 (1996). if it ruling only We will reverse the trial here court’s manifestly erroneous. 402(f)
C. Rule
dispo
accomplish
purpose
encouraging
negotiated
To
its
402(f)
cases,
Rule
sition of criminal
the boundaries of
must be
to the
accused
expectations
delineated
relation
reasonable
of the
at
subjective
made.
the time the statement was
Did the accused exhibit a
expectation
plea,
expectation
and was this
reasonable
totality
Friedman,
under the
of the circumstances?
79
229,
(rejecting
argument
403 N.E.2d
State’s
“
part
made
integral
the statement be
‘as an
of a bona fide
”).
Friedman,
investigator
to an
negotiation’
spoke
the Attorney
inquired
“making
the office of
General. Defendant
about
“
stated,
convicted,
‘If I’m
I
to a Federal
go
deal”
would rather
”
prison
Friedman, 79
opposed
prison.’
as
to a State
Ill. 2d at
“ T
investigator
at 234.
have no control over
responded,
The
” Friedman,
that,
Rosenberg.’
to Mr.
Ill. 2d at
talk
excluded,
court
supreme
but the
at 234. Defendant’s statements
dealing
with a
may
that defendant
have believed
indicated
Ill. 2d
Friedman, 79
prosecutor
police
rather than with a
detective.
(“[The
investigator]
it
403 N.E.2d at
testified
introduction,
calls with the
practice
was a
of his office to answer all
”).
of
recognized
The
it
‘Attorney
office’
court also
General’s
“[T]here
fer make a
had been
a distinction
deal that
admitted.
plea
in the
of a
between statement made
furtherance
discussion
independent
otherwise
admission [that] is not
by
excluded
our
rule.”
Every guilty person who voluntarily speaks to a detective probably hopes to benefit from conversation, by either convincing the detec tive that he did not commit the crime byor obtaining leniency for his cooperation. We should an approach resist every characterizes conversation between a defendant and a detective as a plea negotia police tion. The have an investigatory function that the courts and even the State’s Attorney do not reason, have. For that Federal Rule 11(e)(6) (Fed. 11(e)(6)) Criminal Procedure R. Crim. P. changed so as to cover statements made the defendant in court when a plea was tendered or during plea prosecutor. discussions with the 5 W LaFave, (2d J. Israel & King, N. Criminal 21.2(h), § Procedure at 106 “ 1999). ed. explanation was that the rule as limited ‘fully protects “ ” process discussion by’ authorized federal law ‘without at tempting to deal with confrontations between suspects and law *6 enforcement agents, problems which involve quite different dimen ” “ sions’ that by ‘must be resolved body dealing law ” police interrogations.’ LaFave, 5 W. J. Israel & King, N. Criminal (2d 21.2(h), § Procedure at 1999), 106-07 ed. quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. II, Advisory Committee Note.
Where the detectives tell defendant that they cannot make a deal but can relay prosecutor, information to the defendant could not have entertained a expectation reasonable the detectives were authorized plea. to a People Taylor, v. App. 399, 289 Ill. 3d (1997) 400-01, 310, 682 N.E.2d 312 (admitting question defendant’s about what happen would to him if pleaded he “no contest” to the pending complaint); State, 338, McKenna v. 101 344-45, Nev. 705 P.2d (1985). 614, 618-19 Not all statements made in hopes of some conces sion are necessarily plea discussions. People Victory, v. 94 App. Ill. 3d (1981) (after 719, 721, 722, 419 N.E.2d 76 defendant told an of ficer that he would 10 accept years and asked if the State’s Attorney “ would be to willing plea bargain, answered, the officer T don’t know. You have to check ”); with the State’s Attorney’ Sexton, People v. 162 (1987) (defendant Ill. App. 1359, 3d 515 N.E.2d 1364 did not subjective manifest a belief he entering plea was negotiations; rather, he indicated that since he going to be charged, might he as well talk). Where the simply officers tell any cooperation defendant that part reported would be to State’s Attorney’s office for consideration, any resulting statements are plea not related. People v. (1993). Ramirez, 244 App. 1116, Ill. 3d 613 N.E.2d 1123 police officers here wanted to talk to defendant about facts the crime. Defendant wanted to somebody talk to mak- about
507 author had no officers told defendant police deal. The ing a into entered way, parties that out of the ity a deal. With to discuss case, gave and defendant the facts of the regarding and take” “give himself, in re to sometimes attempt in an exonerate information indicating they knew defendant’s police sponse to statements did informa give truthful. Defendant not prior were not plea of a part do so as a he he was to required tion believed because Defendant’s step any plea agreement. agreement preliminary or as a to admission, excluded independent not statements constituted at Friedman, 353, Ill. 2d at 403 N.E.2d 79 Friedman. a deal. very offer to make willing to admit the
Some decisions are Ward, jury if defendant argued to the People prosecutor v. “ let’s offense, ‘hey, he not have said had not committed the would ” 554, 548 Ward, 3d App. v. 192 Ill. People make a deal.’ Connolly, 1124, (1989), follow v. 1120, refusing to N.E.2d 1127 (1989) (defendant’s in 436, 429, 186 3d 542 N.E.2d App. Ill. admissible). County be made in quiry whether deals could Mason plea negotiation determined there no because the defendant Ward offering offering to to others plea, was not enter a incriminate Ward, 546, at at App. unrelated 3d 548 N.E.2d incidents. 894, 1122; People Tennin, 123 see also (negotiation dropping without bond or release Hanks, plea not a charges, negotiation); People (1988) (defendant would admit he started exchange not a appear, negotiation); fire for a notice cf. 350, 352, 403 about (inquiry 79 Ill. 2d at “ convicted, statement, go ‘If I’m I rather making deal ” It be more ac prison,’ plea negotiation). might Federal held to be as an “offer to plead curate to view Ward defendant’s offer (“I incriminate plus.” plead guilty exchange will others in for a sentence.”) attempt reduced It is difficult to understand how an *7 or favorable treatment does not reduced sentence other if are attempt plead guilty. also involve Even those decisions incorrect, however, Although not result the they do affect the here. basis, Jones, told and we on that jury was about the offer reversed Instead, the jury any present the was not told about offer in the case. facts of jury given defendant had revealed about the information July 1994, and Accordingly, 27, the case. the are independent are admissions and not excluded interviews Friedman.
D. Other Issues ineffective argues appellate counsel Jones was 1994, 16, for failing argue July 27, 1994, the and August In light ruling above, were inadmissible. of our regarding those state ments, we need not argues address that issue. Defendant next the trial court in not the instructing jury involuntary erred on manslaugh ter, because there was died evidence decedent after he was inadvertently trial, knocked any down. At denied having knowledge of Dickerman or how died was moved to the St. area Louis stated that Dickerman was alive well when defendant last him. saw The trial court could reasonably have concluded no credible evidence in record supported giving the the of man slaughter argues instruction. Defendant prove State failed to the murder occurred Sangamon County, may but be proved venue Sims, circumstantial evidence (People (1993)), county 612 N.E.2d proper any and venue is (People Glass, where element the offense was committed (1992)). We conclude that sufficiently proved argues venue in this case. Defendant the infor day mation should not have been amended the first trial to al lege the possibility that defendant created a probability “great harm,” bodily agree but we with the State that the amendment cor rected surprised formal defect and defendant or prejudiced. agree also right We that defendant did not have a judge judge presided automatic substitution of from the who at the first trial.
III. CONCLUSION reasons, For foregoing affirm the of the we decision circuit court.
Affirmed.
GASMAN, J., concurs. STEIGMANN, dissenting: JUSTICE I agree everything majority with has stated in its well-reasoned significant opinion exception. exception majority’s with one That analysis Friedman its case and conclusion that we can affirm this supreme defendant’s conviction consistent what the court I compels said Friedman. Because believe Friedman the conclu- sion that defendant’s 27 and statements 402(f), I admitted in of Rule respectfully violation dissent. law, court, in determining par-
Under current Illinois
whether a
related,
following:
ticular statement
must consider
*8
509
a
to
expectation
negotiate
subjective
a
exhibited
the accused
whether
(2)
was reasonable
and,
did,
expectation
if
his
he
whether
plea
351, 403
Friedman,
2d at
79 Ill.
totality of the circumstances.
the
his
testify as to
case,
did not
In this
because defendant
at 235.
N.E.2d
his
surrounding
objective circumstances
the
subjective expectations,
they
plea
whether
evaluating
may be considered
statements
313, citing
at
289
N.E.2d
Taylor,
See
3d at
related.
circumstances
Friedman,
2d at
At the defendant also information about August 16, penalties manslaughter, and on police investigators returned with an statute book contain- Illinois af- ing meeting, day that information. At that which occurred one plea writing assumption ter defendant had his offer to on the reduced Attorney, investiga- it that the detectives would take to the State’s him to tell them what tors told defendant that it would “behoove” degree murder. Defendant if it to less than first happened amounted out He again investigators told the that he wanted to work a deal. statement, his state- a new which differed from earlier provided then ments. 16, 1994, evinced July 27 and
Defendant’s statements involuntary manslaughter in return guilty plea intent enter a to his to willingness plead guilty his for a lesser sentence and demonstrated exchange Sexton, for concessions. See that the N.E.2d at 1364. The also established evidence Attorney’s police office were to be delivered to State’s investigators. merely asking the investigators Attorney whether the plea bargain, State’s would was asking investigators convey specific offer the State’s Attorney, and they him convey informed the information.
Defendant stated interest in negotiating plea early in both interviews, 27 and before he made incriminat- ing early statements. Because defendant’s interview statements *9 contain “the negotiation process,” rudiments of the under current Il- law, linois subsequent statements on those plea- dates constituted related statements and pursuant were therefore inadmissible to Rule 402(f). essentially
Under the law in Illinois the same as 11(e)(6) federal law Rule was Federal of Criminal Procedure (Fed. 11(e)(6)) R. P. present, Crim. before it was amended to its much limited, more form. Professor explains LaFave’s treatise that Federal 11(e)(6) (Fed. 11(e)(6)) of Rule Criminal Procedure R. Crim. P. was “changed so as to cover made by [a] in guilty plea during court when a tendered or discussions with added.) prosecutor.” LaFave, (Emphasis King, [a] & W. J. Israel N. (2d 1999). 21.2(h), § Criminal Procedure at 106 ed. prior Under the rule, custody version defendant’s statement made in the postal inspectors robbery two that said he would armed plead guilty to him charge against dropped if murder was inadmissible. United (5th 1977). Herman, though States F.2d Cir. Even one inspector responded any position make regard, deals the Herman court held that because made the statements the course during conversation which he sought government concessions from the return plea, for the statements were inadmissible under the then-version of Federal 11(e)(6). time, Herman, Rule F.2d at At Federal Rule “ 11(e)(6) with, made inadmissible ‘statements made connection to, any’ LaFave, plead guilty.” and relevant offer to W. J. Israel & N. (2d King, 21.2(h), 1999), § quot Criminal Procedure at 106 n.325 ed. 11(e)(6). ing Fed. R. P. Crim. law, changing
Just vehicle perhaps as Herman federal Supreme cause might this case Court Illinois reconsider 402(f) or change Supreme Friedman and either Court Rule that court’s 11(e)(6), interpretation of the rule to be more in line with Federal Rule may regarded legitimate protections be as all the providing which suspect which entitled.